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Islamist Radicalisation in Italy: Myth or Nightmare?
An empirical analysis of the Italian case study

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ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN ITALY: MYTH OR NIGHTMARE?

An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Case
Study

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ABSTRACT

This doctoral dissertation weighs in on Olivier Roy's and Stuart Croft's diverging positions on Islamist radicalisation. To Roy and those aligned with his arguments, the phenomenon in question is a worrisome matter and should be treated accordingly. Conversely, as per Stuart Croft and those in line with his theories, fear over Islamist radicalisation is socially and culturally constructed to securitise Muslims and advance specific agendas. Applied to the Italian scenario, which position is ultimately right? Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy a myth, or is it Rome's worst nightmare? In a keen effort to contribute to the existing discussion, we completed one of the largest quantitative and qualitative analyses in the field exploring Italian Muslims' views on religiously framed violence. Providing our definition of "Islamist radicalisation", we determined the presence of an "Islamist outlook" through data from hundreds of questionnaires and interviews/focus groups. Though it is no nightmare, our findings show Italy cannot deem itself immune to prospects of Islamist radicalisation either, for Roy's argument fits the Italian scenario best. As such, we tested a large number of models linking support for violence with various predictor parameters stemming from the most accredited theories on the drivers of radicalisation. No statistically significant support was found for theories proposing discrimination, economic disparity, outrage at Western foreign policy, oppression of Muslim, or any standard sociological variable, including gender and being a convert to Islam, as predictors. Similarly, neither "traumatic experiences" nor rational choice theory was supported by the data. By contrast, the most significant predictor variables relating to support for violence were taking offense against offenders of Islam and the endorsement of an Islamic, theocratic form of government (ideology). Social difficulties were fairly significant. Geography, "networks", frustration, and uncertainty as for the wish to belong to Italian culture (identity crisis) were marginally significant.

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Then, it took me months to conduct extensive field research as I travelled from the north to the south of Italy due to the respondents' initial reluctance to voice their thoughts online. So, I went to 15 cities, visiting mosques, Islamic centres, train stations, public parks, Kebab shops, and other businesses. Most of the times, I was well received. In other instances, I have been thrown out of the place, insulted, and, twice, almost physically assaulted. Then, once the evidence had been gathered, it took me months to manually transfer the data online and create a database from which I could start the long and complex statistical analysis. All in all, my supervisor and I started envisioning this research while chatting at Paddington Station in London in October 2013. It took us almost four years to finalise it.

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INTRODUCTION

A Machiavellian combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare, propaganda via the Internet and social media, and terrorism,¹ the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) still incarnates a major threat to international security. In spite of increased Western military action in the region spearheaded by U.S. President Donald Trump, the Caliphate still occupies portions of Syria and Iraq. Despite the fall of Mosul and the subsequent contraction of its area of control, ISIS has carried out or has claimed responsibility for attacks in major European cities such as Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, Berlin, London, and Barcelona. Yet, what perhaps astonishes most Western audiences and governments is the fact that Muslim citizens residing in Europe have executed every single ISIS-related attack on European soil since 2015.² And if the Caliphate succeeded in galvanising and mobilising European Jihadist terrorists, the group was arguably even more successful in luring Western Muslims to the Middle East. Estimations from various agencies refer to more than 7,700 Western foreign fighters responding to ISIS's call to arms,³ 4,000 of them from Europe,⁴ with France, Germany, the UK, and Belgium leading the chart. Around 1,200 combatants have departed from France, over 900 from Germany⁵, 850 from the U.K.,⁶ and 450 from Belgium.⁷

Home of the multiculturalist approach par excellence, Britain has not been spared from ISIS's European terror-spree. Since March 2017, Britain has suffered 5 attacks allegedly linked to the Islamic State. More than that, fellow British Muslims or individuals living in the UK have been responsible for these attacks. Khalid Masood, a Muslim convert born in Kent, drove a car into pedestrians and then fatally stabbed an unarmed police officer in the vicinity of the Palace of Westminster on March 22nd 2017.⁸ Exactly two months later, 22 year-old British Muslim Salman Ramadan Abedi from Manchester

¹ Cronin, Audrey. (2015). "Isis Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat". *Foreign Affairs*. Vo. 94, no. 2. (March/April Issue), pp. 97-98.

² Please see Table 1 on page 48.

³ Ranstorp, Magnus. (2017). In Vidino, Lorenzo et al. (2017). *Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West*. ISPI, Milan; ICCT, The Hague; The George Washington University Program on Extremism, Washington. Forward.

⁴ Neumann, Peter. (2015). *Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000*. ICSR, Department of War Studies. King's College London.

⁵ Heinke, Daniel. (2017). "German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq; The Updated Data and Its Implications". CTC Sentinel 10: 3.

⁶ (2017). "Who are Britain's Jihadists?" BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985> accessed on 25 April 2017.

⁷ Van Ostayen, Pieter. (2016). "Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks". CTC Sentinel 9:6.

⁸ Dodd, Vikram et al. (2017). "Police unravel multiple aliases of Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood". *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/23/westminster-attack-police-arrest-seven-people-in-raids-at-six-addresses> accessed on 29 August 2017.

detonated a homemade bomb at the Manchester Arena during a music concert.⁹ Likewise, besides a British citizen named Khuram Shazad Butt, authorities confirmed that the other two perpetrators of the London Bridge attacks had been living in the UK right until the date of the attack on June 3rd.¹⁰ Lastly, as already mentioned, Britain has been a steady reservoir of Jihadist foreign fighters. As a matter of fact, Britain counts more British Muslims fighting for ISIS than for the UK Army reserve.¹¹ Among these 850 individuals was the group's notorious executioner Mohammed Emwazi, a.k.a. "Jihadi John", the then 28 year-old Westminster University graduate from West London.¹²

But could the emblematic image of the British graduate dressed in black clenching a knife be just the tip of the iceberg of a much deeper issue concerning Islamist radicalisation in Europe? After all, calls for Sharia-patrolled areas in Germany,¹³ the refusal by a number of French Muslims to observe a minute of silence in honour of Charlie Hebdo's victims,¹⁴ and more than 30 ISIS-related attacks in the Old Continent since 2015¹⁵ do seem to pose a question of Islamist radicalisation. In other words, are Europe's Muslim citizens undergoing a process of radicalisation? And if so, is Islamist radicalisation to be deemed a serious threat to European security, especially when potentially linked to Jihadist terrorism?

Unsurprisingly, such topics are the fulcrum of two diverging academic positions. The first one contends Islamist radicalisation is a major issue, as it sees its potential connection to acts of political violence and terrorism. Following the 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London Jihadist attacks, Lorenzo Vidino claimed Europe clearly had a problem with radicalisation.¹⁶ More than a decade later, most of mainstream European academic experts still "think [Islamist radicalisation] is an urgent problem",

⁹ Evans, Martin et al. (2017). "Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicide-bomber-salman-abedi/> accessed on 29 August 2017.

¹⁰ Knapton, Sarah et al. (2017). "Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba named: Everything we know about the London Bridge terrorists". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/05/ringleader-london-bridge-terror-attack-named-khuram-butt/> accessed on 29 August 2017.

¹¹ McTague, Tom. (2014). "More Brits signing up to fight with Jihadist militants in Iraq and Syria than for the UK Army Reserve". *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2659237/More-Brits-signing-fight-jihadist-militants-Iraq-Syria-UK-Army-Reserve.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹² Freeman, Colin. (2015). "Ladbroke Grove connection- the wealthy West London district that bred Jihadi John". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11438534/Ladbroke-Grove-connection-the-wealthy-west-London-district-that-bred-Jihadi-John.html> accessed on 29 August 2017.

¹³ (2014). "Locals concerned as 'Sharia police' patrol streets of German city". *Deutsche Welle*. <http://www.dw.com/en/locals-concerned-as-sharia-police-patrol-streets-of-german-city/a-17904887> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹⁴ Sengupta, Kim. (2015). "Charlie Hebdo cover: We are not Charlie". *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-cover-we-are-not-charlie-say-the-dissenting-voices-angered-further-by-french-solidarity-9976166.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹⁵ Please see Table 1 on page 48.

¹⁶ Vidino, Lorenzo (2009). "Europe's New Security Dilemma." *The Washington Quarterly*. 32: pp. 61–75.

contends Alex Schmid.¹⁷ Even Olivier Roy, one of the most accredited voices in question, acknowledges that “Islamist radicalisation definitely exists and, without being alarmist, we have to admit it’s a serious matter”¹⁸ (Appendix 1).

Others pundits beg to differ from such assumptions and debunk the supposed correlation between radicalisation and terrorism. According to Stuart Croft from Warwick University, not only is fear of Islamist radicalisation exaggerated, but is also socially constructed to securitise Islam and reaffirm British cultural superiority.¹⁹ By doing so, holds British scholar Tahir Abbas, mainstream society has been able to refrain from dealing with those controversial issues entangled in the tortuous relation between Europe and its Muslim citizens, namely denied rights and inequality for Muslims.²⁰

Ergo, in light of such a debate, the question that comes to mind is quite natural: who is right? Is Islamist radicalisation a perturbing, pressing matter in today’s Europe, as Roy says? Or is the very concept of radicalisation inflated and even constructed to securitise an entire group of people and not having to come to terms with the inability to provide equality for all, as Croft argues?

While the whole study is committed to such inquiries, the latter does not actually feature a comparative analysis of multiple European countries. This is because Europe is not a monolithic entity and, although shared commonalities surely exist, European countries all differ from one another. As such, we believe that a forensic discussion that goes beyond the level of Europe and focuses on the nation states is a crucial starting point. And within the European context, we believe Italy provides an interesting case study in which to replay the discussion stemming from Roy’s and Croft’s observations.

The Choice of Roy and Croft

As we will discuss in the next chapters, the very notion of radicalisation is source of considerable confusion. In reality, “Radicalisation” is a relative and debated concept, which is often politicised and poorly understood. Aware of this, we deem Roy and Croft to be among the best experts our study can use to recreate the kind of fair, academic discussion we aspire to. Arguably the most renowned European pundit on political Islam, we chose Roy because he inserts religious fundamentalism within the European context –which is the milieu where this research operates. Pioneering works such as *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* featured in Chapter II

¹⁷ Schmid, Alex. (2015). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 3 June.

¹⁸ Roy, Olivier. (2015). Interviewed by Michele Groppi, 18 June. Appendix 1.

¹⁹ Croft, Stuart. (2012). *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁰ Abbas, Tahir. (2011). *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience*. London: Routledge.

enable us to contemplate the journey and trajectory of political Islam within our societies.²¹ They make us ponder over the mechanisms and the sociological factors that cause malaise among many European Muslims, ranging from personal grievances to the interplay between globalisation, traditional culture, and identity crisis. As such, Roy allows us to reflect upon those dynamics and vulnerabilities that could be exacerbated and exploited by fundamentalist narratives. And as societies attempt to balance and internalise new facets of multiculturalism, Roy's works let us appreciate the potential risks for Europe should the latter fail to cope with Islamist radicalisation.

Yet, we also elected Roy because he is not alarmist or hostile to Muslims. While he acknowledges the seriousness of the matter, Roy entices no social divisiveness or securitisation of Muslim citizens. During an interview with the author, the French sociologist clearly stated that, "we don't have to be alarmist. Yes, there is an issue with radicalisation, but there is no need for panic. If we do, then we do what the terrorists want" (Appendix 1). More than that, Roy is even critical of policies and behaviours that highlight individual differences within society. Rather, he believes Europe should tackle radicalisation by stressing nationality over religion and by creating communal feelings of belonging.²² Considering the type of controversy surrounding the notion of radicalisation, Roy's attitude is vital for our approach to the study of Islamist radicalisation -for it reinforces our attempt to address such a sensitive subject through rational, constructive terms devoid of any alarmism or prejudice against Islam or Muslims.

On the other end, we opted for Croft for two reasons. To begin with, not only does he question the relationship between Islam and radicalisation and Islam and terrorism; he goes even further by challenging the very established concept of security. As illustrated in Chapter II, Croft introduces us to ontological concepts of "Self" and "Other" that are socially, culturally, and politically constructed and accepted by mainstream society. Remarkable works such as *Securitizing Islam* allow us to ponder over the mechanisms through which British (and European) Muslims have become securitised within a constructed "Self" vs. "Other" dichotomy. To Croft, the whole matter is not about radicalisation and terrorism. Rather, it is about defending British (and Western) culture, which feels threatened and defines itself in juxtaposition to a Muslim "Radical Other."²³ As a result, not only do Croft's works show that fear of radicalisation could be exploited and socially crafted to advance specific agendas;

²¹ Roy, Olivier. (2004). *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press.

²² Roy, Olivier. (2007). "Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe". In Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (eds), *European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. pp. 55-6.

²³ Croft, Stuart. (2012). *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

they also push us, especially those coming from counter-terrorism backgrounds, to critically examine the type of established discourse on radicalisation we have been taught.

Nevertheless, Croft does not deny that there might be an issue with radicalisation and terrorism. On the contrary, he once wrote that none of his analysis “is to deny that there is a ‘real threat’; that there are real people, in real places, planning to kill others, supposedly in the name of Islam. That is not, and cannot be, in dispute.”²⁴ Though critical of the whole narrative on security, Croft does not discredit violence and does not belittle apprehension over it. But he does invite us to carefully examine *how* our societies deal with the phenomenon in question. In doing so, not only does Croft encourage us to live up to the kind of democratic principles we have been preached; he also warns us that the continuing securitisation of European Muslims could backfire and, actually, increase chances of radicalisation.²⁵ In reality, as Roy does in his conclusions, Croft too shows moderation.

And in the end, this type of cogitative moderation is exactly why we think Roy and Croft are a solid duo. While their positions and pieces of evidence are divergent, their final goal is the same: the search for a better society where all citizens feel part of it. Given the degree of animosity surrounding the discourse of radicalisation, by using Roy and Croft can we truly approach and appreciate the complexity of the phenomenon we are trying to explore. We can delve deep into issues of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism without intending any alarmism or securitisation of fellow Muslim citizens. At the same time, we can question and challenge the security discourse we have been taught without minimising the need for security. In other words, thanks to Roy and Croft, we can aim for the construction of a balanced, academic discussion that wishes for a better, more secure, and equal society.

The Choice of Italy: Is the Country an “Exceptional” Case?

Certainly, one could claim that Roy’s and Croft’s observations would better explore cases of nations that really do have serious issues with Jihadist terrorism and radicalisation. Nonetheless, as one might wonder why we did not choose Belgium or France, we think the Italian case study should still be examined for two main reasons. And these both rotate around the idea of Italy’s supposed “exceptionalism” in relation to Islamist radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism. As such, it could be argued that Italy is an exceptional case because, in contrast to Britain, Belgium, France or Germany, the country has so far not been torn by Jihadist attacks. Hence, according to this reasoning, what is

²⁴ Croft, Stuart. (2012). *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*. p. 255.

²⁵ Croft, Stuart. (2012). *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*. p. 256.

different in Italy? Is there is anything special about the Italian scenario that prevents radicalisation and terrorism? What shields Italy?

Naturally, multiple attempts have been made to answer such a riddle. As Vidino reminds, terrorists have used Italy as a logistical platform in the recent past.²⁶ Now, the country is still the main link between Europe and the North African and Balkan Jihadist routes.²⁷ Were Italy to be stricken, terrorist groups would suffer themselves from the loss of an ideal pathway to the gates of continental Europe. To the then Minister of Internal Affairs Angelino Alfano, instead, the reason is to be found in the use of preventive tools such as monitoring and expulsions at the embryonic stages of investigation that allowed authorities to hamper terrorism.²⁸ Journalist Lucia Annunziata has linked Italy's marginal involvement in the anti-ISIS coalition and the lack of Muslim-inhabited ghettos to the absence of terrorism.²⁹ And to Arturo Varvelli from Milanese think tank ISPI, the answer is fairly straightforward: compared to other European realities, Italy counts fewer Muslims and, thus, less violent Islamists.³⁰

By contrast, it could be argued that, although Italy might seem an exceptional case, in reality, it is not. Anis Amri, the Berlin truck driver attacker, radicalised during his transition in Italy and was shot dead by police officers in Milan after fleeing Germany.³¹ Youssef Zaghba, the third perpetrator of the London Bridge attacks, was born and raised in Bologna.³² Coupled with reports of decennial Jihadist activity including thwarted plots, these cases may once again show Italy does not differ considerably from other European nations. Or, if anything, this type of evidence could suggest that the alleged Italian "exceptionalism" is diminishing.³³ Perhaps it is no surprise that the 2016 Secret Services' Report on national security deemed attacks by lone-wolves linked to ISIS considerably likely.³⁴ To

²⁶ Vidino, Lorenzo. (2014). *Home-grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development, and dynamics of radicalization* [Italian]. ISPI, Milan.

²⁷ Vidino, Lorenzo. (2017). In Rosini, Gianni. "Terrorism, Vidino: Italy is not a logistical base: but Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, and Veneto are Jihadist centres". [Italian] *Il Fatto Quotidiano*. <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/06/07/terrorismo-vidino-litalia-non-e-base-logistica-ma-lombardia-emilia-romagna-e-veneto-centri-del-jihadismo/3640721/> accessed on 10 June 2017.

²⁸ Alfano, Angelino. (2016). In Custodero, Alberto. "Alfano: 'Prevention steady, Italy is a safe country'" [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/08/15/news/terrorismo_alfano_prevenzione_ok_paese_sicuro-146021579/ accessed on 10 June 2017.

²⁹ Annunziata, Lucia. (2016). "5 doubts as to why Italy is safe (but maybe not by much)" [Italian]. *Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.it/lucia-annunziata/sicurezza-italia-terrorismo_b_11072118.html accessed on 10 June 2017.

³⁰ Varvelli, Arturo. (2016). In Giudici, Cristina. "Why is Italy still immune to terrorism?" [Italian]. *Il Foglio*. <http://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2016/07/15/news/perche-litalia-e-ancora-immune-dal-terrore-98420/> accessed on 10 June 2017.

³¹ (2016). "Anis Amri killed in Milan" [Italian]. *Il Sole 24 Ore*. <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2016-12-23/spara-ad-agente-milanese-e-grida-allah-akbar-ucciso-polizia-102426.shtml?uud=ADHVIRJC> accessed on 25 April 2017.

³² Tonacci, Fabio. (2017). "London attack, third terrorist identified: Italian-Moroccan Youssef Zaghba" [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/06/06/news/londra_attentato-167383564/ accessed on 10 June 2017.

³³ Groppi, Michele. "The Growing Jihadi Terror Threat to Italy: How Italian Exceptionalism is Rapidly Diminishing".

³⁴ (2017). *Relazione sulla politica dell'informazione della sicurezza*. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica. Rome, Italy.

professor Lombardi, such likelihood would be “only a matter of time,”³⁵ which, according to professor Orsini pondering over ISIS’s loss of ground in the Middle East, could even materialise in 2018.³⁶

Regardless of the correct interpretation of the situation, both approaches necessitate a comprehensive analysis of the Italian Muslim community. If one agrees with the idea of an Italian “exceptionalism”, then exploring the degree by which Islamist views accepting violence are shared by Italian Muslims is warranted. By this logic, would most Italian Muslims reject violence in the name of their religion and, if so, could it be that fear over Islamist radicalisation is truly exaggerated? Instead, if one maintains that Italy is not substantially different from other countries or that its special condition is changing, it is still worth assessing the potential penetration of Islamist ideas within the country’s Muslim community. Accordingly, would Italian Muslims be increasingly accepting violence in the name of their religion and, if so, could this represent a major challenge? All in all, no matter how one looks at the Italian milieu, we believe that Italy should still be a case worth investigating.

The Aim of the Study

Having elucidated the philosophical case for Roy, Croft, and Italy, the exact same question as before comes to be: who is right? Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy a worrisome matter, especially when potentially linked to acts of terrorism, as Roy contends? Or is Islamist radicalisation socially constructed to securitise Islam, permit discrimination, and justify international policies, as Croft believes? Is indeed Islamist radicalisation in Italy a myth, or is it one of the country’s worst nightmares?

As the two positions both feature valid points, our objective is to empirically explore and analyse Italian Muslims’ attitudes on religiously framed violence in order to attest which argument best fits the Italian case study. Given the provided evidence, could it be possible that Islamist radicalisation in Italy is really no pressing issue but “spurs” of radicalisation still emerge? Could we hypothesised that both Roy’s and Croft’s theories are ultimately inaccurate in the sense that one cannot generalise, for each situation obeys to its own dynamics?

³⁵ Lombardi, Marco. (2016). “Why is Italy still immune to terrorism?”

³⁶ For more information, please see professor Orsini’s interview for an Italian political talk show: Orsini, Alessandro (2016). “Orsini: Possible attacks in Italy in 2018” [Italian]. Onmibus, La7 TV, 6 January. <http://www.la7.it/omnibus/video/orsini-possibili-attentati-in-italia-nel-2018-07-01-2016-171296> accessed on 10 June 2017.

Major Clarifications

Before addressing the matter in question, there are several essential clarifications to be made. To start with, we are aware that our approach might have affected the outcome of the study. Since the beginning, we decided to solely focus on people's attitudes and opinions. As such, we recognise that we have failed to appreciate certain categories. As we asked for people's views on violence in the name of Islam, we have taken for granted the concepts of "religion", "being Muslim in Italy", and "violence" –with the latter conceived within the Italian milieu devoid of narratives of "resistance" and "oppression", for instance. Further, we know that there are major schools of Islamic jurisprudence that differ from one another. We realise that individuals internalise religion and sacred tenets differently. And we agree with Frédéric Volpi's claims that Western academia has generally scrutinised "Islamism" through Western lenses that depended on the various disciplines pundits pertained to;³⁷ ergo, we recognise that our approach and conceptualisation of "Islamism" might have been shaped by the discipline we come from, that is, security studies. Aware of such shortcomings, we still decided to choose Italy, contextualise and define the term "Islamist" to fit our analysis, and solely focus on Italian Muslims' opinions. Cognizant of biases and limitations, we just wanted to see if participants living in Italy would eventually support violence in the name of God and, if that were the case, which drivers were significant for their decisions.

In doing so, we acknowledge that the controversial nature of the subject and our academic background might have also impacted the investigation. As we entered the Italian Muslim community, we must admit that most individuals who were asked to participate in the study eventually did not. There were several reasons for this. They were afraid to voice their opinions on such heated topics. They did not trust a non-Muslim researcher who came from a counter-terrorism background. And they preferred talking about racism, Islamophobia, and discrimination rather than Islamist radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism. Although we introduced ourselves with the sincere intention to grant Italian Muslims a voice, touching upon every aspect of their experience in Italy, most potential participants still refrained from taking part to the project. And those who did participate, self-selected themselves; this might have impacted results too, as the opinions we have scrutinised came from a small percentage of those who accepted the premise of the study and might not reflect what most Italian Muslims really think –though we firmly state that the study's sample is nonetheless fairly representative of the overall Islamic community.

³⁷ Volpi, Frédéric. (2010). *Political Islam Observed*. London: Hurst & Co. (Publishers). Introduction.

In light of this, while numbers are our study's main contribution, we are not absolutist in relation to our empirical findings. Although we take pride in the kind of objective, scientific analysis our research is based upon, we are fully aware of the many challenges, limitations, and choices that might have affected the results. Being the best we could do given our resources and capabilities, we definitely deem our numbers true, but only within the contours of the study, its sample, its methodology, and its restrictions. As scientific as they are, numbers should not be approached in dogmatic terms; rather, we feel they allow us to “scratch the surface” of what we are trying to explore. In simpler terms, numbers make our project not the final destination but the starting point towards more solid and objective investigations on radicalisation.

That clarified, although the study touches upon notions of Islamist radicalisation, this is no witch-hunt. In line with the rationale behind our choice of Roy and Croft, not only does this research refrain from assuming or fostering negative generalisations about Islam, Muslims, and Muslims in Europe; it also rests on the premise that holding “radical” views is not an issue per se, for the latter are not automatic precursors of violence. In truth, radicalisation and terrorism, for the most part, have nothing to do with each other. As Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko explain, not every terrorist is a radical and, more importantly, most radicals never become terrorists.³⁸ As renowned expert Brian Jenkins has asserted during a correspondence with the author:

Radical populations may be large. Terrorist numbers are tiny...In most western societies, radical views are themselves not illegal. It is only when a person plots or engages in violence or provides material support (the operative word here is “material”) to violent groups that it becomes a legitimate concern of law enforcement.³⁹

Along the same lines, the framing of the very idea of “Islamist radicalisation” is crafted to avoid or limit any prejudice or bias. Equally to our choice of Roy and Croft, we opted for Robert Satloff's and Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen's definitions because they come, respectively, from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the CISAC Centre at Stanford University – two institutions that have often approached issues of radicalisation and terrorism in critical and moderate terms. Hence, as illustrated in Chapter III, we used Robert Satloff's definition of “radical Islamist” to clarify what constitutes radical Islamist views and how they may be related to violence.⁴⁰ Likewise, we

³⁸ McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. (2011). *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford: University Press, p.5.

³⁹ Jenkins, Brian. (2017). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 8 March.

⁴⁰ Robert Satloff is the Executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For more information about his take on theoretical frameworks regarding Islamism, please see Satloff, Robert. (2016). “Words Matter in the Fight Against Islamism”. *The American Interest*. <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/01/words-matter-in-the-fight-against-islamism/> accessed on 25 April 2017.

utilised Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen's definition of "radicalisation" to ascertain its manifestation.⁴¹ This is particularly significant because it allows us to place Islamist views within "radical" contours that, though they may or may not justify violence, are not naturally linked to actual acts of violence. Simply put, Dalgaard-Nielsen's definition enables the study to search for Islamist views justifying violence in the name of Islam without directly associating them to terrorism.

Lastly, in order to identify signs or manifestations of Islamist radicalisation, we sought the assistance of the three most prominent leaders of the Italian Muslim community. Again, we are aware that this choice might have affected the whole take on the study too. As the Islamic community struggles at finding an entente with the Italian State -which would grant Islam in Italy official recognition and benefits- Imams might already have preconceived, established agendas. That is, in an effort to normalise and engage with authorities, Imams might already conceptualise and reject violence for the sake of being accepted. Aware of this, we still sought and obtained help from the head of the Union of the Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII) Imam Ezzedin Elzir,⁴² COREIS's vice president Imam Yaha Pallavicini,⁴³ and secretary of the Italian Islamic Confederation (CII) Massimo Cozzolino.⁴⁴ Having assessed their potential preconceived take on violence, the established discourse on radicalisation, and Islam's status in Italy, we agreed with the three leaders that the best way to analyse potential instances of radicalisation was to scrutinise respondents' opinions about the following topics: justification of violence in defence of Islam, duty to punish offenders of the Islamic faith, and support for Al Qaeda and ISIS.

A Brief Note on Methodology

Bearing such clarifications and suggestions in mind, we explored Italian Muslims' views on the above-mentioned matters to examine the Roy vs. Croft discussion. Although we will explain every aspect of our methodology in Chapter V, the analysis featured 440 questionnaires and data from 200 subjects participating in interviews and focus groups executed in 15 Italian cities including Milan, Rome, Turin, Naples, and Florence. In order to compare results with mainstream society, 440 Italian non-Muslims were also surveyed. In spite of several methodological considerations and restrictions

⁴¹ Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja is the Director of the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence Academy and associate professor at the Department of Political Science at Stanford University; Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. (2010). "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33: pp. 797–814.

⁴² Union of the Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII). 105, Via Masaccio, 50132, Florence & 17, Via Tor de' Schiavi, 00172, Rome.

⁴³ Islamic Religious Community (COREIS). 9, Via Meda, 20136, Milan.

⁴⁴ Italian Islamic Confederation (CII). 156, Via Ferrarese, 40128, Bologna.

encountered throughout the process –which will be addressed in the methodology section-, such empirical data allowed us to assess the presence of what we labelled a potential “Islamist outlook”.

This was composed of those attitudes justifying violence framed in Islamist terms. That is, we included the answers in the questionnaires and interviews/focus groups that agreed with the right to use violence in defence of Islam, the duty to punish its offenders, and the support for Al Qaeda and ISIS. Our objective has in fact been to search, quantify, and study these answers indicative of a potential “Islamist outlook” with the intent to test our hypothesis –about “spurs” of radicalisation- and contribute to the overall discussion on radicalisation.

The Contribution of the Study

We think that this study constitutes an important contribution to our understanding of radicalisation for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the investigation features one of the largest quantitative analyses about theories of Islamist radicalisation at macro level. In truth, Rachel Gillum and Ruud Koopmans have investigated religious fundamentalist views by both Muslims and Christians in the U.S. and the Old Continent.⁴⁵ The Pew Center has explored Muslims’ views about terrorism and mutual perception between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe.⁴⁶ A number of polls conducted in the UK, France, and Germany have surveyed local Muslims’ views regarding ISIS or Jihadist terrorism.⁴⁷ And a study by three conjoint institutions, ISPI, ICCT, and George Washington University, has offered a greatly valuable assessment of Islamist radicalisation through the study of Jihadist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2017.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, no study so far has been assembled to statistically test assumed casual models of Islamist radicalisation at the macro level. Hence, not only does the project in question address the Roy vs. Croft discussion, but it also replicates it in a new case study –namely Italy. Being one the first ones of its kind, the study also sheds light upon the academic debate on theories of radicalisation, verifying, if radicalisation is indeed occurring, which drivers from the abundant literature review can be best associated to support for violence justified in Islamist terms.

⁴⁵ Gillum, Rachel. (2013). “There is no difference in religious fundamentalism between American Muslims and Christians”. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/16/no-difference-in-religious-fundamentalism-between-american-muslims-and-christians/> accessed on 27 June 2017; Koopmans, Ruud (2015). “Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups”. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 41, No. 1. pp. 33-57.

⁴⁶ Lipka, Michael (2017). *Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world*. Pew Research Center, Washington DC.

⁴⁷ These are all featured in both Charter I and II.

⁴⁸ Vidino, Lorenzo et al. *Fear Thy Neighbor*.

More generally, this investigation could also contribute to the very own discipline of radicalisation studies. According to professor Alex Schmid, this field of research is in desperate need of a reconceptualization of the very concept of “studying radicalisation”, which has often been inconclusive and risks evanescent. To the Dutch expert, the notion of “Radicalisation” remains useful in explaining the potential transition to terrorism, as long as it is detached from violence, is applied to larger groups of individuals, and is studied at the macro level.⁴⁹ Hence, the study in question follows professor Schmid’s directions, for it clearly separates “Radicalisation” and violence and conducts quantitative analyses at macro level.

Further, the project’s findings could also be valuable to Italian policymakers and institutions. The study could indeed enhance the debate on Islamist radicalisation, especially given the lack of substantial academic pieces on the matter in question. Surely, there have been copious amounts of journalistic articles about Jihadist-related activity in Italy,⁵⁰ as well as few but interesting studies elucidating the Jihadist-inspired threats and certain prospects of radicalisation and home-grown terrorism in the country.⁵¹ Indubitably the most distinguished Italian expert in this field, Lorenzo Vidino has provided, in fact, an essential, brilliant picture of the whole Jihadist movement in Italy, focusing on its history, mechanisms, germinal case-studies of home-grown terrorists, and future implications tackling home-grown terrorism.⁵²

Likewise, an EU report has explored European (and hence Italian) security perceptions,⁵³ briefly touching upon the general issue of terrorism, while a few Italian investigations surveyed Italian Muslims’ perspectives on integration and social status in the country.⁵⁴ Similarly, the Leone Moressa survey from July 2015 has provided remarkable insights as to how Italian Muslims feel about ISIS and matters of Islamist terrorism. Still, no study up-to-date in Italy has solely attempted to explore Italian Muslims’ views accepting violence, test casual models of Islamist radicalisation, and then compare results to the ones obtained by Italian non-Muslims.

This research could also further the discussion on issues of integration and coexistence. Although Muslim presence in Italy is significantly inferior when compared to other European countries

⁴⁹ Schmid, Alex. (2013). “The End of Radicalisation?”. ICCT, The Hague. Schmid’s argument about the reconceptualization of the very concept of “Radicalisation” is fully elucidated in Chapter II.

⁵⁰ Dozens of them are the bulk of the evidence of Michele Groppi’s report on Jihadist-related activity in Italy since 2001.

⁵¹ Bjorkman, Carl. (2011). “Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism in Italy”. In Magnus Ranstorp, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation. Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. London: Routledge; Vidino, Lorenzo. (2013). “The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy: Rise and Homegrown Radicals”. CTC Sentinel, 6:11.

⁵² Vidino, Lorenzo. *Home-grown Jihadism in Italy*; Italian Ministry of Justice. (2012). *The radicalization of Islamic Terrorism. Elements for a study of the proselytism phenomenon in jail*. [Italian]. Quaderni ISSP. Number 9.

⁵³ European Commission. (2011). *Special Eurobarometer 371. Internal Security*.

⁵⁴ (2011). “G2: A Proud Generation”. [Italian]. Genemaghrebina Association.

-as most Muslims are first-generation immigrants mainly from North Africa- the country is estimated to experience the fourth largest increase in its Muslim population in Europe. Only behind their counterparts in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, Italian Muslims will grow by 102% in the next 20 years.⁵⁵ Besides, only in 2016, 171,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy from Libya⁵⁶ and more than 250,000 more are expected to arrive in 2017.⁵⁷ Such prospects, though, inevitably pose questions of security, integration, and social cohesion. Undermined by fear over increased Jihadist-related activities and ISIS' credible threats to Italy, potential failed processes of integration, accommodation, and acceptance of new multitudes of Muslim citizens could destabilise both Italy and the very European Union. Thus, given Italy is destined to host increasing amounts of Muslims in the near future, understanding the potential dynamics of radicalisation affecting one of the prime gates to Europe becomes worthwhile.

In this process, our project could be used as a starting point to create bridges between Italy and its Muslim citizens. The similar surveys aimed at both Italian Muslims and non-Muslims highlight commonalities and divergences between the two groups. Interested in its implications, the study has drawn the attention of three Italian Ministries, Muslim and non-Muslim organisations, and a number of politicians, ambassadors, and public figures. Hopefully, its findings will allow these policy makers to increase chances for understanding and dialogue –especially considering the already much politicised debate on radicalisation, terrorism, and integration of Muslims and Islam in Italian society.

The Structure of the Study

In a keen attempt to contribute to the existing field of knowledge, we have opted for an unorthodox structure, which features the literature survey and the methodology section in different chapters, instead of subsuming them in the introduction. This unconventional scheme is mainly due to our desire to present a considerably complex debate on radicalisation in the most possible balanced, coherent, and exhaustive manner. As it will be largely explicated, radicalisation is, in Marc Sedgwick's terms, a considerable source of confusion, for its understanding is subjective, relative, and shaped by

⁵⁵ (2011). *The Future of the Global Muslim Population*. Pew Research Center. Washington DC.

⁵⁶ Kingsley, Patrick. (2016). "2016 Sets New Record For Asylum Seeker Reaching Italy By Boat," *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/2016-sets-new-record-for-asylum-seekers-reaching-italy-by-boat> accessed on 25 April 2017.

⁵⁷ Cartaldo, Claudio. (2017). "Dossier on arrivals by boat: in 2017 more than 250 thousand migrants". [Italian] *Il Giornale*. <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/dossier-riservato-sugli-sbarchi-nel-2017-oltre-250mila-1375348.html> accessed on 25 April 2017.

political agendas and zeitgeists.⁵⁸ And this sort of confusion inevitably characterises the three convoluted, consequential debates around which the study gravitates: the Italian debate on radicalisation, the international academic debate on radicalisation and its discussed relation to terrorism, and the debate on causes of radicalisation.

But as we illustrate these three academic discussions, our aim is not to champion one theory over the other. Our intention is not to pick sides. On the contrary, as we present evidence that corroborates certain theories, we eventually introduce other facts that challenge the very same beliefs. Although this might seem curious, this is our voice when dealing with radicalisation. And it goes hand in hand with our choice of Roy and Croft: radicalisation is complex and, before tackling the potential issues of Islamist radicalisation in Italy, we want to consider and reflect upon every possible argument and counter-argument that could help us construct our statistical analysis and make sense of our numbers.

This is the reason why we take on three convoluted discussions in a row. In order to appreciate the complexity of the Italian debate, one needs to ponder over Roy's and Croft's juxtaposing positions. And in order to appreciate the two pundits' thoughts, one needs to reflect upon the uncertainty surrounding radicalisation's meaning and causes. Though particularly extended, intricate, and filled with apparent contradictions, this last discussion on causes and theories of radicalisation is essential to understand the selection of those predictive, independent variables that are directly extrapolated from the literature survey and inserted into the quantitative analysis. As explained in the methodology, such variables are the tools that will allow us to determine which drivers of radicalisation could best fit the Italian case, if that is the case.

That asserted, Chapter I delves into the Italian debate on Islamist radicalisation. Chapter II juxtaposes the diverging positions held by Roy and Croft on Islamist radicalisation and its discussed relation to terrorism. Chapter III is dedicated to the study's conceptual frameworks and definitions, including its accepted meaning of "Islamist Radicalisation". Chapter IV features the literature review about radicalisation, discussing its theories in depth. Chapter V presents the study's methodology, displaying restrictions and challenges, the sample's composition, its variables, and statistical methods. In a keen attempt to assess which position (Roy's or Croft's) better fits the Italian case study, Chapter VI illustrates empirical quantitative and qualitative findings from Muslim respondents –which are also compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. Based on the gathered evidence, Chapter VII delves into

⁵⁸ Sedgwick, Marc. (2010). "The Concept of Radicalisation as a Source of Confusion". *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vol. 22, Issue 4. pp. 479-494.

the statistical analysis testing causal models of Islamist radicalisation. Drawing on results from such tests, Chapter VIII features the study's discussion, while chapter IX presents the investigation's concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER I: THE DEBATE ON ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN ITALY

Islamist Radicalisation in Italy: Exaggerating an Alleged Threat

Historically relatively immune to Jihadist terrorism, Italy has begun to grow worried over the prospects Jihadist terrorist attacks on its soil. Whilst Islamist radicalisation has only recently turned into a matter of public interest, those aligned with Croft's positions agree with the theory that fear of radicalisation is exaggerated. Their logic is mostly constructed on the questionable amount of empirical evidence that links Italy to Islamist radicalisation and the unlikelihood of acts of Jihadist terrorism.

To begin with, radical visions of Islam seem to gain little traction in Italy. As opposed to other European countries, Italy has never seen hordes of Muslim citizens holding signs advocating for the establishment of Sharia law or stating, "behead those who insult Islam."⁵⁹ Certainly, many have taken part to public demonstrations, but nothing comparable to something as debatable as "al-Quds Day" in London and other cities.⁶⁰ Italian Muslims have never formed unofficial patrol units to impose Sharia law inside their communities like their counterparts did in Germany.⁶¹ Aside from one isolated case,⁶² Jihad has never been glorified in rap songs, unlike in France.⁶³ Even as for more cultural-related issues not linked to radicalisation or violence, the questions of the headscarf or the selling of prohibited goods such as pork and alcohol have not commonly been source of controversy.⁶⁴

Bust most importantly, many Muslims residing in Italy have firmly condemned violence in the name of Allah in multiple occasions. Vice president of the Islamic Religious Community (COREIS),⁶⁵ Imam Sergio Yaha Pallavicini, has once asserted that:

Just like Mafiosi are criminals, so are these self-defined Muslim [terrorists], even if they say they are acting in the name of the Prophet... Hamas, for example, is not Islam, but a movement

⁵⁹ Bowcott, Owen. (2006). "Arrest extremist marchers, police told". *The Guardian*.

<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/feb/06/raceandreligion.muhammadcartoons> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶⁰ Pfeffer, Anshel. (2012). "Iran's specter looms large over London's annual 'Quds Day' march". *Haaretz*.

<http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/2.431/iran-s-specter-looms-large-over-london-s-annual-quds-day-march-1.459264> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶¹ "Locals concerned as 'Sharia police' patrol streets of German city". *Deutsche Welle*.

⁶² The reference is to Anas el Abboubi, a Moroccan citizen who grew up near Brescia whose dream was to become a famous rapper. Initially, Anas's music reflected his desire to combine his Italian and Muslim identities, but he then switched to more violent tunes inciting to Jihad as he was undergoing a radicalisation process. He eventually left for Syria to join ISIS, where he still believed to be. Groppi, Michele. (2015). "Portrait of the Lombard Jihadist". [Italian]. In "Who Fears the Caliph?". *Limes, Italian Magazine of Geopolitics*. No. 3 (March issue). pp. 191-200.

⁶³ Payne, Ed. Carroll, Jason. (2015). "The terrorist recruiting crossroads: Where Jihad meets rap". CNN.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/13/us/jihadi-rap/> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶⁴ Carter, Claire. (2013). "M&S apology over Muslim staff policy". *The Telegraph*.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/10534294/MandS-apology-over-Muslim-staff-policy.html> accessed on 25 April 2017.

⁶⁵ The Islamic Religious Community (COREIS).

that legitimises the use of violence to redeem a territory. Confusing these movements with Islam is like confusing Mafia with Italians.⁶⁶

Following grave incidents of Jihadist terrorism, numerous Muslim leaders have utterly chastised the perpetrators of those massacres, labelling them betrayers of Islam. For example, in the days after the tragic Charlie Hebdo events in Paris, Asfa Mahmoud, the head of Milan's House of Muslim Culture, unambiguously specified that, "violence is against the message of the Prophet."⁶⁷ Reinforcing his point, Mohamed Ben Mohamed from Rome's Centocelle Mosque categorically condemned the terrorists, for "those have nothing to do with Islam. Even if our community has been offended, the answer cannot be violence."⁶⁸ Actually, "violence can never be justified", Segrate's Imam Ali Abu Shwaima's once made crystal clear.⁶⁹ Bearing this in mind, Davide Piccardo has sturdily proclaimed that, "whoever does something like this [killing of the French journalists] is not a Muslim."⁷⁰

Embracing Piccardo's point, groups of outraged Italian Muslim citizens have filled the streets to express their rejection of terrorism in the name of Islam.⁷¹ Such spirals of condemnation were reflected in the July 2015 Leone Moressa Foundation's survey, when 9 out of 10 Muslim interviewees expressed their rejection of ISIS.⁷² Hence, not only was religious violence deemed despicable, but was also perceived as detrimental to the very Muslim community, for "we are the first victims of ISIS and Al-Qaeda", maintained Benaissa Bounegab from Milan's House of Muslim Culture.⁷³ This is because, to many Muslims, radical visions of Islam can never truthfully incarnate their faith, as, according to Hazma Roberto Piccardo, "There is only a moderate Islam."⁷⁴ For that reason, in the words of Egyptian Imam Hazzan Zeinah from Rome's Great Mosque, the type of Islam preached in Italian mosques naturally urges believers to, "follow these noble teachings in our daily lives, where each act of violence

⁶⁶ Yaha Pallavicini, Sergio. (2015). In Pelliccetti, Riccardo. "Here's what is preached at the mosque: 'Allah, count them and exterminate them all'". [Italian]. *Il Giornale*. <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/i-leader-dialoganti-condannano-terrorismo-nei-luoghi-culto-1082268.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶⁷ Mahmoud, Asfa. (2015) In Bonessa, Michelangelo. "Those Italian Muslims between cheering and ambiguity". [Italian] *Il Giornale*. <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/quei-musulmani-italiani-esultanza-e-ambiguit-1081156.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶⁸ Ben Mohammed, Mohammed. (2015). In Castellani, Daniele et al. "At the mosque people don't cry for Charlie Hebdo". [Italian]. *L'Espresso*. <http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2015/01/15/news/in-moschea-non-si-piange-per-charlie-hebdo-1.195285> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶⁹ Shwaima, Ali Abu. (2015). In "At the mosque people don't cry".

⁷⁰ Piccardo, Davide. (2015). In "Those Italian Muslims".

⁷¹ (2015). "The Islamic communities: 'We demonstrate for peace'". [Italian] *La Stampa*. <http://www.lastampa.it/2015/01/09/edizioni/vercelli/le-comunit-islamiche-manifestiamo-per-la-pace-f4QLGHB6kFNuy1ar3xXSN/pagina.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁷² In Polchi, Vladimiro. (2015). "The Caliphate and jihadists are just terrorism". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. 29 June, p. 14.

⁷³ Bounegab, Benaissa. (2015). In "At the mosque people don't cry".

⁷⁴ Piccardo, Hazma Roberto. (2008) In Lorenzetto, Stefano. "Piccardo: 'There's only a moderate Islam'". [Italian]. *Panorama*. <http://archivio.panorama.it/archivio/Piccardo-C-e-solo-un-islam-moderato> accessed on 28 June 2017.

is condemnable per se. The message of Islam is a message of peace, concord, solidarity, and social cohesion. Islam is a religion striving for mercy, love, and not violence.”⁷⁵

Such instances are validated by the Jihadists’ seeming disregard of Italy. Ideally, the country has always epitomised an appealing target to them. After WWII, Rome has consistently been a steady ally of Washington, as it still has three major American military bases on its soil. Italy supported U.S. President George W. Bush’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and even now Italian forces are stationed in both countries. Italy hosts Vatican City, the historical home of Christendom and, conversely, a sworn enemy to Jihadists around the globe. To such regard, during his mandate, Pope Ratzinger irritated many Muslims for his remarks linking violence and Islam.⁷⁶ Grave tension in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan followed Lega Nord member Roberto Calderoli’s disrespectful showing of the controversial Danish cartoon of Muhammad on national television.⁷⁷ Lastly, as terrorism historian Domenico Guzzo believes, Italy’s perpetual open wounds from more than two decades of left and right-wing terrorism make the nation potentially sensitive to the prospects of Islamist terrorism –as people would be forced to re-experience feelings that are still vivid in the country’s memory and not totally processed or overcome.⁷⁸

Yet, when asked about the likelihood of an Al-Qaeda-type of attack on Italy in the wake on 9/11, Imam Bouriq Buochta from Turin showed no hesitation. “It just will not happen”, reassured the Muslim cleric, “[because] here [Osama] bin Laden has no outposts and all Imams in Italy come from the moderate school. And even in case of war, Turin would not be involved, I am sure of that. Here we feel safe, as Turin must feel safe in relation to us.”⁷⁹ Although his assertions would be largely disproven and he himself would be expelled in 2005 for “matters of public order,”⁸⁰ ironically, Buochta’s predictions about Al-Qaeda’s alleged intentions to strike Italy have, so far, turned out to be accurate. Osama bin Laden has threatened Italy less than other Western countries, as the “Eternal City”

⁷⁵ Zeinah, Hazzan. (2015). In Lodoli, Marco. “Mosque, fear, and prayers”. [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/01/10/news/moschea_paura_e_pregchiere_il_vero_islam_soltanto_pace-104633668/ accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁷⁶ (2006). “The Pope is sorry, but Islam’s anger continues” [Italian]. *La Stampa*. <http://www.lastampa.it/2006/09/17/esteri/il-papa-dispiaciuto-ma-non-si-placa-la-rabbia-dellislam-9UtfJngoPgvgLIZvVX6MKM/pagina.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁷⁷ (2006). “Assault on the Italian consulate in Libya”. [Italian]. *Il Corriere della Sera*. http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2006/02_Febbraio/17/islam.shtml?refresh_ce-cp accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁷⁸ Guzzo, Domenico. (2015). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 20 May.

⁷⁹ Bouchta, Bouriq. (2001). In Crosetti, Maurizio. “Bouchta: ‘You must not fear Islam’”. [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2001/09/19/bouchta-non-dovete-avere-paura-dellislam.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁸⁰ (2005). “Turin, Imam Bouchta expelled”. [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. <http://www.repubblica.it/2005/h/sezioni/cronaca/allertaitalia2/imamtorino/imamtorino.html> accessed on 28 June 2017

did not appear to be on Al-Qaeda's top hit-list as much as other European capitals. Accordingly, the majority of thwarted Jihadist plots discovered by Italian authorities prior to 2009 did not feature Italy as the main target.⁸¹

Terrorists were indeed more likely to be linked to the global Jihadist movement, coordinating plots aimed at foreign targets. Besides, large numbers of incarcerated presumed Jihadist terrorists have been eventually released or acquitted of all charges for "lack of evidence."⁸² As of today, Italy has yet to witness one single major Jihadist terrorist attack. And even in spite of ISIS's ascent, 70,8% of Muslim interviewees still thought the risk of Jihadist terrorist attacks occurring in Italy was "really low", according to the Moressa Foundation's survey.⁸³ So, not only did Italian Muslims not appear to hold radicalised views, but the evidence also seemed to discredit potential links between Islamist radicalisation and terrorism.

Actually, it has been argued that the symbiotic relation between Islamist radicalisation and terrorism could well be artificially created. Several actors, including a number of Italian academics,⁸⁴ have identified the nation's media as a crucial tool in the establishment of public anxiety over Islam and its supposedly close association to terrorism. "Look at my hands, they are the same as yours. I work all day long. I have a family. And I have to read in the newspapers that my religion kills. It's false", once thundered a believer from Rome's Centocelle Mosque when asked to comment on how the Italian media shaped perceptions of Muslims and Islam.⁸⁵ To Catania's Imam Kheit Abdelhafid, certain politicians would actually exploit the media to create fear and "spew venom and insult our religion."⁸⁶ Such a process, complained leaders Davide Piccardo, Hareth Amar, and Souheir Katkhouda, was actually nothing more than a blatant attempt to foster feelings of discrimination and Islamophobia.⁸⁷ This was mainly due to discredit Islam on one hand, while avoiding addressing the question of denied rights on the other -especially when it came to the building of mosques⁸⁸ and the treatment of

⁸¹ Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community: Index of Radicalisation*. [Italian]. CEMISS. pp. 120-121.

⁸² Corbucci, Carlo. (2011). *Islamic Terrorism: Falsity and Mystification*. [Italian]. Rome: Agorà.

⁸³ Polchi. "The Caliphate and jihadists are just terrorism".

⁸⁴ Massari, Monica. (2006). *Islamophobia: Fear and Islam*. [Italian]. Rome: Laterza; Allievi, Stefano. (2008). "Islamophobia in Italy". [Italian]. Interviewed by IRIB, Iran, Radio Islam. 29 September.

⁸⁵ Ahmed. (2015). In "At the mosque people don't cry".

⁸⁶ Abdelhafid, Kheit. (2015). In "At the mosque people don't cry".

⁸⁷ (2014). "RAI, Muslim associations to Fico: 'Stop Islamophobia in the public service'". [Italian]. *Il Fatto Quotidiano*. <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/09/12/rai-le-associazioni-musulmane-a-fico-basta-islamofobia-nel-servizio-pubblico/1119448/> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁸⁸ Allievi, Stefano. (2012). *"No" to the Mosque*. [Italian]. Padova: Le Gru.

immigrants.⁸⁹ Scandalised by three specific RAI TV shows, the three leaders wrote to the Italian channel's Chair, Roberto Fico, exhorting him to:

Take action [...] to re-establish that balance and respect, which should be a defining mark of RAI, so that the good name of Muslim citizens can be protected... Vita in Diretta, Porta a Porta, and Virus have all talked about Muslims but with any Muslims, not granting the presence of Muslim representatives on the shows, acting in a biased, prejudiced, and inept fashion... and promoting an image according to which, in each case, Muslims citizens in this country would be potential purveyors of violence, [implying that in Italy] Muslim presence should be deemed as a source of danger for Italians' security.⁹⁰

Echoing an equal degree of dissent towards media deception of Muslims, labelled a sort of "psychological terrorism", regional supervisor Sharif Lorenzini even wrote the then President of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano. In his open letter, Lorenzini urged the President to, "defend the Islamic Community to eradicate every form of social tension against Islam and Muslims, whom, fed up at this situation, will sooner or later decide to demonstrate in the streets in their thousands."⁹¹

To experts such as Stefano Allievi and Mostafa el Ayoubi, the media's construction of the concept of Islamophobia has actually concealed preoccupations over Italy's identity loss at the hands of Islam. Equally to Stuart Croft's assertion on Britain featured in the next chapter, fear of Islam and the ensuing Islamisation of Italy has facilitated the establishment of the Islam-terrorism axis, creating a suspicious Muslim "other". Hence, to el Ayoubi, it is not about Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, but, rather, it is about defending the Italian identity vis-à-vis Islam.⁹² And while Italy has not perchance been ready yet to internalise facets of modern multiculturalism, including the encounter with other forms of religious confessions, the "entrepreneurs of fear" have exploited public worry over Islam to obtain votes, claimed Allievi.⁹³ According to the Padua University professor, especially in Northern Italy, thriving on the need to defend the country's identity, certain politicians have amplified security threats not with the intent to come to terms with Italy's tortuous relation with its growing Muslim population; rather, by "surfing the wave of fear" fostered by the media, these politicians have intentionally accrued confrontation between mainstream society and Muslim minorities because, to Allievi, unstable circumstances grant more votes.

⁸⁹ Chaouki, Khalid. (2015). In Balestrazzi, Gabriele. "Islam and us". [Italian]. *Gazzetta di Parma*. <http://www.gazzettadiparma.it/news/stranieri/247181/L-Islam-e-noi--tre.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁹⁰ Piccardo, Davide et al. (2014). In "RAI, Muslim associations to Fico: 'Stop Islamophobia in the public service'".

⁹¹ Lorenzini, Sharif. (2013). In Amoroso, Pasquale. "Bari, violence against Islamic community" [Italian]. *Il Quotidiano Italiano*. <http://bari.ilquotidianoitaliano.it/cronaca/2013/05/news/bari-violenze-contro-la-comunita-islamica-vice-presidente-cii-si-rivolge-a-napolitano-23455.html/> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁹² El Ayoubi, Mostafa. (2015). "No entrenching". [Italian]. *Nigrizia*, Dossier Islam. p. 44.

⁹³ Allievi, Stefano. (2015). *The Strength of inclusion*. [Italian]. *Nigrizia*, Dossier Islam. pp. 46-49.

If according to Allievi and Piccardo, “it’s unacceptable that the media [...] ignites feelings of Islamophobia,”⁹⁴ the mystification or, worse, the creation of ad hoc Jihadist plots would be even more despicable, contended Carlo Corbucci.⁹⁵ Defence attorney of 80% of the individuals charged with Jihadist terrorism accusations in Italy, Corbucci wrote a 1750-page book entitled *Islamic Terrorism: Falsity and Mystification*. Corbucci’s main argument is that the Jihadist threat has been created through “dialectic and military frauds”. To the Roman lawyer, fear of Islamist radicalisation created by the media was responsible for the twisting of the legal system to justify sentences against presumed terrorists, whom were believed to be guilty *a priori*.

More than that, Corbucci claimed that at least three controversial alleged Jihadist plots had actually been orchestrated, veiled, and attributed to innocent Muslims by third parties, most likely the Italian Secret Services. In Anzio in 2002 and in Rovigo and Naples in 2003, Italian authorities raided various Muslim immigrants’ apartments, confiscating large amounts of explosives, fake documents, contacts, and supplementary Jihadist material. Every subject’s denial of all accusations could not avoid, however, their subsequent incarceration on charges of terrorism. In the end, the three Egyptian citizens from Anzio were released for lack of evidence linking them to the establishment of any subversive organisation -two of them were even reimbursed a total of 280,000 euros.⁹⁶ Likewise, the supposed Jihadist terrorists in Rovigo were rapidly freed after five days for lack of evidence.⁹⁷ Lastly, when asked to elucidate the acquittal in Naples of the 28 Pakistani presumed terrorists, judge for the preliminary investigations Ettore Favara admitted that, “the gathered evidence could not help but reconsider the grave accusations faced by the subjects in question.”⁹⁸ Despite the complete absence of proof and the ensuing, relatively rapid acquittal of all presumed terrorists, to Corbucci, the system still fell victim to the exaggerated level of fear over Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. This, according to the lawyer, was artificially constructed to ultimately justify the government’s support of the U.S-led war on terror and convince the public that intervention was necessary.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Piccardo, Davide et al. (2014). In “RAI, Muslim associations to Fico”.

⁹⁵ Corbucci, Carlo. *Islamic Terrorism*.

⁹⁶ (2009). “Poachers mistaken for terrorists and arrested”. [Italian]. *Il Messaggero*.
http://www.ilmessaggero.it/ROMA/CRONACA/pescatori_di_frodo_scambiati_per_terroristi_e_arrestati_risarciti_con_280_mila_euro/notizie/61916.shtml accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁹⁷ (2003). “Five Moroccans released”. [Italian]. *Il Tirreno*.

http://ricerca.gelocal.it/iltirreno/archivio/iltirreno/2003/04/02/LA7PO_LA706.html accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁹⁸ Favara, Ettore. (2003). In “Naples, Pakistanis accused of terrorism released”. [Italian]. *La Repubblica*.

<http://www.repubblica.it/online/politica/allarmepisanodue/scarcerazioni/scarcerazioni.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁹⁹ Corbucci, Carlo. *Islamic Terrorism*.

Agreeing with the theory that fear of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is overstated, Salameh Ashour, Sapienza University professor and president of the Palestinian Community in Rome, once vehemently summarised the whole matter as follows:

If this phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation were true, Italian prisons would be swamped with Muslim terrorists. On the contrary, vast amounts of those arrested on charges of terrorism were, in fact, eventually released and up-to-date there hasn't been one single big Jihadist attack in Italy. What this discourse on radicalisation fails to address is, instead, the matter of all those denied rights to Muslims, both in Italy and abroad, like the recognition of Palestine. This is the real question.¹⁰⁰

In light of all the provided evidence, can it be argued that fear of Islamist radicalisation in Italy to be actually exaggerated? Is the latter socially constructed to foster feelings of Islamophobia, defend Italian identity, permit discrimination of Muslims, and justify international policies? Could Stuart Croft's theory of securitisation of Islam be ultimately right?

Islamist Radicalisation in Italy: A Likely Worrisome Issue

Unlike professor Ashour et al, the pundits presented in this section do see Islamist radicalisation in Italy as a potentially pressing issue. Being more in tune with Roy's position, their logic is mainly based on the evidence connecting Italy to Islamist radicalisation and the chances of terrorism, which is by no means tenuous. Academics of the calibre of Lorenzo Vidino and Marco Lombardi believe Islamist radicalisation affects Italy too¹⁰¹ and apprehension over it is warranted for a number of reasons.

First and foremost, a number of Italian Muslims do seem to share radical visions of Islam. According to a 516-page report from March 2015 by the Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CEMISS), multiple Koranic schools have taught their young students not to befriend Christians or Jews, as they are destined to hell.¹⁰² 5 out of the 6 main Shia organisations have fostered grave feelings of anti-Semitism. Hazma Piccardo's copy of the Quran, the most widespread in the country, displays excerpts filled with hateful remarks towards Jews, the West, and the Catholic Church. Preacher Adel Smith ridiculed the crucifix on national television and contemptuously defined Western society as "satanic, lesbo-feminist-gay."¹⁰³ And Wagdi Ghoneim, a controversial guest speaker linked to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood invited by UCOIL, stated that whoever does not convert to Islam will

¹⁰⁰ Ashour, Salameh. (2015). In "Islam in Italy: challenges and opportunities" [Italian]. Rome, 5 March. <http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/435415/lislam-in-italia-sfide-e-opportunita> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹⁰¹ Their comments are reported on page 40.

¹⁰² Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. pp. 97-100.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

turn into a cat or a mouse, whereas women are to be beaten because, like sheep, they need a shepherd.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps more alarmingly, a variety of Muslims have sustained violence in the name of Allah. While many leaders have fiercely condemned terrorism, others have glorified or even incited acts of Jihad.¹⁰⁵ For instance, Imam Amar Sahoune from Naples's Piazza Largo al Mercato Mosque has praised Osama bin Laden in a number of sermons, while Imam Abdellah Labdidi from Fermo's El Rahma Mosque declared massacring Westerners was legitimate. Along the same lines, two Imams from Bologna's Al-nur Mosque have commended Palestinian suicide operations against Israel, as martyrs that "died for a just cause and are in heaven now, in Allah's glory", given that "in Israel there are no civilians and not even the children are innocent."¹⁰⁶

In fact, San Donà di Piave's Imam Raoudi Abdelbar has prayed Allah to "exterminate all the Jews [to] make happy all the Muslims in the world."¹⁰⁷ Mostapha El Korchi, Ponte Felciano's Imam, has instead promoted violence against Italians, inviting members of his congregation to "hit Italian children on the head until blood comes out."¹⁰⁸ Likewise, on the eve of Italy's entrance in the U.S.-led war on Iraq, Carmagnola's Imam Abdul Qadir Fadallah Mamour warned that if Italians continued to support the war, Italy would become a land of battle as "Bin Laden will continue to strike Italian soldiers, [for] all Italians are at risk."¹⁰⁹ More recently, preacher Robert "Musa" Cerantonio posted on Facebook a picture of himself holding an ISIS's flag in Saint Peter Square, commenting, "The black Tawhid flag waves in front of the Vatican...Allah willing, we will destroy the Vatican as the head of its people."¹¹⁰

Facts listed in the March 2015 report provide further evidence about multifaceted decennial Jihadist activity on Italian soil.¹¹¹ To begin with, Jihadist sympathisers have financially backed international terrorism through multiple expedients, such as donations ("zakat"), cover companies, or unlawful businesses.¹¹² Cremona's Mosque has used donations to support an Ansar al-Islam training camp in Iraqi Kurdistan, for instance. Through meals and the selling of books and Halal products the

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. pp. 100-4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Pelliccetti, Riccardo. "Here's what is preached at the mosque".

¹⁰⁸ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. p. 104.

¹⁰⁹ Mamour, Fadallah. (2003). In "Minister Pisanu expels Carmagnola's Imam". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. <http://www.repubblica.it/2003/j/sezioni/cronaca/imanarresti/espulso/espulso.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹¹⁰ Cerantonio, Robert. (2015). In Foschini, Giuliano. "Hunting for fighters" [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/01/15/news/a_caccia_di_combattenti_ecco_gli_imam_erranti_che_reclutano_in_italia-104970531/ accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹¹¹ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. pp. 105-8.

¹¹² Ibid.

Milanese Islamic Centre of Viale Jenner has immensely supported the Jihadist cause. Similarly, a cover company named Servizio Lavoro has financed Chechen terrorists by transferring millions of Liras to London and Dubai. Viale Jenner and the Via Quaranta Mosque have even counterfeited documents, including 70 fake passports retrieved by American troops in Iraq. The members of the Buccinasco terrorist cell sold drugs and stole cars to endow their activities. And in 2010 Eurotrust dismantled an international network based in Milan believed to finance Jihadist terrorist groups through drug trafficking and illegal immigration.

Jihadists have also exploited Italy to acquire weaponry.¹¹³ In the '90s, the Camorra Clan provided wannabe fighters with used arms on their way to the Balkans. In 2005 and 2006 Italian officials disrupted a Camorra-based network that provided members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) with logistical assistance and weapons between the cities of Milan, Rome, Naples, Algiers, and Marseilles. In 2012, Neapolitan harbour officials seized 5 containers allegedly transporting construction material; in reality, these were shipping missiles to Hamas through Egypt. Likewise, two ships containing weapons directed to Libya and Iran were seized in Genoa in 2003 and 2009 –the one on the way to the Persian Gulf was transporting forbidden nuclear technology. In 2010, Italian police dismantled a network between Italy and Iran on allegations of international terrorism. In that occasion, officers confiscated large amounts of tracer bullets, highly flammable mixtures of chemical, firebombs, one helicopter, numerous parachutes, and 120 military wetsuits.

As some of these cases show, Italy has also been a crossroad for terrorists.¹¹⁴ Particularly in cities like Milan, Bologna, Cremona and Naples, a number of mosques and Imams –including the notorious cases of Abu Imad and Abu Omar- have been connected to the Algerian GIA, the Salafist Group for the Predication and Combat, Ansar-al Islam, Jamatt-Islamiyya, and, of course, Al-Qaeda. In detail, Viale Jenner hosted Ramzi Youseff, one of the 1993 Twin Tower attackers, while member Abdelhalim Hafeed Remadna was the head of a sleeping cell linked to Abu Jaffa, at the time one of Al-Qaeda's top-3 officials. Renowned for his personal connection to 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and for his central role behind Al-Qaeda's 2004 Madrid attacks, "Mohammed the Egyptian" often transitioned through Milan. Finally, "Hazma the Libyan", to wit Osama bin Laden's emissary, used to live in Milan, but travelled extensively across northern Italy and Europe to establish Al-Qaeda's European network.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. pp. 96-158; Groppi, Michele. "Portrait of the Lombard Jihadist". [Italian]. pp. 191-200.

Besides funds, weapons, and links, Italy has been a steady reservoir of martyrs and foreign fighters destined to theatres of Jihad.¹¹⁵ During the Balkan conflict in the '90s, numerous fighters left northern Italy to join their Bosnian brethren under the leadership of Anwaar Shaaba, at the time Viale Jenner Imam and commander of the Mujahedeen foreign brigade. Then, following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, more than 30 martyrs recruited by 12 main Imams left from the Belpaese, mainly from the area between Milan and Cremona. Among them, the most famous have been Abu Hafs from Cremona and Abu Farid Al Masri from Milan. On December 9th, 2003, Hafs attacked the Iraqi Ministry of Internal Affairs, killing 30 and wounding 660 people. Months later, instead, Al Masri detonated himself at the Canal Hotel in Bagdad, killing a UN special representative and 22 people. Lastly, more than a dozen captured Jihadists detained or transitioned through the U.S. Guantanamo prison came from Italy.

Although Italy has yet to experience one single large-scale Jihadist attack, the nation has actually been a fairly appealing target.¹¹⁶ Since 2001, there have been 27 cases of a Jihadist-related nature, among which 20 thwarted plots, 6 carried out and unsuccessful attacks (featuring no casualties) and 1 carried out and partially successful attack –the one by Mohammed Game at the Santa Barbara Carabinieri base in Milan in 2009, in which the very attacker and a guard reported injuries, but no casualties were registered. Jihadist plots envisioned attacks on several targets, including public areas (restaurants, cafes, shopping malls), critical infrastructure (Milan's tube, railway stations, harbours), diplomatic and military institutions (U.S. embassy and military bases), and symbolic sites (churches, synagogues, monuments). Among these, the most spectacular plans visualised the bombing of Milan's cathedral, the chemical attack on the U.S. embassy in Rome,¹¹⁷ the crushing of a ship filled with explosives in Naples's harbour, and an attack on Vatican City in 2010 and 2016.¹¹⁸

Originally, the perpetrators were mostly young males from North Africa, who were somehow linked to the global Jihadist movement and mainly gravitated around the mosque network. Conversely, recent years have beheld the emergence of lone-wolves and home-grown terrorists typically detached from the mosque network or international terrorist groups. Unlike their predecessors, modern terrorists

¹¹⁵ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. pp. 122-127.

¹¹⁶ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. pp. 112-120.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Custodero, Alberto. (2015). "Blitz against al-Qaeda in Italy". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/04/24/news/maxi_operazione_contro_al_qaeda_in_italia_arrestati_autori_della_strage_del_mercato_a_peshawar-112701307/ accessed on 28 June 2017; Bartolini, Alessandro. (2017). "Isis's Recruiters, Combatants, and Wannabe Kamikazes: The Great Black Story of Jihad Is In Lombardy". [Italian]. *Il Fatto Quotidiano*. <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/01/04/reclutatori-isis-combattenti-e-aspiranti-kamikaze-il-grande-romanzo-nero-del-jihad-e-in-lombardia-le-storie/3282044/2/> accessed on 25 April 2017.

are often self-radicalised through the Internet and social media –as it was for Mohammed Jarmoune and Anas el Abboubi, whom used the virtual space as a means for radicalisation, linkage, and planning of attacks. All in all, since 2001, more than 200 individuals have been arrested on charges of terrorism, featuring more than 100 sentences, including dozens of expulsions.¹¹⁹

Last but not least, ISIS's lure, direct threats, and ideological and physical infiltrations have reaffirmed Italy's relevance on the Jihadist chessboard. To start with, Italy has supplied the Caliphate with fighters who departed for the Syrian and Iraqi front. Though considerably inferior in size compared to other European counterparts, 110 combatants from Italy have in fact joined the Caliphate,¹²⁰ including 10 Italian converts.¹²¹ Among these were Genoese Giuliano Delnevo, the first convert to die in Syria, and Maria Giulia Sergio.¹²² One of the few female Italian converts joining the Caliphate, Maria's animosity towards her own home country has particularly shaken public opinion. In her numerous messages to her family, the then 28-year old wife of an Albanian Jihadist, has urged her family to leave for Syria, live strictly by Sharia law, and wage Jihad on the infidels in Italy.¹²³ Even though Maria and the majority of Italian combatants are still believed to be in the Middle East – where a number are also presumed deceased and incarcerated-, at least 17 of them have allegedly returned to Italy, declared Italian authorities.¹²⁴

Whilst ISIS has mostly sought to recruit foreign fighters, Italy has been object of direct threats by the very Caliphate. In truth, the group has menaced Italy more than any other terrorist organisation.¹²⁵ This is due to its symbolic role as the home of Christendom and its appeal in relation to a prophetic vision by the Prophet Mohammad foreseeing an Islamic conquest of Rome near the end-of-time.¹²⁶ In September 2014, after the United States launched air strikes in Syria, the then ISIS's

¹¹⁹ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. pp. 96-158

¹²⁰ Schianchi, Francesca. (2017). "110 fighters from Italy departed to fight with ISIS". [Italian] *Il Secolo XIX*. http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/italia/2017/01/06/ASIOTlqF-combattere_fighter_foreign.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹²¹ Neumann, Peter. *Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000*.

¹²² For more information on three specific cases of Italian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, please see Marone, Francesco. (2016). "Italian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq". *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 7(1), pp.20–35.

¹²³ Sergio, Maria Giulia. (2015). In "Wiretapping, Maria Giulia Sergio". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. <http://video.repubblica.it/edizione/milano/le-intercettazioni-maria-giulia-sergio--papa-prendi-mamma-per-i-capelli-e-vieni-in-siria/206021/205126> accessed on 10 June 2017; Sergio, Maria Giulia. (2015). In "Maria Giulia, the Jihadist that recruited in Italy". [Italian]. *L'Espresso*. <http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2015/07/01/news/maria-giulia-sergio-la-jihadista-che-reclutava-in-italia-ecco-cosa-diceva-ai-genitori-e-alla-sorella-in-partenza-1.219478> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹²⁴ Serafini, Marta. (2017). "Isis, 17 are the foreign fighters already returned to Italy". [Italian] *Il Corriere della Sera*. http://www.corriere.it/politica/17_gennaio_05/isis-sono-17-foreign-fighters-gia-rientrati-italia-04d07d02-d390-11e6-a965-24e9ebbeaea2.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹²⁵ Groppi, Michele. (2017). "The Growing Jihadi Terror Threat to Italy: How Italian Exceptionalism is Rapidly Diminishing". CTC Sentinel West Point 10:5.

¹²⁶ Prophecies related to the conquest of Rome are mentioned in various hadith. For example see: <https://sunnah.com/muslim/54/50> accessed on 25 April 2017.

spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani stated in an audiotape: “With Allah’s permission, we will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to us.”¹²⁷

In the same vein, in February 2015 ISIS released a video of the beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts on a Libyan beach. One of the fighters warned on camera, “We are here, south of Rome. Soon we will conquer Rome with God’s will.” Such warnings were indeed designed to pressure Italy not to deepen its involvement in Libya, as Italy has so far only been involved in logistical support to recognized anti-ISIS forces.¹²⁸ Again in 2015, a video featuring executions and beheadings was specially subtitled in Italian and stated, “You have declared war on me with the misbelieving alliance...the more you will fight, the more you will suffer.”¹²⁹ One of the most explicit threats was made in April 2016 when an English speaking fighter featured in a video showing footage of previous attacks stated, “If it was Paris yesterday, and today Brussels, only Allah knows where it will be tomorrow. Maybe it will be in London or Berlin or Rome.”¹³⁰

Lastly, Italy has experienced ideological and physical infiltrations by the Islamic State. The cases of two of ISIS’s affiliated Imams sheds light upon the Caliphate’s realisation that Italy is a potential fertile land to promote Jihadist agendas. As already mentioned, Musa Cerantonio, the pro-ISIS Australian Imam of Italian origin subsequently arrested in the Philippines on charges of terrorism, preached in Brescia and Bergamo in August 2012.¹³¹ Likewise, Bilal Bosnic travelled across the Italian peninsula to explicitly recruit fighters, preaching in Pordenone, Cremona, and Bergamo in July 2011.¹³² During and after his journey, Bosnic facilitated the radicalisation process of two Balkan fighters who joined ISIS in 2013.¹³³ Unsurprisingly, not only did the Bosnian Imam confirm the presence of Italian

¹²⁷ (2014). *IS Spokesman Rallies Fighters Against U.S.-Led Coalition, Threatens Enemy and Calls Individual Muslims to Launch Attacks*. SITE Intelligence Group.

¹²⁸ Grignetti, Francesco. (2016). “U.S. Raid in Libya, Italy offers support but won’t send its army”. [Italian]. *Il Secolo XIX*, http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/mondo/2016/08/02/ASVoHCKD-italia_sostegno_militari.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹²⁹ Stabile, Giordano. (2015). “New threats to Italy in a new ISIS’s video”. [Italian]. *La Stampa*, <http://www.lastampa.it/2015/04/14/esteri/nuove-minacce-allitalia-in-un-video-dellisis-s2c8mYqTa6OIVpEP4aLCdl/pagina.html> accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹³⁰ (2016). “Islamic State hints at attacks in London, Berlin and Rome,” Reuters.

¹³¹ Di Landro, Armando. (2015). “The Italian-Australian Jihadist Imam. Sermons in Bergamo and Brescia too”. [Italian]. *Il Corriere della Sera* http://bergamo.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/15_gennaio_20/musa-cerantonio-bergamo-brescia-moschee-1f9d5874-a090-11e4-b571-55218c79aee3.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹³² Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. p. 105.

¹³³ (2016). “The journey of the Jihadists from Veneto to ISIS’s training camps”. [Italian]. *Il Corriere della Sera* <http://corrieredelveneto.corriere.it/veneto/notizie/cronaca/2016/28-marzo-2016/viaggio-jihadisti-veneto-campo-addestramento-dell-isis-240231397695.shtml> accessed on 25 April 2017.

fighters joining ISIS in a 2014 interview; he also corroborated the Caliphate's interest in Italy to recruit new members.¹³⁴

Understanding Italy's potential, ISIS has made extensive use of the Internet to propagandise its message in Italian,¹³⁵ galvanise minds, and entice acts of terrorism. As confirmed by the Mossad, Italy would count 162 ISIS's affiliates on its soil,¹³⁶ including the Tunisian and the Pakistani citizens arrested in Brescia in July 2015. Planning attacks on a U.S. military base and other symbolic Italian sites, the two for months showed their support for ISIS online. Apparently integrated and communicating in Italian to each other, they underwent a process of self-radicalisation by downloading Jihadist material, culminating in threats such as, "We are in your streets. We are everywhere. We are choosing the targets, waiting for the X hour."¹³⁷ In truth, the organisation has propagandised its conquest of the Vatican and would allegedly plan Pope Francis's assassination, warned the Mossad and the CIA.¹³⁸ Likewise, on April 8th 2016 Abderrahim Moutaharrik, a former kickboxing champion living in Lecco, was provided an order by an Islamic State sheikh to strike Italy.¹³⁹ As authorities demonstrated he was planning to target the Vatican,¹⁴⁰ Moutaharrik was arrested in April 2016 and was sentenced to 6 years in prison in February 2017.¹⁴¹

¹³⁴ Foschini, Giuliano. (2014). "Bilal Bosnic: 'There are Italians in ISIS. We will conquer the Vatican'" [Italian]. *La Repubblica*, http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2014/08/28/news/bilal_bosnic_ci_sono_italiani_nell_is_conquisteremo_il_vaticano-94559220/ accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹³⁵ Ranieri, Daniele. (2014). "Here's how the Islamic State recruits in Italy". [Italian]. *Il Foglio*. http://www.ilfoglio.it/video/2014/08/28/video-esclusivo-cosi-lo-stato-islamico-fa-reclutamento-in-italia_7-120359-2014-8_c245.htm accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹³⁶ Grilli, Franco. (2015). "Mossad: 'Jihadists are planning 10 attacks in Europe'". [Italian]. *Il Giornale*. <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/mossad-i-jihadisti-preparano-10-attacchi-europa-1089983.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹³⁷ (2015). "Terrorism, 2 arrested in Brescia". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/07/22/news/terrorismo_due_arresti_a_brescia_promuovevano_1_is_sul_web-119568984/ accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹³⁸ Rame, Sergio. (2015). "Mossad and the CIA warn Pope Francis". [Italian]. *Il Giornale*. <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/mossad-e-cia-avvertono-papa-francesco-vaticano-prossimo-1081884.html> accessed on 10 June 2017.

¹³⁹ Bartolini, Alessandro. (2017). "Isis's Recruiters, Combatants, and Wannabe Kamikazes: The Great Black Story of Jihad Is In Lombardy".

¹⁴⁰ Romano, Luca. (2016). "ISIS's face in Lombardy and Piemonte". [Italian]. *Il Giornale*, <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/i-volti-dellisis-lombardia-e-piemonte-1252295.html> accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁴¹ Randacio, Emilio. (2017). "Terrorism, ISIS's boxer sentenced to 6 years". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*, http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/02/14/news/terrorismo_isis_pugile_condannato_milano-158273826/ accessed on 25 April 2017.

Finally, capitalising on the seemingly unstoppable migration flow, ISIS has allegedly attempted to infiltrate Italy with terrorists disguised as refugees.¹⁴² Only in 2016, 171,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy from Libya.¹⁴³ Disguised as a refugee was Ben Nasr Mehdi, a Tunisian explosive expert previously linked to Al Qaeda,¹⁴⁴ who had been incarcerated after being convicted of terrorism offences in Italy and deported to Tunisia. In November 2015 Mehdi attempted to re-enter Italy with fake credentials seeking political asylum, but was discovered and deported back to Tunisia.¹⁴⁵ Italian security services suspect Mehdi is a key figure for facilitating jihadists' journeys towards Syria and Iraq.¹⁴⁶

There is also concern that irregular migrants arriving in Italy might be vulnerable to the message of radical proselytisers inside Italy, because of unmet expectations and unstable circumstances within rescue centres. A case in point was Anis Amri, who carried out the 2016 Berlin truck attack. Amri was radicalized in prison in Sicily after arriving there as a young asylum seeker and being jailed for starting a fire at his refugee shelter.¹⁴⁷ Aware that prisons can serve as venues for radicalisation, as the Amri case shows,¹⁴⁸ Italian authorities are currently monitoring 400 detainees presumed at risk of radicalisation.¹⁴⁹ All in all, if one takes into account ISIS's alleged attack on the Italian Consulate in Cairo,¹⁵⁰ and its presumed involvement in the kidnapping of four Italian technicians in Libya,¹⁵¹ little

¹⁴² (2015). "Isis, warning from the Libyan Minister: Terrorists arrive to Italy on migrants' boats". [Italian]. *Il Messaggero*. http://www.ilmessaggero.it/PRIMOPIANO/ESTERI/isis_terroristi_arrivano_barconi_migranti_ministro_libico_allarme/notizie/1349387.shtml accessed on 10 June 2017.

¹⁴³ Kingsley, Patrick. (2016). "2016 Sets New Record For Asylum Seeker Reaching Italy By Boat," *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/2016-sets-new-record-for-asylum-seekers-reaching-italy-by-boat> accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁴⁴ (2011). "Islamic terrorism, sentences and releases confirmed". [Italian] *Il Resto del Carlino*, http://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/reggio_emilia/cronaca/2011/07/15/544393-terrorismo_islamico_confermate_condanne.shtml accessed on 28 June 2017.

¹⁴⁵ Scalea, Daniele. (2016). "In regard to terrorists on boats". [Italian]. *Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.it/daniele-scalea/terroristi-barconi-isis-_b_11603062.html accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁴⁶ Viviano, Francesco. (2015). "Lampedusa, a returning terrorist on a boat". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/11/08/news/lampedusa_su_un_barcone_terrorista_di_ritorno-126872333/ Cristina accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁴⁷ Cavallaro, Felice. (2016). "Berlin attack, Amri radicalised in Sicily". [Italian]. *Il Corriere della Sera* http://www.corriere.it/esteri/16_dicembre_22/anis-amri-berlino-radicalizzazione-sicilia-carcere-6fd8abea-c88e-11e6-b72f-beb391d55ecd.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁴⁸ Heil, Georg. (2017). "The Berlin Attack and the Abu Walaa Islamic State Recruitment Network". CTC Sentinel 10:2

¹⁴⁹ Nadotti, Cristina. (2017). "Jihadists of Italy, here are the stats and the anti-terrorism operations". [Italian]. *La Repubblica*. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/03/30/news/tutte_le_operazioni_antiterrorismo_e_gli_arresti_in_italia-161777930/ accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁵⁰ Molinari, Maurizio. (2015). "Isis claims car bombing in Cairo". [Italian]. *La Stampa*. <http://www.lastampa.it/2015/07/11/esteri/egitto-forte-esplosione-nel-centro-del-cairo-colpito-consolato-italiano-xT8NiCsJlivT9Qi5do0gTK/pagina.html> accessed on 11 June 2017.

¹⁵¹ (2015). "Libya, 4 Italians kidnapped in Mellitah". [Italian]. *Il Corriere della Sera*. http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_luglio_20/libia-farnesina-quattro-italiani-rapiti-mellitah-101937da-2eaa-11e5-820a-d82a668b1363.shtml accessed on 12 June 2017.

doubts remain as for the group's concrete bellicose intentions. According to former Minister of Internal Affairs, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, Angelino Alfano, the threat stemming from ISIS can be "compared only to Al-Qaeda's 9/11."^{152 153}

In light of the displayed evidence, Alessandro Orsini, head of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism at Roma Tor Vergata, agrees that, "the problem with radicalisation that leads to terrorism exists in Italy too. Empirical evidence shows so."¹⁵⁴ Echoing his colleague's point, Cattolica University professor Marco Lombardi believes that, "The process of [Islamist] radicalisation is a grave issue that must be tackled in every European country. Numbers, even if in Italy these are low in relation to terrorism, cannot underestimate the question."¹⁵⁵ As the most authoritative academic voice on the subject, Lorenzo Vidino explains:

Italy is now affected too, though in minor ways, by dynamics of radicalisation that are similar to the ones experienced by other European countries for more than a decade; [there is a] limited presence of structured terrorist groups, but [an increase in] processes of auto-radicalisation; the majority of the radicalised subjects [are] to be found among second-generation [Muslims] and converts; [there is an] increasing amount of women; [a] limited role of the mosque and the cruciality of Internet and social media.¹⁵⁶

Given these facts, can one state that Islamist radicalisation in Italy is a pressing, critical issue requiring maximum attention? Could its potential in relation to the prospects of terrorism as whole represent a major threat to the country's security? Could Roy's claims of urgency be legitimate, after all?

¹⁵² Alfano, Angelino. (2015). In "Isis, Alfano: 'Increased security just like after 9/11'". [Italian]. RAI News. <http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/articoli/alfano-terrorismo-sicurezza-italia-allarme-ded02842-9897-4e2e-87df-33e093b8b241.html> accessed on 11 June 2017.

¹⁵³ Grotti, Leone. (2016). "'We'll soon get to Rome.' ISIS's list of threats to Italy". [Italian]. *Tempi*. <http://www.tempi.it/roma-isis-ha-minacciato-italia-e-perche#.WQNXnBzUDEc> accessed on 25 April 2017; Taylor, Adam (2015). "The Islamic State threatens to come to Rome; Italians respond with travel advice". *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/20/the-islamic-state-threatens-to-come-to-rome-italians-respond-with-travel-advice/> accessed on 25 April 2017.

¹⁵⁴ Orsini, Alessandro. (2015). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 16 July.

¹⁵⁵ Lombardi, Marco. (2015). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 16 July.

¹⁵⁶ Vidino, Lorenzo. (2015). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 18 July.

CHAPTER II: THE DEBATE ON RADICALISATION

Islamist Radicalisation and its Potential, Discussed Relation to Terrorism: Two Juxtaposing Positions

As shown in the last chapter, the issue of Islamist radicalisation and its controversial, potential relation to acts of terrorism has recently gained considerable attention in Italy. But the Italian case is just one facet of a much larger academic debate between two diverging positions that disagree on how they perceive the very issue of Islamist radicalisation and its supposed relation to Jihadist-inspired terrorism.¹⁵⁷

Roy's Take on the Challenge of Islamist Radicalisation

As already stated, to renowned French sociologist Olivier Roy, radicalisation exists and can potentially cover a crucial role in relation to acts of terrorism, including home-grown terrorism. This is not to say that Roy or whoever agrees with his position envisions all those undergoing a radicalisation process or merely holding radical ideas ultimately turn to terrorism;¹⁵⁸ rather, especially as for home-grown terrorism, Roy and alike deem radicalisation as a potential key element in explaining the root causes of such forms of violence.

According to Roy, Islamist radicalisation is, first and foremost, a matter of identity searching in the context of a globalised world. In his famous book *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, the French scholar argues radical visions of Islam are a response to the loss of traditional Islamic cultures undermined by globalisation.¹⁵⁹ As recalled in his previous work, *The Failure of Political Islam*, not only has globalisation eroded Islamic traditional values, but Islamist groups, except in Iran's case, have also failed in seizing political power.¹⁶⁰ In parallel, globalisation has facilitated the de-territorialisation of the Ummah, the community of Muslims' believers, as many migrated to the West. Once in Europe though, large numbers of young, second-generation Muslims often experience a sort of identity crisis, which juxtaposes their traditional values of Islam with secular Western culture.

Such a vacuum creates, as Roy elaborates, a lost generation that can fall prey to fundamentalist views. Marking a clear-cut separation from the parents' traditional religious values, radical theories of

¹⁵⁷ The adherence of scholars and pundits to these two positions is by no means mutually exclusive. That is, some adherents may not necessarily and entirely fit into one argument or the other, but, nonetheless, for the sake of analysis, they provide valuable insights that can be used by the position they are more in tune with.

¹⁵⁸ Schmid, Alex. "The end of radicalisation?"; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. (2011). *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford: University Press.

¹⁵⁹ Roy, Olivier. (2004). *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press.

¹⁶⁰ Many of the points Roy makes are expanded from his 1994 piece *The Failure of Political Islam*: Roy, Olivier. (1994). *The Failure of Political Islam*. London: IBI Tauris.

Islam are “both a mirror of and a form of revenge against the globalisation that has made them what they are.”¹⁶¹ “Al Qaeda and consorts”, writes Roy, “offer a narrative of revolt and violence that appeals to an unmoored youth and gives a religious and political dimension to youth revolt.”¹⁶² In fact, through the acquisition of purist forms of Islam, born-again Muslims are able to create an imaginary, universal, and almighty Ummah. This imagined community goes beyond any sort of physical or national boundary, reclaiming Islam’s past grandeur and role as a major antagonistic force against the West. As the French scholar clearly summarises:

Radicalized young people, who rely heavily on an imagined Muslim politics (the Ummah of earlier times) are deliberately at odds with the Islam of their parents... They invent an Islam which opposes itself to the West... They are moved to action by the displays of violence in the media of Western culture. They embody a generational rupture... and they are not involved with the local religious community and the neighbourhood mosques. These young people practice self-radicalization on the Internet, searching for a global jihad. They are not interested in the tangible concerns of the Muslim world, such as Palestine. In short, they are not seeking the Islamization of the society in which they live but the realization of their sick fantasy of heroism.¹⁶³

Such a mixture of uncertainty and fantasies of glory are also found in other works by Marc Sageman and Farhad Khosrokhavar. According to Sageman,¹⁶⁴ hordes of young European Muslims, outraged by Western foreign policy and frustrated by Western societies’ inability to meet their expectations, could undergo a bottom-up process of self-radicalisation.¹⁶⁵ Struggling to establish their own identity vis-à-vis Europe’s national myths based on degrees of “Britishness”, “Frenchness”, “Germanness”, these young Muslims could form a “new generation of terrorists consist[ing] of home-grown wannabes –self-recruited, without leadership, and globally connected through the Internet. They are young people seeking thrills and a sense of significance and belonging to their lives.”¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ Roy, Olivier. (2007). “Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe”. In Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (eds), *European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. pp. 55-6.

¹⁶² Roy, Olivier. “Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe”. pp. 55-6.

¹⁶³ Roy, Olivier. (2015). “There Are More French Muslims Working For French Security Than For Al Qaeda”. *The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olivier-roy/paris-attack-muslim-cliches_b_6445582.html accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁶⁴ Sageman cannot entirely be placed under Roy’s umbrella, as in 2013 he even came to challenge the very notion that radicalisation can be linked terrorism. Yet, his work is still relevant to Roy’s position. For more information about Sageman’s 2013 declaration regarding radicalisation, please see Hasan, Mehdi. (2013). “Woolwich Attack: Overreacting to Extremism ‘Could Bring Back Al Qaeda’ Ex CIA Officer Warns”. *The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/27/sageman-interview_n_3342206.html, accessed on 01 August 2017.

¹⁶⁵ Sageman, Marc. (2008). *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

¹⁶⁶ Sageman, Marc. (2008). “The Next Generation of Terror”. *Foreign Policy*. Issue 165. March/April Issue. p. 37.

Similarly, Khosrokhavar's works with multiple Islamist detainees in France enlighten how the search for identity can trigger radicalisation leading to terrorism. Based on his numerous interviews, the French sociologist explains how economic hardship, perceived racism, and rejection by Western society can provoke feelings of humiliation. Yet, humiliation is not perceived as a personal condition, but as a common state of the global Ummah, which, either while in prison¹⁶⁷ or in the aftermath of precipitating events such as the Bosnian War or the invasion of Iraq ("archetypal event"), facilitates the creation of an imaginary "Neo Ummah". As Khosrokhavar articulates:

Radicalisation is, in summary, related to the Neo Ummah, mainly characterized by its being 'wounded', 'manhandled', repressed, humiliated, and acted upon contemptuously...[Yet this is also] jubilant through its new achievements [that is, luring the West] into traps and quagmires [as young Muslims] build up their new identity by fighting against a mighty enemy who becomes a 'lame duck' [and is defeated] because the Islamic youth is not only more valiant, but more intelligent...by cheating the enemy.¹⁶⁸

If such a "locus for revenge" pushes young Muslims to create an imaginary society, then the main question becomes the battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims in Europe, argues Gilles Kepel in *The War for Muslim Minds*.¹⁶⁹ According to this renowned French expert, Europe is indeed in the midst of a battle for the hearts and minds of second and their-generation European Muslims. Largely disenfranchised and deluded by Western societies' inability to satisfy their expectations, these young, angry Muslims¹⁷⁰ struggle for the right of "self definition", which is stuck between Islamic and European identities, eventually falling prey to radical visions of Islam.¹⁷¹ Begotten by such mechanisms of radicalisation, Kepel believes that home-grown terrorist attacks like Madrid have "established Europe as the new front line for terrorist attacks...[and] as the primary battlefield on which the future of global Islam will be decided."¹⁷²

Unsurprisingly, Kepel warns that, "The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds in the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of [Muslim] believers on the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West."¹⁷³ Kepel concedes that, if European societies succeed in integrating young, disaffected Muslims and steer them towards prosperity, the new generation in question might become the Islamic

¹⁶⁷ Khosrokhavar, Farhad. (2015). "The Mill of Muslim Radicalism in France". *The New York Times*.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/the-mill-of-muslim-radicalism-in-france.html?_r=0 accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁶⁸ Khosrokhavar, Farhad. (2013). "Radicalization through religion". University of Michigan. pp. 1-8.

¹⁶⁹ Kepel, Gilles. (2004). *The War for Muslim Minds*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

¹⁷⁰ Leiken, Robert. (2005). "Europe's Angry Muslims," *Foreign Affairs*. 84:4. (July/August).

¹⁷¹ Kepel, Gilles. *The War for Muslim Minds*. Ch. 7.

¹⁷² Kepel, Gilles. *The War for Muslim Minds*. p. 241.

¹⁷³ Kepel, Gilles. *The War for Muslim Minds*. p. 8.

vanguard of the next decade, initiating and inspiring virtuous cycles of modernity and democracy even in their countries of origin. Regrettably, were this outcome not to materialise itself, the risk for Europe is:

[To] become a place where Islamists and Salafists will manipulate significant numbers of Muslims...to help advance their aim of creating strongholds of uncompromising Islamist identity capable of sustaining political campaigns (as over the *hijab*) or creating *jihadi* cells capable of inflicting attacks on the scale of Madrid.¹⁷⁴

Afraid that the radicalisation of such young, angry Muslims could eventually pave the way for waves of European mujahedeen, Robert Leiken argues not only does Islamist radicalisation represent a serious threat to Europe, but also to the entire Western world.¹⁷⁵

Yet, if Roy agrees on the seriousness of the issue of Islamic radicalisation, the French scholar still preaches cautious approaches in countering radicalisation. Roy urges not to give in to the whole Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory, for such an Islamist "neo-fundamentalism" is not only a reaction but also a product of the West. Being part of the West, "Muslims end up thinking in Western ways [and] tend to express their identities through these Western models,"¹⁷⁶ which are also found in purist forms of Catholicism and Protestantism. The reason why, according to Roy, many governments fail to properly address this Islamist neo-fundamentalism is because they lack the understanding of the actual context Islam is inserted in the West, where the Muslim faith is de-territorialised, Westernised, and projected to a global vision of an imaginary "Ummah."¹⁷⁷

Therefore, Roy proposes a precise course of action in relation to the state of Islam in Europe. To begin with, Europe should stop referring to the "Muslim community", but acknowledge that Muslims form an utterly divided and heterogeneous population.¹⁷⁸ Secondly, society should stress the disconnection between religion and culture.¹⁷⁹ Islamist terrorists, and even more so converts who joined al-Qaeda, demonstrate to have nothing in common with traditional Islamic values, as they are no more the bearers of a traditional culture.

This should be followed by the push for a Western Islam, which does not mean interfering with ideology or necessarily championing a liberal Islam. Rather, this Westernised version of Islam should be based on the voluntary choice to belong to the Muslim faith, avoiding considering Muslim anyone

¹⁷⁴ Kepel, Gilles. (2004). In "The War for Muslim minds: an interview with Gilles Kepel". Open Democracy. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-5-57-2216.jsp>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

¹⁷⁵ Leiken, Robert. "Europe's Angry Muslims".

¹⁷⁶ Roy, Olivier. *Globalized Islam*. p. 201.

¹⁷⁷ Roy, Olivier. *Globalized Islam*. pp. 1-58, 303.

¹⁷⁸ Roy, Olivier. "There Are More French Muslims Working For".

¹⁷⁹ Roy, Olivier. "Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe". pp. 55-6.

with a Muslim background. Westernised Islam should then be treated and recognised by the same laws and principles that deal with other religions, as society should stress citizenship above any other form of communal affiliation. By doing so will Europe meet the aspirations of many Muslims, that is, the recognition of Islam as a Western religion and Muslims as full citizens, “while discouraging the creation of small communities, ghettos, and minority status. This would also isolate the terrorists and prevent them from building a political constituency.”¹⁸⁰

In addition to Roy, other eminent scholars have dedicated their efforts to the study of Islamist radicalisation and its potential role in leading to acts of terrorism. This, though, is mainly due to the fact that, as Schmid has asserted, except for rare cases, most of mainstream European academic experts do think Islamist radicalisation exists and is a serious issue that needs to be studied.¹⁸¹ Unsurprisingly, the period following the Madrid and the London bombings and other home-grown-related incidents has been marked by a mushrooming literature regarding radicalisation –most of which will, in fact, be taken into analysis in this study’s literature survey. Experts of the calibre Rik Coolsaet, Magnus Ranstorp, Lorenzo Vidino, Petter Nesser, Peter Neumann, and also U.S. scholars Bruce Hoffman and Brian Jenkins, are only few of the names of those academics who have dedicated their energies to the studying of radicalisation as a crucial, possible trigger factor for political violence.¹⁸²

Also, a number of leading centres and think tanks throughout the West have engaged in major projects to research the issue of radicalisation, among which RAND in Santa Monica, CA, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, the Real Instituto Elcano in Madrid, the International Counter-Terrorism Institute (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, the international Centre for the Study of Radicalisation based at King’s College London (ICSR), and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in the Hague. All of the abovementioned studies feature a wide array of topics dealing with radicalisation and terrorism –including home-grown terrorism-, ranging from

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Please see note on page 13.

¹⁸² Bergen, Peter, Hoffman, Bruce. (2010). *Assessing the Terrorist Threat*. Bipartisan Policy Center; Jenkins, Brian. (2010). *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001*. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation; Schmid, Alex. (2013). *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*. ICCT Research Paper; Coolsaet, Rik. (2011). (Ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*, 2nd edition. Farnham: Ashgate; Magnus Ranstorp. (2010). “Understanding Violent Radicalisation”, In Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), *Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. London: Routledge; Vidino, Lorenzo. (2009). “Europe’s New Security Dilemma”. *The Washington Quarterly*. 32:4. pp. 61-75; Petter Nesser. (2010). “Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe: Exploring motivational aspects of recruitment and radicalisation”, in Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*. pp. 108-09; Neumann Peter. (2008). ‘Introduction’, in P.R. Neumann, J. Stoil, & D. Esfandiary (Eds.), *Perspectives on radicalisation and political violence: papers from the first International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence*. ICSR, London. p. 4; Donatella Della Porta & Gary LaFree. (2012). “Processes of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation”. *IJCV*, Vol. 6, No. 1. p. 4.

definitions, theories, mechanisms, implications, policy decision making etc. Nonetheless, the universal common denominator is the relevance of radicalisation as a possible crucial tool for violence to occur.

In general, such academic interest in Islamist radicalisation might be reinforced by certain European Muslims' acceptance of violent rhetoric or religiously framed violence. Although most French and European Muslims have fiercely condemned terrorism, a number of French Muslim students still refused to observe a minute of silence to honour Charlie Hebdo's victims.¹⁸³ Shortly after, a primary school teacher decided to leave his school in Lille due to his pupils' anti-Semitic attitudes,¹⁸⁴ while a Muslim girl-gang attacked a 21 year-old woman for wearing a bikini swimsuit in a public park in France.¹⁸⁵ In the wake of the controversial Danish cartoons about the Prophet Mohammad, numerous outraged Muslim protesters filled British streets holding signs saying, "behead those who insult Islam" and "death to democracy."¹⁸⁶ Similar slogans have also been registered at a number of al-Quds protests in London and Paris, inciting anti-Israeli and anti-Western sentiments.¹⁸⁷ In Germany, a number of Muslims established Sharia-patrolled units to ensure the respect of Sharia Law close to Dusseldorf.¹⁸⁸ And, all in all, there have been numerous Muslim clerics promoting violent visions of Islam across the continent.¹⁸⁹

Still, what perchance motivates most of Roy's proponents is the factual evidence that seems to potentially link radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism in Europe. As shown in Table 1, we have counted 58 Jihadist-related attacks in Europe since 9/11. One again, we must clarify that creating the following list was no easy task. As there can be uncertainty as to what constitutes a "terrorist act", we know that our selection of Jihadist attacks might be incomplete, relative or even inaccurate –for some cases are still being investigated or circumstances continue to remain unclear. As such, we inserted attacks whose links to terrorism were proven or whose motivation was allegedly driven by Jihadist ideology. In this respect, we included a number of attacks where perpetrators have shouted "Allah Ahkbar" before

¹⁸³ Sengupta, Kim. "Charlie Hebdo cover: We are not Charlie".

¹⁸⁴ Mulholland, Rory. (2015). "Teacher quits French Muslim school accusing it of 'promoting Islamism'". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11398672/Teacher-quits-French-Muslim-school-accusing-it-of-promoting-Islamism.html> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁸⁵ Calderwood, Imogen. (2015). "French women furious after 'Muslim girl-gang' attacks 'immoral' sunbather". *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3175959/Girl-gang-attacks-immoral-sunbather-wearing-bikini-French-park-sparking-JeSuisCharlie-style-social-media-campaign.html> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁸⁶ Bowcott, Owen. "Arrest extremist marchers, police told".

¹⁸⁷ Millet, Richard. (2012). "Hezbollah marches through London again on Al Quds Day". Richard Millet's Blog. <https://richardmillet.wordpress.com/2012/08/17/hezbollah-marches-through-london-again-on-al-quds-day/> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁸⁸ "Locals concerned as 'Sharia police' patrol streets of German city". *Deutsche Welle*. <http://www.dw.com/en/locals-concerned-as-sharia-police-patrol-streets-of-german-city/a-17904887> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁸⁹ Kern, Soeren. (2011). *Europe: 'You Are Entering A Sharia Controlled Zone'*. Gatestone Institute. International Policy Council, NY.

their acts. Certainly, shouting “Allah Ahkbar” is not and cannot be associated to terrorism. Also, at least in a number of circumstances, we know that perpetrators might have nothing to do with violent visions of Islam. We are also aware that a number of them suffered from mental issues and that religion was not even an important part of their lives. Yet again, with a degree of vagueness, we still decided to take into account perpetrators’ self-proclaimed and alleged religious motivations.

Considering such clarifications, 40 of our selected 58 attacks (69%) have taken place in the last two years. Home of the largest Muslim community in Western Europe with almost 5 million Muslims,¹⁹⁰ France has witnessed the highest number of attacks (23/58, 40% of the total). The UK has been the second most preferred target, featuring 13 incidents. In this chart, Germany ranks third (7/58), followed by Belgium (6/58), Spain and Sweden (2/58 each). Denmark, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Italy, and Finland have registered 1 incident so far. Overall, there have been 675 victims and more than 4,300 injuries. Although France has suffered the highest amount of casualties, Spain has experienced the deadliest attack on the European soil, counting 191 fatalities and 1,800 injuries following a series of train bombings in Madrid in 2004.

Until 2012, aggressors were mainly linked to terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, and Hezbollah, from which they were recruited, trained, and, probably at times, even directed. Starting in 2014, coinciding with the rise of the Islamic State, almost every incident has even been directly connected to ISIS. Out of all the attacks allegedly linked to the Caliphate (more than 30), at least 22 have been carried out by lone-wolves allegedly self-radicalised through ISIS’s propaganda. The group has been the most prolific organisation inspiring and/or supporting terrorism in Europe since 9/11.

¹⁹⁰ Hackett, Conrad. (2016). *5 Facts About the Muslim Population in Europe*. Pew Research Center, Washington DC.

Table 1. List of Jihadist-related attacks in the European Union and the UK since 2001.

Date and location of Attack	# of Victims (including the attackers)	# of Injuries	Affiliation (formal, presumed or unofficial)*	Type of Perpetrator**
1) 11/03/2004, Madrid bombings (Spain)	191	1,800	Al-Qaeda	Cell/group
2) 2/11/2004, Theo Van Gogh murder, Amsterdam (Holland)	1	0	Hofstad Network	Lone
3) 07/07/2007, London bombings (UK)	53	700	Al-Qaeda	Cell/group
4) 21/07/2007, London bombings (UK)	0	1	Al-Qaeda	Cell/group
5) 30/05/2007, Glasgow Airport attack (UK)	0	5	Al-Qaeda	Cell/group
6) 22/05/2008, Giraffe Restaurant failed nail-bomb attack, Exeter (UK)	0	1	-	Lone
7) 12/10/2009, Milan (Italy)	0	2	-	Lone
8) 14/05/2010, MP Timms stabbing, (UK)	0	1	-	Lone
9) 11/12/2010, Stockholm bombings (Sweden)	1	2	-	Lone
10) 02/03/2011, Frankfurt Airport shooting (Germany)	2	2	-	Lone
11) 11-19/03/2012, Toulouse and Montauban shootings (France)	7	5	Al-Qaeda	Lone
12) 18/07/2012, Burgas bus bombing (Bulgaria)	7	32	Hezbollah	Lone
13) 22/05/2013, Woolwich murder (UK)	1	0	Al-Shabab	Cell/group
14) 25/03/2013, La Défense attack, Paris (France)	0	1	-	Lone
15) 24/05/2014, Jewish museum of Belgium shooting (Belgium)	4	0	ISIS	Lone
16) 20/12/2014, Joués-lès-Tours stabbings (France)	1	3	ISIS	Lone
17) 21/12/2014, Dijon attacks (France)	0	11	-	Lone

18) 07-09/01/2015, Charlie Hebdo and Jewish supermarket attack Paris (France)	20	22	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	Cell/group
19) 03/02/2015 Jewish community Centre Stabbing, Nice (France)	0	3	-	Lone
20) 14-15/02/2015, Copenhagen attacks (Denmark)	2	5	-	Lone
21) 19/04/2015, Châtelain murder (France)	1	0	-	Lone
22) 26/06/2015, Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attack (France)	1	2	ISIS	Lone
23) 21/08/2015, Oignes Train Attack (France)	0	4	ISIS	Lone
24) 17/09/2015, Stabbing of Spandau policewoman, Berlin (Germany)	1	1	-	Lone
25) 13-14/11/2015, Paris & Saint-Denis attacks (France)	137	368	ISIS	Cell/group
26) 05/12/2015, Leytonstone subway stabbing, London, (UK)	0	1	-	Lone
27) 01/01/2016, Mosque and Soldier Vehicle Ramming, Valence (France)	0	5	ISIS (?)	Lone
28) 07/01/2016, Paris police station attack (France)	1	0	ISIS	Lone
29) 11/01/2016, Jewish teacher machete attack, Marseille (France)	0	1	ISIS	Lone
30) 18/02/2016, Bangladeshi Imam Bludgeoning, Rochdale (UK)	1	0	ISIS	Cell/group
31) 26/02/2016, Train station Stabbing, Hanover (Germany)	0	1	ISIS	Lone
32) 22/03/2016, Brussels bombings (Belgium)	35	340	ISIS	Cell/group
33) 16/04/2016, Sikh Temple bombing, Essen (Germany)	0	3	ISIS	Cell/group
34) 13/06/2016, Magnaville stabbing attacks (France)	3	0	ISIS	Lone
35) 14/07/2016, Nice truck attack (France)	87	434	ISIS	Lone
36) 18/07/2016, Würzburg train attack (Germany)	1	5	ISIS	Lone

37) 25/07/2016, Ansbach bombing (Germany)	1	15	ISIS	Lone
38) 26/07/2016, Normandy church attack, Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray (France)	3	3	ISIS	Cell/group
39) 06/08/2016, Charleroi Machete attack on police, Charleroi (Belgium)	1	2	ISIS	Lone
40) 04/09/2016, Osny Prison Melee attack, Osny (France)	0	3	-	Lone
41) 05/10/2016, Double stabbing of Schaerbeek police officers, Brussels (Belgium)	0	4	-	Lone
42) 19/12/2016, Berlin Christmas market attack (Germany)	12	56	ISIS	Lone
43) 03/02/2017, Louvre machete attacks, Paris (France)	0	2	ISIS	Lone
44) 18/03/2017, Orly Airport Attack, Orly (France)	1	0	ISIS (?)	Lone
45) 22/03/2017, Westminster attack, London (UK)	6	49	ISIS	Lone
46) 07/04/2017, Stockholm truck attack (Sweden)	5	14	ISIS	Lone
47) 20/04/2017, Shooting of Champs-Élysées Police officer, Paris (France)	1	3	ISIS(?)	Cell/group
48) 22/05/2017, Manchester arena bombing (UK)	23	250	ISIS	Lone
49) 03/06/2017, London Bridge attacks (UK)	11	48	ISIS	Cell/group
50) 06/06/2017, Notre-Dame police officers' hummer attack, Paris (France)	0	2	ISIS	Lone
51) 19/06/2017, Champs-Élysées Police Vehicle car attack, Paris (France)	1	0	ISIS (?)	Lone
52) 20/06/2017, Brussels Central Train Station bombing (Belgium)	1	0	?	Lone
53) 17/08/2017, Catalonia attacks, Barcelona and Cambrils (Spain)	24	152	ISIS	Cell/group

55) 18/08/2017, Turku knife attack (Finland)	2	5	?	Lone
55) 25/08/2017, Buckingham Palace sword attack, London (UK)	0	3	?	Lone
56) 25/08/2017, Brussels Patrol Unit knife attack (Belgium)	1	2	?	Lone
57) 15/09/2017, Parsons Green “Bucket Bomb” attack, London (UK)	0	30	?	Lone
58) 01/08/2017, Marseille Central Train station knife attack, France	3	0	ISIS	Lone (?)
TOTAL OF ATTACKS	VICTIMS: 675	INJURIES: > 4,300		

*This includes official, proven affiliation to terrorist groups; alleged, believed affiliations that are still investigated; unofficial affiliations given the fact that a number of perpetrators had no direct link with terrorist organisations, but claimed to be inspired by them and terrorist organisations claimed responsibility for the attack.

**This is meant at the time of the attack, if the perpetrator carried out operations alone or in group –for follow-up investigations have often proved several lone actors had culprits or where somehow assisted by third actors.

All in all, perpetrators either held citizenship of the country they attacked or had been living there or in other European countries for a number of years/months. The last two years have seen the emergence of foreign nationals, including asylum-seeking refugees, as the perpetrators of terrorist attacks –just like in Germany, Sweden, and Finland.¹⁹¹ Lone actors have carried out 76% of the total attacks (44/58). Aggressions have featured suicide operations, hostage kidnapping, and targeted assassinations; have made use of bombings, stabbings, gunfights, and hijacking of cars and trucks to drive into crowds of people; have targeted soldiers, law enforcement officers, politicians, professionals, and innocent civilians; have been executed in public areas (like stations, airports, factories, workplaces, boulevards) or even at peoples’ home doorsteps.

Besides the above-mentioned attacks, Europe also counts dozens of Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked thwarted plots. Among the most spectacular were the 2006-foiled plans to explode 10 trans-Atlantic

¹⁹¹ For more information about the Wurzburg attack, please see: Oltermann, Philip. (2016). “Germany’s first attack by radicalised asylum seeker alarms officials”. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/germany-train-attack-could-prompt-rethink-of-counter-terrorism-policy> accessed on 15 June 2017; for more information about the Ansbach attack, please see: Weaver, Matthew. (2016). “Ansach bombing: attacker pledged allegiance to Isis, says official-as it happened”. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/25/ansbach-explosion-german-town-deliberate-blast-latest> accessed on 15 June 2017; for more information about the Stockholm attack, please see: Anderson, Christina. (2017). “Stockholm Suspect Was Denied Asylum and Told to Leave in ‘16”. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/world/europe/sweden-truck-attack.html?_r=0 accessed on 15 June 2017; for more information about the Turku attack, please see Slawson, Nicola. (2017). “Finland knife attacker ‘targeted women’”. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/19/finland-police-believe-turku-knife-attack-was-terrorism> accessed on 29 August 2017.

airplanes carrying passengers to North America from the UK,¹⁹² and the 2014 alleged plans to detonate five British passenger planes bound for major European destinations in a “Christmas spectacular.”¹⁹³ In 2010 authorities thwarted a plot envisioning Mumbai-style commando attacks in cities in Germany, France, and Britain.¹⁹⁴ In 2014, Jihadist terrorists wanted to attack the Eiffel Tower, the Louvre Museum, and nuclear plant in France.¹⁹⁵ In 2015 a terrorist cell based in Sardinia had previously intended to attack Vatican City.¹⁹⁶ In the same year, ISIS members were accused of plotting attacks against Munich train stations on New Year’s Eve.¹⁹⁷ In 2016 French authorities arrested three ISIS-affiliated women after their attempted car bombing at the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris.¹⁹⁸

Preoccupation over Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is also given by the potential return of those European foreign fighters who have joined the Islamic State. According to a 2015 study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), almost 4,000 foreign fighters left from Europe to join Isis in the Middle East.¹⁹⁹ The largest European countries, France, Germany, and Britain, have also provided the largest numbers of fighters. For instance, France has provided ISIS with 1,200 fighters, Germany 900,²⁰⁰ Belgium 450,²⁰¹ and the UK 850.²⁰² But in relation to the country’s population size, the most affected countries are Belgium (more than 40 per capita), Denmark (100-150, 27 per capita) and Sweden (150-180, 19 per capita). Given such numbers, European authorities have been growing preoccupied over the possible return of belligerent Jihadists that could mount attacks in their homelands, as it was the case for the Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting and the Saint-Quentin-

¹⁹² (2006). “Police: Plot to blow up aircraft foiled”. CNN. <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/10/uk.terror/> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁹³ Macintyre, Donal. (2014). “Exclusive: Al Qaeda plot to blow up 5 passengers planes in Christmas ‘spectacular’”. *Daily Express*. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/541725/REVEALED-Al-Qaeda-plot-to-blow-up-5-European-passenger-jets-in-Christmas-spectacular> accessed on 12 July 2017.

¹⁹⁴ Norton-Taylor, Richard. (2010). “‘Mumbai-style’ terror attack on UK, France, Germany foiled”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁹⁵ Samuel, Henry. (2014). “Islamist plot to blow up Eiffel Tower, Louvre, and nuclear power plant foiled, say French police”. *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10956636/Islamist-plot-to-blow-up-Eiffel-Tower-Louvre-and-nuclear-power-plant-foiled-say-French-police.html> accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁹⁶ Custodero, Alberto. “Blitz against al-Qaeda in Italy”.

¹⁹⁷ Millward, David. (2016). “Munich terror alert: Two railway stations ‘evacuated’ as German police warn of threat by Islamic State suicide bombers”. *The Telegraph*.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12077040/Munich-terror-alert-train-stations-evacuated.html> accessed on 15 June 2017.

¹⁹⁸ Chrisafi, Angélique. (2016). “Cell of French women guided by ISIS behind failed Notre Dame attack”. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/09/cell-of-french-women-radicalised-by-isis-behind-failed-notre-dame-attack> accessed on 15 June 2017.

¹⁹⁹ Neumann, Peter. *Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000*.

²⁰⁰ Heinke, Daniel. (2017). “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq; The Updated Data and Its Implications”. CTC Sentinel 10: 3.

²⁰¹ Van Ostayen, Pieter. (2016). “Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks”. CTC Sentinel 9:6.

²⁰² (2017). “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?” BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985> accessed on 25 April 2017.

Fallavier attack. In fact, in both instances in Belgium and France, attackers had previously travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS, had spent large periods of time in the region, and eventually brought the war home.²⁰³

In light of the provided evidence, it is no surprise, then, that several institutional and political figures have also expressed their concern over the potential bond between Islamist radicalisation and the chance of terrorist attacks. Following the 07/07 London bombings, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, then head of the MI5, warned an increasing number of individuals were “moving from passive sympathy toward active terrorism through being radicalised and indoctrinated by friends, families, in organised training events here [in the UK] and overseas, by images on television, through chat rooms and Web sites on the Internet.”²⁰⁴ At the time of such statement, Dame Manningham-Buller referred to nearly 30 AQ-inspired plots planned by British foot soldiers to cause casualties and endanger Britain’s economy, reinforcing the then PM Tony Blair’s beliefs that the threat from Islamist home-grown terrorism would last a generation.²⁰⁵ Perhaps even more alarmingly, following the Woolwich attack – the murder of British soldier Drummer Lee Rigby by two Jihadist terrorists- the then UK Home Secretary Theresa May warned that thousands of people were potentially at risk of being radicalised and “[the UK government] need[s] to see if there are additional steps we should be taking to prevent radicalisation.”²⁰⁶

Distress over the threat of home-grown terrorism has instigated several other reports from the UK²⁰⁷ and elsewhere, specifically designed to prevent radicalisation.²⁰⁸ Keenly attempting to shed light upon the relation between radicalisation and home-grown terrorism, the EU also birthed numerous

²⁰³ (2014). “Brussels Jewish Museum killing: Suspect ‘admitted attack’”. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27654505> accessed on 13 July 2017; Dearden, Lizzie. (2015). “‘Isis’ French factory attack”. *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/grenoble-isis-beheading-live-updates-french-factory-attack-10347351.html> accessed on 13 July 2017.

²⁰⁴ Manningham-Buller, Eliza. (2006). In Cowell, Alan. “Blair Says Homegrown Terrorism Is Generation-Long Struggle”. *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/11/world/europe/11britain.html?_r=0, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²⁰⁵ Blair, Tony. In Cowell, Alan. “Blair Says Homegrown Terrorism Is Generation-Long Struggle”.

²⁰⁶ May, Theresa. (2013). In “Woolwich murder probe: ‘Thousands’ at risk of radicalisation, says Theresa May”. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22671619>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²⁰⁷ Numerous were the reports and investigations in the UK, among which: House of Commons [1087]. (2006). *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*; HM Government [CM 8092]. (2011). *Prevent Strategy*; Christmann, Kris. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. (2012). *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*; House of Commons [HC 1446]. (2012). *Roots of violent radicalisation*; HM Government. (2013). *Tackling extremism in the UK*.

²⁰⁸ Pretch Tomas. (2007). *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe*. Danish Ministry of Justice; United Nations, co-Chairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism. (2008). *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism the Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*; Tinka Velhius, Jorgen Staun. (2009). *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport. State of Lower of Saxony. (2012). *Radicalisation Processes in the Context of Islamic Extremism and Terrorism*.

important studies and reports to better understand and tackle the issue of Islamist radicalisation.²⁰⁹ Yet, in spite of considerable efforts, ten years after the Madrid bombings, the then British PM David Cameron had argued radicalisation and Islamist extremism were still a main issue,²¹⁰ while in the wake of the events of Charlie Hebdo, the then French PM Manuel Valls conveyed that France “is at war against terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islam, against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity, freedom, and solidarity.”²¹¹ Echoing such sentiments, EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles De Kerchove admitted that:

The terror threat is still present in Europe [although] we now have franchises of Al Qaeda everywhere in the world. We have seen some lone wolves –people acting by themselves with no link to Al Qaeda core. And we have recently seen a rise of Europeans going to Syria –going there to fight. And that raises a specific security challenge.²¹²

In regard to European mujahedeen entering the Syrian civil conflict, former PMs Tony Blair²¹³ and David Cameron,²¹⁴ along with French,²¹⁵ Dutch and German authorities,²¹⁶ have shown serious worries over the risk of return of European fighters to their home countries. According to Cressida Dick, the Metropolitan Police’s assistant commissioner and head of specialist operations at the time, Britain

²⁰⁹ For further information, please consult: European Union Council Decision. (2007). *Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security related risks*. 124/EC, Euratom; European Commission. (2010). *The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges*. COM 386; Council of the European Union. (2011). *EU Action Plan on combating terrorism*. 15893/1/10; Malmstrom, Cecilia. (2011). In European Commission. *Europe needs to step-up its efforts to fight violent extremism*. Speech/11/586; European Commission. (2011). *Internal Security*. Special Eurobarometer 371; RAN. (2014) *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response*; European Parliament. (2014). *Preventing and countering youth radicalisation in the EU*. PE 509.977.

²¹⁰ Cameron, David. In “David Cameron: Speech on radicalisation and Islamic extremism”. *New Statesman*. (5 February 2011). <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²¹¹ Valls, Manuel. (2015). In Bilefsky, Dan. “French Premier Declares ‘War’ On Radical Islam”. *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html?_r=0 accessed on 13 July 2017.

²¹² Gilles De Kerchove. (2014). In Riebert, Bernd. “De Kerchove: ‘Terror threat still present in Europe’”. *Deutsche Welle*. <http://www.dw.de/de-kerchove-terror-threat-still-present-in-europe/a-17486669>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²¹³ Blair, Tony. (2014). In Sparrow, Andrew. “Tony’s Blair speech calling for global drive to fight Islamist extremism”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2014/apr/23/tony-blairs-speech-calling-for-west-to-fight-islamist-extremism-reaction-politics-live-blog>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²¹⁴ Cameron, David. (2014). In McTague, Tom. “‘Islamic militants in Iraq planning to attack us here in the United Kingdom’: Cameron warns MPs of terror threat from Middle East”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2661159/Former-spy-chief-warns-young-men-leave-UK-jihadis-Europe-Iraqs-ambassador-U-S-claims-thousand-bin-Ladens-emerge-Isis.html>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²¹⁵ (2014). “After the arrest of Mehdi Nemmouche, the debate over French jihadists’ surveillance revamps” [French]. *Le Monde*. http://www.lemonde.fr/europeennes-2014/article/2014/06/01/la-tuerie-de-bruxelles-montre-la-realite-de-la-menace-djihadiste_4429880_4350146.html, accessed on 24 June 2017; Le Pen, Marine. (2012). In Schofield, Hugh. “Did France ignore the Islamic radical threat?” BBC News. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17476996>, accessed on 24 June 2017; Meichtry, Stacy. (2014). “France Fears Syria Is Becoming Terrorist Training Ground”. *The Wall Street Journal*. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304049904579517751693560582>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²¹⁶ (2013). “Netherlands, Germany alarmed over Islamist extremist”. *The Yurriyet Daily News*. <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/netherlands-germany-alarmed-over-islamist-extremists-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=42916>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

could feel long-term consequences of the Syrian conflict, as young British Muslims who have travelled there to fight might commit violence when they return.²¹⁷ Furthermore, as former head of counter-terrorism at MI6 Richard Barrett has declared, up to 300 people have already come back to the UK from Syria, but intelligence services have faced an impossible task in trying to track them. Bearing this in mind, Barrett then added:

If you imagine what it would cost to really look at 300 people in depth, clearly it would be completely impossible to do that, probably impossible even at a third of that number... With this whole business in Syria, although there is no linear projection from foreign fighters to domestic terrorists, it's inevitable that a number will fall into this category.²¹⁸

In conclusion, those who agree with Roy consider Islamist radicalisation as a key, potential element in leading to acts of terrorism, and particularly home-grown terrorism. In this screenplay, the actors are often disenfranchised and detached young Western Muslims who embrace hard-line visions of Islam. Through these, young Muslims might experience a process of radicalisation triggering, in rare instances, violence. In the end, for most proponents of Roy's theories, if Jihadist terrorism, including home-grown attacks, is a worrisome issue, then Islamist radicalisation is one of main issues to tackle.

Croft's Construction of the Islamist Radicalisation Threat

Juxtaposing Roy's supporters are those in line with Stuart Croft. To him, not only is fear of Islamist radicalisation exaggerated, but the very concept of radicalisation and its presumed association with terrorism is also flawed. In his distinguished book *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*, Croft holds the idea that "Britishness" has come to be constructed in contradistinction to a new Islamist terrorist "Other", in order to reinforce the sense of British identity, perceived to be under challenge. By applying ontological notions to the domain of security studies—that is, by focusing on the individual "Self" rather than the State-, Croft argues individual values and behaviours are inter-subjectively constructed, creating sets of identities, which are supposed to interact with one another either congruously or discordantly.

In terms of security, those identities that collide with the dominant one suffer a process of "insecuritization", by which the dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should

²¹⁷ Dick, Cressida. (2014). In "UK will count cost of Islamic extremism for 'many years', says Cressida Dick". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-extremism-for-many-years-says-cressida-dick>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

²¹⁸ Barrett, Richard. (2014). In "UK will count cost of Islamic extremism for 'many years', says Cressida Dick". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-extremism-for-many-years-says-cressida-dick>, accessed on 24 June 2017.

be designated, as those who are to be controlled, objectified, and feared –in other words, securitized. Such a process is justified by the need of a society to find antagonist forces in order to reinforce and reaffirm its sense of identity.²¹⁹ Therefore, societies need to construct a biographical narrative of continuity, rotate around networks that can be trusted, and act in accordance to “self-integrity”. That is, societies learn to be aware of what is acceptable and appropriate at all times and struggle against those “insecure” parts of mainstream society that collide with the dominant identity.²²⁰

That affirmed, Croft employs such ontological notions to describe the status of British Muslims since 9/11:

The contribution of ‘Britishness’ [meant to boost] the ontological security of some has necessitated the ontological securitization of others, specifically those known as ‘British Muslims’. That is, dominant notions of Britishness have been inter-subjectively understood and have become means of securitizing those categorized as ‘British Muslims.’²²¹

In detail, two pivotal events like 9/11 and the 07/07 attacks heralded the dichotomous construction of a new British “Self”²²² juxtaposed with a Muslim “Other”, later personified in “British Muslims”. As opposed to being considered as a constituent part of Britain, British Muslims have been portrayed as a separate identity by those “trust structures” from the political, religious, and media realms. According to some, not only did the media construct, shape, and aggravate the actual entity of the idea of radicalisation,²²³ but it also contributed to the marginalisation of British Muslims, linking Islamist radicalisation to terrorism.²²⁴ Therefore, conceived as living in a particular special and temporal space, alongside Britain, the mainstream Muslim community, and its youth in particular,²²⁵ became, eventually, a subject of fear and suspicion.²²⁶ This can be explained, indeed, by the need of society to provide social solidity vis-à-vis perceived existential threats to the dominant identity. In fact, although “Britishness” is in part defined by what it is against –here constructed as “Islamic terrorism”, Croft argues:

²¹⁹ Croft, Stuart. (2012). *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 5.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Croft, Stuart. (2012). “Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of British Muslims”. *Contemporary Security Policy*. Issue 32, Vol. 2. pp. 219-235.

²²² Croft, Stuart. *Securitizing Islam*. Ch. 3 and 4.

²²³ Hoskins Andrew, O’Loughlin, Ben. (2009). “Pre-mediating guilt: radicalisation and mediality in British news”. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. 2:1. pp. 81-93.

²²⁴ Hoskins, Andrew. O’Loughlin, Ben. (2009). “Media and the myth of radicalization”. *Media, War, and Conflict*. 2:2. pp. 107-110.

²²⁵ Lynch, Orla. (2013). “British Muslim youth: radicalisation, terrorism, and the construction of the “Other”. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. 6:2. pp. 241-261.

²²⁶ Croft, Stuart. *Securitizing Islam*. Ch. 5.

The fear of ‘British Muslims’ creating terrorist attacks against the self is not the key element, in all but a handful of cases. Rather, it is the sense that the ‘British Muslim’ other will be successful in its ‘confrontation’ with the ‘British identity’, thus depriving the self of key identity resources.²²⁷

In spite of the imaging of an enormous and unprecedented threat posed by Islamist terrorism,²²⁸ Croft holds the crucial underlying factor is not terrorism *per se*, but the dominant British identity’s dread of the Islamisation of the country.²²⁹ Such timorousness, in the end, justifies the process of “insecuritization” of the constructed idea of “British Muslims”, which results in their control and final securitization. By applying this angle to matters of Islamist radicalisation and home-grown terrorism, Croft shows the core issue lies at the very base of the debate. Islamist radicalisation and terrorism remain pressing issues, but undue worries over their symbiotic relation have been exaggerated to successfully construct a certain vision of Muslims, which eventually led to the securitization of Islam and the whole Islamic community. Put poorly, it is not about Islamist radicalisation causing terrorism, but, rather, it is about the struggle for identity and how Islam in the UK is being securitized under the banner of security to boost the idea of “Britishness”.

Croft’s theory about the securitization of Islam is welcomed among other experts. Harvard University professor Jocelyne Cesari’s work can be regarded as a sort of antechamber to Croft’s oeuvre. Three years prior to Croft’s *Securitizing Islam*, Cesari illustrated how the securitization of Islam in Europe, in response to the perceived threat coming from Islamist terrorism, was not merely a speech act, but a true policy-making process affecting the making of immigration laws, multicultural policies, and security policies.²³⁰ Yet, unlike Luca Mavelli’s theory about the need to defend a secular religious subjectivity from Islam,²³¹ Cesari’s underlying reason for the justification of the securitization of Islam springs from the actual European unwillingness to come to terms with its presence in Europe:

Islam is still seen as a dangerous and alien religion. Coming to terms with Islam would mean for Europeans to acknowledge their own restrictive conception of religion vis-à-vis civil society and citizenship. This would require a paradigm shift that Europe does not yet seem ready to accept.²³²

²²⁷ Croft, Stuart. “Constructing Ontological Insecurity”. p. 228.

²²⁸ Croft Stuart. “Constructing Ontological Insecurity”. p. 231.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Cesari, Jocelyne.(2009). *The Securitization of Islam in Europe*. CEPS Challenge. Research Paper n.14. p. 1.

²³¹ Mavelli, Luca. (2013). “Between Normalisation and Exception: The Securitization of Islam and the Construction of the Secular Subject”. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*. 41:2. pp. 159-181.

²³² Cesari, Jocelyne. *The Securitization of Islam in Europe*. p. 13.

This rejection and fear to accept Islam as a cardinal entity in European societies is a product of the so-called Islamophobia phenomenon. According to Tahir Abbas, particularly disseminated by the media after 9/11, erroneous political and cultural misinterpretations of Islam created a symbiotic relation between radicalisation and Islam and violence and Islam²³³, inciting feelings of fear towards Islam.²³⁴ Accordingly, such daunted sentiments aim to hide envy for a few Muslims' success in society. They turn a blind eye to larger questions of contested foreign policy,²³⁵ issues of Muslim integration, and social, economical, and cultural alienation featured in imperfect multicultural societies.²³⁶ And they normalise and justify the process of the securitization of Islam. To Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin, the very concept of radicalisation is nothing but a myth created by the media.²³⁷

As per Cesari, whilst empirical evidence shows most Muslims are willing to make accommodations in their practices to fit into Western society, "the process of securitization, [which] involves actors who propose that Islam is an existential threat to European political and secular norms...justifies extraordinary measures against it [Islam and the Muslim community]."²³⁸ Practically speaking, such exceptional measures translate into the hardening of the discourse on Muslim immigration, the needs of the Islamic community, and a number of anti-terrorism policies. Equally to Tahir's analysis, Cesari's sums up her main point as such:

The European state views Muslim groups as a threat to its survival and takes measures to reassure citizens that it will not allow the incubation of terrorism. However, the politicisation of religion essentially impoverishes and threatens its survival, leading devout Muslims to feel resentful of the interference of non-religious actors. Thus, the measures intended to prevent radicalisation actually engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism. This is the process of securitization.²³⁹

²³³ Roy and his supporters do not argue for an association between ideology, in this case Islam, and violence, as ideology is indubitably important but not sufficient to trigger terrorism (see works by Sageman and Horgan featuring the terrorists' profiles in which degree of religiousness are not universally shared, as terrorists were not particularly religious). Yet, the point Abbas and others make is that deviant interpretations of Islam, especially in the media, have created the connection between Islam and radicalisation and Islam and violence, promoting, in the end, feelings of Islamophobia.

²³⁴ Abbas, Tahir. (2012). "The symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalisation". *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. 5:3. pp. 345-358.

²³⁵ Brighton, Shane. (2007). "British Muslims, multiculturalism, and UK foreign policy: 'integration' and 'cohesion' in and beyond the state". *International Affairs*. 83:1. pp. 1-17.

²³⁶ Abbas, Tahir. "The Symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalisation". For further information about Islamophobic attitudes being associated, in particular, to the radicalisation of Muslim youths, please consult Salahi, Reem. (2009). "Muslim Youth Radicalization or Politically Correct Islamophobia?" *The Huffington Post*.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reem-salahi/muslim-youth-radicalization_b_405055.html, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²³⁷ Hoskins, Andrew. O'Loughlin, Ben (2009). "Media and the myth of radicalization." *Media, War, and Conflict*. 2:2. pp.107-110.

²³⁸ Cesari, Jocelyne. *The Securitization of Islam in Europe*. p. 1.

²³⁹ Ibid.

Therefore, in regard to Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, not only is the theory linking the latter two inflated –being the product of muddled conventional wisdom²⁴⁰ and Islamophobic feelings that spawned myths of radicalisation and the securitization of Islam²⁴¹; also, its unquestioned support is counterproductive and dangerous, as these sentiments of Islamophobia could backfire and push, *de facto*, Muslims towards radicalisation –resulting in the alienation of entire communities regardless of their invaluable partnership and support in governments’ counter-terrorist efforts.²⁴²

This could be an ironic outcome, especially given that facts show radicalisation is not widespread among Muslims. The Gallup survey on the global Muslim population by John L. Esposito and Galia Mogahed -the most comprehensive study of its kind, representing 90% of its population- demonstrates that Muslims are not as radicalised as expected. Muslims and Americans -and Westerners as a whole- are not intrinsically different when it comes to what matters most in life. Findings illustrate the two share the same desires and aspirations for a better tomorrow. When asked to describe their dreams for the future, the majority of Muslims would not mention fighting in a “Jihad”, but, rather, finding a better job.²⁴³

Along these lines, research by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris shows basic cultural values of Muslim migrants evolve to conform to the predominant culture of the European society in which they live, as Islam is neither an exclusive identity nor a marching order.²⁴⁴ Although they proudly maintain their religious credo, most European Muslims happily combine their national and religious identities- as demonstrated by Muslims’ increasing role in society, the mushrooming of multicultural

²⁴⁰ Githens-Mazer, Jonathan, Lambert, Robert. (2010). “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse”. *International Affairs*. 86:4. pp. 889-901.

²⁴¹ Kundnani, Arun. (2014). “Boris Johnson’s Radicalization Myth-Making”. *The Huffington Post*. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/arun-kundnani/boris-johnsons-radicalisation_b_4896120.html, accessed on 03 July 2017; For further discussion and information about the debate over Islamophobia in Europe, please consult Burke, Jason, Traynor, Ian. (2009). “Fears of an Islamic revolt in Europe begin to fade”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/26/radicalisation-european-muslims>, accessed on 28 June 2017; Vaisse, Justin. (2010). “Eurabian Follies”. *Foreign Policy*. January/February Issue.

²⁴² For further reading about how the British and the U.S. government enlarged the gap with their Islamic communities, please consult Mamdani, Mahmood. (2002). “Good Muslims, Bad Muslims: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism”. *American Anthropologist*. 104:3. pp. 766-775; Bux, Shahid. (2007). “Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalisation: Addressing some Myths”. *The Police Journal*. Vol. 80. pp. 267-278; Patel, Faiza. (2011). “Rethinking Radicalization”. Brennan Center for Justice. New York University School of Law.

²⁴³ Esposito, John. Mogahed, Galia. (2008). In “Press Release for *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*”. Gallup Center. <http://www.gallup.com/press/104206/who-speaks-islam.aspx#1>, accessed on 28 June 2017.

²⁴⁴ Inglehart, Ronald, Pippa, Norris. (2009). “Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destination.” Harvard Kennedy School.

organizations promoting dialogue, and the rise of interfaith marriages between Christians and Muslims, especially in Britain.²⁴⁵

More importantly, most Muslims have fiercely condemned violence and terrorism. As illustrated in the Gallup survey, Muslims and Americans are equally likely to reject attacks on civilians, for they are morally unjustifiable. In reality, those who condone acts of terrorism are a minority and are no more likely to be religious than the rest of the population, argue Esposito and Mogahed.²⁴⁶ Accordingly, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, hordes of outraged French Muslims have demonstrated at Champs-Élysées, all over France,²⁴⁷ and in other parts of Europe against Islamist terrorism and ISIS, through the slogan, “Not in my name.”²⁴⁸ Analogously, multiple British Muslim leaders have come together in an online video to openly condemn Jihadist violence and the Caliphate.²⁴⁹ One of them, a prominent cleric named Tahir ul-Qadri, has even launched an anti-ISIS “counter-terrorism curriculum” in London to be taught both in Muslim institutions and British schools. Ul-Qadri’s intention is to:

Make clear that all activities carried out by Is or any other terroristic or extremist organisation either in the name of God or religion or establishing any kind of Islamic state by acts of violence...are totally in violation of the Quran and Islam. The children who are going to Isis and fighting over there and leaving the comforts of their own British society, they are going to hell.²⁵⁰

Such outcries against radical visions and violent acts in the name of Islam by European Muslims challenge claims of their religion’s incompatibility with Western values.²⁵¹ As British polls from 2012 show, in spite of many difficulties, 83% of British Muslims are proud to be Muslim citizens, 77% of

²⁴⁵ Millington, Karen. (2013). “What happens when Muslims and Christians tie the knot?” BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/0/24338285> accessed on 28 June 2017.

²⁴⁶ Esposito, John. Mogahed, Galia. “Press Release”.

²⁴⁷ (2015). “Millions across France join ‘unprecedented’ rallies against terrorism”. France 24. <http://www.france24.com/en/20150111-france-demonstration-paris-attack-rally-unprecedented-turnout> accessed on 28 June 2017.

²⁴⁸ (2014). “#NotInMyName: Young British Muslims stand up to Isis in online campaign”. *Mirror*. <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/notinmyname-young-british-muslims-stand-4274392> accessed on 15 July 2017.

²⁴⁹ (2014). “UK Imams Against Isis”. Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Bd0Y6qWmlA> accessed on 15 July 2017.

²⁵⁰ Ul-Qadri, Tahir. (2015). In Holden, Michael. “Pakistani cleric launches anti-ISIS curriculum in Britain”. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/23/britain-security-curriculum-idUSL8N0Z92Y720150623> accessed on 15 July 2017.

²⁵¹ For more information about polls in Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany showing how non-Muslims claimed that Islam is not compatible with mainstream society, please see: YouGov-Cambridge Programme. (2015). In Rogers, Joel. “The majority of voters doubt that Islam is compatible with British values”. *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/politics-blog/11503493/The-majority-of-voters-doubt-that-Islam-is-compatible-with-British-values.html> accessed on 12 July 2017; Conger, George. (2006). “Most Dutch say Islam incompatible with West”. *The Jerusalem Post*. <http://www.jpost.com/International/Most-Dutch-say-Islam-incompatible-with-West> accessed on 12 July 2017; Vopel, Stefan. (2015). *Religion Monitor. Understanding common ground. Special study of Islam*. Bertelsmann Stiftung Foundation.

them strongly identify with Britain, 86.4% feel they belong in Britain, and 82% want to live in diverse and mixed neighbourhoods.²⁵² In France there are more Muslims in the army, the police, and the gendarmes than in the al-Qaeda network, as the case of Ahmed Merabet demonstrates.²⁵³ As a Muslim police officer killed while defending Charlie Hebdo's offices, Merabet's heroic actions were revered by all of France, because, in his brother's words:

My brother was Muslim and was killed by two terrorists, two false Muslims. Islam is a religion of peace and love. As far as my brother's death is concerned, it was a waste. He was proud of the name Ahmed Merabet, proud to represent the police, and of defending the values of the Republic: liberty, equality, fraternity.²⁵⁴

These examples demonstrate that, "Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible", uniting people against violent extremism, had endorsed the then PM David Cameron in 2011.²⁵⁵

Even regardless of European Muslims being less radicalised than assumed, empirical evidence also seems to debunk the link between Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. First of all, high numbers of Muslims condemning terrorism can simply explain why there are not as many Islamist terrorist attacks as imagined, contends University of North Carolina professor Charles Kurzman. "If there are more than a billion Muslims in the world, many of whom supposedly hate the West and desire martyrdom", Kurzman asks, "why don't we see terrorist attacks everywhere, every day?"²⁵⁶ Then, Kurzman calculates that global Islamist terrorists have succeeded in recruiting fewer than 1 in 15,000 Muslims over the past 25 years, and fewer than 1 in 100,000 since 2001. This results into 1 in 100,000 Muslims being a terrorist, which still leaves approximately 15,000 terrorists from a global population of around 1.5 billion Muslims.²⁵⁷ Although Islamist terrorism should be taken as a serious peril, such a

²⁵² University of Essex. (2012). In Moosavi, Leon. "Muslims are well-integrated in Britain- but no one seems to believe it". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/jul/03/muslims-integrated-britain> accessed on 15 July 2017.

²⁵³ Roy, Olivier. "There Are More French Muslims Working For".

²⁵⁴ Merabet, Malek. (2015). In Graham-Harrison, Emma. "Paris policeman's brother: 'Islam is a religion of love'". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/charlie-hebdo-policeman-murder-ahmed-merabet> accessed on 15 July 2017.

²⁵⁵ Cameron, David. (2011). In Groves, Jason. "'We need to be a lot less tolerant towards Islamic extremists'". *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353902/David-Cameron-Stop-tolerating-Islamic-extremists-respect-British-core-values.html> accessed on 15 July 2017.

²⁵⁶ Kurzman, Charles. (2011). In Ross, Aaron. "Why Aren't There More Muslim Terrorists?". Princeton University's Loonwatch. <http://www.loonwatch.com/2011/08/book-review-the-missing-martyrs-by-charles-kurzman-2/>, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

threat should not be overblown because, “as it turns out, there just aren’t that many Muslims determined to kill us.”²⁵⁸

This appears to be the case in the United States. Out of more than 300 American deaths from political violence and mass shootings since 9/11, until 2013 only 33 have come at the hands of Muslim-Americans, asserted a report.²⁵⁹ During that period, instead, 180,000 Americans were murdered for reasons unrelated to terrorism.²⁶⁰ And between 1970 and 2011, non-Muslims were responsible for more than 90% of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Overall, 32% of the perpetrator groups were motivated by ethno-nationalist/separatist agendas, 28% by single issues, such as animal rights or opposition to war, 11% by right-wing extremists, 22% by left-wing extremists, and, finally, 7% by religious beliefs.²⁶¹ Within this, out of a total of 2,400 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 1970, Muslims carried out only 60 attacks, amounting to 2.5% of all terrorist incidents.²⁶² Such findings confirm Marquette University professor Risa Brooks’ assertion that the threat posed by Islamist radicalisation and home-grown terrorism in the United States has been greatly exaggerated.^{263 264} In her own words:

My conclusion should be generally reassuring to Americans: Muslim home-grown terrorism does not at present appear to constitute a serious threat to their welfare. Nor is there a significant analytical or evidentiary basis for anticipating that it will become one in the near future. It does not appear that Muslim Americans are increasingly motivated or capable of engaging in terrorist attacks against their fellow citizens and residents.²⁶⁵

Brooks concludes her analysis by warning about the risk from officials’ overstatements of the threat posed by radicalised Muslim Americans. To her, mischaracterizing this threat, in turn, is potentially costly and counterproductive for the security of the United States and the welfare of its citizens—in terms of economic spending, public resilience to terrorism, and alienation of the Muslim community.²⁶⁶

²⁵⁸ Ross, Aaron. (2011). “Why Aren’t There More Muslim Terrorists?”. Princeton University’s Loonewatch. <http://www.loonwatch.com/2011/08/book-review-the-missing-martyrs-by-charles-kurzman-2/>, accessed on 03 July 2014.

²⁵⁹ Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. (2013). In Cline, Seth. “The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: A New Threat Emerges”. U.S. News. <http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/02/26/the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing-a-new-threat-emerges>, accessed on 03 July 2014.

²⁶⁰ Kurzman, Charles. (2013). In “Non-Muslims Carried Out More Than 90% of All Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil”. Washington’s Blog. <http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/05/muslims-only-carried-out-2-5-percent-of-terrorist-attacks-on-u-s-soil-between-1970-and-2012.html>, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²⁶¹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. (2013). In “Non-Muslims Carried Out More Than 90% of All Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil”.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Brooks, Risa. (2011). “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?” *International Security*. Vol. 36, n. 2. pp. 4-47.

²⁶⁴ Brooks holds the increase in radicalisation-related arrests is not a proper indicator for evaluating the actual risk of Muslim radicalisation in America, as they could be the result of a clustering of arrests of those long engaged in militancy or the apprehension of large groups, such as the members of the Daniel Boyd network or the al-Shabab recruits.

²⁶⁵ Brooks, Risa. “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States”. p. 10.

²⁶⁶ Brooks, Risa. “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States”. pp. 42-47.

Similarly to their American counterparts, European reports too seem to challenge the alleged link between Islamist radicalisation and home-grown terrorism. In 2013, the Europol TE-SAT reported that, out of 219 terrorist attacks occurring in 2012, more than 70% were related to separatist terrorism (France and Spain registered the highest rates). By contrast, Jihadist terrorists had carried out 6 attacks on EU soil (compared to none in 2011), killing 8 people.²⁶⁷

Although Jihadist attacks and related offenses have sharply increased since then, the 2016 TE-SAT report confirmed once again that, “As in previous years, the attacks specifically classified as separatist terrorism accounted for the largest proportion”, with the UK, France, and Britain leading the chart.²⁶⁸ Conversely, acts of violence against Muslims, their properties, or their worship places by non-Muslims have been on the rise both in Europe^{269 270} and the United States -according to a FBI report, 2015 registered 257 incidents related to hate crimes against American Muslims, marking a 67% increase compared to the previous year.²⁷¹ In light of this, columnist Gary Younge conveys that, “Muslims are nowhere near the greatest terrorist threat... That doesn’t mean there isn’t a problem... But... put bluntly, if you have to assume anything when a bomb goes off in Europe, think region, not religion.”²⁷²

Finally, even anxiety over hostile Jihadists returning to Europe from Syria and Iraq might be overstated for a number of reasons. Firstly, studies of returning fighters fail to conclude that participation in foreign conflict increases involvement in terrorist activity on domestic soil.²⁷³ For instance, a 2014 project by Jeanine van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker analyses cases of foreign fighters returning from Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia. In spite of tentative evidence, the Dutch researchers present 8 possible pathways returning fighters can undertake, which not all necessarily entail violence. The study concludes that, “although there is reason for concern with regard to (potential) high numbers of returning Western foreign fighters from Syria, only having an eye for the worst-case scenario is a too

²⁶⁷ Europol. (2013). *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. TE-SAT Report. pp. 9-10

²⁶⁸ Europol. (2016). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. TE-SAT Report. pp. 10-11.

²⁶⁹ European Union Fundamental Rights Agency. (2013). *Fundamental Rights: Challenges and Achievements in 2012*. Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union. pp. 145-182;

²⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch. (2017). *World Report 2017: European Union*. New York, NY.

²⁷¹ FBI. (2015). *Hate Crime Statistics*. In Kishi, Katayoun. (2016). *Anti-Muslim assaults reach 9/11 era levels, FBI data show*. Pew Research Center, Washington DC.

²⁷² Younge, Gary. (2011). “Europe’s Homegrown Terrorists”. *The Nation*.

<http://www.thenation.com/article/162270/europes-homegrown-terrorists#>, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²⁷³ Hegghammer, Thomas. (2014). In McNeil Nillson Richard. “More radical approaches are needed by European governments”. *Your Middle East*. http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/the-west-should-not-fear-syrias-foreign-fighters_23696, accessed on 03 July 2017.

narrow focus to look at this multifaceted phenomenon.”²⁷⁴

Secondly, group and ideological fragmentation might limit chances of combat. Of all the European Jihadists entering Syria, writes Christoph Reuter, “only a fraction see battle [while] far more are building bases in the region.”²⁷⁵ Third, those who travelled abroad for Jihad might actually be less likely to focus on terrorist operations against the West, for they would detract attention from the more global brand of Jihad fighters propound, maintains Richard McNeil.²⁷⁶ Finally, as Peter McKay endorses, “the percentage of UK Muslims volunteering for Jihadism abroad is tiny. So is support for them in the Muslim community. The youngsters who volunteer are the exception, not the rule.”²⁷⁷

Last but not least, several epistemological ruminations of very term of radicalisation question the claims made by Roy’s adherents. As Mark Sedgwick endorses, the concept of radicalisation is *per se* a source of considerable confusion.²⁷⁸ To being with, as several scholars opine, confusion arises as to whom should be labelled “radical”.²⁷⁹ Further, the absence of a shared, universal definition of radicalisation is problematic, as it paves the way for subjective policies, as the Anglo-Saxon and the European approaches utterly demonstrate.²⁸⁰

Secondly, the concept of radicalisation is strictly connected to historical contexts and zeitgeists. Throughout history, those designed as “radicals” have gained both positive and negative connotations depending on their ultimate purpose and on their antagonist forces.²⁸¹ Thirdly, the idea of radicalisation is also shaped by societies’ different contexts (security, integration, and foreign policy), which are based on different agendas. Given that each agenda, however, uses the term “radical” to mean something different, the inevitable collision between these adds confusion to the concept of

²⁷⁴ De Roy van Zuijdewijn, Bakker, Edwin. (2014). “Returning Western foreign fighters”. International Centre for Counter-terrorism, The Hague. p. 10.

²⁷⁵ Reuter, Christoph. (2013). “Jihad Tourists: How Dangerous Are Syria’s Foreign Fighters?” *Der Spiegel*. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/syrian-jihadist-problem-is-real-but-reports-often-exaggerated-a-924900.html>, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²⁷⁶ McNeil Nillson Richard. “More radical approaches are needed by European governments”.

²⁷⁷ McKay, Peter. (2014). “Jihad and why young men love going to war”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2665368/PETER-McKAY-Jihad-young-men-love-going-war.html>, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²⁷⁸ Sedgwick, Marc. (2010). “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 22:4. pp. 479-494.

²⁷⁹ Moskalenko, Sophia, McCauley, Clark. (2009). “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 21. pp. 40; Bartlett, Jamie, Miller, Carl. (2012). “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 24:1. pp. 1-21.

²⁸⁰ Neumann, Peter. (2013). “The trouble with radicalization”. *International Affairs*. 89:4. pp. 873-893.

²⁸¹ Schmid, Alex. (2013). *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*. ICCT, The Hague; Neumann, Peter. (2008). “Introduction” In *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. p. 4.

radicalisation -as an agenda's definition of "radical" is unlikely to meet the other agendas' criteria to be defined as such.²⁸² Finally, just like governments struggle in their attempts to fully comprehend radicalisation, audiences too understand the concept in question subjectively. Although media outlets reach large audiences, studies show the public differs from official and media discourses on radicalisation, as individuals internalise the meaning of radicalisation according to their own lines of thought. This disjuncture creates a variegated, but more confusing mosaic of ideas of radicalisation.²⁸³

All in all, once again, when it comes to the relation between Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, such epistemological considerations prove the problem lies at the base of the debate. This is because the very concept of radicalisation cannot help being intrinsically confusing. Put plainly, confusion arises as for what radicalisation is, who is to be defined as "radical", how the term is shaped by time and different contexts/agenda, and how the public perceives it. In other words, the concept of radicalisation is relative and subjective.

Proving this point is the type of controversy surrounding the question of whether British Muslim organisations should receive governmental funds to counter radical views. As announced in the wake of the 07/07 bombings by Ruth Kelly, the then secretary for Communities and Local Government for the Labour Party, the agenda's conscious aim was to develop a sort of "British version of Islam", devoid of anti-Western sentiments and projected towards Muslims' integration.²⁸⁴ Hence, this "prevent" strategy commenced by the Labour Party and then continued by the Coalition government allowed several Muslim organisations to acquire taxpayers' money. Yet, as often reported by *The Telegraph*, in some cases, governmental funds ended up financing groups that actually promoted radical tenets of Islam or even displayed ties with radical and/or terrorist groups (the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, for instance).²⁸⁵ In light of such evidence, the then Home Secretary Theresa May was even forced to admit that "hundreds of thousands of pounds" were wasted in the name of prevention.²⁸⁶

Nevertheless, governmental response was mixed, for organisations like the Muslim Council of

²⁸² Sedgwick, Marc. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion".

²⁸³ O'Loughlin, Ben, Boudeau, Carole, Hoskins, Andrew, Holloway, Royal. (2011). "Distancing the extraordinary: Audience understandings of discourses of 'radicalization'". *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies*. 25:2. pp. 153-164.

²⁸⁴ Jones, Stephen. (2013). "New Labour and the Re-making of British Islam". *Religions*. Vol. 4, pp. 550-566.

²⁸⁵ Gilligan, Andrew. (2009). "Islamists who want to destroy the state get £100,000 funding". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/6427369/Islamists-who-want-to-destroy-the-state-get-100000-funding.html> accessed on 15 May 2017; Turner, Camilla. (2014). "Government donation to Muslim Charity Forum denounced as 'madness'". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11114599/Government-donation-to-Muslim-Charities-Forum-denounced-as-madness.html> accessed on 15 May 2017.

²⁸⁶ May, Theresa. (2011). "Islamist hatemongers funded by the taxpayer with money earmarked for schools". *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2000492/Theresa-May-admits-63m-terror-fighting-fund-GIVEN-extremist-groups.html> accessed on 15 May 2017.

Britain and the Muslim Charity Forum were stripped of their funds,²⁸⁷ while others considered as radical were not.²⁸⁸ In spite of harsh criticism and controversial proof of their radical nature, associations, groups, and schools have still continued to benefit from governmental funds. For example, the then PM David Cameron once criticised the Labour Government's financing of the Shakhsiyah Foundation for its "extremist links"; but his administration eventually granted state funds to a number of Muslim schools that the very act PM had already condemned for promoting anti-British sentiments.²⁸⁹ Not only does this sort of inconsistency show that the Labour and the Coalition governments interpreted the notion of radicalisation differently; it also demonstrates that even within the same administration uncertainty may arise as to what being radical actually means.

In order to avoid or decrease similar controversial cases caused by different interpretations of the notion of radicalisation, John Horgan argues for the need to focus on terrorist behaviour and terrorism. The study of radicalisation, endorses the scholar, "may ultimately prove unnecessary."²⁹⁰ Peter Neumann,²⁹¹ instead, opts for a more holistic approach to the study of radicalisation, equally emphasizing both extremist beliefs and behaviours to elucidate as much as possible radicalisation's labyrinthian nature.²⁹² Finally, Sedgwick recommends abandoning the use of radicalisation as an absolute concept, recognising at the same time its relativity and moulding by different contexts and agendas.²⁹³

In summary, those more in line with Croft²⁹⁴ disagree on the urgency surrounding the concept of Islamist radicalisation and its discussed correlation to terrorism. To them, radicalisation and the fear of Jihadist-inspired home-grown terrorism have been constructed to mask deeper issues such as identity struggle (as in the British case), socio-economic alienation and marginalisation, securitization of Islam, and feelings of Islamophobia fabricated by the media and institutional figures. Further, empirical

²⁸⁷ Phillips, Melanie. (2011). In "Islamist hatemongers"; Turner, Camilla. "Government donation to Muslim Charity"; Ross, Tim. (2015). "Muslim charity stripped of state funding over extremism fears". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/11337846/Muslim-charity-stripped-of-state-funding-over-extremism-fears.html> accessed on 15 May 2017.

²⁸⁸ Turner, Camilla. "Government donation to Muslim Charity"; Westrop, Samuel. (2015). *UK: Some Faiths are More Equal than Others*. Gatestone Institute. International Policy Council, NY.

²⁸⁹ Malnick, Edward. (2014). "Islamic schools condemned by Cameron receive state funding". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10706398/Islamic-schools-condemned-by-David-Cameron-receive-state-funding.html> accessed on 15 May 2017.

²⁹⁰ Horgan, John in Neumann, Peter. "The trouble with radicalization".

²⁹¹ As already specified in note n. 157, the adherence to Roy's and Croft's positions is not mutually exclusive and, certainly, Peter Neumann cannot be placed under Croft's umbrella, as, to him, radicalisation is truly a worrisome phenomenon. Yet, the reason why Neumann, along with Dr. Alex Schmid from note 281, is being used in this section derives from his valuable points about the trouble with radicalisation as a whole that can reinforce the argument Croft makes.

²⁹² Neumann, Peter. "The trouble with radicalization".

²⁹³ Sedgwick, Marc. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion". p. 491.

²⁹⁴ Except for Neumann and Schmid.

evidence shows Muslims hold less radical views than feared, Jihadist home-grown terrorist attacks are minimal when compared to other types of terrorism, and predictions of violence following Jihadists' return from Syria and Iraq seem less unlikely than envisioned. Lastly, some experts contend the main issue lies at the base of the debate, as the meaning of radicalisation is in itself problematic, relative, and misused.

In the end, for those under Croft's umbrella, radicalisation and terrorism remain considerable threats, but are, nonetheless, mythicized, overstated and exaggerated. In truth, the real matters are Europe's new racism, feelings of Islamophobia, controversial politicians, and "securocrats."²⁹⁵ As Reem Salahi vehemently puts it, the public should "stop parroting the misguided construct of homegrown terrorism and Islamic radicalization as the problem, when the real problem is xenophobia couched in politically correct terms."²⁹⁶

As illustrated in Chapter I, the points raised by Roy and Croft are source of heated discussion in Italy as well. As academics, politicians, and institutional figures choose their side, the study aims to discover which argument is ultimately right. Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy an urgent matter that ought to become one of the country's worst nightmares, especially if potentially linked to terrorism? Or is fear of radicalisation exaggerated and socially constructed to justify unjust policies against Italian Muslims? Before attempting to understand which of the two positions best fits the Italian case, it is paramount to delve into the literature survey about radicalisation. Ergo, the following chapter is dedicated to the elucidation of definitions and theories of Islamist radicalisation.

²⁹⁵ Younge, Gary. "Europe's Homegrown Terrorists"; Zogby, James. (2011). "Peter King Note: Islamophobia Can Create Radicalization". The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/peter-king-note-islamopho_b_831790.html, accessed on 03 July 2017; Jenkins, Simon. (2013). "The real threat to our way of life? Not terrorists or faraway dictators, but our own politicians and securocrats". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/27/real-threat-terrorist-politicians-national-security>, accessed on 03 July 2017.

²⁹⁶ Salahi, Reem. (2009). "Muslim Youth Radicalization or Politically Correct Islamophobia?" The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reem-salahi/muslim-youth-radicalizati_b_405055.html, accessed on 03 July 2017.

CHAPTER III: THE STUDY'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND DEFINITIONS

Defining “Islamist radicalisation” is an indubitably strenuous task. This happens because uncertainty surrounds the two elements of the equation, namely “Islamist” and “Radicalisation”. What does being an “Islamist” actually mean? What constitutes “Radicalisation”? How do “Islamist” and “Radicalisation” interact with each other? When can one spot instances of “Islamist radicalisation”? Before addressing the discussion on theories and causal models, the following section presents the debate on definitions and provides ground for the crafting of its operational definition of “Islamist radicalisation”.

Conceptual Framing and Definitions of “Islamist” in the Literature

As already mentioned in the Introduction,²⁹⁷ we recognise that we have taken for granted certain categories. For instance, as we asked for people’s opinions about violence in the name of Islam, we have taken for granted the concepts of “religion”, “being an Italian Muslim” or “being an Italian Muslim talking about violence in Islam”. Likewise, we are aware that there are major schools of Islamic jurisprudence that differ from one another. We also know that individuals internalise religion and sacred tenets differently. Most importantly, we know that we could have dedicated more emphasis to the conceptualisation of “Islamism”, “Wahabism”, “Salafism”, and to major theorists like Ibn Taymiyya, Hassan Al Banna, Sayyid Qubt, and Ruhollah Khomeini - none of them mentioned in this research.

Keeping this in mind, we still thought that an exhaustive discussion on the conceptualisation and on the journey of “Islamism” was not as pivotal for the sake of our study, which only focuses on what people think and why they might think that way. Although we did contextualise “Islamism” within the Italian milieu and we briefly touched upon the evolution of the concept in question, we mostly dedicated our efforts to define how we could identify “Islamist” manifestations. As such, this section features those definitions and academic ruminations that eventually allowed us to locate “Islamist” within our theoretical framework.

That clarified, the term “Islamist” stems from the word “Islamism”. As shown in the works by Martin Kramer and Mehdi Mozaffari, the term has changed its meaning and connotations multiple

²⁹⁷ Please see page 18.

times throughout history.²⁹⁸ Originally, “Islamism” had appeared in the 17th century in France and until WWI it has been used as a synonymous of Islam or belonging to the Islamic faith. The term acquired more political connotations following the 1979 Iranian revolution to stress the entrance of religious affairs into the political order. After being replaced by “political Islam”, “Islamic fundamentalism” and “radical Islam”, the term regained traction in the wake of 9/11 mainly to refer to revolutionary Muslim militants.

Since then, conceptualising “Islamism” continues to be a considerably challenging task. To begin with, as William Shepard et al note, in the post 9/11 era the term “has often acquired a quasi-criminal connotation close to that of political extremism, religious sectarianism, or bigotry, [whose] goals are often perceived merely as a series of violations of human rights and the rights of women.”²⁹⁹ The academic domain has struggled at conceptualising “Islamism” too. Frédéric Volpi argues that this is due to the inability of Western academia to address the concept critically. Despite a blossoming literature, Volpi claims that scholars often read Islam through the lenses of the “dominant” Western narrative, which ultimately offers different strands of analysis that solely depend on specific disciplines and research goals.³⁰⁰ This kind of approach makes “Islamism” relative and subject to one’s field of study -as pundits from post-colonial studies, international studies, sociology of religion, democratisation studies, multicultural studies, security studies, and globalisation studies might present different perspectives based on what they are exploring.³⁰¹

Such biased takes on “Islamism” might not allow Western scholars to fully appreciate the type of dynamic, transnational transformation Muslim politics are experiencing recounted by Peter Mandaville.³⁰² More than that, the common usage of “Islamism” adds uncertainty and takes for granted the complexity and multifaceted nature of practices and interpretations of Islam, notes Elizabeth Nugent. For instance, pondering over the term “Islamist”, Nugent writes:

Islamists can range from those that advocate for quietism, effecting gradual political change through internal individual reform, to political parties advocating for societal reform through social welfare and electoral contestation, to revolutionary militants that seek to overthrow illegitimate states and implement revolutionary change. Islamists range from those who root justifications of their political behaviour in personal and literalist interpretation of the textual

²⁹⁸ Kramer, Martin. (2003). “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?”. *The Middle East Quarterly*. Vo. 10, No. 2. pp. 65-77. Mozaffari, Mehdi. (2007). “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*. Vo. 8, No. 1. pp. 17-33.

²⁹⁹ Shepard, William et al. (2014). In Esposito, John. *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*. Oxford, Islamic Studies Online. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/print/opr/t236/e0888> accessed on 17 June 2017.

³⁰⁰ Volpi, Frédéric. (2010). *Political Islam Observed*. London: Hurst & Co. (Publishers). Introduction.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Mandaville, Peter. (2001). *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*. London: Routledge.

tradition, to those who rely on interpretations derived from independent reasoning and decision-making with a firm basis in established schools of Islamic legal theory.³⁰³

Subsuming the above-mentioned categories under a unique “Islamist” umbrella increases confusion as to what and whom should be considered “Islamist”, warns Nugent.³⁰⁴

To Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, this “sloppy language” disregards complexities and contexts and ends up alienating Muslims.³⁰⁵ Thus, it is no surprise that the Council on American-Islamic relations once complained that the word “Islamist” had become shorthand for “Muslims we don’t like;”³⁰⁶ that “Islamism” has become of the most contested terms in scholarly literature, as Emin Poljarevic underlines;³⁰⁷ and that due to its misused, relative, and politicised nature, a number of American scholars have even argued for the abandoning of “Islamism”, labelled ineffective.³⁰⁸

Notwithstanding the kind of uncertainty and criticism around the concept of “Islamism”, multiple attempts have been made to define the term. In doing so, major emphasis has mostly been allocated on the centrality of Islam within personal and public spheres. Back in 1932, Hasan al-Turabi used “Islamiyyun” to indicate, “political Muslims for whom Islam is the solution, Islam is religion and government and Islam is the Constitution and the Law.”³⁰⁹ Decades later, William Shepard used the term “Islamic Totalism” to describe “the tendency to view Islam not merely as a ‘religion’ in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behaviour.” Switching to the term “Islamism”, Berman Sheri defines it as “the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life.”³¹⁰ And Poljarevic observes that, “Islamists are those who believe that Islam has an important role to play in organizing a Muslim-majority society and who seek to implement this belief.”³¹¹

Other definitions point to Sharia Law as a valuable tool to establish an Islamic order. Olivier

³⁰³ Nugent, Elisabeth. (2014). “What do you mean by ‘Islamist’?”. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/what-do-we-mean-by-islamist/> accessed on 17 June 2017.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Hamid, Shadi & Dar, Rashid. (2016). *Islamism, Salfism, and jihadism: A Primer*. Brookings Institution, NY.

³⁰⁶ Council on American-Islamic Relations. (2015). “CAIR Welcomes AP Stylebook Revision of ‘Islamist’”. CAIR Official Website. <https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-releases/11808-cair-welcomes-ap-stylebook-revision-of-islamist.html> accessed on 17 June 2017.

³⁰⁷ Poljarevic, Emin. (2015). “Islamism”. In Emad El-Din Shahin. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics*. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. <https://0-www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.mylibrary.qu.edu.qa/article/opr/t342/e0252> accessed on 17 June 2017.

³⁰⁸ For more information about the academic debate on the utility of the term “Islamism”, please see Martin, Richard et al. (2009). *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam*. Stanford University: Stanford University Press.

³⁰⁹ Al-Turabi, Hasan. (1932). *Al-Islam wal-Hukm*. London: Al-Saqi, 2003 ed. p. 49.

³¹⁰ Sheri, Berman. (2003). “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vo. 1, No. 2. pp. 257-272.

³¹¹ Poljarevic, Emin. “Islamism”.

Roy indicates “Islamism” as “the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that aims to re-create a full Islamic society, not simply by imposing shari’a [Islamic law], but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action.”³¹² Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon refer to “Islamism” as “a religious ideology that insists on the application of shari’ah law by the state.”³¹³ Likewise, Peter Mandaville defines it as “forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shari’ah.”³¹⁴

As “Islamism” often entails political participation, Efraim Karsh believes Islamists are truly “political activists and ideologues” renewing the quest for “Allah’s Empire.”³¹⁵ Akin to socialism and liberalism, “Islamism is a discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order,” writes Salman Sayyid.³¹⁶ To him, “Islamism can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full-blooded attempt to reconstruct society on Islamic principles.”³¹⁷

Other scholars add emphasis on how certain Islamists wish to achieve these societal/political goals through the use of violence. To Mozaffari, “Islamism” is “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means.”³¹⁸ And to Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Islamism seeks the imposition on entire societies of a certain form of Muslim religious rule, together with the destruction of everything that Islamists believe is antithetical to their understanding of the proper practice of Islam.”³¹⁹

The Study’s Conceptual Framework and Definition of “Islamist”

Taking these definitions into account, the study’s main distinctive trait of “Islamism” and, thus, “Islamist” is not to be sought in the milieu in which Islamists may operate (electoral, militant, or personal). It pertains not to the heterogeneous nature of the actors, such as quietists, militants, political activists, etc. It is not to be searched in the content of the ideology, which may be based on the centrality of Islam in personal and/or public life. It is not majorly focused on the end goal many Islamists may aspire to, namely the establishment of an Islamic order under Sharia Law. Rather, it

³¹² Roy. *Globalized Islam*. p. 58.

³¹³ Benjamin, Daniel & Simon, Steven. (2002). *The Age of Sacred Terror*. New York: Random House. pp. 48-9.

³¹⁴ Mandaville, Peter (2007). *Global Political Islam*. London: Routledge. p. 57.

³¹⁵ Karsh, Efraim. (2006). *Islamic Imperialism: A History*. Filey: L&L Composition. p. 207.

³¹⁶ Sayyid, Salman. (1997). *A Fundamental Fear*. London: Zed Books. p. 17.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Mozaffari. “What is Islamism?” p. 21.

³¹⁹ Satloff. “Words Matter in the Fight Against Islamism”.

ponders over the role of violence as a tool to achieve one's goals. According to Satloff, "One can reasonably differentiate between those who employ violence and those who merely endorse, advocate, or sympathize with those who employ violence—calling the former *violent Islamists* and the latter *radical* or *extremist Islamists*."³²⁰

Ergo, keenly avoiding any prejudiced generalisation or misuse of the term, the study's conceptualisation of "Islamist" encompasses the main contributions the literature has so far offered. That is, it acknowledges the different nature of the actors that might be considered "Islamist", ranging from quietist followers to revolutionary militants who may operate in different milieus. It recognises that Sharia and the establishment of an Islamic form of government or rule are desirable, but not all Islamists aim or apply their energies for them. But, for the sake of analysis, the most emphasis is attributed to the justification of violence in religious terms.

Applying Satloff's description of "Radical Islamist" to the above-mentioned definitions, the study provides the following definition of "Islamist":

A person, whose religious affiliation is self-proclaimed, who adopts literalist visions of Islam and who, while centring (or not) such overarching interpretations within private and/or public, social and political spheres, advocating (or not) for the establishment of an Islamic legal and societal order, justifies or accepts violence framed in religious terms.

Though not mutually exclusive, this definition enables to respect the variegated nature of "Islamists", the spheres in which they may operate, and their end goals. But most importantly, it draws the line between purist, orthodox religious interpretations, and the acceptance of violence as a tool for change. In simple terms, a person adopting literal visions of Islam and advocating for the establishment of Sharia may be considered orthodox or purist, but not "Islamist". In this logic, an individual becomes an "Islamist" only when violence is justified religiously independently from his/her degree of religiosity and personal/universal aspirations –as one might even refrain from centring religion within his/her private/public sphere or advocate for an Islamic order, but still accepts violence framed in religious terms.

Conceptual Framing and Definitions of "Radicalisation" in the Literature

Equally to "Islamism", defining the term "Radicalisation" is an essentially arduous exercise. Etymologically, "radical" comes from the Latin words "radix" and "radicalis", which respectively

³²⁰ Ibid.

mean root and rooted.³²¹ However, the meaning “going to the origin, essential” dates from 1651.³²² Centuries later, in relation to societal contours, Carole Douglas sees “Radical” as “going back to the root of things,”³²³ while John Belchem as “returning to the first principles.”³²⁴ With regard to more contemporary politics, Daniel Schönpflug links such aspirations to “go back to the roots” to the concept of fundamental change in society through the use of extraordinary means.³²⁵ This notion of sweeping change is also developed by Joyce Irwin who refers to reform outside or against the established institutions, against the system.³²⁶

As illustrated in the previous chapter, “Radicalisation”, especially when applied to sweeping social change, is an utterly relative concept. This is due to the fact that “Radical”, based on notions of “going back to roots”, is a relative idea. In time, its sense has in fact changed according to historical, political, and social contexts. Interestingly, Andrew Silke notices that terrorists have not always been deemed “Radical”, for there was no mention of IRA members being radicalised at the time.³²⁷ In turn, advocates of republicanism against royalism in the 19th century were considered “Radical.”³²⁸ In the 1960’s, hippies and those who countered the established status quo were too regarded as such.³²⁹ Even feminism was initially considered a radical movement, for it championed freedom from oppressive male supremacy.³³⁰ And in present-day Texas, purist Christian preachers and right-wing activists have labelled gay advocates radical extremists.³³¹

Starting in 2004, “Radicalisation” has gained more pejorative nuances being linked to terrorism. This was mainly due to the desire to understand the reasons and processes by which Western Muslims would engage in acts of home-grown terrorism.³³² Since then, multiple efforts have been made to search for an exhaustive definition. In more general terms, Rem Korteweg et al define “Radicalisation”

³²¹ Canu, Isabelle (1997). *The protection of democracy in Germany and France*. [German]. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. p. 21.

³²² Pisoiu, Daniela. (2012). *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe. An occupational change process*. New York: Routledge. p. 14.

³²³ Douglas, Carole. (1990). *Love and Politics: Radical feminists and lesbian theories*. San Francisco: Ism Press. In Pisoiu Daniela. *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe*. p. 14.

³²⁴ Belchem, John. (1996). *Popular Radicalism in Nineteenth-century Britain*. New York: Saint Martin’s Press. In Pisoiu Daniela. *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe*. p. 14.

³²⁵ Schönpflug, Daniel. (2002). *Der Weg in Die Terreur*. Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag. pp. 16-17.

³²⁶ Irwin, Joyce. (1979). *Womenhood in Radical Protenstantism*. New York: E. Mellen.

³²⁷ Silke, Andrew. (2011). “Disengagement or Deradicalization.” *CTC Sentinel* 4, pp. 18–21.

³²⁸ Arun Kundnani, (2012). “Radicalisation: the journey of a concept”. *Race & Class*, Vol. 54, No. 2. pp. 3-25.

³²⁹ Bingham, Clara. (2016). *Witness to the Revolution: Radicals, Resisters, Vets, Hippies, and the Year America Lost Its Mind and Found Its Soul*. New York: Random House.

³³⁰ Rhodes, Jacqueline. (2005). *Radical Feminism Writing and Critical Agency: from manifesto to modem*. Albany: State University of New York Press. p. 29.

³³¹ Couvillon, Dillon. (2014). “Gays Are Not Terrorists –A Response to Pat Roberts”. The Huffington Post.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dillon-couvillon/half-the-battle-of-being-_b_6031328.html accessed on 19 June 2017.

³³² Arun, Kundnani. “Radicalisation: the journey of a concept”. pp. 3-25.

as “the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to the democratic structures and institutions.”³³³ Fairly similarly, Lidewidje Ongerling sees it as the “process of personal development whereby an individual adopts even more extreme political or political-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods.”³³⁴

Other pundits stress the use of revolutionary means and violence as attributes of the very idea of “Radicalisation”. To Peter Waldmann, “a person with radical goals questions the status quo of the socio-political order with a view to replacing it with another –either a revolutionary or an extremely reactionary one.”³³⁵ Thomas Olesen defines “Radicalisation” as “the process through which individuals and organisations adopt violent strategies –or threaten to do so- in order to achieve political goals.”³³⁶ Peter Neumann describes it as “the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims.”³³⁷ For Alex Wilner and Claire Dubouloz, “Radicalisation” is “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and in which the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence.”³³⁸

The abundant amount of academic and institutional³³⁹ definitions of “Radicalisation” has been unable to avoid criticism, however. First, equating it to the notion of “Terrorism”, there is no shared definition of “Radicalisation”. As a group of Australian pundits admits, “about the only thing radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a process.”³⁴⁰ As a result, the term continues to be relative, poorly understood, ill-defined, and a source of considerable confusion.³⁴¹ Second, definitions have failed to provide policymakers with clear-cut approaches to prevent and counter radicalisation. Given the emphasis on “individual” and “personal” in most of the above-definitions,

³³³ Korteweg, Rem et al. (2010). “Background contributing factors to terrorism” In Ranstorp, Magnus (ed). *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe*. London/New York: Routledge. p. 31.

³³⁴ Ongerling, Lidewidje (2007). *Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands. Experiences, expectations, and approaches*. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Washington DC. p. 3.

³³⁵ Waldman, Peter. (2010). *Radicalisation in the Diaspora: Why Muslims in the West attack their host countries*. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. p. 8.

³³⁶ Olesen, Thomas. (2009). *Social Movement Theory and Radical Islamic Activism*. Centre for the Study in Islamism and Radicalisation, Aarhus. p. 8.

³³⁷ Neumann, Peter (2012). *Prisons and Terrorism*. ICSR, London. p. 12.

³³⁸ Wilner, Alex, Dubouloz, Claire (2011). “Transformative Radicalization.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34: pp. 418–38.

³³⁹ For a list of definitions by institutions and governments, please see: Schmid, Alex. (2013). *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation*. pp. 12, 17-18.

³⁴⁰ Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011). *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review*. Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defence. p. 13.

³⁴¹ Sedgwick, Marc. “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”.

much academic research has been devoted to attempts to link personal circumstances to causes of terrorism. But such attempts have been mostly unsuccessful. Though individual biographies certainly matter, the extensive focus on personal variables has produced “false positives”, notes Schmid.³⁴² That is, what enticed certain individuals to radicalise and turn to violence did not apply to others with similar characteristics.

The inability to develop profiles or predictive models based on personal circumstances has brought the very study of radicalisation into doubt. Even two of the most renowned experts in terrorism studies, namely John Horgan and Marc Sageman, have come to challenge conventional wisdom linking root causes of terrorism to radicalisation of young Muslim individuals. Following the Boston Marathon bombings, Horgan stated that, “The idea that radicalisation causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research.”³⁴³ Echoing his colleague’s remarks, Marc Sageman has suggested that, “the notion that there is any serious process called ‘radicalisation’ or indoctrination, is really a mistake.”³⁴⁴

The Study’s Reconceptualization of “Radicalisation”

Against this background, the study rests on professor Schmid’s assumption that the concept of “Radicalisation” can enjoy a second life amid conceptual renovation.³⁴⁵ The Dutch scholar believes that a much larger theoretical framework is needed to diminish confusion and over reliance on individual factors to elucidate complex processes of radicalisation. Schmid maintains that “Radicalisation” can remain useful and indispensable if it is seen as affecting conflict parties on both sides in a confrontation; accepts that radical opinions do not necessarily lead to political violence or terrorism; is applied not only to individuals and small groups but also to larger groups; is studied not only at the micro, but also at the meso and macro-levels; is detached from radicalism, while being more linked to the process of growing commitment to, and engagement with, violent extremism.³⁴⁶

³⁴² Schmid, Alex (2013). “The End of Radicalisation?”

³⁴³ Sageman, Marc. In Schmid. *The End of Radicalisation?*

³⁴⁴ Horgan, John. In Schmid. *The End of Radicalisation?*

³⁴⁵ Schmid, Alex. “The end of radicalisation?”

³⁴⁶ In truth, not only “extremism”, but other terms needed to be differentiated from “radicalism” or “radicalisation”. For instance, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko differentiated between “activism”, which is non-violent, legal political engagement, and “radicalism”, which entails illegal and/or violent political behaviour: Moskalenko, Sophia. McCauley, Clark. (2010). “Measuring Political Mobilisation: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21. p. 240; Daniela Pisoïu, instead, drew the line between “radicalism”, “extremism”, and “fundamentalism”: Pisoïu, Daniela. *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe*. pp. 15-18; Astrid Bötticher’s and Miroslav Mares’s works share Alex Schmid’s distinction between “radicals” and “extremists”: Bötticher, Astrid, Mare, Miroslav. (2012). *Extremism: Theories, Concepts, Forms*. Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag. pp. 58; Bartlett, Jamie. Miller, Carl. “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-violent Radicalization”.

This last point is particularly significant. To Schmid, within the Western European zeitgeists, there is a substantial difference between “Radicals” and “Extremists”:

While radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, extremists are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity. They are also positively in favour of the use of force to obtain and maintain political power, although they might be vague about this in their public pronouncements, especially when they are still in position of weakness. Extremists tend to have inflexible ‘close minds’, adhering to a simplified mono-causal interpretation of the world where you are either with or against them...Radicals, on the other hand, have historically tended to be more open to rationally and pragmatic compromise, without abandoning their search for getting to the root of a problem. Radicalism is redeemable –radical militants can be brought back into the mainstream, extremist militants, however, much less so.³⁴⁷

As Schmid infers, the real issue is not the adoption of radical ideas *per se*, but the transition into “Extremism”, which is by nature more inclined to accept violence.

In light of this, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen’s distinction between “Cognitive Radicalisation” and “Violent Radicalisation” fits Schmid’s logic perfectly. She explains that “Cognitive Radicalisation” is “a growing readiness to support and pursue far-reaching changes in society that conflict with or pose a direct threat to the existing order”, while “violent radicalisation [is] a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts.”³⁴⁸ That is, cognitive radicalisation is the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are at odds with those of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a completely different belief system. Violent radicalization, instead, occurs when an individual takes the additional step of employing violence to further the views derived from cognitive radicalisation.

Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definition utterly suits the study’s conceptual framing of the idea of “Radicalisation”. Crafted in this way, it unambiguously clarifies that radicalisation does not automatically result in violence. Also, defined so, “Violent Radicalisation” is linked to notions of “Extremism”, or, in Schmid’s terms, to the acquisition of extreme views that either justify or trigger acts of violence in response to a state of close-mindedness that leaves no room for tolerance.

The Study’s Definition of “Islamist Radicalisation”

Having defined and reconceptualised the terms “Islamist” and “Radicalisation” singularly, the study seeks to propose a more exhaustive definition of “Islamist radicalisation”. Connecting it to

³⁴⁷ Schmid, Alex. *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation*. p. 10.

³⁴⁸ Daalgard-Nielsen, Anja. (2010). “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Vo. 33, Issue 9. pp. 797-814.

Islam/Islamism, Carolin Goerzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi describe “Radicalisation” as “the process of progressively adopting more radical beliefs and ideas of Islam.”³⁴⁹ Analogously, Sam Mullins sees “Radicalisation” as “the process of coming to adopt militant Islamist ideology.”³⁵⁰ In the context of Jihadism in Denmark, in Michael Taarnby Jensen, “Radicalisation is understood as a process in which people gradually adopt views and ideas which might lead to the legitimisation of political violence.”³⁵¹

Inspired by Satloff’s and Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definitions of “Islamist” and “Radicalisation”, and resting on the assumption that both terms are relative and are being crafted within the current Western, European zeitgeists, the study defines “Islamist radicalisation” as:

The process by which a Muslim individual or a group of Muslim individuals residing in Europe, whose religious affiliation is self-proclaimed, adopts purist visions of Islam or Islamic tenets, which, while centring (or not) such overarching interpretations within private and/or public spheres, advocating (or not) for the establishment of an Islamic legal and societal order, may or may not turn into justification for violence and/or active engagement in actual acts of violence framed in religious terms to subvert the democratic system or achieve particular political goals.

Although the above definition is not mutually exclusive, it can be noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, it acknowledges that radicalisation is a process. Second, it inserts Islamist radicalisation into the European, Western context, recognising this process might differ substantially in other parts of the world –though it does not claim the West to be a monolithic entity. Third, it respects the different nature of the actors (quietists vs. activists), milieus (private sphere vs. public sphere), and end-goals (advocating or not for an Islamic order). Fourth, it allows for the fact that radicalisation does not always result in violence, but can also remain latent.

Fifth, it links “Radicalisation” not to purist, literalist views of Islam, but to extremist views that are more likely to accept and/or engage in violence in response to a state of close-mindedness that leaves no room for tolerance. By this reasoning, Islamist views become so only if they accept violence and Islamist radicalisation only occurs when individuals accept and/or participate in violence that is justified in religious terms. In other words, purist views that might conflict with the existing order are not the main issue *per se*. Violence is the principal threshold, which is independent from one’s degree of religiosity or societal aspirations -as one could even be a non-religious person who does not advocate for an Islamic order but still accepts and/or engages in violence framed in religious ways.

³⁴⁹ Goerzig, Carolin, Al-Hashimi, Khaled (2015). *Radicalization in Western Europe*. London: Routledge, p. 31.

³⁵⁰ Mullins, Sam (2012). “Iraq Versus Lack of Integration.” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 4, pp. 110–113.

³⁵¹ Taarnby Jensen, Michael. (2006). *Jihad in Denmark: an overview and analysis of Jihadi activity in Denmark 1990-2006*. Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. p. 61.

That asserted, the study's definition covers three intersecting groups of actors, which are similar to Lorenzo Vidino's and James Brandon's three subgroups of Islamist militants.³⁵² "religious purists", "non-violent Islamist extremists", and "violent Islamist extremists". Here, "religious purists" are those individuals who internalise purist visions of Islam that may or may not pervade their private/public sphere and that may or may not advocate for an Islamic order. "Religious purists", who might be considered orthodox, may or may not conflict with the existing order, but never endorse violence. "Non-violent Islamist extremists", who may or may not be "religious purists", accept violence in religious ways but do not engage in any violent act. "Violent Islamist extremists", who also may or may not be "religious purists", justify and actually engage in violence framed in Islamist terms.

Given these three categories, the study searches for "non-violent Islamist extremists,"³⁵³ for their justification of violence framed in religious concepts is indicative of instances of Islamist radicalisation. Still, as specified in the Introduction, this is no witch-hunt. Even if one person supports violence, his/her involvement in it is by no means automatic. As Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko explain, not every terrorist is a radical and, more importantly, most radicals never become terrorists.³⁵⁴ In Jenkins's terms,³⁵⁵ the real issue is only when one makes the transition into operational support and/or actual acts of violence. Hence, the study's intention is not to criminalise, stigmatise, and marginalise those who might accept violence in religious terms. Rather, if such instances of Islamist radicalisation are spotted, the research aspires to explore those drivers that may lead to the endorsement of violence religiously justified, while contributing to the Roy vs. Croft discussion on radicalisation.

³⁵² Vidino, Lorenzo. Brandon, James. (2012). *Countering Radicalization in Europe*. ICSR, London. p. 10.

³⁵³ As explained in the methodology section, the study's field research was conducted in the "legal domain" and, thus, the author assumes the subjects participating in questionnaires and interviews/focus groups were not directly engaged in any terrorist activity at the time the research was executed.

³⁵⁴ McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. p. 5.

³⁵⁵ Please see Note on page 19 in the Introduction.

CHAPTER IV: THE DEBATE ON THEORIES OF RADICALISATION

Since its entrance in the field, “Radicalisation” has been widely applied to elucidate root causes of terrorism. In addition to theoretical models explaining how radical views can turn into violence and terrorism summarised in Appendix 2, there have been many attempts to understand why certain individuals radicalise and embrace violence. Wishing so, various governmental institutions have offered sets of root causes of radicalisation.³⁵⁶ A number of experts have instead focused on terrorists’ and extremists’ biographies with the intent to establish common profiles. Edwin Bakker scrutinised and found provisional similarities among terrorists’ lives and backgrounds,³⁵⁷ as did Thomas Hegghammer.³⁵⁸ Similarly, Tomas Precht discussed commonalities regarding recurrent causes and characteristics of European Jihadists’ radicalisation process.³⁵⁹ And Peter Nesser even proposed a Jihadist personality-type model based on profiles of Jihadist terrorists in Europe.³⁶⁰

Even though some tentative similarities were indeed found between studies,³⁶¹ other investigations admit that establishing terrorists’ profile is a nearly impossible quest.³⁶² As Magnus Ranstorp et al, put it, each potential triggering factor –stemming from economic, social, political, cultural, psychological, religious, and personal conditions-, is instrumental but not sufficient to solely

³⁵⁶ Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. (2012). *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*; House of Commons [HC 1446]. (2012). *Roots of violent radicalisation*; HM Government. (2013). *Tackling extremism in the UK*; Precht Tomas. (2007). *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe*. Danish Ministry of Justice; United Nations, co-Chairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism. (2008). *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism the Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*; Velhius, Tinka, Staun, Jorgen. (2009). *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport. State of Lower of Saxony. (2012). *Radicalisation Processes in the Context of Islamic Extremism and Terrorism*; RAN. (2014) *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response*; RAN. (2016). *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism*.

³⁵⁷ Bakker, Edwin. (2006). *Jihadi terrorists in Europe*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Clingendael;

³⁵⁸ Hegghammer, Thomas. (2006). “Militant Islamism in Saudi Arabia: Patterns of Recruitment to ‘Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’”. *Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorist Networks*. Proceedings from a FFI (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment) Seminar. Oslo, 15 March.

³⁵⁹ Precht, Tomas. (2007). *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe*. The Danish Ministry of Justice.

³⁶⁰ Nesser, Petter. (2005). *Profiles of Jihadist Terrorists in Europe*. Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.

³⁶¹ Predictably, multiple factors were encountered, but, on average, the ones that recurred the most were essentially four: identity crisis or some sort of vulnerability determined by various psychological grievances, outrage at unjust Western policy, group dynamics, and the role of the Internet. Al-Lami, M. (2009). *Studies of Radicalisation*. Department of politics and International Relations. University of London. ESRC; Hemmingsen, S. Andreasen, J. (2007). *Radicalization in Europe*. DIIS; Travis, Alan. (2008). “MI5 challenges views on terrorism in Britain”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1> accessed on 25 May 2017.

³⁶² Sageman, Marc. (2004). *Understanding Terrorist Networks*. University of Philadelphia Press; Pape, Robert. (2005). *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House. The House of Commons. (2006). *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*. London: The Stationery Office. pp. 31; Horgan, John. (2008). “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes”. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vo. 618, no. 1. pp. 80-94; Vidino, Lorenzo et al. *Fear Thy Neighbor*.

explain every single instance of radicalisation.³⁶³ To Precht, this is due to the fact that the very process of radicalisation is a strictly personal matter.³⁶⁴ Its causes are “unclear and can even be unknown to the radicalising person”, observe Tinka Veldhuis and Edwin Bakker.³⁶⁵ What seems to be clearer, Ranstorp et al hold, is that radicalisation occurs as an intersection between an individual’s personal circumstances – resulting from his/her psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, and religious dimensions-, and the current zeitgeist.³⁶⁶ As such, radicalisation, conclude Velhius and Bakker, is really the product of a combination of all the above-mentioned factors that is unique for every person.³⁶⁷

This given, our research does not advance additional theoretical causal models that would overflow an already abundant literature on the matter. Rather, the following section presents the main theories that are linked to Islamist radicalisation. These are essential to understand the choice of the predictive variables the quantitative analysis is built upon. Thus, we borrow models and theories from terrorism studies and apply them to the concept of “Islamist Radicalisation”. In doing so, however, we assume no automatic relation between radicalisation and terrorism. We explore theories that can only (or mostly) be applied to the European/Western context, for Islamist radicalisation occurring in different societal milieus in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere might feature different explanations and dynamics.³⁶⁸ And throughout the whole analysis we steadily differentiate between instances of Islamist radicalisation –here intended as the justification of violence framed in religious terms- and cases of Islamist radicalisation leading to terrorism.

That asserted, this research utilises Martha Crenshaw’s scheme on causes of terrorism, as well as root cause models of violent radicalisation by Veldhuis, Daniela Pisoiu,³⁶⁹ and the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales.³⁷⁰ Drawing on the mentioned studies, the following section divides causes of radicalisation into grievances, rational factors, structural factors, and facilitating factors. Although cases from outside the Islamist domain (IRA and Red Brigade, for instance) and instances of

³⁶³ Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*. p. 6.

³⁶⁴ Precht, Tomas. “Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe”. p. 5.

³⁶⁵ Veldhuis, Tinka. and Bakker, E. (2009). *Muslims in the Netherlands: Tensions and Violent Conflict*. MICROCON Policy Working Paper 6. Brighton: MICROCON. p. 5.

³⁶⁶ Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*. p. 6.

³⁶⁷ Veldhuis, Tinka. and Bakker, Edwin. (2007). “Causal factors of radicalisation and their mutual consistency” [Dutch]. *Vrede & Veiligheid*. Vo. 36, no. 4. pp. 447-470.

³⁶⁸ Joffe, George. (2013). *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Mcmillan.

³⁶⁹ Pisoiu, Daniela. (2014). “Radicalization”. In Ceseri, Jocelyne. *The Oxford Handbook of European Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³⁷⁰ Crenshaw, Martha. (1981). “The Causes of Terrorism”. *Comparative Politics*. Vo. 13(4). pp. 379-399; Velhius Tinka, Staun, Jorgen. *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*; Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*.

Jihadist terrorism are mentioned, this section is centred on what we have defined as “non-violent Islamist extremists”.

Grievances

As the concept of “Radicalisation” grew increasingly attached to explain root causes of terrorism in the post 9/11 era, grievances have been often utilised to explain motivations behind acts of terrorism. Grievances have been generally conceptualised as a response to a sense of suffering, deficiency, and “lacking” individuals may experience at social, political, and psychological levels.

1. Social Level

Within society’s social contours, economic disparity and discrimination are the grievances typically used to address Islamist radicalisation. Two valuable tools the literature offers to understand why individuals radicalise and, at times, turn to violence are found in the relative deprivation theory and the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The first theory mainly deals with economic disparities causing terrorism. It is based on Ted Gurr’s belief that rebellions come to be when people cannot bear the undeserved misery of their lot, perceived unjust when compared to others’ better status quo.³⁷¹ In Islamist terms, relative deprivation theory is important to grasp the sense of victimisation experienced by Muslims nationally and worldwide, which allows for Islamist narratives claiming Islam and the Islamic world to be under attack.³⁷² Linked to the above-mentioned theories, the second valuable tool is John Davies’ belief that resentment and violence are always responses to frustration.³⁷³

As there have indeed been Jihadist terrorists driven by feelings of financial inequality,³⁷⁴ economic disparity is also to blame for radicalising hundreds of European Muslims, holds Tahir Abbas.³⁷⁵ Although disparity is not embedded in the system, official reports show Muslims generally

³⁷¹ Gurr, Ted. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁷² Yousufzai, Khouwaga, Emmerling, Franziska. (2017). “Explaining violent radicalization in Western Muslims: a four factor model”. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. Vo. 8, Issue 1. pp. 68-80.

³⁷³ Davies, John. (1973). “Aggression, violence, revolution, and war”. In Knutsen, N. *Handbook of Political Psychology*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. pp. 234-260.

³⁷⁴ For more information about how economic disparities were a main driving force for 9/11 20th hijacker, as were they for terrorists in the Horn of Africa, Britain, and Germany, please see: Piazza, James. (2012). “Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism”. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Vo. 29(5). pp. 521-546; Lyman, Princeton. (2008). “The War on Terrorism in Africa”. In Harbeson, John. *Africa in World Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 276-302; Abbas, Tahir. “Muslim radicalisation’s socio-economic roots”; Keifer, Michael. (2014). In “Recruiting for Jihad”. *Deutsche Welle*. <http://www.dw.com/en/recruiting-for-jihad/a-17483704> accessed on 16 June 2017.

³⁷⁵ Abbas, Tahir. (2011). *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics*. Oxon: Routledge.

constitute the lower-income class in various European countries.³⁷⁶ First-generation immigrants often struggle to obtain citizenship and regular working Visas, frequently falling prey to unemployment. Unskilled workers are more likely to find occupation, but salaries tend to be low and conditions unstable.

In addition to perceived economic inequality at the work place, Muslim communities feel underrepresented and cannot always voice their malaise.³⁷⁷ Within second, third, fourth generations, socio-economic advancement has also been slow, scarred by “generational reproduction of acute unemployment, poor housing, and declining health.”³⁷⁸ In turn, thousands of European Muslims reside in lower-income neighbourhoods outside various city centres, which are often torn apart by crime, decaying infrastructure, drug abuse, and tension with police.

It is exactly in these vulnerable outskirts, symbol of the kind of economic disparity affecting European Muslims, that radicalisation preys on alienated, poor youngsters, claims Abbas.³⁷⁹ A study for the European Union recounts how “enduring unemployment is creating the conditions for youth disaffection, with recognition that environmental and familial pressures place many young people at risk from varying forms of radicalism and criminality.”³⁸⁰ In this scenario, gangs and gang-related culture, the report conveys, can play an instrumental role in the acquisition of extremist views. Drawing on this, a study by ISPI highlights how terrorist organisations, namely ISIS, exploit gang-torn, impoverished areas to radicalise young Muslims. Turning, in rare cases, into “Jihadist hotbeds”, the report shows how Muslim enclaves in several European cities “are breeding ground for Islamic radicalism and may pose a threat to Western security.”³⁸¹

As for Britain, Abbas believes young British Muslims are particularly more vulnerable to radicalisation when they are poor, discriminated, and northern.³⁸² Even though pockets of poverty are found in East London affecting the Bangladeshi community, Abbas asserts that conditions for Muslims in northern Britain are direr:

³⁷⁶ European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. (2006). “Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia”. pp. 44-54.

³⁷⁷ European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. “Muslims in the European Union”. pp. 30-38.

³⁷⁸ Abbas, Tahir. (2009). “Muslim radicalisation’s socio-economic roots”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/29/islam-terrorism-radicalisation-recession> accessed on 16 June 2017.

³⁷⁹ Abbas, Tahir. *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics*. Introduction.

³⁸⁰ Smith, Thomas, Egan, Dave. (2014). *EU Gangs Programme. Summative Research Report of Transnational Partner Research Responses*. Life Long Learning Programme, European Commission. p. 7.

³⁸¹ Varvelli, Arturo. (2016). *Jihadist Hotbeds. Understanding Local Radicalization Processes*. ISPI, Milan. p. 11.

³⁸² Abbas, Tahir. “Muslim radicalisation’s socio-economic roots”.

The problems of widening economic and social inequalities also have implications for wider issues of alienation, disenfranchisement, isolation, and dislocation that impact on how young men, Muslims and non-Muslims, might become vulnerable to the forces of political radicalism, and sometimes where the hate towards the “other” turns to acute forms of violence.³⁸³ Besides other extra-continental realities,³⁸⁴

France is another example of how harsh economic circumstances can fuel Islamist radicalisation. A study by one of France’s leading think tanks, *Institut Montaigne*, has analysed living conditions in several suburbs (*banlieues*) around Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and other cities. Similarly to Daniela Pisoiu’s study on “sub-cultures,”³⁸⁵ the investigation described the outskirts in question as “separate Islamic societies” parallel to France, which are affected by “isolation”, “wasteland[s] of the de-industrialisation”, “radical rejection of France” and “Islamic values of community closure.”³⁸⁶

Although the 2005, 2007, and 2010 riots have been considered more “popular” than Islamist uprisings,³⁸⁷ “the rise of radical Islam is largely concentrated in the most sensitive French suburbs”, writes Eric Denece, founder of the French Centre for Intelligence Research.³⁸⁸ “Over the past three decades” the founder maintains, “France let its inner cities become real powder kegs. In lawless areas, the fundamentalism has used the failure of the state because it thrives wherever there is frustration.”³⁸⁹ Given that, in 2005 Denece estimated approximately 500,000 French Muslims to adhere to hard-line visions of Islam, warning the country about an “explosion in the suburbs.”³⁹⁰

Discrimination and racism can also be significant drivers of radicalisation at the social level. Adding to historical and religious misconceptions about Muslims and Islam embedded in Western cultures,³⁹¹ crossroad events have accrued mutual resentment and mistrust. Episodes such as the

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ For more information about economic disparity favouring to the diffusion of extremist ideas in Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, please see: Apostolou, Andrews. (2004). “State Failure and Radicalism in Central Asia”. In Zeyno, Baran (Ed.), *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology*. Washington DC: The Nixon Center. pp. 55-63; Talant Kuskhubekov. (2004). “The Kyrgyz Response”. In Zeyno, Baran. *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. pp. 45-50.

³⁸⁵ Pisoiu, Daniela. (2015). “Subcultural Theory Applied to Jihadi and Right-Wing Radicalization in Germany”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 27, no. 1. pp. 9-28.

³⁸⁶ Institute Montaigne. In Scarborough, Rowan. (2015). “France’s ethnic apartheid: ‘Separate Islamic societies’ breed malcontent, radicalism”. *The Washington Times*. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/25/frances-ethnic-apartheid-separate-islamic-societie/?page=all> accessed on 23 June 2017.

³⁸⁷ Hussey, Andrew. (2014). “The French Intifada: how the Arab banlieues are fighting the French state”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/french-intifada-arab-banlieues-fighting-french-state-extract> accessed on 23 June 2017.

³⁸⁸ Denece, Eric. (2015). In “France’s ethnic apartheid”.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Said, Edward. (1979). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage; Abbas, Tahir. *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics*. Ch. 5.

“Satanic Verses”, the Danish cartoons over the Prophet Mohammad, the controversial question of the veil in France, and the rise anti-Islam groups across Europe have often widened the gap between Muslims and mainstream society.³⁹² Precipitating events such as 9/11 and acts of home-grown terrorism have, in turn, exacerbated feelings of Islamophobia and discrimination towards Muslims. Although its meaning and perception remain unclear, Islamophobia indubitably affects both the UK and Europe, contends Christopher Allen.³⁹³

As there have been cases of violence, crime, and Jihadist terrorism fuelled by perceived discrimination,³⁹⁴ discriminatory attitudes can also foster radicalisation within wider Muslim communities. According to Abbas, drawing on notions of securitisation successfully constructed by the media and the political discourse, Islamophobic-related discrimination has seriously hindered the integration of large segments of the British Muslim community.³⁹⁵ Missed integration, exacerbated by citizenship deprivation of suspected subjects,³⁹⁶ has augmented chances for radicalisation.³⁹⁷ Personal interviews with members of Islamist groups in Britain by Quintan Wiktorowicz show extremist movements have capitalised on widespread feelings of frustration and alienation ignited by discrimination and racism.³⁹⁸ Furthermore, according to a 2015 poll, 4 in 10 British Muslims agree that discriminatory actions by police and MI5 are contributing to the radicalisation process of young Muslims.³⁹⁹ And in Germany, where studies report Muslims feeling discriminated against,⁴⁰⁰ the lack

³⁹² Abbas, Tahir. *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics*. Chapter 5; Croft, Stuart. *Securitizing Islam*. Ch. 4, 5.

³⁹³ Allen, Christopher. (2010). *Islamophobia*. Farnham: Ashgate. Part 4.

³⁹⁴ For more information about the correlation between discrimination and youth's engagement in violence in the UK, France, and Spain, Farhad Khosrokhavar's interviews with prison inmates, and the cases of terrorists Mohammed Jarmoune and Mohammed Hersi, please see: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2010). *Experience of discrimination, social marginalisation, and violence*; Khosrokhavar, Farhad. In Rosenthal, John. (2006). *The French Path to Jihad*. Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Italian State Police. (2013). “Discriminated for being Muslim, becomes terrorist”. [Italian]. <http://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/29347/> accessed on 16 May 2017; Hersi, Mohammed. (2014). In Bell, Stewart. “Mohammed Hersi wanted to move to Muslim country to escape Canada's ‘Islamophobia’, terror trial hears”. *National Post*. <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/mohamed-hassan-hersi-wanted-to-move-to-muslim-country-to-escape-islamophobia-terror-trial-hears> accessed on 23 June 2017.

³⁹⁵ Abbas, Tahir. “The symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalisation”.

³⁹⁶ For more information about the negative effects on the British Muslim community due to the government's policy to deprive individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism of their citizenship, please see: Choudhury, Tufyal. (2017). “The radicalisation of citizenship deprivation”. *Critical Social Policy*. Vo. 37, Issue 2. pp. 225-244.

³⁹⁷ Abbas, Tahir. *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics*. Introduction.

³⁹⁸ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. (2005). *Radical Islam Rising*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Ch. 1.

³⁹⁹ Perring, Rebecca. (2015). “British Muslims blame police and MI5 for radicalising teens who want to join Islamic State”. *Daily Express*. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/569536/British-Muslims-blame-MI5-police-radicalisation> accessed on 16 June 2017.

⁴⁰⁰ Holtz, Peter et al. (2013). “German Muslims and the ‘Integration Debate’”. *Integrative Psychological & Behavioural Science*. Vo. 47(2). pp. 231-248.

of governmental measures countering Islamophobic attitudes has been blamed for triggering radicalisation amongst Turkish citizens.⁴⁰¹

In neighbouring France, racism and discrimination have much to do with Islamist radicalisation as well. Spokeswoman for the Collective Against Islamophobia, Elsa Ray contends that in France “a lot of young Muslim people feel hopeless nowadays [as] they are discriminated against on a daily basis, at work, at school.”⁴⁰² Echoing her colleague’s words, former French Ministry of Justice Rachida Dati invites France not to “close [its] eyes forever. There is Islamophobia. There is enormous inequality. There is unequal treatment of different population.”⁴⁰³

If “doors are closed when you are an Arab,”⁴⁰⁴ natural feelings of resentment pave the way to radicalisation, holds Radwan Masmoudi. As director of the Washington-based Center of the Study of Islam and Democracy, Masmoudi understands that young French Muslim “get fed up with their life and they don’t see any hope for improvement...they are like a ticking bomb.”⁴⁰⁵ Hence, as Olivier Roy explains, in French *banlieues*, the attraction of radical Islam becomes a “youth movement...[because] to some of them, radical Islam is a way to find a second life.”⁴⁰⁶ British author Andrew Hussey contends the situation in France is so tense, that the rise of radical Islam as a response to racism could turn the country into the major set of a future global war, featuring even a French Intifada.⁴⁰⁷

2. Political Level

Politically speaking, worldwide oppression of fellow Muslims and Western foreign policy are the two most accredited factors provoking outrage. In terrorism studies, nearly every scholar mentions the duo as instrumental elements in motivating terrorism. Specifying that profiles are almost impossible to establish, Marc Sageman still notes that anger at Western intervention in the Islamic world is a distinctive trademark of virtually every Jihadist.⁴⁰⁸ This happens because, as Yousufzai Khouwaga and

⁴⁰¹ Alboga, Bekir. (2014). In Kern, Soeren. *Germany Aiming to Become More Muslim Friendly*. The Gatestone Institute. International Policy Council.

⁴⁰² Ray, Elsa. (2015). In Muhammad, Hakeem. “Is France failing its Muslim youth?”. Aljazeera America. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/14/france-islamophobia-immigration.html> accessed on 15 July 2017.

⁴⁰³ Dati, Rachida. (2015). In Alexander, Harriet. “France is still ignoring radicalisation threat”. *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11553307/France-is-still-ignoring-radicalisation-threat-warns-Europes-anti-extremism-tsar.html> accessed on 16 June 2017.

⁴⁰⁴ Sadeg, Yazid. (2005). In “French Muslims face job discrimination”. BBC. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4399748.stm> accessed on 16 July 2017.

⁴⁰⁵ Masmoudi, Rawdan. (2015). In “Is France failing its Muslim youth?”.

⁴⁰⁶ Roy, Olivier. (2015). In Alderman, Liz. “After Terrorist Attacks, Many French Muslims Wonder: And What Now?”. *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/europe/french-muslims-worry-about-backlash-after-charlie-hebdo-attack.html?_r=0 accessed on 16 July 2017.

⁴⁰⁷ Hussey, Andrew. “The French Intifada: how the Arab banlieues are fighting the French state”.

⁴⁰⁸ Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad*. Ch. 5

Franziska Emmerling claim, Western foreign policy “lies at the root of modern day Islamist terrorism.”⁴⁰⁹ Ibrahim el-Houdaiby writes that hostility “is not a rejection of Western values. Rather, it is foreign policies that cause hostility, [as] 81% of politically radicalised Muslims describe the U.S. as ‘aggressive.’”⁴¹⁰ In light of this, former president of the U.S. Barack Obama and current Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn both acknowledge the centrality of Western foreign policy in triggering Islamist radicalisation and terrorism.⁴¹¹

In depth, as Korteweg et al illustrate, Islamists deem the West guilty of Muslims’ dire conditions. Adding to old resentment sprung from past colonialist domination of Muslim lands,⁴¹² indignation stems from Western military intervention in the Islamic world; its support for dictatorial and corrupted regimes in the Middle East; its backing and double-standard attitude towards Israel; its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which are conceived as deliberate aggressions on Islam masked under the “War on Terror” banner.⁴¹³

A number of theories and beliefs can expound such kind of hostility towards the West. For example, John Dollard’s oppression theory argues that oppression provokes political violence.⁴¹⁴ This happens particularly when governments mistreat particular groups of people, robbing them of their identity, dignity, security, and freedom, adds Martha Crenshaw.⁴¹⁵ Mark Juergensmeyer’s humiliation-revenge theory contends humiliation evokes feelings of revenge and, ultimately, violence.⁴¹⁶ Jerald Post’s cultural identity theory prioritises the identity of a particular cultural group over the individual.⁴¹⁷

Leonard Weinberg’s national cultural theory maintains that some cultures, societies, and countries are more collectivist than others and, ergo, are more likely to experience acts of terrorism

⁴⁰⁹ Yousufzai, Khouwaga, Emmerling, Franziska. “Explaining violent radicalization in Western Muslims”. p. 69.

⁴¹⁰ El-Houdaiby, Ibrahim. (2009). “Trends in Political Islam in Egypt”. In Emerson, Michael, Kaush, Kristina, Youngs, Richard. (Eds.) *Islamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean Relations*. Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. p. 29.

⁴¹¹ Obama, Barack. (2013). In Hasan, Mehdi. “Extremists point to Western foreign policy to explain their acts. Why do we ignore them?” Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/woolwich-attack-western-foreign-policy_b_3357794.html accessed on 22 June 2017; Corbyn, Jeremy. (2017) In Mason, Rowena, Stewart, Heather. “Jeremy Corbyn: the war on terror is simply not working.” *The Guardian*.

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/26/jeremy-corbyn-the-war-on-terror-is-simply-not-working> accessed on 22 June 2017; Barnard, Paolo. (2006). *Why They Hate Us*. [Italian]. Milan: RCS Libri.

⁴¹² Said, Edward. *Orientalism*.

⁴¹³ Choudhury, Tufyal. (2007). *The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government London; Korteweg et al. (2010). “Background contributing factors to terrorism”. In *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*. pp. 21-49

⁴¹⁴ Dollard, John. (1939). *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁴¹⁵ Crenshaw, Martha. (1986). “The psychology of political terrorism”. In *Political Psychology*. Hermann, M. G. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. pp. 379-413; Taylor, M. (1994). *Terrorist lives*. London: Brassey’s.

⁴¹⁶ Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2000). *Terror in the mind of God*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁴¹⁷ Post, Jerald. (2003). “The Terrorist in their own words”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 15, pp. 171-184.

than individualist realities.⁴¹⁸ Likewise, Gahad Hamed's theory of collective belonging maintains that family bonds, friendships, and feelings of collective belonging are defining traits of Arab and Muslim societies. This is mostly due to the fact that "the Arab culture places a high emphasis on the importance of family which ensures that a person who is raised in the Arab culture understands where their loyalty lies and their goal is to grow into a member of the family that makes them proud."⁴¹⁹

The sense of collectivist loyalty is noticeable in Muslim's pronounced identification with their faith. This, according to a 2006 Pew poll, is the most important defining trait for Muslims around the world. To them, their religious affiliation is more important than nationality. As such, it is perhaps no surprise that support for fellow oppressed Muslims from the Palestinian Territories averaged 70% among European Muslims and 74% among Muslims worldwide.⁴²⁰

The above-mentioned theories can surely account for the myriad of terrorists blaming their actions on oppression of Muslims and Western foreign policy.⁴²¹ In a similar way, such theories also elucidate cases of Islamist radicalisation driven by the political grievances in question. According to Tufyal Choudhury, the answer is to be searched in the strength of a shared Islamic identity that allows for empathy and support of oppressed brethren.⁴²² Reactions by a number of British and French Muslims to the bellicose events of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may prove Choudhury's point. As a response to Palestinian casualties at the hands of Israel in 2012, hordes of Muslims protested in London chanting "Allahu Akbar" ("God is the Greatest") while burning Israeli flags.⁴²³ In the same year, during

⁴¹⁸ Weinberg, Leonard. (1994). "Cultural differences in the behaviour of terrorists". *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 9, pp. 241-262.

⁴¹⁹ Hamed, Gahad. (2012). "Friends, Relationships, and Family in the Arab Society". Institute for Middle East Studies Canada. Working paper no.7, p. 9.

⁴²⁰ (2006). *Muslims in Europe*. Pew Research Center, Washington DC.

⁴²¹ Among the terrorists that stressed oppression of Muslims and outrage at Western foreign policy are the very Osama bin Laden, the "Times Square bomber" Faisal Shahzad, the "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Woolwich attack perpetrator Michael Adebolajo, and the 07/07 London bombings attackers Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer. For more information, please see: Bin Laden, Osama. (1998). "A Muslim Bomb". In Bin Laden, *Messages to the World*. p. 88; Hasan, Mehdi. (2013). "Extremists point to Western foreign policy to explain their acts. Why do we ignore them?"; Robinson, Martin. (2014). "The Final Insult". *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2568317/Justice-Lee-Rigby-Soldiers-family-arrive-court-wearing-matching-t-shirts-act-solidarity-ahead-sentencing-two-Muslim-converts-murdered-him.html> accessed on 22 June 2017; Desai, Meghnad. (2007). *Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the New Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. p. 7; Moghadam, Assaf. (2011). *The Globalization of Martyrdom*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 199.

⁴²² Choudhury, Tufyal. (2007). *The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government London.

⁴²³ (2012). "Protesters burn flags outside US embassy in London". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/9544579/Protesters-burn-flags-outside-US-embassy-in-London.html> accessed on 16 May 2017; Martin, Arthur. (2015). "Pictured: Father who blamed police for not stopping his daughter joining Isis screams 'burn USA'". *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3015311/Pictured-Father-blamed-police-not-stopping-daughter-joining-ISIS-screams-burn-USA-stands-just-feet-Lee-Rigby-s-killer-Muslim-demo.html> accessed on 17 July 2017.

the Jerusalem Day held in Britain's capital in solidarity with the Palestinians, protesters displayed signs that stated, "We're all Hezbollah" and "Israel is the disease, we're the cure."⁴²⁴

Two years later, following the Jewish State's military operations in the Gaza Strip against Hamas, thousands of French Muslims marched through several cities to condemn Israeli violence. On that occasion, protestors purposely defied a ban imposed after marches on two Parisian synagogues occurred the previous weekend, resulting in scuffles with the police. Again in Paris, a number of demonstrators climbed on top of a building and burned an Israeli flag, for "we must show that, as Muslims, we're all united", a protestor declared.⁴²⁵

Back in Britain, outrage at Western foreign policy also fuelled instances of Islamist behaviour justifying violence. Couching their frustration at the U.S. and the UK in religious terms, during the 2011 9/11-memorial event in London, a group of about 100 Muslims, including members of Muslims Against Crusades, burned American flags in front of the U.S. embassy. As one demonstrator shouted, "You [America] will always face suffering, you will always face humiliation, unless you withdraw your troops from Muslim lands", others held signs saying, "Islam will dominate the world."⁴²⁶ Similarly, following Osama bin Laden's death, dozens of Al-Qaeda's sympathisers marched in front of the U.S. embassy once again, staged a mock funeral for the organisation's deceased leader, burned U.S. flags, and featured signs stating, "Jihad to defend the Muslims", from "Western injustice in Iraq, Afghanistan."⁴²⁷

One year later, during an anti-American rally in London, Islamists held banners that proclaimed, "The followers of Mohammad will conquer America", while black Jihadist flags waved in the background. Other signs stated that "Muslims will destroy the crusaders", as, according to the speech by preacher Anjem Choudary, Sharia law is destined to take over the entire world, including the UK.⁴²⁸ And the very same Imam, in a 2013 BBC show, refused to condemn the murder of drummer Lee Rigby

⁴²⁴ Millet, Richard. "Hezbollah marches through London again on Al Quds Day".

⁴²⁵ Vinocur, Nicholas. (2014). "Anti-Israeli Protesters Rally Across France". *Haaretz*. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.606036> accessed on 16 June 2017.

⁴²⁶ (2011). "100 protesters burn American flag outside U.S. embassy in London during minute's silence for 9/11". *Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2036172/9-11-memorial-events-London-protesters-burn-American-flag-outside-US-embassy.html> accessed on 17 May 2017.

⁴²⁷ (2011). "This just in from London-istan: Violent clashes outside U.S. Embassy after hundreds of UK Muslims stage mock funeral for 'murdered' Bin Laden". *Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1384344/Osama-Bin-Laden-death-UK-Muslims-stage-mock-funeral-outside-US-Embassy.html> accessed on 17 May 2017.

⁴²⁸ Martin, Arthur. "Pictured: Father who blamed police for not stopping his daughter joining Isis screams 'burn USA'".

by two Jihadist terrorists, describing the action as a response to unjust British and Western foreign policies.⁴²⁹

3. Psychological Level

Psychological factors have been recently gaining traction within the political discourse following terrorist attacks by allegedly mentally unstable subjects. In the wake of the Leytonstone knife attack,⁴³⁰ the Nice truck attack,⁴³¹ and the Ansbach bombing,⁴³² authorities have reported all perpetrators responsible for these attacks to have a history of mental illness resulting from psychological disorders. Yet, with most of the academia having discarded psychopathological, narcissist, and paranoid theories, the following section scrutinises the two psychological factors ordinarily associated with radicalisation: negative/traumatic personal experiences and identity crisis.

This first theory is based on the idea that negative personal experiences and traumatic events can cause violence. Applied to radicalisation, such a belief can explain why certain individuals and, in rare instances, even entire cultures radicalise in the aftermath of negative occurrences and traumas.⁴³³ As Quintan Wiktorowicz's study illustrates, adverse experiences and traumatic events might create cognitive openings, undermining and questioning individual core beliefs. This process initiates the search for a new, better identity, where overarching Islamist ideas offer a sense of meaning, belonging, and opportunity for redemption and success.⁴³⁴

⁴²⁹ (2013). "Preacher refuses to 'abhor' attack". BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-22650053/anjem-choudary-refuses-to-abhor-woolwich-attack> accessed on 22 June 2017.

⁴³⁰ Dodd, Vikram, Addley, Esther. (2016). "Leytonstone knife attack: man convicted of attempted murder". *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/08/leytonstone-knife-attack-man-convicted-of-attempted> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴³¹ Boyle, Danny et al. (2016). "Nice terror attack: Police vans blocking promenade withdrawn hours before". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/nice-terror-attack-police-vans-blocking-promenade-withdrawn-hour/> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴³² Weaver, Matthew, Farrer Martin. (2016). "Ansbach bombing: attacker pledged allegiance to Isis, says official". *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/25/ansbach-explosion-german-town-deliberate-blast-latest> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴³³ For more information on the theory of cultural trauma, please see: Jeffrey, Alexander et al. (2004). *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*. Berkeley: University of California Press; for more information about cultural traumas stemming from forced migration affecting entire cultures, colonialism in Egypt, and harsh living situation in the Gaza Strip, please see: Sagramoso, Domitilla. (2010). "Islam and ethno-nationalism in the north-western Caucasus". In Yemelianova, Galina. *Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union*. Oxon: Routledge. p. 136; Asik, Ozan, Mehmet. Erdemir, Ayakan. (2010). "Westernization as Cultural Trauma". *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*. Vo. 9, no. 25. pp. 111-132; Heyer, Julia. (2014). "The Spoils of War: Violence in Gaza Leads to Youth Radicalization". *Der Spiegel*. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-in-gaza-strip-leads-to-radicalization-of-palestinian-youth-a-985510.html> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴³⁴ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *Radical Islam Rising*. Ch. 2.

As personal negative or traumatic experiences have been instrumental catalysts for a number of terrorists,⁴³⁵ they have been source of Islamist radicalisation as well. Aside from the role prisons cover, which will be later analysed, death of friends or family member is believed to be a stimulus to radicalisation. Wiktorowicz's investigations with members of the Islamist group al-Muhajiroun in Britain indicate that 31.7% of the interviewees began to think more deeply about Islam following the death of a family member. Disregarding the fact that 3% of the interviewees' religious seeking commenced after near-death experiences, distress from the death of relatives eventually facilitated the acquisition of Islamist ideas culminating in al-Muhajiroun memberships.⁴³⁶

In addition to familial losses, traumas linked to migration might also offer chances for radicalisation. Various studies show that, compared to the overall population, refugees and asylum seekers are more likely to suffer from pre⁴³⁷ and post-migratory traumas, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder⁴³⁸ and depression.⁴³⁹ Distressed by living conditions in overcrowded accommodation centres and by the tortuous nature of the asylum-seeking process, refugees embody appealing targets. ISIS's attempt to radicalise and recruit migrant newcomers in Italy⁴⁴⁰ and Germany⁴⁴¹ proves this point. Actually, fearing other asylum-seekers emulating Riaz Khan Ahmadzai,⁴⁴² Mohammad Daleel,⁴⁴³ and Anis Amri,⁴⁴⁴ German authorities are "very concerned that Islamists in Germany are trying, under the

⁴³⁵ Among these are Hussam Abdu, Mohammed Bouyeri, Riadh Jelassi, Adam Gadahn, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: Reynolds, James. (2004). "Nobody is going to live forever". BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3899015.stm accessed on 23 June 2017; Veldhuis, Tinka, Bakker, Edwin. *Muslims in the Netherlands*. p. 20; Vidino, Lorenzo. (2011). "The Buccinasco Pentiti: A Unique Case Study of Radicalization". *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 23, no.3. pp. 398-418; Olsson, Peter. (2013). "Homegrown Terrorists: Rebels in Search of a Cause". *The Middle East Quarterly*. Vo. 20, no.3. pp. 3-10.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ The include war, violence, torture, targeted persecution, forced labour, forced migration, and family separation: Rousseau, C. et al. (2011). *Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: Evidence Review from Newly Arriving Immigrants and Refugees*. Canadian Collaboration for Immigrant and Refugee Help.

⁴³⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2002). *Resettlement Handbook*. p. 234.

⁴³⁹ Moran, M. (2013). "Psychiatrists Have a Role in Assessing Candidates for Asylum". *Psychiatric News*. Vo. 48, no. 13, pp. 1-1.

⁴⁴⁰ (2017). "Terrorism: Iraqi citizen arrested in Crotone: he propagandized for ISIS" [Italian]. *Il Corriere della Sera*. http://www.corriere.it/cronache/17_giugno_19/terrorismo-arrestato-iracheno-crotone-faceva-propaganda-isis-a0f92742-54b4-11e7-8fb7-7977c09f9d70.shtml accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴⁴¹ (2015). "Islamist recruiters target asylum seekers, German intelligence says". RT News. <https://www.rt.com/news/316233-islamist-recruiters-target-refugees/> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴⁴² Ulrich, Andreas. (2016). "Germany Attackers Had Contact with Suspected IS Members". *Der Spiegel*. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/attackers-in-germany-had-contact-with-suspected-is-members-a-1106271.html> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴⁴³ Gatehouse, Gabriel. (2016). "Germany 'was warned about Ansbach suicide bomber'". BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37059100> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴⁴⁴ Collony, Kate, Stephen, Chris. (2016). "Berlin attack suspect Anis Amri had been on watchlist since January". *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/21/berlin-attack-suspect-anis-amri-under-monitoring-since-january> accessed on 23 June 2017.

cover of humanitarian assistance, to exploit the situation of the refugees for their own ends and to proselytize and recruit among asylum-seekers.”⁴⁴⁵

Besides personal negative experiences, identity crisis is a major psychological factor explaining both terrorism⁴⁴⁶ and manifestations of Islamist radicalisation. According to Gilles Kepel, Farhad Khosrokhavar, and Olivier Roy, radicalisation occurs as individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity in a perceived hostile and confusing world, namely French society.⁴⁴⁷ As second and third-generations become Westernised to the extent they no longer feel part of their parents’ culture, they end up crashing against society’s unwillingness to incorporate them. Stuck between traditional cultures and Western, liberal, globalised societies, this type of identity crisis renders Islamist visions alluring, for they satisfy an inner quest for meaning, dignity, and belonging. Providing a valid alternative to traditional Islamic values, Islamist views grant alienated Muslims a noble cause to advocate for -that is, the heroic defence of Islam and oppressed Muslims-, transitioning, in their eyes, from rejects to honourable individuals.

Like France, Germany too finds itself handling issues relating to an identity crisis among its Muslim citizens. Baffled between traditional Islamic values and Germany, which brands Islam as an incompatible entity,⁴⁴⁸ numerous Muslims are coming to embrace Islamist visions that further separate them from mainstream society. As a matter of fact, according to a 2012 poll, 48% of German Muslims would reject German majority culture. More than that, among the 14 to 32-year-olds that were surveyed, “there exists a subgroup of religious extremists who hold anti-Western views and are reportedly prepared to use violence.”⁴⁴⁹

Britain is another example of how certain Muslim citizens end trapped between their Islamic tradition and Western values. For Imtiaz Shams, issues of identity crisis are inevitable when British Muslims are confronted by a society that feels suspicious towards them and that questions their beliefs.⁴⁵⁰ And in this scenario, explains Ed Husain narrating his journey towards the joining of Islamist group Hiz ub-Tahrir, Islamist views represent a solution to the search for identity:

⁴⁴⁵ Massen, Hans-Georg. (2015). In “Islamist recruiters target asylum seekers, German intelligence says”.

⁴⁴⁶ For a perfect example of how issues of identity crisis facilitated the radicalisation process of a number of French Jihadist terrorists please see: Khosrokhavar, Farhad. *The French Path to Jihad*.

⁴⁴⁷ Khosrokhavar, Farhad. “Radicalization through religion”; Kepel, Gilles. *The War for Muslim Minds*; Roy, Olivier. “There Are More French Muslims Working For”.

⁴⁴⁸ Vopel, Stefan. “Religion Monitor. Understanding common ground. Special study of Islam.”

⁴⁴⁹ (2012). “Many German Muslims ‘refuse to integrate’”. *The Local*. <http://www.thelocal.de/20120301/41079> accessed on 21 June 2017.

⁴⁵⁰ Shams, Imtiaz. In Anthony, Andrew. (2015). “Losing their religion: The hidden crisis of faith among Britain’s young Muslims”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/17/losing-their-religion-british-ex-muslims-non-believers-hidden-crisis-faith> accessed on 21 June 2017.

My generation of young British Muslims was torn between two cultures. The mainstream British lifestyle of dating, pre-marital sex, living together, and dissolution of partnerships with comparatively little fuss was not something that appealed to us. Simultaneously, the customs of our parents' generation—arranged marriages with cousins—were equally abhorred...Cut off from Britain, isolated from the Eastern culture of our parents, Islamism provided us with a purpose and a place in life. More importantly, we felt as though we were the pioneers, at the cutting edge of this new global development of confronting the West in its own back yard.⁴⁵¹

This newly found persona, continues Husein, made him proud, for “everywhere we [members of the organisation] went, we were the brothers to be respected. It was intoxicating.”⁴⁵²

Catherine Raymond's interviews with members of Sharia4UK are another illustration of how identity crisis can entice Islamist radicalisation.⁴⁵³ Before becoming more interested in his religion, one of Raymond's interviewees said: “The path I was following was not the right path, I always had this feeling that there was something wrong...I've got purpose now.”⁴⁵⁴ Similarly, according to another member who spoke about his Muslim friends, “At home they'd be pious, and then when they'd go to school, or college, or university they'd become someone else...change their names...change their attitudes...it is an identity crisis.”⁴⁵⁵

Rational Factors

In contrast to social, political, and psychological grievances, an alternative explanation for root causes of radicalisation is not to be searched in feelings of suffering, deficiency, or lacking that an individual may experience. Rather, the individual is perceived as a rational actor embarking on a benefit-cost analysis, pushed by self-interest and self-betterment. In terrorism studies, as Martha Crenshaw elaborates, the rational choice theory entails that terrorist actions derive from conscious, calculated decisions. As such, terrorism is rationally adopted as the optimum strategy to accomplish socio-political goals.⁴⁵⁶ Within this context, mobilisation depends not on the existence of grievances, but, as Alan Krueger contends, on the availability of material and symbolic incentives and resources in

⁴⁵¹ Husain, Ed. (2007). *The Islamist*. London: Penguin Books. p. 69.

⁴⁵² Husain, Ed. (2007). “Interview: Ed Husain, author of the *Islamist*”. *The Guardian*.

<http://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/may/12/religion.news> accessed on 21 July 2017.

⁴⁵³ Raymond, Catherine. (2010). *Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK: The group behind the ban*. ICSR, London.

⁴⁵⁴ Raymond, Catherine. “Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK”. p. 20.

⁴⁵⁵ Raymond, Catherine. “Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK”. p. 21.

⁴⁵⁶ Crenshaw, Martha. (1998). “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice”. In Reich, Walter. (Ed.). *Origins of Terrorism*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 8. Another work dealing with Islamist terrorist organisations' actions driven by calculated cost-benefit analyses, please see Ganor, Boaz. (2015). *Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

the political system.⁴⁵⁷ These ruminations conflict with claims that terrorist acts are altruistic in nature,⁴⁵⁸ as they are really driven by mankind's classical sense of egoism⁴⁵⁹ that materialises into action only if personal incentives are achievable.⁴⁶⁰

Applied to radicalisation, Daniela Pisoiu argues Islamist radicalisation is nothing but the product of a rational occupational choice.⁴⁶¹ Through the analysis of numerous Islamists' trials, court material, and interviews in Austria, France, and Germany,⁴⁶² Pisoiu claims individuals rationally engage in decision-making processes and choose to become Islamists over other occupations. This decision is built on the subjects' evaluation of three occupational categories Pisoiu names "Standing", "Recognition", and "Reward". In detail, "Standing" applies to what an individual values most in society in terms of prestige. "Recognition" pertains to the perceived approval and support of particular actions by the social surrounding, based on a commonly shared apprehension of what is acceptable. "Reward" refers to the idea of being successful for making a highly noble and compensated difference.⁴⁶³

Pisoiu states that the evaluation of these three categories is no different than what regular people do when they choose their occupation. What differentiates Islamists is their interpretation of the categories in question.⁴⁶⁴ To Islamists, "Standing" means courage, altruism, and heroism. "Recognition" signifies religious approval within their constituencies, including peers, family, and the larger masses. "Reward" equals to advocating for a noble cause in defence of Islam and in pursuit of eternal life. For some, "Reward" also means material gain, whether in form of money, lucrative businesses, or various preferential treatments.

These "radical" interpretative frameworks are learned and constantly legitimised and reinforced through the establishing of increasingly exclusivist and absolutist environments. As a result, such frameworks rationally convince individuals that, when compared to other occupations, espousing the

⁴⁵⁷ Krueger, Alan. (2007). *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

⁴⁵⁸ For more information about how terrorist can be regarded by perpetrators and communities as an act of altruism, please see: Pedahzur, Ami et al. (2003). "Altruism and fatalism: the characteristics of Palestinian suicide terrorists". *Deviant Behavior*. Vo. 24, no. 4. pp. 405-423.

⁴⁵⁹ Hobbes, Thomas (1651). In Gaskin, John Charles (ed.). (1998). *Leviathan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁶⁰ For a critique of neoclassic economic theories applied to rational political behaviour, please see: Simon, Herbert. (1995). "Rationality in Political Behavior". *Political Psychology*. Vo. 16, no. 1. pp. 45-61.

⁴⁶¹ Pisoiu, Daniela. (2012). *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe*.

⁴⁶² Pisoiu also included biographies of radicals from several other countries like Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, and Italy.

⁴⁶³ Pisoiu, Daniela. *Islamist Radicalisation in Europe*. Ch. 4.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

Islamist cause entails more benefits than costs.⁴⁶⁵ By this logic, chances of electing other careers are nullified, for they are deemed less efficient than direct, first-hand action. According to Pisoiu, this is why Islamists reach to the conclusion that there is no feasible solution other than taking action and embrace the Islamist occupation.⁴⁶⁶

As numerous are the cases of terrorists⁴⁶⁷ and Jihadist organisations⁴⁶⁸ applying rational decision-making processes, the calculated choice to join Islamist groups may suit Pisoiu's theory of Islamist radicalisation. In Britain, Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Sharia4UK have often drawn negative attention due to their anti-Western tone and desire for Sharia law. Particularly in the wake of official bans or public altercations, it could be argued that, for Muslims living and working in Britain, joining or gravitating around the groups in question could be problematic. Yet, if one applies Pisoiu's notions of "Standing", "Recognition" and "Reward" and agrees with purist interpretations and the implementation of Sharia, joining Hizb ut-Tahrir and Sharia4UK may be still logical and desirable. This could explain why, in spite of potential controversy, between 3,000 and 4,000 British Muslims, most of them students, decided to become members of Hizb ut-Tahrir,⁴⁶⁹ and why contentious preacher Anjem Choudary boasts hundreds of followers.⁴⁷⁰

Material incentives may also prove Pisoiu's point. Given the harsh economic and social conditions affecting many European Muslims, the opportunity to benefit from various sorts of concrete aid⁴⁷¹ may offer chances for Islamist radicalisation. The famous Islamic centre of Viale Jenner in Milan

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid. Ch. 5.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ For more information about the rational decision-making process behind acts of suicide terrorism, please see: Ganor, Boaz. (2007). *The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon*. ICT, Interdisciplinary Center. Herzliya; Bukay, David. (2009). "The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings". *The Middle East Quarterly*. Vo. 13, no.4. pp. 27-36; Zedalis, Debra. (2004). *Female Suicide Bombers*. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. War College. p. 21; Vidino, Lorenzo. (2006). *Al Qaeda in Europe*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. p. 55; Pittel, Karen. Rubbelke, Dirk. (2009). *Decision Processes of a Suicide Bomber*. Center of Economic Research at ETH, Zurich. For more information about the rational decision process to join ISIS, please see: (2015). "Skyping with the enemy: I went undercover as a Jihadi girlfriend". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/26/french-journalist-poses-muslim-convert-isis-anna-erelle> accessed on 23 June 2017; Hughes, Chris. (2014). "British jihadi Isis fighters post chilling Youtube video urging Muslims to 'sacrifice your family for Allah'". *Mirror*. <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/british-jihadi-isis-fighters-post-3734364> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁴⁶⁸ For further information about how Jihadist organisations rationally apply their effort to radicalise and recruit, please see: Ferrero, Marco. (2002). *Radicalization as a reaction to failure*. University of Eastern Piedmont. Alessandria; Ganor, Boaz. *The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon*; Hoffman, Bruce. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 133; Horgan, John. (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. New York: Routledge. p.3.

⁴⁶⁹ Husain, Ed. (2010). In "Asharq al-Awsat talks to the Quilliam's Foundation Ed Husain". *Asharq al-Awsat*. <http://english.aawsat.com/2010/10/article55249028/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-the-quilliam-foundations-ed-husain> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁴⁷⁰ Raymond, Catherine. "Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK".

⁴⁷¹ These include, in Hamas' or Hezbollah's style, after school care, distribution of food, or housing and financial assistance/consulting.

perfectly fits this reasoning. In addition to providing halal meals, language courses, and even academic school programmes in lieu of Italian public schools, the centre is also renowned for having provided immigrants with fake Visas. But for those who supported the Islamist cause, counterfeited work Visas would cost 700 euros, instead of the 2,500 euros regular price.⁴⁷² Obviously, such examples cannot minimally relate to the kind of social services Hamas, Hezbollah, and IRA have provided in their jurisdictions.⁴⁷³ Nevertheless, they still create rational incentives to join Islamist milieus in return for spiritual and material rewards.

What perchance supports Pissou's theory the most may be represented by British Muslim women's rational decision to join ISIS. Interestingly, the choice to embark on journeys to the Middle East might be far more logical for women than men, argues Julia Brewer.⁴⁷⁴ First of all, joining ISIS as Jihadi brides satisfies women's noble desire to serve Allah and His warriors. As Nabeelah Jaffer explains, women tend to imagine the Caliphate as "a world in which there is little poverty and inequality, governed with perfect fairness under clear-cut, divine laws that work to the advantage of all."⁴⁷⁵ As Katherine Brown puts it, by joining the Islamic State, these women think they will become "perfect people", to whom ISIS is saying, "You can have this perfect world –you just need to try a little bit harder."⁴⁷⁶

Kalsoom Bashir, co-director of *Inspire*, believes ISIS represents an alternative to the remarkably controlled lives experienced by many Muslim women back at home.⁴⁷⁷ Dominated by their fathers and husbands, without a voice, and unable to experience many of those freedoms British culture grants, Muslim women sometimes take their chances and leave -as it was the case of the three sisters from Bradford who left their respective husbands and fled to Syria with their children.⁴⁷⁸ To women like

⁴⁷² Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. p. 109.

⁴⁷³ Levitt, Matthew. (2007). *Teaching Terror*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington DC; Cammett, Melani. (2014). *Compassionate Communalism*. Cornell University: Cornell University Press. Ch. 6; Carpenter, Scott et al. (2009). "Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism". *Journal of National Security Law and Policy*. Vo. 3, no 303. pp. 303-329; Moghaddam, Fathali. (2006). *From the terrorists' point of view: what they experienced and why they come to destroy*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

⁴⁷⁴ Brewer, Julia. (2015). "For British Muslim women, Isis may offer freedom". *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/for-british-muslim-women-isis-may-offer-freedom-10329930.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁴⁷⁵ Jaffer, Nabeelah. (2015). "The secret world of Isis brides". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/isis-brides-secret-world-jihad-western-women-syria> accessed on 28 June 2017

⁴⁷⁶ Brown, Katherine. (2015). In Jaffer, Nabeelah. "The secret world of Isis brides".

⁴⁷⁷ Bashir, Kalsoom. (2015). In Brewer, Julia. "For British Muslim women, Isis may offer freedom".

⁴⁷⁸ Hallyday, Josh et al. (2015). Missing Bradford sisters 'are far from ultraconservative Muslim family'. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/16/missing-bradford-sisters-ultra-conservative-muslim-family> accessed on 23 June 2017.

them, Syria is not a war-zone but a “way out” that provides them with another opportunity to start a new life.

Furthermore, as associate fellow at Chatham House, Hassan Hassan claims, ISIS empowers women, especially in relation to their family members. To this regard, Hassan writes that:

If a woman is found violating the Isis dress code, her husband or father would be punished, not her. In tribal societies, women are also traditionally not allowed to share inheritance, but Isis has reversed that if the case is reported. Women have used such practices and rulings to report their husbands to Isis members and even win a divorce.⁴⁷⁹

Not widely reported in the media, these practices might eventually convince Muslim women they can be better protected and respected under the Caliphate rather than in their Western societies.

Finally, a series of economic and practical advantages might attract female recruits. As “Umm Umar” implies during her Twitter conversation with Nabeelah Jaffer, life under ISIS can be normal, for “U can come here and study btw. Study fiqh [Islamic legal interpretations], hadeeth [sayings of the Prophet], medicine, etc....u can [also] do hisbah [join the religious police], but if ur married ur husband will want u to stay at home lol...lots of ajar [reward for good deeds].”⁴⁸⁰ Speaking of which, if women are married to a shaheed, a martyr who died in battle, the Caliphate provides for them. “U dnt hav 2 pay 4 ANYTHING if u r wife of a shaheed,” writes “Umm Zahra”.⁴⁸¹ But all women, the girl reassured, are looked after, for “U will still get money each month.”⁴⁸²

Surely, as not each and every one of the 500 Western women⁴⁸³ -including 60 from Britain-⁴⁸⁴ joining ISIS did so after carefully calculating costs and benefits. Yet, it is likely that many of those who have reached the Caliphate had indeed been briefed about the mentioned incentives, providing rational grounds for leaving everything behind, holds Hassan Hassan.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁷⁹ Hassan, Hassan. (2015). “Three sisters, nine children, one dangerous journey to the heart of Isis. What is the lure of the caliphate?”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/21/three-sisters-nine-children-what-is-the-lure-of-the-isis-caliphate> accessed on 21 July 2017.

⁴⁸⁰ Umm, Ummar. (2015). In Jaffer, Nabeelah. “The secret world of Isis brides”.

⁴⁸¹ Umm, Zahra. (2015). In Jaffer, Nabeelah. “The secret world of Isis brides”.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Hoyle, Carolyn et al. (2015). “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to Isis”. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. p. 8.

⁴⁸⁴ Hall, John. (2014). “Revealed: How ‘up to 60’ women who rule Isis’s capital by fear”. *Daily Mail*.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2858819/Up-60-British-Jihadette-women-rule-ISIS-s-capital-fear.html> accessed on 21 July 2017.

⁴⁸⁵ Hassan, Hassan. “Three sisters, nine children, one dangerous journey to the heart of Isis”.

Structural Factors

Structural factors do not explain radicalisation through grievances or processes of logical decision-making. Rather, emphasis is allocated on the structure and the mechanisms of particular elements, namely social groups and ideology. That is, what is relevant now is how Islamist groups and Islamist ideology function and ignite, at times, processes of radicalisation.

1. Social Group and Personal Bonds

In terrorism studies, the relationship between social group dynamics/personal bonds and terrorism has been widely explored.⁴⁸⁶ Group dynamics might play a crucial role in triggering terrorism because collective identity subsumes individual identity, argue Jerrold Post et al.⁴⁸⁷ Bearing this in mind, Wiktorowicz and Sageman draw their analyses on those psychological theories that explain terrorism as a product of group psychology within idiosyncratic subcultures that coalesce in reaction to circumstances they perceive as intolerable.⁴⁸⁸ To the two scholars, grievances are essential, but not sufficient to instigate the radicalisation process, as they necessitate particular groups of people and personal bonds. Bluntly put, Wiktorowicz's and Sageman's contention is that radicalisation is really about who you know and how you interact with that person or group.

As such, Wiktorowicz focuses on the relation between social movement theory -more precisely with one of its sub-branches called framing theory-, and radicalisation. Social movement theory deals with the production and dissemination of meaning and how individuals come to conceptualise themselves as a collectivity, based on the social group they decide to be a part of.⁴⁸⁹ In this picture, a frame is an individual's worldview, consisting on values and beliefs; being a complex entity, an individual matures several frames, which enter competition to establish themselves as the authoritative interpretation of social reality. The success of a social movement, thus, depends on its ability to align

⁴⁸⁶ Della Porta, Donatella. (1996). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. (2010). "Individual and group mechanisms of radicalization". In Fenstermacher, L. et al (Eds.), *Protecting the homeland from international and domestic security threats*. Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) and U.S. Air Force, The Joint Staff. Washington, D.C; Ariel Merari. (2010). *Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Mia Bloom (2005). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁴⁸⁷ Post, Jerrold. Sprinzak Ehud. Denny, Laurita. (2003). "The Terrorists in their own words". *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 15, no.1. pp.171-184.

⁴⁸⁸ Hoffman, Bruce (1998). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press. Post, Jerrold. (2004). *Leaders and their followers in a dangerous world: The psychology of political behavior*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

⁴⁸⁹ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *Radical Islam Rising*. p. 14; _____. (2004). *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

its frame to the one of the person who joins the group.⁴⁹⁰ There, the individual comes to fully identify with the social movement identity, and at that stage, according to Wiktorowicz, radicalisation takes place.

Like Wiktorowicz, Sageman equally recognises the importance of group dynamics and networks in triggering radicalisation. Based on his studies of dozens of Islamist terrorists, for Sageman, radicalisation stems from the interplay, not linear or sequential order though, of four factors: the individual sense of moral outrage in response to perceived suffering by fellow Muslims in the world; the personal interpretation of such moral outrage by the individual within the context of a larger war against Islam; the individual's potential resonance between one's sense of moral outrage and one's own experience, embodied by personal stories of discrimination and inequality within the frame of Western societies; finally, the mobilisation through networks which function as "echo chambers", where a "spontaneous bunch of guys" makes the transition from rhetoric to violence, that is, where radicalisation takes place.⁴⁹¹

Unlike Wiktorowicz, Sageman majorly stresses the impact of personal bonds and networks made of like-minded people, most likely displaying already existing connections to each other, as a crucial element for radicalisation to occur.⁴⁹² In a post 9/11 counter-terrorist era, where top-down recruitment is less feasible, aspiring militants are connected not so much by formal organisational ties, but rather by shared ideology and the Internet. In Sageman's terms, radicalisation is a bottom-up process, which is possible through the coming together of virtual, already connected, global networks. Similar to Donatella della Porta's analysis of Red Brigade members,⁴⁹³ in most all the cases identified, Sageman claims that people who joined a militant cell already knew someone affiliated with it.⁴⁹⁴ Corroborated by Rogelio Alonso's and Jamie Barrett's studies of Jihadist terrorists,⁴⁹⁵ Sageman asserts strong emotional bonds formed through informal kinships or close friendships do, in fact, play a central role in individuals' shift towards radical political violence.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid. pp. 15-16; Snow, David. (2003). "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization". In Klandermans, Bert et al (Eds.) *From Structure to Action*. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. pp. 197-212.

⁴⁹¹ Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad*. Ch. 4.

⁴⁹² Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad*. pp. 84-5, Ch. 6.

⁴⁹³ Della Porta, Donatella. (1988). "Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations". In Klandermans, Bert et al. (eds.), *From Structure to Action*. pp. 155-169.

⁴⁹⁴ Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad*. p. 66.

⁴⁹⁵ Alonso, Rogelio. (2010). "Radicalization and Recruitment Among Jihadist Terrorists in Spain". In *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*. pp. 207-230; Bartlett, Jamie, Miller, Carl. "The Edge of Violence". Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization".

Applied to Islamist radicalisation, Wiktorowicz's and Sageman's ideas find confirmation in the cases of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Shari4UK. Besides cases in Central Asia,⁴⁹⁶ Hizb ut-Tahrir's group involvement was also instrumental in triggering the radicalisation of a number of British Muslims. Michael Whine explains that, particularly active on British campuses⁴⁹⁷ like Imperial College and Queen Mary College, Hizb ut-Tahrir's has radicalised students and professionals through conferences, poster hangings, and face-to-face interaction.⁴⁹⁸ Once a Hizb ut-Tahrir's member and recruiter, Ed Husain recounts how he used to distribute leaflets across British campuses (i.e. "The only meeting place for a Muslim and a Jew is on the battlefield") with the specific intent to radicalise and recruit students.⁴⁹⁹ As he recalls in a 2007 CNN interview:

It was here [East London] that I and extremist organisations in the mid 1990s, and even now, found it easy to recruit, because people in these parts of Britain don't have a clear identity as to who they are, whether they are Asian, whether they're Muslim, whether they're British. We claimed India, for example, was Muslim land to be conquered again by the Army of a coming Caliph. That was the sort of rhetoric we were putting out and nobody questioned us.⁵⁰⁰

Thriving on issues of identity crisis Hizb ut-Tahrir members have often managed to promote Islamist views, which eventually increased religious animosity at Tower Hamlets and Newham College. Such intense propaganda culminated in the recruitment of 3,000-4,000 British Muslims, recounted Husain to the London-based Arab newspaper *Asharq al-Awsat*.⁵⁰¹

In a similar fashion, Sharia4UK also shows group dynamics can induce Islamist radicalisation. Led by controversial preacher Anjem Choudary, Sharia4UK, which was banned in 2010, has exploited different platforms and methods to increase its outreach capabilities within British society. As shown in Catherine Raymond's study, aside from extensive use of the Internet, the organisation has championed public initiatives meant to foster radicalisation and recruitment. The targets, Choudary reveals, were

⁴⁹⁶ Talant Kuskchubekov. (2004). "The Kyrgyz Response". In Zeyno, Baran. *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. pp. 45-50; Kabiri, Muhiddin. (2004). "HT and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan". In *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. pp. 67-72; Khushshnidin, Zukriddin. (2004). "The Uzbek Response". In *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. pp. 36-44; Zhankuliev, Amanzhol. (2004). "The Kazakh Response". In *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. pp. 45-50.

⁴⁹⁷ Whine also asserted the group targeted potentially vulnerable youth in the streets of Birmingham, but was not as successful as it was in London.

⁴⁹⁸ Whine, Michael. (2004). "Hizb ut-Tahrir in Open Societies". In Zeyno, Baran. *The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir*. pp. 87-95.

⁴⁹⁹ Husain, Ed. (2007). "With God on their side?". *The Guardian*.

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jun/27/withgodontheirsideside> accessed on 21 July 2017.

⁵⁰⁰ Husain, Ed. (2007). Interviewed by Amanpour, Christiane. "Radical Islam: Britain's huge problem". CNN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_WKFpak9Mc accessed on 21 June 2017.

⁵⁰¹ Husain, Ed. "Asharq al-Awsat talks to the Quilliam's Foundation Ed Husain".

urban areas displaying “a lot of problems with the youth, prostitution, drugs, alcohol [where we] really tap into that and present the Islam as an alternative.”⁵⁰²

Prior to the 2010 ban, Sharia4UK often engaged in road shows around London on a weekly basis, where members held banners, distributed leaflets, sold DVDs, and engaged in face-to-face interaction. As Choudary interacted with contacts at universities such as the London School of Economics, the University of Leeds, and Trinity College in Dublin, student groups presumably affiliated to Sharia4UK also staged low-profile events on and off campus. This type of determined and efficacious group participation resulted in the support hundreds of British Muslims.

Likewise, personal bonds can too be pivotal elements for the acquisition or reinforcement of Islamist ideas. Though his journey towards radicalisation had already begun, Ed Husain’s initial interaction with other likeminded individuals he came to identify as “brothers” plunged him deeper into extremism.⁵⁰³ Comparably, as Claire Stevens writes, her grandson’s radicalisation followed his befriending of Muslim students in college. After a few months when Muslim friends would pile up in his bedroom, the previously atheist boy, “Under the informal tutelage of his new friends...eagerly took on the attitudes of his Muslim ‘brothers’ in place of his former personality.”⁵⁰⁴ These attitudes, however, consisted in “hate-filled bile against homosexuals, women, Jews, anyone in fact who wasn’t a Muslim man.”⁵⁰⁵

2. Ideology

Indubitably, radicalisation is detached from any particular type of religion. Still, studying the beliefs shared by Islamists and Jihadists might in turn be a useful tool in elucidating the reasons why certain individuals radicalise. Surely, this is not to advance any link between Islam and radicalisation or Islam and terrorism. Nor are we arguing Islamist ideology and Islamist actors to be monolithic entities. As specified in Chapter III, Islamists differ in literalist interpretations and end goals. Here, the type of Islamist ideology that accepts violence framed in religious terms is the one analysed to shed light upon the narratives built to foster radicalisation.

Two theories could help address the impact of Islamist ideology. First, Robert Lifton’s absolutist theory refers to the adoption of dogmatic, non-negotiable, and non-debatable ideology that

⁵⁰² Choudary, Anjem. (2010). In “Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK”. p. 15.

⁵⁰³ Husain, Ed. “Interview: Ed Husain, author of the Islamist”.

⁵⁰⁴ Stevens, Claire. (2014). “I was a liberal atheist. And then my stepson found radical Islam”. *The Spectator*. <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9329742/my-boy-the-radical-muslim/> accessed on 21 June 2017.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

justifies terrorism in order to achieve its goal of creating a pure world.⁵⁰⁶ Second, Albert Bandura's social learning theory pertains to the learning from a young age of aggressive behaviour through observation and imitation.⁵⁰⁷ In relation to terrorism, a variant of this theory has been invoked to explain violence as a product of witnessing acts of violence, glorification of terrorism, and teaching of martyrdom.⁵⁰⁸

Given these theories, when exposed to literalist interpretations, individuals might adopt absolutist attitudes that intimately bind them to the newly acquired tenets. As illustrated in Korteweg et al.,⁵⁰⁹ dogmas are internalised through the teachings by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Yusuf 'Azzam, Osama Bin Laden,⁵¹⁰ Anwar al-Awliki, and Musab Al-Suri. As there can only be one true God, these types of Islamists see that the world is in a perpetual state of war between "Dar al-Islam" (House of Islam), and "Dar al-Harb" (House of war). Inhabited by infidels, the latter must either convert to their righteous vision of Islam and abide by Sharia Law or be confronted through Jihad.⁵¹¹ In case of Western and/or Zionist aggression of Muslim lands, Jihad becomes a mandatory duty for every true Muslim. Killing of civilians and attacks on foreign countries are justified if the victims support governments guilty of oppressing Muslims.⁵¹²

Aside from specific doctrines, external and internal factors might facilitate the rise of this particular kind of ideology. The first element is embedded in the relation between Islam, the West, and globalisation. To Salman Sayyid, Islamism, which is one interpretation of Islam, acts in function of the erosion of the West and the loss of its hegemony. In this picture, as the West is unable to halt its decentralisation, Islamists operate to end the "Age of the West". Benefiting from globalisation, Islamism is destined to become the major force antagonising Western decaying supremacy and the Westernisation of the international system.⁵¹³

⁵⁰⁶ Lifton, Robert. (2000). *Destroying the World to Save It*. New York: Holt.

⁵⁰⁷ Bandura, Albert. (1973). *Aggression: A social learning analysis*. New York: Prentice Hall.

⁵⁰⁸ Crenshaw, Martha. (1992). "How terrorist think". In Howard, L. *Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses*. New York: Praeger.

⁵⁰⁹ Korteweg et al. "Background contributing factors to terrorism". pp. 21-49.

⁵¹⁰ For further information regarding sources of radical Islamic tenets, please see Korteweg et al. "Background contributing factors to terrorism".

⁵¹¹ "Jihad" is a highly disputed concept. Here it is intended as the use of violence against the infidels. For more information about the multiple meanings and interpretations of the very concept of Jihad, please see: Ali, Shaheen, Rehman, Javaid. (2005). "The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law". *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*. Vo. 10, issue 3. pp. 321-343; Bashir, Abdul-Raheem. (2015). "The Concept of Jihad in Islamic Philosophy". *American International Journal of Social Science*. Vo. 4, no.1. pp. 141-148.

⁵¹² Korteweg et al. "Background contributing factors to terrorism". pp. 21-49.

⁵¹³ Sayyid, Salman. (1997). *A Fundamental Fear*. London: Zed Books. Preface.

Benjamin Barber sees Islamism more in relation to the dynamics of globalisation than in relation to the West. For Barber, globalisation creates a collision between forces of Islamic tribalism, reactionary fundamentalism, integration of modernism, and aggressive economic and cultural globalism (the “McWorld” system). By this logic, Islamist visions are a response to perceived sense of destabilisation of traditional Islamic tribal societies and Islamic religious identity, deemed under siege in modern globalised contexts. Unlike Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations”, Barber considers this struggle “as a dialectic expression of tensions built in a single global civilization.”⁵¹⁴

Along similar lines, Roy thinks that globalisation changes the way many Muslims perceive their faith. Not in mere juxtaposition to Barber’s “McWorld”, European Muslims approach Islam as individuals interacting with and within a globalised world. As the process of de-territorialisation disconnects religion from a particular territory or culture, globalisation and the Diaspora of the Muslim community favour the creation of a new, transnational, often virtual Ummah. In this frame, Islamist narratives might become appealing to young Muslims, for they aspire to be part of a global, strong, and noble community.⁵¹⁵

As Korteweg et al note,⁵¹⁶ another factor allowing for the rise of Islamism is the lack of powerful counter-narratives. Although Muslim communities at large have decisively condemned Islamist terrorism, the alleged absence of powerful counter-narratives hinders moderate voices, while somehow empowering extremist ones. Finally, though the role of the mosque and Imams is somehow becoming less relevant within second, third generations,⁵¹⁷ Imams or spiritual leaders can, at times, cover highly instrumental roles in shaping individuals’ radicalisation processes.⁵¹⁸

As multiple terrorists have justified their actions in Islamist terms,⁵¹⁹ two examples from Belgium and Britain could best illustrate how particular religious interpretations can trigger Islamist

⁵¹⁴ Barber, Benjamin. (1996). *Jihad vs. McWorld*. New York: Ballantine Books. p. xvi.

⁵¹⁵ Roy, Olivier. *Globalized Islam*. pp. 1-58, 303.

⁵¹⁶ Korteweg et al. “Background contributing factors to terrorism”. p. 31.

⁵¹⁷ Vidino, Lorenzo. *Home-grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development, and dynamics of radicalization*.

⁵¹⁸ For more information about Imams being central figures in a number of terrorists’ radicalization process, please see: Leiken, Robert. “Europe’s Angry Muslims”; Karagiannis, Emmanuel. (2012). “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization”. *Politics, Religion, and Ideology*. Issue 13, no. 1. pp. 99-113; Kolig, Erich. (2014). *Freedom of Speech and Islam*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. p. 108; (2007). “Race hate cleric Faisal deported”. BBC.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6691701.stm accessed on 23 June 2017; Nielsen, Jorgen. (2012). *Islam in Denmark*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. p. 187.

⁵¹⁹ For examples of single terrorists mentioning Allah and the Quran, please see: Bouyeri, Mohammed. In Benjamin, David. (2005). *The Next Attack*. New York: Henry Holt. p. 91; Abdullah, Bilal. In Gardham, Duncan. (2008). “Glasgow bomb plot: Wills to families left by airport terrorists”. *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3689301/Glasgow-bomb-plot-Wills-to-families-left-by-airport-terrorists.html> accessed on 24 June 2017; Abdulmutallab, Umar. (2011). In U.S. District Court, Detroit, In “Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s statement on guilty plea”. *Detroit Free Press*. <http://www.freep.com/article/20111012/NEWS01/111012038/Transcript-Read-Abdulmutallab-s-statement-guilty-plea>

radicalisation. Head of the disputed organisation Sharia4Belgium, Fouad Belkacem, alias Abu Imran, once explained that his quest for the establishment of Sharia law in Belgium was motivated by the religious duty to reject democracy and follow Allah's teachings:

Sharia is Islam, to be clear. There is no difference between Islam and Sharia...Democracy is the opposite of Islam and Sharia. We believe that Allah is the legislator, Allah makes the laws, He's the One who tells us what's allowed and what's forbidden...It's really funny when I hear someone saying 'I was speaking to a democratic Muslim'. It's the same thing as saying 'I was speaking to a Christian Jew or a Jewish Muslim' or something like that. It's impossible...and the Muslim that says he's against Sharia is not a Muslim, it's impossible.⁵²⁰

Commenting on prospects of Muslims being the majority in cities like Antwerp in the next 30 years, Imran predicted that, "The victory of Allah is very near, so I think the West needs to prepare itself for a wave of Sharia and Islam."⁵²¹

Resonating his fellow Belgian's remarks is also British-born preacher Anjem Choudary. Head of banned groups such as al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK, Choudary has justified his intentions to overthrow democracy in Britain by arguing that, "Islam is superior. And will not be surpassed. So I believe that the law of God is much superior to man-made law...the messenger Mohammad, he said 'Fight them with your wealth, with your body, with your tongue.' So, I'm engaged here, if you like, in a verbal Jihad."⁵²² Though the leader maintained both al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK were non-violent political parties, Choudary has nonetheless couched his support for physical Jihad in religious terms:

You can't say that Islam is a religion of peace, because Islam does not mean peace. It means submission. So the Muslim is the one who submits. There is a place for violence in Islam. There is a place for Jihad in Islam...The Koran is full of, you know, Jihad [which is] the most talked about duty in the Koran other than 'tawhid' - belief. Nothing else is mentioned more than the topic of fighting.⁵²³

accessed on 24 June 2017; Adebolajo, Michael. (2013). In Bond, Anthony. "Lee Rigby murder trial". *Mirror*. <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/lee-rigby-murder-trial-michael-2943185> accessed on 24 June 2017; Hall, John. (2014). "'British banker' reveals he has quit to join ISIS in Iraq". *Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2759535/British-banker-reveals-quit-join-ISIS-Iraq-hated-ruled-laws-Allah-s-self-indulgence-rich.html> accessed on 24 June 2017; Muthana, Aseel. (2015). In Rogers, Tim. "Cardiff Jihadist 'willing to die' for Isis fight in Syria". BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-28116575> accessed on 24 June 2017; "Umm Khulthum". (2015). In Jaffer, Nabeelah. "The secret world of Isis brides"; Sherwood, Harriet et al. (2015). "Schoolgirl jihadis". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria> accessed on 24 June 2017.

⁵²⁰ Belkacem, Fouad. (2012). Interviewed by Hule, Dale. CBN. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GjNlaIoZKAE> accessed on 24 June 2017.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Choudary, Anjem. (2014). In Ward, Clarissa. "Campaigning for Isis in the West". CBS News. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/recruiting-for-isis-60-minutes/> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁵²³ Choudary, Anjem. (2010). In Stakelbeck, Eric. "UK Muslim Leader: Islam Not A Religion of Peace". CBN News. <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2010/March/UK-Muslim-Leader-Islam-Not-a-Religion-of-Peace/> accessed on 21 June 2017.

In conformity to such assertions, Choudary has never condemned the murder of British soldier Lee Rigby by two Jihadist terrorists, not to mention the attacks on the Parisian magazine Charlie Hebdo. Defending Islam, even through force, is justifiable for the British preacher because Islam “is more than just a religion. It is not just a spiritual belief. It is, in fact, an ideology which you believe in and you struggle for and you are willing even to die for, because you believe in that: that is your whole life.”⁵²⁴

Conversion and Gender Theories

Combining grievances, rational, and structural factors, conversion and gender theories have recently gained much attention. This is mainly due to the fact that Western converts to Islam are overrepresented in acts of terrorism.⁵²⁵ Likewise, reports on European foreign fighters travelling to ISIS-occupied territory suggest that 17% of them are women.⁵²⁶ And recent events, such as the Westminster attack by a British convert⁵²⁷ and the three French Muslim women’s foiled plot to strike Notre Dame,⁵²⁸ reinforce the need to keep exploring conversion and gender theories.

1. Conversion Theories

As already stated, Western and European converts to Islam have earned much consideration in recent years. As Sam Mullins’s research demonstrates, despite their minor presence within European Muslim communities, converts are overrepresented in terrorist attacks.⁵²⁹ In spite of a series of methodological and conceptual ruminations, Bart Schuurman et al corroborate Mullins’s findings, agreeing that converts are overrepresented both in home-grown terrorism and foreign fighting.⁵³⁰

Disparate are the explanations for converts’ radicalisation. Milena Uhlmann argues converts are more likely to radicalise because they lack knowledge of Islam.⁵³¹ Inspired by John Lofland’s and Rodney Stark’s categorisation of “total converts,”⁵³² Daniel Benjamin refers to “converts’ zeal”,

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

⁵²⁵ Flower, Scott. (2013). “Muslim Converts and Terrorism”. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*. Vo. 5, no. 11. pp. 6-9; Mullins, Sam. (2015). “Re-examining the involvement of Converts in Islamist Terrorism: A Comparison of the U.S. and the U.K.”. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vo. 9, no 6. pp. 72-84;

⁵²⁶ Bakker, Edwin, De Leede, Seran. (2016). *European Female Jihadists in Syria: Exploring an Under-Researched Topic*. ICCT, The Hague.

⁵²⁷ (2017). “London attack: what we know so far”. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39355108> accessed on 24 June 2017.

⁵²⁸ Chrisafi, Angelique. (2016). “Cell of French women guided by ISIS behind failed Notre Dame attack”.

⁵²⁹ Mullins, Sam. “Re-examining the involvement of Converts in Islamist Terrorism”.

⁵³⁰ Schuurman, Bart et al. (2016). *Converts and Islamist Terrorism*. ICCT, The Hague.

⁵³¹ Uhlmann, Milena. (2007). “European Converts to Terrorism”. *Middle East Quarterly*. Vo. 15, no. 3. pp. 31-37.

⁵³² Lofland, John, Stark, Rodney. (1965). “Becoming a World Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective”. *American Sociological Review*. Vo. 30, no. 6. pp. 862-875.

namely the desire to demonstrate commitment to the new faith.⁵³³ Marion Van San observes Dutch and Belgian youngsters with problematic backgrounds acquiring knowledge of Islam online being easily manipulated.⁵³⁴ Stressing the role of identity and belonging, Monika Bartoszewicz believes that individuals who are at odds with both their identity and the society they belonged to before embracing Islam are more inclined to radicalisation.⁵³⁵

Comparing converts and non-converts in the U.S. and the UK, Mullins describes their radicalisation as a combination of mental issues/personal circumstances and group/structural factors such as socioeconomic deprivation and the role of social media.⁵³⁶ Emmanuel Karagiannis concludes that four mechanisms are responsible for the radicalisation of European Jihadi converts: personal victimisation resulting from abuses and/or discrimination; “the slippery-slope”, meaning the joining of radical groups with influential members and preachers; “the power of love”, as in being radicalised by partners and relatives; and political grievances affecting the domestic/international scene.⁵³⁷

In addition to renowned Jihadist converts such as the Westminster attacker,⁵³⁸ the above explanations unravel why other European converts sympathise with religious violence. Former Italian communist and proud supporter of Hezbollah, Ammar De Martino has envisioned the destruction of Israel, inviting all Muslims in the world to fight oppression in “any possible way.”⁵³⁹ Barbara Aisha Farina, a convert from Milan, became notorious for her pro-Osama bin Laden remarks on the wake of 9/11, her editorial of two magazines glorifying martyrdom, and her blogs meant to disseminate Jihadist ideology in Italy.⁵⁴⁰

A Former boxer from Neu-Ulm, Pierre Vogel has become one of the most famous Islamist voices in Germany. Calling himself Abu Hamza, the name of a warrior from the time of Prophet Mohammad, he has exhibited a “HAM-ZA 911” license plate, a clear reference to Hamza and 9/11.⁵⁴¹ Reportedly against violence, Vogel has been investigated for contacts with suspected Jihadists, tried to

⁵³³ Benjamin, Daniel. (2007). *The Converts' Zeal: Why Are So Many Jihadists Converts to Islam?* Brookings Institute, Washington DC.

⁵³⁴ Van San, Marion. “Lost Souls Searching For Answers? Belgian and Dutch Converts Joining the Islamic State”. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vo. 9, no. 5. pp. 47-56.

⁵³⁵ Bartoszewicz, Monika. (2012). “Controversies and Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to Islam”. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vo. 7, no. 3. pp. 17-29.

⁵³⁶ Mullins, Sam. “Re-examining the involvement of Converts in Islamist Terrorism”.

⁵³⁷ Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization”.

⁵³⁸ For a plentiful list and elucidation of cases of Jihadist converts, please see: Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization”.

⁵³⁹ Ammar, De Martino Luigi. (2006). In Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. p. 102.

⁵⁴⁰ Vidino, Lorenzo. *Home-grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development, and dynamics of radicalization*. pp. 49-52.

⁵⁴¹ Bartsch, Matthias et al. (2012). “The Dangerous Success of Radical Young Clerics”. *Der Spiegel*.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-growing-following-in-germany-the-dangerous-success-of-radical-young-clerics-a-816642-2.html> accessed on 24 June 2017.

hold public funeral prayers for Osama bin Laden,⁵⁴² and his sermons are believed to contribute to the radicalisation of Muslim youth, say German authorities.⁵⁴³

2. Gender Theories

To other pundits, terrorism and Islamist radicalisation can be approached through gender. As for men, focus should not be allocated on grievances and rational and structural factors, but, rather, on the individual's sense of manhood. Studies by Louise Archer⁵⁴⁴ and Choudhury Tufyal⁵⁴⁵ illustrate that masculinity, intended as the central, often dominant, role of the man within the familial system, is a defining trait in most Islamic cultures. Given its relevance, failed social advancement due to any given factor might imperil one's manhood.

In this picture, masculinity theory can be a valuable asset in explaining radicalisation. Running an empirical study of Pakistani masculinities, Maleeha Aslam explains that socially trivialised men are more likely to be frustrated. And as such, they more incline to accept violence to regain masculine efficacy.⁵⁴⁶ Michael Kimmel's analysis on the Taliban reinforces Aslam's point.⁵⁴⁷ Convinced that society depends on them, Muslim men feel emasculated by their inability to fully cope with American interference and attempts of Westernisation. In this context, the Taliban's discourse offers men a chance to reclaim their manhood from emasculating policies of globalisation. Similarly, Katherine Brown claims that counter-terrorist policies might foster the securitisation of British Muslims, stripping men (and women too) of their rights and dignity as equal members of society.⁵⁴⁸ And these, in turn, might endorse Islamist ideas made of warped utopian politics that offer solutions to perfused feelings of malaise, including one's damaged sense of masculinity.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴² Huggler, Justin. (2015). "Islamic extremists 'trying to recruit Syrian refugees in Germany'". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11856326/Islamic-extremists-trying-to-recruit-Syrian-refugees-in-Germany.html> accessed on 24 June 2017.

⁵⁴³ Almelling, A. et al. (2015). "An overview of Germany's Islamist scene". Deutsche Welle. <http://www.dw.com/en/an-overview-of-germanys-islamist-scene/a-18860746> accessed on 24 June 2017.

⁵⁴⁴ Archer, Louise. (2001). "Muslim brothers, black lads, traditional 'Asians': British Muslim young men's constructions of race, religion and masculinity". *Feminism and psychology*. Vo. 11, no.1. pp. 79-105.

⁵⁴⁵ Choudhury, Tufyal. *The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)*. pp. 10-11.

⁵⁴⁶ Aslam, Maleeha. (2012). *Gender-based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist Islamism and Terrorism*. New York: United Nations University Press.

⁵⁴⁷ Kimmel, Michael. (2002). "Gender, Class, and Terrorism". *The Chronicle Review*. The Chronicle of Higher Education.

⁵⁴⁸ Brown, Katherine. (2010). "Contesting the securitization of British Muslims". *Interventions*. Vo. 12, no.2. pp. 171-182.

⁵⁴⁹ Brown, Katherine. (2017). "This is how Islamist radicalisation actually happens". *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/manchester-attack-isis-al-qaeda-radicalisation-risk-factors-a7753451.html> accessed on 25 June 2017.

Besides terrorists feeling emasculated or in search for manhood,⁵⁵⁰ certain male Islamists also accept violence in gendered terms. During the course of a focus group in Reggio Emilia with the author, a sub-group of 5 individuals expressed their sympathy for those defending oppressed brethren. One of the 5 subjects, a North African worker in his thirties, made the point that it was a man's duty to defend his ground. "As a man, you must defend your own home and your own brothers. If you cannot, other men will come protect you. That's what they do, it's their job as good Muslim men,"⁵⁵¹ declared the worker. Analogously, after claiming that Islam allows for self-defence, a Tunisian citizen in Palermo concluded his comment by asking, "If they attack your family and you do nothing, what kind of man are you?"⁵⁵²

When it comes to women, a specific gendered approach may elucidate the motifs enticing them to embrace Islamist viewpoints. Here, radicalisation becomes a function of women's relation with mainstream society and with their community/familial system. In Britain, for instance, the Muslim Women's Network UK claims Islamic women to be one of the most deprived groups in the country.⁵⁵³ Muslim women display the highest unemployment rates, the poorest health, and the lowest educational attainment. And they face multiple discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, and dress code. Being more recognisable than men, women are in fact the main targets of Islamophobic attacks.⁵⁵⁴

Regardless, instead of tackling the mentioned social issues, the British government only expects women to counter radicalisation, complain Muslim Women's Network UK.⁵⁵⁵ Yet, women's involvement is solely due to the assumption that women are more "peaceful" than men. Based on notions of femininity that see women as "moderate" subjects who can prevent radicalisation, this kind of prejudice is emblematic, Brown holds.⁵⁵⁶ To her, such a concept truly reinforces the stereotype that

⁵⁵⁰ Kimmel refers to the case of Mohammed Atta and his father's constant undermining of his manhood for not succeeding in becoming a doctor. In fact, the mastermind of the 9/11 hijackings would have turned to terrorism as a response to his failed attempt to satisfy his father and the subsequent shame bestowed upon his family: Kimmel, Michael. "Gender, Class, and Terrorism"; The other example is the one by ISIS's commander Abu Bilel who reasserts his manhood by proudly stating that Jihadi bribes fantasise him being a warrior of Allah: (2015). "Skyping with the enemy: I went undercover as a Jihadi girlfriend". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/26/french-journalist-poses-muslim-convert-isis-anna-erelle> accessed on 25 June 2017.

⁵⁵¹ Interview no. 58, Q7, Appendix 5.

⁵⁵² Interview no. 68, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁵⁵³ Muslim Women's Network UK (MWNK). (2010) "Memorandum: Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, Select Committee Report 2010 on Preventing Violent Extremism PVE20".

⁵⁵⁴ Vidal, Ava. (2014). "Islamophobia: 'people call us terrorist, grab our veil, want us dead'". *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/10804880/Islamophobia-People-grab-our-veils-call-us-terrorists-and-want-us-dead-What-its-really-like-to-be-a-Muslim-woman-in-Britain.html> accessed on 26 June 2017.

⁵⁵⁵ MWNK. (2010). *Memorandum*. Muslim Women's Network UK.

⁵⁵⁶ Brown, Katherine. (2012). "Gender and Anti-Radicalisation: women and emerging counter-terrorism measures". In Satterthwaite, Margaret, Huckerby, Jayne (Eds). *Gender, National Security and Counter-terrorism: a human rights*

women cannot be effective role actors, for they misread reality and need guidance. This would explain why preventive programmes are not engaging Muslim women as much as they should. And when they do, women are mainly functioning in the policy sphere as “mothers” and not as “citizens”.

Instead of overcoming cultural barriers and truly feel part of society, Muslim women are expected to use “motherly” skills to spy on their families. As a result, the dominant narrative intrinsic to the political discourse on radicalisation does not empower British Islamic women. Rather, it hinders their interaction, public involvement (even within mosques⁵⁵⁷), and sense of trust in the government, concludes Brown.⁵⁵⁸ Feeling ignored and detached from society, Muslim women’s constructed vulnerability inevitably offers chances to organisations such as ISIS to feed on discontent.

Regrettably, women’s status is not less problematic within their communities/familial systems. As co-director of *Inspire*⁵⁵⁹ Sarah Khan observes, British Muslim women often suffer from “barriers within families, barriers within communities, and lack of ‘outside agencies’ that can help.”⁵⁶⁰ Living remarkably controlled lives, certain women conflict with the patriarchal structures of their communities.⁵⁶¹ Adding to cultural gaps with their parents, women can too find themselves stuck between traditional cultures and British values promoting emancipation.

Similar to traumatic events such as being raped,⁵⁶² failure to follow/respect traditional values often results in tension and dishonour bestowed upon a woman’s family. Fearing various kinds of repercussion at the hands of husbands, fathers, and relatives, Muslim women can feel voiceless. Even at university, due to their parents’ worry caused by the securitisation of Muslims in Britain, Islamic women are discouraged to engage in several forms of activism and student life.⁵⁶³ Unable to interact with reliable religious authorities within their communities, women struggle at finding external assistance too, falling prey to depression and alienation.

perspective. London: Routledge. pp. 36-59; Brown, Katherine. (2013). “Gender, Prevent, and British Muslimism”. Public Spirit. <http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/gender-prevent-and-british-muslims-2/> accessed on 26 June 2017.

⁵⁵⁷ Brown, Katherine. (2008). “The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community”. *Journal of Politics and International Relations*. Vo. 10, no. 3. pp. 472-491.

⁵⁵⁸ Brown, Katherine. “Gender and Anti-Radicalisation”; “Gender, Prevent, and British Muslimism”.

⁵⁵⁹ *Inspire* is a counter-extremism and human rights organisation based in the UK.

⁵⁶⁰ Khan, Sara. (2015). “My journey into the complex lives of British Muslim women and girls”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/29/british-muslim-communities-women-face-challenge-extremism> accessed on 26 June 2017.

⁵⁶¹ Bashir, Kalsoom. (2015). In Brewer, Julia. “For British Muslim women, Isis may offer freedom”.

⁵⁶² Bloom, Mia. (2016). “The changing nature of women in extremism and political violence”. *Freedom from Fear*. Issue 11. pp. 1-15.

⁵⁶³ Brown, Katherine, Saeed, Tania. (2015). Radicalization and counter-radicalization at British universities: Muslim encounters and alternatives. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Vo. 38, no.11. pp. 1952-1968.

Considering both their relation with mainstream society and with their communities/families, Islamist ideas offer women a chance to restore their position/status, whichever and wherever it may be. Aside from female terrorists and suicide bombers,⁵⁶⁴ cases of British Muslim women accepting Islamist views and joining ISIS prove this point. As a study of British Muslim men and women finds a correlation between depression and support for Islamist violence,⁵⁶⁵ women's radicalisation can be seen in response to their vulnerable condition. As Edwin Bakker and Seran de Leede contend, their departure is a rebellion against mainstream society and their communities that disregarded them.⁵⁶⁶ To Hassan, ISIS embodies the chance for a new life where women are granted the care and respect they seek,⁵⁶⁷ while fulfilling their utopian aspiration of life under the Caliphate, assert Carolyn Hoyle et al.⁵⁶⁸

For instance, tweeting with British girls who left for Syria, Jaffer notes that Islamist ideas satisfy material needs, desire for independence, and much-aspired feelings of sisterhood.⁵⁶⁹ Moreover, Jaffer reports that Islamist views often solve issues of identity crisis experienced in Britain. A girl of Libyan origin who previously lived and studied in the UK named "Umm Kulthum" found in Islamist views an answer to the antidepressants she took as a lonely girl in England. "Umm Umar" also described herself as being desperately lonely and alienated while in Britain, for she felt unable to combine her identity with society. But joining ISIS gave her that much needed sense of meaning and "rush" she was longing for: "Man I hated the UK so much...the sickest [best] thing I've ever done in my life is to cross that Turkish border...it's time for action. Your Eeman [faith] will get sooo high during the border crossing. Big adrenaline rush."⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁴ Zedalis, Debra. *Female Suicide Bombers. Strategic Studies Institute*. U.S. War College; Bloom, Mia. "The changing nature of women in extremism and political violence"; Brown, Katherine. "Blinded by the explosion? Security and resistance in Muslim women's suicide terrorism", In Joberg, Laura, Gentry, Caron (Eds.) (2011). *Women, gender and terrorism*. Athens: University of Georgia Press; Pearson, Elizabeth. (2016). "The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theories on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad". *Policy & Internet*. Vo. 8, Issue 1. pp. 5-33.

⁵⁶⁵ University of London. In Dugan, Emily. (2014). "Radicalised Muslims in UK more likely to be born in Britain, rich, and depressed". *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/radicalised-muslims-in-uk-more-likely-to-be-wellheeled-9754062.html> accessed on 26 June 2017.

⁵⁶⁶ Bakker, Edwin, De Leede, Seran. *European Female Jihadists in Syria*. p. 7.

⁵⁶⁷ Hassan, Hassan. (2015). "Three sisters, nine children, one dangerous journey to the heart of Isis. What is the lure of the caliphate?". *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/21/three-sisters-nine-children-what-is-the-lure-of-the-isis-caliphate> accessed on 26 June 2017.

⁵⁶⁸ Carolyn, Hoyle et al. (2015). *Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, London. pp. 20-27.

⁵⁶⁹ Jaffer, Nabeelah. "The secret world of Isis brides".

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

Facilitating Factors

In addition to grievances, rational factors, structural elements, and conversion and gender theories, facilitating factors are those that cannot singlehandedly cause radicalisation, but are still worth mentioning as incubators of radicalisation. These elements, namely the Internet, international crises, prisons, Diasporas, and various social centres, can sometimes foster, reinforce, and boost an individual's radicalisation process or radicalisation leading to terrorism.

The Internet

The Internet and the new social media are indubitably crucial tools for radicalisation. According to Ines Van Behr et al, the Internet features numerous advantages.⁵⁷¹ First, it creates more opportunities to acquire Islamist visions. Its high-speed, unlimited 24/7 reach, anonymity, and rhetorical tolerance, which would not be permitted in the real world, allows for like-minded people. Establishing connections and networks, these are able to share all sorts of information, including propagandist material, practical knowledge, and footage/imagery. Second, the Internet acts as an amplifying echo chamber, where Islamist views are constantly reinforced through the interaction with a virtual global community. Third, the Internet arguably facilitates the creation of illegal, underground groups that would be considerably more arduous to establish in real life.

Finally, the almost universal access to the Internet accrues the reach of Islamist ideas. According to *The Economist*, in 2012 more than a third of the people living in the Middle East had access to the Internet. In the same year the United Arab Emirates featured the world's highest rate of smartphone penetration (61%). In Egypt, that rate stood at 26%, not much below Germany's 29%.⁵⁷² In Europe, rates of Internet usage stood at 75% and 89% in the UK.⁵⁷³

In this picture, as endorsed in Bart Barendregt's study, the Islamification of technology allows Muslim youngsters to explore Islamist interpretations "to distance themselves from older, traditional practices while also challenging Western models."⁵⁷⁴ Certainly, it is nearly impossible to calculate how many Muslims have internalised Islamist concepts through and because of the Internet. But as virtually every terrorist has resorted to the Internet at some point,⁵⁷⁵ it is plausible to assume that social media and the web have and still facilitate the spread of Islamist radicalisation on a global level.

⁵⁷¹ Von Behr, Ines et al. (2013). "Radicalisation in the digital era". RAND Europe.

⁵⁷² (2012). "The online ummah". *The Economist*. <http://www.economist.com/node/21560541> accessed on 27 June 2017.

⁵⁷³ Von Behr, Ines et al.. "Radicalisation in the digital era".

⁵⁷⁴ Barendregt, Bart. In "The online ummah".

⁵⁷⁵ AIVD. (2006). *Violent jihad in the Netherlands*. The Hague: AIVD. p. 43.

International Crises

Strictly linked to the political domain, major international crises might spark radicalisation. Wars and military confrontations affecting Muslims often reinforce widespread beliefs Islam and Muslims are under Western/Zionist attack.⁵⁷⁶ In addition to inspiring or motivating terrorists,⁵⁷⁷ crises like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might pave the way for outbursts of Islamist sentiments. During the 2014 pro-Palestinian demonstrations following confrontation in the Gaza Strip, a number of anti-Semitic tones were indeed crafted in Islamist terms. At a Central London march, protesters confronted a Jewish woman with her two young children telling them to, “Burn in hell.”⁵⁷⁸ And In North London, a rabbi was reportedly verbally assaulted by a number of youths who shouted “Free Palestine, F*** the Zionists, F*** the Jews” and “Allahu Akhbar.”⁵⁷⁹

In the course of rallies throughout Britain and London, protestors have showed placards evoking Nazi persecution of Jewish people by declaring, “Hitler, you were right!”⁵⁸⁰ Although Muslims were not the sole perpetrators, an organisation called the Community Security Trust reported that anti-Semitic incidents increased by 500% in the UK since the beginning of the 2014 Gaza War.⁵⁸¹ And, allegedly, Israeli aggression on the Palestinian people was also responsible for stirring Muslims-led riots in the suburbs of Paris.⁵⁸²

Prisons

As studies show Islam to be the fastest growing religion among convicts in Europe and North America, Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt tag prisons as fertile foundations for radicalisation.⁵⁸³ Based on al-Qaeda’s penetration of American jails, a U.S. 2006 policy report even warned that prison

⁵⁷⁶ Christmann, Kris. “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism”. p. 26.

⁵⁷⁷ For more information on how international crisis can fuel, spark, or accelerate terrorists’ radicalisation process, please see Nesser, Petter. (2012). *Jihad in Europe*. Oslo: University of Oslo. PhD Thesis. p. 58; Neumann, Peter. “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000”.

⁵⁷⁸ Culzac, Natasha. (2014). “Israel-Gaza conflict: Rise of anti-Semitic attacks in UK”. *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/israelgaza-conflict-rise-of-antisemitic-attacks-in-uk-as-crisis-rages-in-the-middle-east-9631174.html> accessed on 27 June 2017.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁰ Greenwood, Chris. (2014). “Rising tide of anti-semitism in Britain as Jewish people face backlash over bloodshed in Gaza”. *Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2707421/Rising-tide-anti-semitism-Britain-Jewish-people-face-backlash-bloodshed-Gaza.html> accessed on 27 June 2017.

⁵⁸¹ Community Security Trust. (2014). In “Israel-Gaza conflict”.

⁵⁸² Vinocur, Nicholas. “Anti-Israeli Protesters Rally Across France”.

⁵⁸³ Silber, Mitchell. Bhatt, Arvin. (2007). *Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. New York City Police Department, NY.

radicalisation posed a “threat of unknown magnitude to the security of the [United States].”⁵⁸⁴ In an attempt to explore the relationship between prisons and radicalisation, an ICSR study run in 15 countries recognises that “prisons matter”. Jails’ overcrowding, chaotic and unsafe conditions, and acts of discrimination against Muslim convicts might indeed favour Islamist narratives.⁵⁸⁵

Following his work with British Muslim convicts, Gabriele Marranci explains that convicts’ defence of a “self” that cannot be subjugated by man-made laws facilitates the acquisition of Islamist views derived from a “Prison Islam.”⁵⁸⁶ As Humberto Trujillo et al add, the feeling of being collectively marginalised can render inmates vulnerable to prospects of radicalisation, enticing sorts of identity seeking among prisoners.⁵⁸⁷ As prisoners tend to adopt the attitudes and actions of influential “others”, Islamist convicts and Imam carry out active proselytism.

Not only have prisons facilitated a number of terrorists’ radicalisation process.⁵⁸⁸ Jails are also responsible for creating Islamist inmates, especially in Britain. England and Wales, for instance, count almost 12,000 incarcerated Muslim convicts, 100 of them jailed on terrorism charges. Pondering over these numbers, former head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office Chris Phillips has once warned that, in British prisons, “what we have is a growing haystack of extremists where we still have to find the single needle that’s going to go off and do something really nasty.”⁵⁸⁹ Echoing Phillips’ point after spending time in more than 40 jails in the UK, former convict John Shelly admits that:

Over the last few years there’s been a real sort of noticeable change of people becoming radicalised and getting themselves involved in violent situations -and being coerced into doing that by some of what you might call the more prominent Muslims that are inside for various offences...Extremism...it’s grown and grown by the day, and [guards] found themselves in a situation where they can’t separate anyone because wherever they separate them to, they’re just mixing them with other people who have the same view and same sort of message.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁴ (2006). *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*. The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute and the University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group. p. i.

⁵⁸⁵ Even if “prisons matter”, the study clarifies jails should not be viewed only as threats, as they hold much potential for the de-radicalisation of radicals and terrorists. Neumann, Peter. (2010). *Prisons and Terrorism*. ICSR, King’s College London.

⁵⁸⁶ Marranci, Gabriele. (2009). *Faith, Ideology, and Fear*. London: Continuum.

⁵⁸⁷ Trujillo, Humberto et al. (2009). “Radicalization in Prison? Field Research in 25 Spanish Prisons”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 21, no.4. pp. 558-579.

⁵⁸⁸ For more information on the role of prisons in terrorists’ radicalisation process, please see: Neumann, Peter. (2009). *Joining Al Qaeda: Islamist Militant Recruitment in Europe*. Adelphi Paper 339. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ch. 3; Silke, Andrew. (2014). (Ed.), *Prisons, Terrorism, and Extremism*. New York: Routledge; Kushner, Harvey. (2004). *Holy War on the Home Front*. New York: Sentinel; Neumann, Peter. “Prisons and Terrorism”. p. 27; Hamm, Mark. (2008). “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S.” National Institute of Justice, Journal no. 261; Hamm, Mark. (2010). “Prison Radicalization and Sacred Terrorism”. In Rosenfeld, Richard et al. *Contemporary Issues in Criminological Theory and Research*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. pp.179, 181-182; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. p. 87.

⁵⁸⁹ Phillips, Chris. (2015). In Kotecha, Sima. “Warning over Islamic radicalisation in England’s prisons”. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32194671> accessed on 27 June 2017.

⁵⁹⁰ Shelly, John. (2015). In “Warning over Islamic radicalisation in England’s prisons”.

Diasporas

Intended as those societal contexts composed of ethnic groups forming their communities in foreign countries,⁵⁹¹ Diasporas are believed to enable processes of radicalisation.⁵⁹² At times, Diasporas conceal grievances resulting from the dichotomous interaction between indigenous and minority cultures. Although cases devoid of conflict exist, Diasporas generally include low-income immigrants in contrast with societies resenting their presence, as many European Muslims feel.

Exacerbated by social/economic inequality, individuals within Diasporas might fall prey to issues of identity crisis stuck between traditional and indigenous cultures. Drawing on such assumptions, the largest Muslim communities in the Diaspora in Western Europe –featuring the Algerian community in France, the Turkish in Germany, the Moroccan in Italy, and the Pakistani in Britain- have all witnessed the emergence of Islamist visions and, at times, of Jihadist terrorists.⁵⁹³

Other Social Centres

Besides prisons, different social settings like schools, clubs, workplaces or sport centres can too contribute to Islamist radicalisation. Deemed places of interaction and exchange of ideas, such venues represent appealing targets to Islamists. As several terrorists have been radicalised in schools, universities, and gyms,⁵⁹⁴ there have been various attempts to exploit these places to foster Islamist views. In fact, members of al-Muhajiroun are known for infiltrating gyms in the past.⁵⁹⁵ Members of al-Ghurabaa –another organisation linked to al-Muhajiroun- have also entered community centres and gyms.⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹¹ Safran, William. (1991). “Diasporas in Modern Societies”. *Diaspora*. Vo. 1, no.1. pp. 83-99.

⁵⁹² Waldmann, Peter. (2010). *Radicalisation in the Diaspora*. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid; Wanger, Andreas. Mauer, Victor. (2009). *The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism*. Center for Security Study, ETH, Zurich.

⁵⁹³ Most cases have been presented or mentioned throughout this chapter.

⁵⁹⁴ For more information about cases of terrorists radicalised in British schools and gyms, please see: Whitehall Report. In Slack, James. (2011). “40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for terror”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394625/40-UK-universities-breeding-grounds-terror.html> accessed on 27 June 2017; Robinson, Martin. (2015). “If he’s a ‘beautiful, kind man’, why is he killing innocent civilians?” *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2970521/Outrage-group-blames-MI5-radicalising-extremely-kind-Jihadi-John-fled-Syria-kill-people-ISIS.html> accessed on 27 June 2017; Bracchi, Paul. (2015). “The campus of hate”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2972909/The-campus-hate-terrorist-butcher-Emwazi-s-murderous-alter-ego-created-heart-Britain-s-capital-city.html> accessed on 27 June 2017; (2007). “Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan”. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762209.stm accessed on 27 June 2017.

⁵⁹⁵ Doward, Jamie. (2007). “The network”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/06/terrorism.jamiedoward> accessed on 23 June 2017.

⁵⁹⁶ Lewis, Paul. (2006). “Banned group tried to rent hall near suspects’ home”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/16/topstories3.terrorism> accessed on 23 June 2017.

Satisfying what Michael Whine describes as a preference for recruiting the elites,⁵⁹⁷ members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have penetrated university campuses in the UK. And so did al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK associates.⁵⁹⁸ Likewise, certain Muslim teachers have exploited public schools to spread aggressive Islamist visions. Best known as the “Operation Trojan Horse”, the plan discovered in 2014 envisioned the imposition of academic curricula with the intent to Islamise several schools in Birmingham.⁵⁹⁹ As former counter-terror chief Peter Clarke reported on the Birmingham scandal:

I have established that there is a group of associated individuals in positions of influence in schools and governing bodies who have, over quite a considerable time, looked to introduce what could be described as an aggressive Islamist agenda into some schools, very few schools, in Birmingham... There is a group of people of like mind, who are well known to each other, who have been working together for a number of years - and they have deliberately sought to bring those practices into the schools.⁶⁰⁰

These views referred to by Mr Clarke were then considered “grossly intolerant”, as they included explicit homophobia, disparagement of strands of Islam, highly offensive comments about British service personnel, and recurrent anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli sentiments. Even though the dynamics of the mentioned case in Birmingham and other British institutes remain unclear, it is believed that schools and other social centres could also function as incubators of radicalisation.

Critique of Theories of Islamist Radicalisation

In terrorism studies, Maxwell Taylor and John Horgan note that most theories on root causes of terrorism fall short vis-à-vis the specificity argument.⁶⁰¹ To them, “whilst many people experience circumstances that might be correlated with induction into a terrorist lifestyle, relatively few people actually become violent terrorists.”⁶⁰² Borrowing Taylor’s and Horgan’s specificity argument, no theory on Islamist radicalisation can singlehandedly explain the fact that what enticed certain individuals to radicalise did not apply to others with similar characteristics. Nor can such theories explain the fact that those aspects that were crucial in certain Islamists’ journeys were minimal or totally absent in other Islamist biographies.

⁵⁹⁷ Whine, Michael. “Hibz ut-Tahrir in Open Societies”.

⁵⁹⁸ Raymond, Catherine. “Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK”. pp. 17-8.

⁵⁹⁹ Coughlan, Sean. (2014). “‘Disturbing’ findings from Trojan horse inquiry”. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/education-28419901> accessed on 27 June 2017.

⁶⁰⁰ Clarke, Peter. (2014). In “Disturbing findings from Trojan horse inquiry”.

⁶⁰¹ Taylor, Maxwell. Horgan, John. (2002). “The psychological and behavioural bases on Islamic fundamentalism”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 13, no. 4. pp. 37-71.

⁶⁰² Ibid. p. 52.

As such, grievances cannot expound why millions of Muslims experiencing equal or similar conditions do not justify violence framed in Islamist terms. As already seen, most European Muslims are economically deprived, claim denied social rights, and are victims of racism and discrimination. Most of them feel outrage at Western foreign policy oppressing fellow Muslims. Some suffer from personal traumatic experiences and many from issues of identity crisis.

Were grievances the sole responsible for radicalisation, Europe would count millions of its Muslim citizens espousing violent Islamist views. By contrast, not only are Islamists justifying violence a documented minority,⁶⁰³ but do not fit into the alleged theories either. As one of the most outspoken British Islamist voices, Anjem Choudary did not suffer from economic deprivation. To prove this, an American journalist even asked the then leader of Sharia4UK if he did not see any discrepancies between his anti-Western message and his wealthy, “comfortable” life in the UK.⁶⁰⁴

Likewise, Ed Husain did not suffer from economic deprivation, discrimination or racism. Aside from isolated intolerant events, he was beloved by his schoolteachers. His family even made friends with the nuns from the neighbourhood and used to help out at the church’s annual jumble sale.⁶⁰⁵ In truth, a study of 600 Muslim men and women living in the UK reveals Islamists are not generally poor and discriminated. Rather, they are more likely to be born in Britain, rich, and depressed.⁶⁰⁶

But even so, traumatic experiences and identity crisis cannot singlehandedly explicate Islamist radicalisation. Not every loss of relatives or conflict with mainstream society leads Muslims to endorse violence in the name of Islam. Besides, a number of Muslim teenage girls fleeing to Syria came from stable, integrated backgrounds. They were not depressed, alienated, or, at least apparently, stuck between cultures. Amira Abase, for example, was a straight-A student who was also athletic, good-looking, respected, and well liked by all. She counted many non-Muslim friends, enjoyed Western TV series, listened to chart pop music, talked about dating boys, loved her I-Phone, and even wanted to have a lip piercing. To her, recalled a friend, her faith was important, but she perfectly combined it with her British lifestyle.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰³ Esposito, John. Mogahed, Dalia. (2007). *Who Speaks for Islam*. New York: Gallup Press. p. xii; Grant, Madeline. (2014). “16% of French Citizens Support Isis, Poll Finds”. News Week. <http://www.newsweek.com/16-french-citizens-support-isis-poll-finds-266795> accessed on 28 June 2017; Polchi, Vladimiro. “The Caliphate and jihadists are just terrorism”. p. 14.

⁶⁰⁴ Choudary, Anjem. In “Campaigning for Isis in the West”.

⁶⁰⁵ Husain, Ed. *The Islamist*. Ch. 1.

⁶⁰⁶ Bhui, Kalamdeep. In Dugan, Emily. (2014). “Radicalised Muslims in UK more likely to be born in Britain, rich, and depressed”. *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/radicalised-muslims-in-uk-more-likely-to-be-wellheeled-9754062.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶⁰⁷ Reid, Sue. (2015). “From joker to jihadi bride”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2978248/From-joker-jihadi-bride-exclusive-pictures-goofs-like-typical-London-schoolgirl-reveal-poisoned-mind-15-year-old-s-run-join-ISIS.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

And if outrage at Western foreign policy/oppression of Muslims is believed to fuel radicalisation the most, one cannot account for the emergence of anti-Western Islamist ideas in countries like Sweden. The Nordic nation displays no colonialist history in the Middle East and its military presence in the region is almost null.⁶⁰⁸ Stockholm is regarded as one of the most outspoken critics of Israel⁶⁰⁹ and has heavily invested into the integration of immigrants and refugees. Yet, the country is home to Islamist groups, is an “exporter of Jihad”, and has been stricken by Jihadist terrorism.⁶¹⁰

When it comes to conversion theories, not all converts radicalise. In the interviews with the author, Italian converts to Islam often underlined their inner peace Islam provided them, their quest for brotherhood, and their subsequent rejection of anything justifying violence in the name of Allah.⁶¹¹ Likewise, not all men who do not succeed in life turn to radical ideas. Some men, as Imtiaz Shams explains, move on, find other balances or even lose faith.⁶¹² Besides, a few who arguably had fulfilling occupations in academic and financial institutions still radicalised and even engaged in Jihad.⁶¹³ In spite of securitisation, discrimination, identity crisis, and their tortuous relation with society and their familial system, certain women find ways to balance their Islamic and Western identities without recurring to Islamist views to fill the void.⁶¹⁴

As for the other featured theories, there are various critical considerations to be made. In regard to rational factors, there are two main pieces of criticism. First, rational choice theories fail to address the “free-riding problem”, according to which people let others endanger their social status

⁶⁰⁸ Stavrou, David. (2010). “The debate over Swedish troops in Afghanistan”. *The Local*. <http://www.thelocal.se/20101215/30858> accessed on 24 May 2017.

⁶⁰⁹ Sanchez, Raf. (2016). “Israelis urge to boycott Ikea in diplomatic row with Sweden”. *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/12101735/Israelis-urged-to-boycott-Ikea-in-diplomatic-row-with-Sweden.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶¹⁰ Hakim, Yalda. (2016). “How Sweden became an exporter of Jihad”. BBC. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37578919> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶¹¹ An example of this is given in Interview no. 15 and interview no. 25, Appendix 5.

⁶¹² Shams, Imtiaz. In Anthony, Andrew. (2015). “Losing their religion: The hidden crisis of faith among Britain’s young Muslims”. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/17/losing-their-religion-british-ex-muslims-non-believers-hidden-crisis-faith> accessed on 28 June 2017..

⁶¹³ Multiple are the cases of Islamist terrorists coming from wealthy backgrounds featuring generally-regarded fulfilling occupations. In addition to Shehzad Tanweer, the ringleader of the 07/07 London attacks Siddique Khan held a degree from Leeds University and was involved in Beeston’s community as a primary school teaching assistant. And another British Muslim by the *nom de guerre* “Abu A’ntaar” used to work as a banker in London. For more information, please see: (2007). “Profile: Mohammad Siddique Khan”. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762209.stm accessed on 28 June 2017. Hall, John. (2014). “‘British banker’ reveals he has quit to join ISIS in Iraq”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2759535/British-banker-reveals-quit-join-ISIS-Iraq-hated-ruled-laws-Allah-s-self-indulgence-rich.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶¹⁴ (2005). “Is Islam compatible with the West?”. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4204820.stm accessed on 28 June 2017.

and, in case of success, they too will benefit from collectively acquired good.⁶¹⁵ If one assumes that individuals are self-interested actors, joining Hizb ut-Tahrir or sympathise banned groups like al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK in today's unstable societal context may be hazardous. In reality, rational choice theories do not grasp the role emotions play, which can elucidate decisions to embark on "irrational" radical journeys, holds Jeff Victoroff.⁶¹⁶ This would explain the fact that, for instance, out of more than 3 million British Muslims, only a few thousands joined Hizb ut-Tahrir and Sharia4UK.⁶¹⁷

Second, Pisoiu's notion that individuals rationally choose the Islamist occupation falls short when it comes to drop-outs. Basing their decision on the radical framework Pisoiu presents, individuals should never abandon Islamist paths and groups. Actually, if they agree that there is no higher aspiration in life other than becoming an Islamist, the decision to quit seems irrational. But some still abandon their Islamist journey, and the case of Ed Husain is perhaps one of the best examples. In spite of his commitment to his Islamist cause, after the death of a Christian student on campus he realised the very ideas he was preaching were also responsible for the student's murder. Emotionally struck, not only did Husain rationally decide to abandon Hizb ut-Tahrir, but he also gradually relinquished his views to become one of the most outspoken British Muslims against Islamist extremism.⁶¹⁸

In spite of their unquestioned relevance, group dynamics and personal bonds may too fail to untangle the whole Islamist puzzle. This is because not every person who comes to contact with the group's members eventually becomes radicalised. Sharia4UK has distributed thousands of leaflets, while its members interacted with dozens of potentially vulnerable targets.⁶¹⁹ Yet, only a portion of those who decided to continue the conversation and then followed through ultimately became Islamists. What network theories seem to disregard is the initial, pivotal role individual motivations and circumstances cover. Especially in Sageman's bottom-up process of radicalisation, a lack of such individual presumptions would indeed seriously hinder Islamist groups' ability to connect and attract recruits.

As for the impact of ideology, two main observations should be raised. First, ideology alone is incapable of elucidating dilemmas as to why millions of Muslims who learn or are exposed to violent interpretations of their faith and grow up in certain contexts that may glorify martyrdom do not

⁶¹⁵ Baumol, Willaim. (1952). *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

⁶¹⁶ Victoroff, Jeff. (2005). "The mind of the terrorist". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vo. 49, no. 1. pp. 3-42.

⁶¹⁷ Husain, Ed. "Asharq al-Awsat talks to the Quilliam's Foundation Ed Husain"; Raymond, Catherine. "Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK".

⁶¹⁸ Husain, Ed. *The Islamist*.

⁶¹⁹ Raymond, Catherine. "Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK".

radicalise.⁶²⁰ Were radicalisation only a matter of ideology, the world would be overflowed with Islamists. Conversely, evidence shows Islamists supporting violence are a minority, as numerous schools or interpretations of Islam preach and yearn for peace and dialogue with other religions while condemning violence in the name of Allah.

In regard to facilitating factors, not all those exposed to online Islamist material end up accepting violence. In spite of their worrisome diffusion, online communities have mainly remained daunting but virtual armies.⁶²¹ Preserving anonymity, online users usually tend to display more extreme views online than they normally would in real life.⁶²² Besides, as Tim Stevens and Peter Neumann hold, despite its numerous benefits, the Internet alone cannot replace human, face-to-face interaction providing ideological reinforcement, practical training, and operational knowledge.⁶²³ As Sageman puts it, remaining an instrumental platform for Islamist discourse, “[for] the type of allegiance that the jihad demands, there is no evidence that the internet is persuasive enough by itself.”⁶²⁴

Even though international conflicts might spark tension, they still do not automatically entice Islamist radicalisation. On the contrary, international turmoil might also enhance people’s search for justice and peace. Noticing imbalance in Muslims’ reactions in relation to Israeli oppression of Palestinians and ISIS’s atrocities, Taj Hargei urged fellow Muslims to show the same level of emotional condemnation for the Caliphate as they do for Israel.⁶²⁵ Further, the Muslim Council of Britain joined British Jewish organisations in a united call for a ceasefire and a condemnation of civilian casualties on both sides. Echoing such cries for peace, Muslim and Jewish believers came together to publicly announce their rejection of violence by the launching of a campaign named “Muslims and Jews refuse to be enemies.”⁶²⁶

Even if prisons are indisputable incubators of radicalisation, they do not automatically trigger Islamist ideas. The British prison system, for instance, counts approximately 12,000 Muslim inmates. A study by Marc Hamm suggests that, while in prison, some convicts convert to other religions, others

⁶²⁰ European Commission. (2008). *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*. Official Journal of the European Union. p. 5.

⁶²¹ Jenkins, Brian. (2011). *Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies*. RAND. Santa Monica, CA. p. ix.

⁶²² Ibid. p. 17.

⁶²³ Stevens, Tim. Neumann, Peter. (2009). *Countering Online Radicalisation*. ICSR, King’s College London. pp. 12-13.

⁶²⁴ Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. p. 163.

⁶²⁵ Hargei, Taj. (2014). “Why aren’t British Muslims condemning the maniacs killing in the name of Islam?”. *The Daily Mail*. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2725475/Why-aren-t-British-Muslims-condemning-maniacs-killing-Islam-From-leading-Muslim-voice-troubling-question.html> accessed on 28 June 2017.

⁶²⁶ Hafiz, Yasemine. (2014). “‘Jews And Arabs Refuse To Be Enemies’ Movement Demands Peace”. The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/15/jews-and-arabs-refuse-to-be-enemies_n_5587742.html accessed on 28 June 2017.

abandon every form of religious practice, and many do not even radicalise.⁶²⁷ Although British (and Western) prisons continue to be at risk of Islamist radicalisation, it is unrealistic to think that each and every one of the 12,000 Muslim prisoners in the UK is destined to undergo through an Islamist process. Most of the time, this needs no jail, for Islamists such as Ed Husain have never had a criminal record.

Moreover, not everyone who is part of the Muslim Diaspora becomes an Islamist. If this were the case, Britain would count thousands of Pakistani Islamists, France hordes of Algerian sympathisers of Jihad, Germany a myriad of Turkish Islamists, and so on. On the contrary, most Islamists from those countries are not born in the Diaspora, as most of them are British and French citizens.

Likewise, not every Muslim student exposed to violent visions becomes an Islamist. If this were true, Britain and other European countries would count thousands of Islamist students within their educational system. By contrast, campuses and schools host Muslims organisations dedicated to interreligious and cultural dialogue. They have also shut down a number of events considered dangerous, as it was the case for Westminster University following the revealing of Jihadi John's true identity.⁶²⁸ Lastly, not all Islamists have necessarily resorted to youth groups and sports clubs or gyms to acquire extreme visions.

Assessment of the Literature Survey

As specified at the beginning of this section, there is no factor which can singlehandedly explain Islamist radicalisation. Such a phenomenon is highly personal and occurs as a combination of individual and environmental circumstances in specific contexts. Ergo, this chapter has presented the debate surrounding theories on radicalisation not to champion one theory over the other. As already stated in the Introduction, our intention is not to pick sides. On the contrary, as we have presented evidence that corroborates certain theories, we have eventually introduced other facts that challenged the very same beliefs. Although this might seem curious, this is our voice when dealing with radicalisation. And, again, it goes back to our initial choice of Roy and Croft: radicalisation is a complex phenomenon and, before tackling potential issues of Islamist radicalisation in Italy, we want to consider and reflect upon every possible argument and counter-argument stemming from the literature survey and the evidence provided.

⁶²⁷ Hamm, Mark. "Prison Radicalization and Sacred Terrorism".

⁶²⁸ Gover, Dominic. (2015). "'Jihadi John': Westminster University bans Muslim hate cleric". *International Business Times*. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/jihadi-john-westminster-university-bans-muslim-hate-cleric-after-mohammed-emwazi-revealed-1489651> accessed on 28 June 2017.

As we are about to delve into the empirical core of the study, which theory is ultimately right? Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy a pressing matter or is it a myth? If radicalisation is indeed happening, which theories from the literature survey validate Roy's point? And if radicalisation is not occurring, what are the reasons that confirm Croft's claims? Before addressing such queries, the following sections will feature the study's methodology, which is essential to understand how we constructed our empirical analysis.

CHAPTER V: THE STUDY'S METHODOLOGY

Having set the academic discourse on Islamist radicalisation, conceptual frameworks/definitions, and theories of radicalisation, this section features the study's methodology. This includes: an overview of the Italian Muslim community; the study's restrictions and challenges; its population sample; the outline of its variables; the statistical methods used to empirically test causal models of Islamist radicalisation.

Overview of the Italian Muslim Community

Significantly inferior compared to other European countries, the Muslim presence in Italy amounts to 1,650,000 individuals, equalling to 3% of the Italian population.⁶²⁹ In spite of newly established second-generations, Muslims in Italy are mostly first-generation immigrants mainly employed in the primary sector, import-export, construction, and food industry.

From a religious standpoint, the overwhelming majority of Muslims residing in Italy are Sunnis, while only 2% are estimated to be Shia followers. Between 10,000 and 70,000 Italian citizens are believed to have converted to Islam. In Italy, Muslims can count on more than 20 social organisations, hundreds of worship places and Islamic centres, and four officially recognised mosques: the al-Rahman mosque in Segrate, the Great Mosque in Rome, and the ones in Ravenna and Colli di Val d'Elsa.⁶³⁰

From a demographic perspective, as shown in Table 2 and Graphs 1 and 2, although 43% of Muslims in Italy come from North Africa, the largest national group is from Albania. Albanians number almost 500,000 individuals, accounting for 32% of the overall Italian Muslim community.

⁶²⁹ Groppi, Michele. *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. p. 17.


⁶³⁰ Ibid. pp. 7-9.

Table 2. Italian Muslims' top-ten countries of origin and growth rate since 2011.


Country of citizenship (in base al 1/1/14)	2011	2012	2013	2014 (%increase/decrease compared to 2011)
1) Albania	482,627	450,908	464,962	495,709 (+ 3%)
2) Morocco	452,424	408,667	426,791	454,773 (+0.05%)
3) Bangladesh	82,451	81,683	92,695	111,223 (+35%)
4) Tunisia	106,291	82,997	88,291	97,317 (-8%)
5) Egypt	90,365	66,932	76,691	96,008 (+6%)
6) Senegal	80,989	73,702	80,325	90,863 (+12%)
7) Pakistan	75,720	71,031	80,658	90,615 (+20%)
8)Algeria	25,935	20,725	21,801	23,095 (-11%)
9) Turkey	19,068	16,354	17,711	19,951 (+5%)
10) Iran	7,444	5,962	7,273	8,995 (+21%)

Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.

Graph 1. Italian Muslims' top-ten countries of origin and % values in relation to the overall Muslim community.



Graph 2. Italian Muslims' geographical area of origin.




Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.


The second largest national group is composed of almost 450,000 Moroccan citizens (29% of Muslim community), followed by individuals from Bangladesh, which has experienced a 35% growth rate since 2011 (7.2% of the total). Tunisian, Egyptian, Senegalese and Pakistani citizens range from 97,000 to 90,000 citizens, respectively taking fourth (6.3%), fifth (6.2%), sixth (5.9%), and seventh (5.8%) place in the chart. Considerably inferior in number, Algerian, Turkish and Iranian citizens seal the top-ten chart, forming with all the other unmentioned Muslim countries the remaining 7.6% of the Italian Muslim community.

As shown in Graph 3, males (the red columns) always outnumber their female counterparts (the blue columns) in every national group. For instance, the largest gaps between men and women are registered in the cases of Bangladesh (70% vs. 30%) and Senegal (73% vs. 27%) –though other groups not inserted in the chart display much larger differences.

Graph 3. Male/female ratio in relation to country of origin.



Graph 4. Male/female ratio in relation to interregional demographic concentration.




Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.

Such ratios are reflected on the Muslims' geographical concentration on the Italian soil, as Graph 4 illustrates, where Muslim males are always more numerous than Muslim females in every part of the country.

Overall, as Graph 5 indicates, the overwhelming majority of Muslims reside in Northern Italy, as 39% and 27% of them live, respectively, in the North West and the North East. By contrast, only


21% of Italian Muslims reside in the centre of the country, while 13% live in the south –combining the islands and the mainland.

Graph 5. Italian Muslims’ interregional geographical concentration.



Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.

Chart 6. Italian Muslims’ regional geographical concentration.



Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.

As for Italian regions, showing that Muslim males outnumber their female counterparts in every region, Graph 6 reveals that Lombardy registers the highest concentration of Muslim citizens. In truth, Lombardy hosts 409,351 Muslims, which amounts to 26.5% of the overall Muslim population in Italy. Following Lombardy are Emilia-Romagna, home to 207,114 Muslims (13.4%), Veneto (139,539, 9%), Piedmont (137,467, 9%), Tuscany (8%), and Lazio (9%). Lastly, Marche (3.4%), Sicily (3.4%), Liguria (3.2%), and Campania (2.7%) end the regional top-ten chart.

At the provincial level, the provinces tallying the largest amounts of Muslim inhabitants are the ones in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. As Table 3 illustrates, in the first ten positions, four are the provinces from Lombardy (Milan, Brescia, Bergamo, Varese) three from Emilia-Romagna (Bologna, Modena, Reggio Emilia), and one from Lazio (Rome), Piedmont (Turin), and Tuscany (Florence). Milan is the province that hosts the largest quantity of Muslims (118,342), followed by Rome (89,748) and Brescia (73,204). Padua, Venice, and Genoa take, respectively place 17th, 18th, and 20th, while, surprisingly, Naples and Palermo, two major southern cities, only take 31st and 46th position.

Table 3. Italian Muslims' geographical concentration at the provincial level.

Province	Total	Male	Female
1) Milan	118,342	74,819	43,523
2) Rome	89,748	61,503	28,245
3) Brescia	73,204	41,042	32,162
4) Bergamo	58,365	33,638	24,727
5) Turin	53,007	29,467	23,540
6) Bologna	43,106	24,533	18,573
7) Modena	39,606	21,877	17,729
8) Varese	34,784	19,966	14,818
9) Florence	33,510	18,528	14,982
10) Reggio Emilia	29,399	16,665	12,734
17) Padua	23,541	13,084	10,457
18) Venice	23,355	13,433	9,922
20) Genoa	20,565	12,051	8,514
31) Naples	16,290	12,091	4,199
46) Palermo	10,218	6,619	3,599

Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). *Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community*. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.

The Study's Restrictions and Challenges

There have been various restrictions/challenges before and throughout the course of the analysis. From a sociological standpoint, the major limitation has been the self-selection bias.⁶³¹ Being completely voluntary, the study has included only those subjects who wished to participate in the questionnaires or interviews/focus group sessions. Having an interest/desire to voice their opinion, there might be a chance that such answers could have steered the study's outcome in a certain direction and may not be fully reflective of the overall Muslim population.

Likewise, the heated nature of the project might have hampered participation and reliability. Starting in spring 2016, the study's field research was conducted in the wake of ISIS's terror spree in Europe. As COREIS, UCOII, and CII initially distributed questionnaires through mailing lists and newsletters, we estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 Muslims had the opportunity to participate. But in spite of anonymity, individuals were reluctant to share their opinions about religious violence, al Qaeda, and ISIS. This forced us to abandon online surveying, and we then started gathering physical evidence at mosques, Islamic centres, and public places. And even then, recruiting potential participants has not been an easy task.

In the end, 440 subjects accepted to partake in the questionnaires and 200 took part in interviews and focus groups. In this frame, we acknowledge that sensitive questions in today's European charged context might have deterred potential participants, while possibly shaping the attitudes of those who did participate. Hence, we wonder if a larger sample, devoid of likely fears of voicing opinions in the current, tense zeitgeist, could have altered the study's results.

More generally, we are also aware that written questionnaires are not able to assure the veracity of the provided answers.⁶³² Nor are we able to know if subjects, particularly the ones filling the questionnaires, have taken a serious effort to understand questions with the intent to provide accurate responses.⁶³³ Further, the potential impact of some of the study's queries has prevented the actual measurement of a number of variables -as will be explained later. For instance, the variable "Networks" did not assess possible, concrete contacts or personal bonds with Islamist third actors, as the risk of non-response rate to the question was exceptionally high. Consequently we decided to measure the

⁶³¹ Whitehead, John. (1991). "Environmental Interest Group Behavior and Self-Selection Bias In Contingent Valuation Mail Surveys". *Growth and Change*. Vo. 22, issue 1. pp. 10-20.

⁶³² Furnham, Adrian. (1990). "Faking personality questionnaires: Fabricating different profiles for different purposes". *Current Psychology*. Vo. 9, issue 1. pp. 46-55.

⁶³³ Csiernik, Rick, Birnbaum, Rachel. (2017). *Practising Social Work Research: Case Studies for Learning*. Toronto: Toronto University Press. p. 122.

perception one person has about contacts with third parties.⁶³⁴ And finally, our inability to conduct investigations within the Italian prison system or specific mosques,⁶³⁵ along with linguistic and cultural barriers, logistical restraints,⁶³⁶ and risky situations,⁶³⁷ did not allow us to gain the wider picture we originally aimed for.

*The Study's Sample*⁶³⁸

After weighing the mentioned restrictions, we decided that the study's sample would consist of 440 questionnaires and 200 subjects taking part in interviews/focus groups. In social sciences, quantitative samples range from 30 to thousands of observations. Such studies generally accept a 5% margin of error with a 95% confidence interval.⁶³⁹ According to Herbert Weisberg's and Bruce Bowen's Table of maximum sampling error, if one is eager to accept an error level of 5%, then the sample should count 400 observations.⁶⁴⁰ Being greater than 400, we can affirm that the study's sample size is ample enough to provide statistically significant results. As for the qualitative part of the research, we determined the threshold of 200 through classic notions of saturation.⁶⁴¹ That is, we stopped sampling relevant cases when data from interviews/focus group offered no new theoretical insight or, in other words, when information would consistently repeat itself.

That asserted, the quantitative analysis is based on a questionnaire featuring 68 questions/statements, which were translated into Italian, Arabic, and French. A very similar

⁶³⁴ If we had asked, "Are you in contact with any Islamists and/or Jihadists?" we would have obtained a truthful measurement of the variable "Networks". But being the risk of non-response rate exceptionally high, we preferred to see if people agreed or disagreed with the statement that "Members of a group and friends are the ones who really make a cause worthy".

⁶³⁵ The Italian Ministry of Justice had prevented the author from extending the project to the prison system in light of a number of safety and logistical considerations. Likewise, the author has been unable to conduct research in a number of mosques and Islamic centres that rejected any kind of involvement *a priori*.

⁶³⁶ For instance, in two occasions, focus group sessions hosted more individuals than normally expected (30 instead of 20). Yet, due to lack of communication/misunderstanding, the milieus' geographic location, and participants' expectations, the author was still forced to carry out the sessions.

⁶³⁷ In two particular circumstances, the author was verbally and nearly physically assaulted.

⁶³⁸ The information about the composition of the non-Muslim sample is provided in Appendix 3.

⁶³⁹ In statistics, "Margin of error" measures the maximum amount by which the sample results are expected to differ from those of the actual population. In other words, it measures the likelihood that the results reflect the views of the sample population. Given that quantitative studies target samples of individuals and not entire populations, a certain amount of error is bound to occur because not everyone from the population, in this case almost 2 million Muslims, is analysed. Thus, most studies use the 5% threshold, meaning that any result is subject to a 5% error of either +5% or -5%. By "Confidence Interval" we mean the likelihood the people who took part to the study are representative of the overall population. In this case, as in most quantitative studies, if we were to repeat the same analysis over and over, we would expect the same results 95% of the time.

⁶⁴⁰ Weisberg, Herbert, Bowen, Bruce. (1977). *An Introduction to Survey Research and Data Analysis*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. p. 41.

⁶⁴¹ Bryman, Alan. In Baker, Sarah, Edwards Rosalind (Eds.). (2012). *How many qualitative interviews is enough?* National Centre for Research Methods Review Paper. Southampton: ESRC National Centre for Research Methods. p. 18.

questionnaire was also distributed to 440 Italian non-Muslim citizens in order to compare answers. Both available in Appendix 3, questionnaires aimed at Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were administered in 15 Italian cities. These have been selected according to Muslim demographics and Jihadist history. These were: Milan, Rome, Brescia, Bergamo, Turin, Bologna, Modena, Reggio-Emilia, Padua, Venice, Genoa, Naples, and Palermo. In addition to a few dozen online surveys, the vast majority of written questionnaires have been delivered at mosques, Islamic centres, markets, train/bus stations, and individual businesses and activities (Kebab shops, barbers, Halal butcheries, etc.).

Specifying that the Muslim target population has not been preselected in any way, the sample includes 303 males and 133 females. At the time of the field research, including only definite answers,⁶⁴² 263 respondents were 16 to 30 years old, 155 between 30 and 60, and 17 over 60. 117 individuals were Italian citizens, while 116 were born in Italy, and 254 had been living in the country for more than 5 years. 209 respondents came from Africa, in particular, Morocco (96/440), Tunisia (39/440), and Egypt (29/440). As for the rest, 64 subjects came from Asia and 34 from Europe. As for residency, 108 respondents lived in the northeast of Italy, 195 in the northwest, 81 in the centre, and 54 in the south. Milan counted the highest amount of respondents (68/440), followed by Rome (50/440), Turin (42/440), Florence (31/440), Naples (30/440), Venice (27/440), and Brescia (24/440).

In relation to occupation, 188 individuals were employed, 59 were business owners, 119 were students, 36 were unemployed, and 30 were engaged in other kinds of activities. 212 individuals earned less than 1,000 Euros a month, 133 between 1,000 and 2,000, and 16 more than 2,000. 249 were single, 168 married, and 30 divorced. 159 respondents had children while 272 did not. 232 had a high school diploma, 113 a university degree, and 88 had neither one or the other. 286 stated they always go to mosque, 99 said they only take part in religious ceremonies on holidays, and 34 declared they are not very observant. As for religious affiliation, 365 respondents were Sunni, 21 Shia, 39 Sunni converts, and 1 convert was Shia. In light of its composition, we can affirm that the study's sample is fairly representative of Italy's Muslim population.

In regard to the qualitative analysis, 97 subjects participated in interviews, while 103 took part in focus groups. Subjects from the interviews were randomly approached. By contrast, aside more informal gatherings,⁶⁴³ focus groups sessions were facilitated by a number of community leaders. Yet,

⁶⁴² That is, excluding, only in this part, those subjects who answered, "I do not know" or "Decline to state".

⁶⁴³ In a number of instances, focus group sessions were not planned, for the author introduced himself to groups of people gathered outdoors of mosques and public places. If groups counted more than 3 people, they automatically became informal focus groups.

individuals involved in focus groups were almost never singularly selected, as Imams and assistants extended invitations to their entire communities.

Both interviews/focus groups featured direct, face-to-face interaction in Italian, English, and French. Unlike the questionnaires, questions were open-ended and varied in nature depending on the interviewees. Interviews and focus group sessions were administered in the same cities and milieus the questionnaires were handed, but did not feature the same participants. The vast majority of participants were males from North Africa, but women, converts, members from second generations, and subjects from other national groups were also included.

The Quantitative Study's Variables

As already stated, the quantitative analysis is entirely based on a written questionnaire that was carefully crafted with the help of the three most prominent Italian Muslim leaders.⁶⁴⁴ The questionnaire is divided into four parts. The first one includes standard sociological variables such as age, gender, economic status, educational attainment, occupation, nationality etc. (questions 1-14). The second part proposes a number of statements meant to reflect Muslims' conditions in Italy (questions 15-37). The third part features statements on Islamist radicalisation, Jihadist terrorism, and issues of integration and coexistence (questions 38-59). The last section displays the participants' predictions about future attitudes and scenarios (questions 60-68).

Most questions were intended to assess the respondents' views on different issues and were phrased as precise statements from which each respondent could choose one of the following answers: 1) strongly agree, 2) slightly agree, 3) slightly disagree, 4) strongly disagree, 5) do not know, 6) decline to state. In the quantitative part of the study only the definite responses (the first 4) were taken into account. To such regard, probably due to self-selection bias, non-response rate – answering “Do not know” or “Decline to state”- was never an issue,⁶⁴⁵ for it averaged to 5-6%.

The quantitative analysis had two main objectives: determine the existence of a possible “Islamist outlook” and elucidate its drivers. By “Islamist outlook” we refer to the respondents' views on violence framed in Islamist terms. These visions have been scrutinised through the respondents' agreement or disagreement with four statements crafted with the three Muslim leaders: 1) justification

⁶⁴⁴ Please see page 20 in the Introduction.

⁶⁴⁵ As previous research has shown, sensitive questions can push subjects to hide “socially unacceptable” views by answering “No opinion”, “I do not know”, or “Decline to state”. Luckily, the study's most sensitive questions did not suffer from high non-response rate. For more information on the matter of non-response rate, please see: Tourangeau, Roger. (2007). “Sensitive Questions in Surveys”. *Psychological Bulletin*. Vo. 133, no. 5. pp. 859-883.

of violence in defence of Islam; 2) duty to punish whoever offends Islam and its sacred tenets; 3) support for Al-Qaeda; 4) support for ISIS. These are the study's "Response variables" which are potentially reflective of an "Islamist outlook". That stated, as for justification of violence in defence of Islam, we selected statement #42: "Violence in defence of Islam can also be justified". As for duty to punish offenders, we chose statement #43: "Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished". By support for Al-Qaeda, we meant statement #44: "Al Qaeda and other groups are the only ones that can fight Zionist and American imperialism". Lastly, by support for ISIS, we meant statement #45: "ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate".

The formulation of two of the mentioned statements needs further explanation. The variable about the duty to punish offenders of Islam is deliberately vague in its implication of punishment. As discussed with Imam Yaha Pallavicini, had we intentionally included physical force,⁶⁴⁶ we would have obtained large non-response rates due to the charged impact of the Charlie Hebdo attack on the subjects' perceptions. Referring to punishment instead of violence, we were still able to include in the responses both those entailing physical punishment and those envisioning non-violent tools (legal action). Pallavicini et al also advised us to use more neutral tones about Al Qaeda.⁶⁴⁷ Had we specifically addressed the legitimacy of the group as we did for ISIS,⁶⁴⁸ many would have not answered, feared the Imams. This is due to the fact that, in cities like Milan, Al Qaeda counted on established networks. By proposing a more neutral statement,⁶⁴⁹ were we still able to gain a sense one's possible support for Al Qaeda. To the Imams, in fact, whoever believes that Al Qaeda and alike are the only ones that can fight Zionist and American imperialism is still more likely to sympathise with the group.

The other variables originated from the theories described in the literature review. As Table 4 shows, such "Predictive variables" can be classified (with a degree of vagueness) as "Grievances", "Psychological factors" "Rational factors", and "Structural factors". "Conversion/Gender theories" are included in a wider group we named "Standard sociological variables", which also included age, nationality, occupation, educational attainment etc.⁶⁵⁰ Within "Grievances", we used statement #18 to indicate economic disparity: "As a Muslim, I struggle at finding a good occupation". As for social

⁶⁴⁶ Originally we intended to craft the statement as: "Whoever insults Islam and its sacred tenets should be physically punished or killed".

⁶⁴⁷ Originally we intended to craft the statement similar to the one we used for ISIS: "Al Qaeda's struggle against Zionist and American imperialism is legitimate".

⁶⁴⁸ This was possible because the Imams believed we would have encountered less ambiguity in relation to the Caliphate, which is believed to enjoy little support within Italy's Muslim community.

⁶⁴⁹ A person can agree with the notion that Al Qaeda and alike are the only ones that have the capabilities to fight Zionist and American imperialism without actually supporting such groups.

⁶⁵⁰ We refrained from including "Facilitating factors" such as the Internet, prisons, Diasporas, international crises, and social centres as they can be deemed more as incubators of radicalisation.

difficulties, we used statement #16: “As a Muslim, I have a difficult time blending in at school or at work”. In regard to discrimination and racism, we used statement #15: “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against”. As for outrage at Western foreign policy, we used statement #28: “Western foreign policy towards Muslim countries is and has been unjust and frustrating”. We selected statement #29 to indicate perceived oppression of Muslims: “Muslims in the world are often oppressed”.

Table 4. List of Predictive (Independent) Variables Used in the Study.

INDEPENDENT (PREDICTIVE)	VARIABLES
Variables from the literature on radicalisation (aside from conversion and gender theories)	Grievances <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic disparity • Social difficulties • Discrimination/racism • Outrage regarding Western foreign policy • Perceived oppression of Muslims • Frustration
	Psychological factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traumatic personal experience • Identity crisis
	Rational factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rational spiritual and material benefits
	Structural factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social groups/personal bonds (“networks”) • Ideology
Standard sociological variables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Age • Gender • Nationality • Birthplace • Years of permanent residency in Italy • City of residence • Social status • Number of children • Economic status • Educational attainment • Occupation • Political orientation • Religious participation • Religion

Within “Psychological factors”, we used statement #32 to indicate traumatic/negative personal experiences: “In the past, there have been hard experiences that brought me closer to God”. By “Identity crisis”, we meant statement #31: “In Italy I have often asked myself if I wanted to embrace

Italian culture or if I wanted to be out of it". As for "Rational factors", we chose statement #40: "A person decides to get physically involved in a cause due to personal interests, which can be both material and mental/spiritual". As anticipated in the study's restrictions, this statement is not able to measure one's actual material/spiritual incentives to support/engage in Islamist activities. Rather, this statement assesses one's perception of such factors, which may or may not be deemed relevant to the person in question.

Within "Structural factors", we opted for statement #39 to indicate social groups/personal bonds (which we labelled "Networks"): "Members of a group and friends are the ones who really make a cause worthy". Equally to "Rational factors", this statement is not able to measure one's actual contacts/bonds with Islamist third actors, but, rather, only one's perception and relevance about them. As for "Conversion", we used question #14 to indicate if one was a Shia or a Sunni convert. Likewise, as for "Gender", we selected question # 2 to determine one's gender.

Lastly, as for "Ideology", we all concurred it would be best to include something that most purists would agree on, that is, their preference, in the Middle East, for Sharia law. So, we chose statement #46: "In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better than a democratic one". Yet, we mean no automatic juxtaposition between democratic and Islamic theocratic systems, for it can be argued both Islam and Sharia Law have a democratic essence.⁶⁵¹ Still, following the insights by Imam Pallavicini, we still decided to craft the statement in this way for specific reasons. First, the Imam feared that a statement solely based on people's attitudes on Sharia law would have resulted in high non-response rates. Thus, we decided to set the scenery in the Middle East while giving Italian Muslims a means of comparison of what they are accustomed to, that is, Western democracy. But again, this is not to juxtapose democracy and Sharia, or democracy and Islam; rather, by providing a more neutral ground (i.e. the "Middle East") and a means of comparison ("democracy"), we intended to explore Italian Muslim's overall views on theocratic forms of government.

Statistical Methods

After assessing the Roy vs. Croft debate, we used statistical methods to explore the possible "Islamist outlook" –a detailed explanation of statistical terminology, concepts, and tests can be found in Appendix 4. Yet, our aim to explore possible drivers was not to determine causal relations between

⁶⁵¹ For more information about Islam and democracy being highly compatible, please see Voll, John, Esposito, John. (1993). "Islam's Democratic Essence". *Middle East Quarterly*. Vo. 1, no.3. pp. 3-11; for more information about the theocratic Iranian system featuring bits of democracy, please see Bruno, Greg. (2008). "Religion and Politics in Iran". Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/background/religion-and-politics-iran> accessed on 17 July 2017.

variables, for statistics, as a matter of principle, are unable to establish causality. Hence, in an effort to study our potential “Islamist outlook”, we tested 25 predictive variables⁶⁵² to assess their potential impact on our “Response variables” – that is, supporting violence in defence of God, the duty to punish offenders of Islam, Al Qaeda, and ISIS.

As presented in Appendix 6, we first tested every single predictor with the four “Response variables”, measuring the degree of independence (0.05 significance p-value). For the most significant predictors we then looked at single parameter analyses, where we measured the odds that religiously framed violence could be justified based on the single predictor (i.e. the probability that, within the contours of this study, individuals who felt discriminated against also justified punishing offenders of Islam). Finally, as shown in Appendix 6, we selected the most significant predictors and inserted them into logistic regression models to assess which one of them, when all grouped together, emerged as the most significant one.

Interview/Focus Groups Questions

Qualitative data was not subsumed in the quantitative analysis. Though we did quantify results in the qualitative section, data from the 200 interviewees were mainly used to enhance and elucidate trends and attitudes stemming from the questionnaire. Unlike the previous methods employed, interviews and focus groups displayed a more flexible structure. Questions were open-ended and had the goal to facilitate and positively stimulate the interviewees’ participation.

Interviews/focus group sessions were mainly divided into two parts. In the first one, the author addressed the situation of Muslims in Italy. He touched upon perceptions of discrimination, racism, social equality, portrayal of Islam, and frustration asking questions such as: “What are your views regarding Italy? Is there discrimination or racism?”; “Is it hard to find a good house, a good job, and a mosque, place of worship, being Muslim?”; “What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media?”; Have you ever felt frustration due to your personal situation in Italy?” In the second part, the author asked the participants what they themselves thought about potential issues of Islamist radicalisation, delving deep into their perception of violence in the name of God. Hence, the author asked queries such as: “Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?”;

⁶⁵² In reality, we tested every variable that we carved out of the questionnaires, such as, for instance “Sense of Mistrust”, “Difficulty in finding an appropriate worship place” or “Perception of a media war against Islam”. Yet, for the sake of analysis and due to their final non-significance in the regression models, we decided to include only those variables that are mostly linked to the literature survey or that could incorporate the variables in question – “Discrimination”, “Social difficulties” and “Economic disparity”, for example, can include difficulty in finding a worship place and the feeling there is a media war against Islam.

“What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?”; “What about if someone offends Islam and its Prophet?”; “What are your views about ISIS and Al-Qaeda?”

CHAPTER VI: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ROY VS. CROFT

Roy vs. Croft: Who's Right in Italy?

Having expounded the Italian debate on Islamist radicalisation, conceptual frameworks and definitions, theories of radicalisation, and methodological aspects, we are now able to address the discussion between Roy's and Croft's positions. Devoid of any kind of alarmism or unfair generalisation, proponents of Roy contend Islamist radicalisation is a serious issue for today's Europe and must be addressed as such. By contrast, those who agree with Croft maintain Islamist radicalisation is socially and culturally created by the media and other agencies to securitise the Muslim community and advance certain agendas.

Once again, the question is quite natural: who is right? Which position can best fit the Italian scenario? Based on their argumentations and evidence, we envisioned neither Roy nor Croft to be ultimately right. Though it is probably no nightmare, our hypothesis was that Islamist radicalisation could not be deemed a myth either, as "spurs of radicalisation" might still emerge. Was our assumption accurate? In order to verify so, we searched for what we called an "Islamist outlook". Based on the definition of "Islamist radicalisation" we provided,⁶⁵³ this "Islamist outlook" includes the respondents' justification of violence framed in Islamist terms. Presenting and comparing the results on religiously framed violence by Muslim and non-Muslims participants, the following section allows us to assess which position was more accurate.


Islamist radicalisation in the Respondents' Eyes

Our first goal was to understand how Islamist radicalisation is generally perceived in Italy. Within the sample extrapolated from Italian society, Islamist radicalisation is indeed perceived as a real issue affecting both Islam and the Islamic community in Italy. In fact, 69% of non-Muslim respondents (304/440) stated there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam. 19.5% (86/440) declared there is an issue but it is exaggerated by the media. Only 2.5% (11/440) said there is no issue of radicalisation in Islam, while 8% (35/440) did not know, and 1% (4/440) did not answer. Likewise, 44% (193/440) claimed there is an issue of radicalisation within Italian Muslim communities. 23% (103/440) affirmed there is but it is exaggerated. 9.5% (42/440) said there is no such an issue in Italy, 22.5% (99/440) had no opinion, and 1% (3/440) refused to answer.


⁶⁵³ Please see page 77 in Chapter III.

Unlike their non-Muslim counterparts, when we asked Muslim respondents if they thought radicalisation exists and is an issue, their response was more ambivalent. As shown in Graph 7, 20% of them (86 out of 440) affirmed there is an issue of radicalisation within their religion. 44% (194/440) contended such a question does exist, but it is minimal and exaggerated by the media. 26% (115/440) maintained Islam has no issue of radicalisation. 5% (23/440) did not know and 5% (22/440) did not answer. Similarly, as Graph 8 illustrates, respondents were more likely to disagree with the claim that Italian Muslim communities suffer from internal issues of radicalisation. Indeed, 43% (189/440) of the respondents believed radicalisation is not a problem in Italy. 10% (46/440) begged to differ and maintained there is an issue of radicalisation, while 30% (132/440) contended there is a problem, but it is minimal and exaggerated by the media. 11% (49/440) had no opinion and 5% (21/440) did not reply (1% of the data was missing).

Graph 7. Charts on Muslim respondents' perception of radicalisation in Islam




Graph 8. Charts on Muslim respondents' perception of radicalisation within the Italian Muslim communities.




Ergo, when comparing Muslim and non-Muslim samples, the difference in the perception on the issue of Islamist radicalisation appears evident. As shown in Graph 9, among all those agreeing there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam, 304 were non-Muslims and 86 Muslims (circa 4/1 ratio). 86 non-Muslim subjects claimed such an issue exists but is exaggerated by the media, while Muslim respondents arguing the same were 194 (more than twice as many). Among those who held Islam has no issue of radicalisation, there were 11 non-Muslims and 115 Muslims (more than 10 times as many). That is, non-Muslim respondents were significantly more likely to affirm there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam. Muslim participants were instead tremendously more prone to deny the matter in question, for they were also considerably more likely to clarify radicalisation is exaggerated.

Graph 9. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent's views on the perception of Islamist radicalisation in Islam.



Graph 10. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent's views on the perception of Islamist radicalisation inside Italian Islamic communities.



A fairly similar scenario repeated itself regarding Islamist radicalisation inside Italian Muslim communities. As illustrated in Graph 10, among all those agreeing there is an issue of radicalisation

within local communities, 193 were non-Muslims and 46 Muslims (more than 4/1 ratio). 103 non-Muslim and 132 Muslim respondents claimed such an issue affects local Islamic communities too, but it is inflated. Among those who maintained local communities have no issue of radicalisation, there were 42 non-Muslims and 189 Muslims (5 times as many). Similarly to the previous query, non-Muslim respondents were considerably more likely to claim Italian Islamic communities do have an issue of radicalisation. Muslim participants were instead substantially more inclined to state such an issue does not affect their communities, while they were barely more inclined to affirm radicalisation is inflated.

In light of this, why were Muslim respondents divided or more ambivalent when asked about radicalisation? How did interpretations of the matter in question differ from person to person? Among those agreeing radicalisation exists and is an issue, scriptural ignorance and manipulation of Islam were the two main factors motivating their answers. From north to south, recurrent answers included phrases such as: “Radicalisation exists and is a big problem because people who don’t know Islam read the Quran, take some parts out of context, and use them for their own needs,”⁶⁵⁴ “Radicalisation has become a problem because people who know nothing of Islam, who have not studied it, take some figurative notions and take them too far, but these people are not real Muslims, for they do not represent us,”⁶⁵⁵ “Radicalisation is huge and our communities have to do something.”⁶⁵⁶

Others agreeing with this idea have also clarified that Islamist radicalisation is minimal and/or exaggerated by the media. As one student in a focus group session in Bergamo stated:

You don’t have to believe everything they tell you or make you read. You probably know that Muslims are killed by these [Islamist] terrorists for the most part and, on top of it, if you look at who commits the most acts of terrorism, Muslim perpetrators are the great minority. This [radicalisation] problem exists but it’s minimal. In fact, if you think that we are more than a billion and a half in world and there are only a few thousands who are now in Syria, you do the math, but it’s a very small percentage of the whole Muslim population in the world.⁶⁵⁷

Likewise, an Italian-born Muslim student from Naples declared that, though radicalisation exists, pro-violence Islamists are “really a minority and fear towards them is exaggerated, even created by the media to securitise our community and keep us under control.”⁶⁵⁸

⁶⁵⁴ Interview no. 2, Q7, Appendix 5.

⁶⁵⁵ Interview no. 12, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁵⁶ Interview no. 26, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁵⁷ Interview no. 23, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁵⁸ Interview no. 16, Q5, Appendix 5.

Conversely, those who denied Islam and Muslim communities in Italy have an issue of radicalisation stressed the peaceful nature of their religion being hijacked by individuals who cannot be deemed true Muslims. As a Bangladeshi street vendor in Naples articulated, “I don’t think there is [an issue of radicalisation in Islam]. Islam is perfect, it teaches you how to love, how to behave, how to be peaceful at all times; then if you hurt someone in the name of God, I am not sure if He will ever forgive you.”⁶⁵⁹ Indeed, from north to south, respondents who vehemently rejected allegations of Islam and Italy having an issue of radicalisation clarified that, “Islam means peace and has nothing to do with being radical”⁶⁶⁰ and, “If you are a radical, you are not a Muslim because the Quran and the Prophet teach us to respect everyone.”⁶⁶¹ A focus group in Reggio Emilia explained why Islam does not have a problem of radicalisation in a similar fashion:

All of those who are radical are not real Muslims. They don’t know what Islam actually is. What does “Allah Ahkbar” mean? Anyone can say it, even you could, and are you a Muslim? It’s not enough to cry that aloud in a public place, you don’t become Muslim, you’re not a Muslim just for that. You have to live Islam and follow the teachings of the Prophet, which are all about peace. So, ask yourself: can these people be Muslim? No, they cannot.⁶⁶²

Along the same lines, Italian Muslim communities should not be considered at risk, because, “Unfortunately there are many extremists... but not in Italy”, reassured a Moroccan young woman in Milan.⁶⁶³ “Here in Italy”, continued an Egyptian baker, “Imams teach us to love the country and its inhabitants. We have to earn our spot in society, and maybe one day Milan could have too, like London, a Muslim mayor who serves all citizens. So, you see, there is just no room for radicalism and extremism here; we would be the first victims.”⁶⁶⁴

In sum, when it comes to the perception of radicalisation in Islam and inside Italian Muslim communities, unlike non-Muslims, Muslim respondents mostly agreed with the assumption that there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam, though it is minimal and exaggerated by the media. Yet, they slightly denied that there is an equal question in Italy. These presumptions are not too surprising, perhaps, as 82% of the survey’s respondents –as will be later illustrated- believed there is a media war to discredit Islam, but 81% of them stated they still love Italy and its culture and want to be part of Italian society. Could the respondents’ perception be a sign that Croft’s argument is ultimately right?

⁶⁵⁹ Interview no. 48, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶⁰ Interview no. 55, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶¹ Interview no. 61, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶² Interview no. 57, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶³ Interview no. 46, Q5, Appendix 5.


⁶⁶⁴ Interview no. 42, Q5, Appendix 5.

The Search for an “Islamist outlook”: Violence in the Name of God

In an effort to verify if Muslim respondents’ assumptions could prove Croft’s argument right over Roy’s, we looked for attitudes justifying violence in Islamist terms. In our quest for a possible “Islamist outlook”, we searched for what we defined as “non-violent Islamist extremists” –at least to the best of our knowledge, operating within legal domains, we assumed everyone participating in the study not to be actively engaged in any violent activity. That asserted, within the sample extrapolated from Italian mainstream society, 5.2% (23/440) non-Muslims strongly supported violence in defence of faith, 3.9% (17/440) slightly endorsed it, 11.1% (49/440) slightly opposed it, 75% (330/440) strongly rejected it, 3.6% (16/440) did not have an opinion, and 1.1% (5/440) refused to answer. Within the non-Muslim sample, 86% (379/440) of respondents rejected violence in the name of religion, while force was endorsed 9% (40/440) of the times.

As for the Muslim sample, although the majority of respondents in the questionnaire did not justify violence in defence of Islam, a considerable minority did. According to Graph 10, those who strongly or slightly approved of defending Islam violently amounted to 24% (respectively 52 and 53 out of 440 respondents), which, counting only definite answers –excluding participants who had no opinion or refused to answer-, turned to 26% (105/408). As for the rest of the sample, 45% of the respondents (198/440) strongly disagreed with violence justified in defence of Islam, 24% (105/440) slightly disagreed, 3% (14/440) had no opinion, and 4% (18/440) declined to state.

Graph 10. Charts on the Muslim respondents' take on violence in defence of Islam.



Understandably, rates for support of religiously framed violence were higher in the questionnaires than in interviews/focus groups. Taken individuals might be more cautious during face-to-face interactions, only 32 subjects out of 200 (in 16 cases out of 71 in which interviews and focus groups were conducted), or 15.5%, supported religiously motivated violence. The overwhelming justification for such beliefs was rooted in the respondents' conviction that Islam allows force as long as it is executed in self-defence and/or defence of other Muslims. "The only thing that Islam allows is self-defence, that is, if you are attacked, then you can react, but that's it. Violence, offensive violence, can never be justified", explained three North Africans in Bologna.⁶⁶⁵ As a Gambian artisan from Verona declared, "Only if there is a good reason God can allow [violence], like say you have to defend yourself."⁶⁶⁶

To other respondents, the concept of self-defence applied also to other Muslims being oppressed. As an Egyptian owner of a Kebab place in Milan argued, "Islam and violence cannot go in the same sentence, unless you are talking about non-Muslims oppressing Muslims,"⁶⁶⁷ because, "It's

⁶⁶⁵ Interview no. 60, Q7, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶⁶ Interview no. 39, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview no. 43, Q6, Appendix 5.

natural when a person is oppressed to rebel and do whatever he can to end the suffering, even by fighting”, clarified two Pakistani shopkeepers.⁶⁶⁸ In fact, to a Bangladeshi immigrant in Rome, “The only case in which violence is justifiable is in the face of oppression. Let’s say someone kills or attacks your family or your Muslim brethren, you then can kill or attack your enemy’s family, for the Quran allows you to do so.”⁶⁶⁹ In this case, “If there is a good cause, like defending oppressed brothers,”⁶⁷⁰ not only is defensive Jihad allowable but even mandatory. Remarks from respondents in Naples, Genoa, and Milan included examples such as: “If one brother is attacked and cries for help, then I have to help him, because I have to be a good Muslim”; “If a brother is in danger or under the yoke of the oppressor, it is a religious duty to go and help him”; “If there is oppression you are compelled to take action to defend your Muslim brothers.”⁶⁷¹ That stated, though supporters of violence were drastically outnumbered in both the quantitative and the qualitative analysis by proponents of the “Peaceful nature of Islam [which] leaves no room for violence, at any time, especially in the name of God,”⁶⁷² a significant minority in the study’s sample justified the use of force in defence of their religion.

The Duty to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and Its Prophet

Equally to other realities, Italian mainstream society has witnessed the emergence in recent years of charged debates juxtaposing respect for religious icons and freedom of speech. As such, non-Muslim respondents were asked to voice their thoughts on the duty to punish whoever offends the sacredness of a religion and its symbols. Within this sample, 7.3% of respondents (32/440) strongly accepted the punishment of offenders, 8.2% (36/440) slightly endorsed it, 18.2% (80/440) slightly opposed it, 59.3% (261/440) strongly rejected it, 4.8% (21/440) had no opinion, and 2.3% (10/440) declined to state. In total, 15.5% (68/440) of the sample justified the punishment of religious offenders, while 77.5% (341/440) disagreed with such a stance.

Analogously, Muslim respondents were asked to share thoughts on the duty to punish whoever offends Islam and its Prophet. Similarly to the justification of violence in defence of Islam, a significant minority also supported the duty to punish offenders. As Graph 11 shows, out of 440 respondents, 69 (16%) strongly agreed with punishing whoever insults Islam and its prophet, while 62 (14%) slightly agreed with such a stance. In total, 30% of the sample (131/440) justified the duty to punish offenders

⁶⁶⁸ Interview no. 10, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁶⁶⁹ Interview no. 1, Q6, Appendix 5.


⁶⁷⁰ Interview no. 22, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷¹ Respectively, Interview no. 10, Q6; Interview no. 20, Q7; Interview no. 47, Q7, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷² Interview no. 67, Q8, Appendix 5.

of Islam, amounting to 33% (131/392) if only definite answers were counted. As for the rest of the survey, 15% (67/440) slightly rejected the idea of punishing offenders of Islam, 44% (194/440) strongly opposed it, 5% (23/440) did not know, and 6% (25/440) declined to state.

Graph 11. Charts on Muslim respondents' take on the duty to punish offenders of Islam.



As already specified in the methodology section, this particular statement on the duty to punish whoever insults Islam and its prophet did not necessarily infer any use of violent means. Yet, it was still inserted in the analysis for its charged nature. Needless to say, the sensitivity of the issue in question transpired considerably during the interviews and focus groups. Though the vast majority rejected the idea of punishing religious offenders, certain respondents rejected violence but showed sympathy as to why others would react violently if their prophet were insulted. For instance, a Tunisian student from Bologna explained that offending Islam and Mohammed “[Is] a huge provocation that should not be done. Yet, even if I think killing or hurting someone is wrong, I think we are doomed to wars of religion, because people don’t understand how hurtful insulting Mohammed is.”⁶⁷³ A group of fellow Tunisians in Brescia elucidated the delicacy of the issue as follows:

⁶⁷³ Interview no. 58, Q7, Appendix 5.

You can insult me, my wife, my children, and all of the people who are here [in front of you]. It would hurt, but it wouldn't hurt as much as if you offended our Prophet, because all of our lives, compared to Him, are worth nothing, and so, when someone insults Mohammed it hurts us real bad inside of our souls, because He's more sacred than our lives.⁶⁷⁴

In light of this, 47 people out of 200 (circa 25%) claimed that whoever insults Islam and its sacred tenets should be punished. However, 23 of these believed offenders of their faith should certainly be punished, but only through legal means. A Palestinian activist living in Rome warned that offenders of Islam “should be sued immediately,”⁶⁷⁵ because, as a group of respondents in Lombardy explained:

Mohammed cannot be touched, as He's sacred for us. We are for freedom of speech, but your freedom ends when someone else's starts. We respect all of the prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and even the Virgin Mary, because, if you do not, you cannot be a real Muslim. So, given that we respect this, why shouldn't people respect our Prophet and our sacred truth? [Hence] we can take legal action.⁶⁷⁶

All these respondents clearly and openly repudiated violence in favour of legal action. Turkish workers in Modena conceded that, “No one should be punished physically, but legally,”⁶⁷⁷ for “Even if you insult the Prophet, I cannot kill you, I will sue you, but God forbid I use violence in His name, and whoever does so is not a Muslim”, affirmed two waiters in Milan.⁶⁷⁸

By contrast, the other 24 subjects who would punish offenders of Islam either directly or indirectly justified violent means. Comments from those who patently endorsed actual force featured examples such as: “[A] person should definitely be punished, even physically if he doesn't stop and repent”; “It's definitely right to punish someone who offends the Prophet, maybe even physically, especially if this person keeps doing that”; “I cannot kill you, but I do understand if someone punches you because you cannot touch the Prophet.”⁶⁷⁹ As a Turkish family man from Modena put it:

Killing someone is out of the question. But at the same time, just like in your family you have to discipline your children and punish them if they persevere in their mistakes, you have to do the same here. If you decide to write offensive caricatures [about Mohammad] and I tell you that insults me once, twice, three times, four times, etc., then maybe, if I slap you, you stop.⁶⁸⁰

The rest of the respondents who indirectly supported violent means inferred the foolishness of insulting Islam and its prophet given the existence of short-tempered, unbalanced individuals. In other words, to

⁶⁷⁴ Interview no. 32, Q8, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷⁵ Interview no. 5, Q7, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷⁶ Interview no. 32, Q8, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷⁷ Interview no. 37, Q8, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷⁸ Interview no. 28, Q3, Appendix 5.

⁶⁷⁹ Respectively, Interview no. 71, Q7; Interview no. 3, Q7; Interview no. 65, Q7, Appendix 5.

⁶⁸⁰ Interview no. 37, Q8, Appendix 5.

these respondents, offenders are to blame themselves if they end up being attacked. Their most common remarks included phrases such as: “If you decide to insult Mohammad, it’s your risk, you should not do that”; “There are lots of crazy people out there, if you decide to provoke them, it’s your own risk, because you know by now how bad insulting the Prophet is”; “It’s wrong to kill people, but I understand that if you insult Mohammed and there are some crazy people out there...it’s your risk...If there are some hotheads and you insult the Prophet, it’s your fault.”⁶⁸¹

In general, most respondents greatly rejected the duty to punish offenders of Islam and its prophet based on a myriad of religious and civic values gravitating around respect, patience, and the peaceful nature of Islam, including the very teachings of Mohammad. Nevertheless, a significant minority begged to differ, for, whether physically or legally, if one offends Mohammad, “This person has to be punished harshly”, judged a Moroccan mother from Varese.⁶⁸²

Views on Al Qaeda and ISIS


Considering public apprehension over such groups within Italian mainstream society, non-Muslims respondents were asked to share their views on Al Qaeda and ISIS. Within this sample, as for Al Qaeda, 3.6% of non-Muslim respondents (16/440) strongly endorsed its struggle, 3% (13/440) slightly agreed with it, 8.6% (38/440) slightly opposed it, 68% (299/440) strongly rejected it, 12% (53/440) had no opinion, and 4.8% (21/440) refused to answer. As for ISIS, instead, 5% of non-Muslim participants (22/440) strongly endorsed ISIS, 2.7% (12/440) slightly approved of it, 8.6% (38/440) slightly rejected it, 76.6% (337/440) strongly opposed it, 4.1% (18/440) had no opinion, and 3% (13/440) declined to state. Overall, support for Al Qaeda and ISIS amounted, respectively, to 7% (29/440) and 8% (34/440), while the groups were opposed 77% and 85% of the times (337/440 and 375/440).

Within the Muslim sample, as clearly described in Graphs 12, out of 440 respondents, 25 strongly endorsed Al Qaeda’s struggle and 19 somewhat supported it. In total, 10% (44/440) of the surveyed subjects supported Al Qaeda, which became 12% counting only definite answers (44/380). As for the rest of the survey, 10% (47/440) slightly disagree with Al Qaeda’s struggle, 66% (289/440) strongly opposed it, 6% (28/440) had no opinion, and 7% (32/440) refused to answer.

⁶⁸¹ Respectively, Interview no. 10, Q7; Interview no. 57, Q7; Interview no. 32, Q8, Appendix 5.


⁶⁸² Interview no. 29, Q8, Appendix 5.

Graph 12. Charts on Muslim respondents' take on Al Qaeda's struggle.



When it comes to ISIS, Graph 13 illustrates that, out of 440 surveyed subjects, 32 strongly agreed with the legitimacy of the group's struggle, and 25 slightly approved of it. Overall, 13% (57/440) of respondents in the survey endorsed ISIS, which amounted to 15% (57/392) if only definite answers were taken into account. As for the rest of the questionnaire, 10% (42/440) somewhat disagreed with ISIS's actions, 67% strongly opposed them (293/440), 3% (15/440) expressed no opinion, and 7% (33/440) declined to state.

Graph 13. Charts on Muslim respondents' take on ISIS's struggle.



Such results were noticeably greater in the survey than in the interviews and focus groups. Given Al Qaeda and ISIS related-terrorist activities in Europe, this might have been a quite predictable outcome, arguably, for we did not expect many individuals to openly voice their support for the groups in question. Unsurprisingly, only 7 people out of 200 (3.5%) patently showed their sympathy or appreciation for the two terrorist organisations. To all of them, the reason behind their support was mainly tied to the lack of governmental intervention to protect oppressed Muslims, and the subsequent religious duty to fight oppression. As a group of North African interviewees in Emilia-Romagna reflected upon:

Think you are a Syrian citizen. Who is going to protect you? Assad? Putin? The West? No, only other true Muslims who are obliged to come protect you if you are in danger. If there is violence, if people are dying and the West does nothing, what is left for the Syrians? If other people do not take action, there's only death. And at this point, it's really a religious duty for every true Muslim to defend oppressed and persecuted brothers.⁶⁸³

Bearing this in mind, a Senegalese vendor in Naples thundered against Bashir Assad and the West, pronouncing Al Qaeda and ISIS to be “[...] the only defenders of oppressed people in Syria and the

⁶⁸³ Interview no. 21, Q7, Appendix 5.

Middle East,”⁶⁸⁴ from “[...] the Syrian and the Western regimes [who] butcher [them] daily”, reiterated a Somali worker in Florence.⁶⁸⁵ “If it weren’t for them”, continued the man, “there would be much more blood in the area.”⁶⁸⁶

All in all, it is paramount to specify that the overwhelming majority of the study’s respondents strongly rejected Al Qaeda and ISIS. Especially in the qualitative part of the research, respondents were almost unanimous in their stance when asked about the terrorist organisations in question. They harshly condemned Al Qaeda, ISIS, and religiously motivated violence fiercely, for these organisations, to them, are “made of infidels [and are] shameful to Muslims everywhere,”⁶⁸⁷ for “they do not represent any kind of Islam or Muslims by any means.”⁶⁸⁸ However, not only did a fair minority support Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’s armed struggle, but also justified it in religious terms, framing it within the mandatory duty to protect fellow oppressed Muslims.

Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents’ Comparison on Religiously Framed Violence

When comparing the questionnaires by non-Muslim and Muslim respondents, it is evident the two groups share a different take on the justification of religiously framed violence. In sum, 9% of non-Muslim respondents (40/440) agreed with force in defence of faith, 15.5% (68/440) endorsed the punishment of religious offenders, and 7% (29/440) and 8% (34/440) supported Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’s struggles. In turn, within the Muslim sample, 24% of respondents (105/440) agreed with violence in defence of faith, 30% (131/440) accepted the punishment of offenders of Islam, 10% (44/440) supported Al Qaeda’s struggle, and 13% (57/440) viewed ISIS’s struggle as legitimate. As shown in Graph 14, combining all respondents from the two samples who accepted violence in defence of

⁶⁸⁴ Interview no. 8, Q8, Appendix 5.


⁶⁸⁵ Interview no. 71, Q8, Appendix 5.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁷ Interview no. 7, Q9, Appendix 5.

⁶⁸⁸ Interview no. 21, Q9, Appendix 5.

Graph 14. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent's views on religiously framed violence.



faith, 40 were non-Muslims and 105 were Muslims (almost 3 times as many). Along the same lines, non-Muslim respondents agreeing with punishing those who insult a religion's sacred tenets were 68, while Muslim participants claiming the same were 131 (almost twice as many). Lastly, Al Qaeda counted 29 non-Muslim supporters and 44 Muslim proponents (1.5 times as many), while ISIS 34 non-Muslim supporters and 57 Muslim advocates (1.7 times as many). In all the mentioned instances, in regard to support for religiously motivated violence, Muslim respondents noticeably outnumbered their non-Muslim counterparts.

Roy More Than Croft

Before we started our field research, we expected both Roy's and Croft's arguments to be somewhat inaccurate in describing the Italian scenario. We disagreed with Croft's claim that radicalisation is socially constructed, as we expected to identify manifestations of Islamist radicalisation. At the same time, we predicted such instances to be minimal, unlike, perhaps, the French case, where prospects of Islamist radicalisation might even fuel an "explosion in the suburbs", contended Eric Denece.⁶⁸⁹ Hence, we did not assume Islamist radicalisation to be a pressing, urgent

⁶⁸⁹ Please see page 83.

issue, for we pictured the vast majority of Muslim respondents to fiercely reject violence framed in religious terms.

The empirical evidence we produced seems to challenge our initial hypothesis, however. Surprisingly, we did not register mere “spurs” of radicalisation. Rather, we came across a significant minority of respondents who actually endorsed violence framed in Islamist terms, ranging from 10% to 30% of the total sample. Simply put, our observed “Islamist outlook” was ultimately greater than expected. These findings are fairly consistent with what Italian officials have observed. In the words of Domenico Messina from the Italian Postal Police: “Your results are fairly consistent with our findings. As we monitor the Web on a daily basis, we can say that up to 30% of the online community supports violent interpretations of Islam.”⁶⁹⁰

The three Imams’ reactions⁶⁹¹ to the quantitative results also challenge our initial hypothesis. In fact, the three clerics have all unanimously shared their concern about the quantity of individuals from the sample supporting violence framed in religious terms. Pallavicini defined the findings as “bone-chilling.”⁶⁹² “To me”, continued the Imam, “when I completed the questionnaire myself, when it came to the statements about violence in Islam, the answer was quite simple and unquestionable. But, apparently, I was wrong.”⁶⁹³ Cozzolino, who converted to Islam years ago, labelled the results “really, really worrying, for they should not be minimised.”⁶⁹⁴ Imam Elzir expressed even more disappointment and worry about the “Islamist outlook”:

This research is very important to us to see how we are doing inside our communities. And when you say that almost 30% of the people would punish whoever offends Islam or would justify violence in the name of Allah, while between 10% and 15% support Al Qaeda and ISIS, it’s way too many people. I thought we would find like a 5% rate or so, but even 5% would still be too much. The fact there are these people who espouse violence in the name of Islam is unacceptable. It goes against everything we teach everyday.⁶⁹⁵

In light of official data from the Police, and in light of three Imam’s comments, we can affirm that the debate on Islamist radicalisation in Italy steers more towards Roy’s position. Not only do the study’s results disprove our hypothesis of finding mere “spurs” of radicalisation; they also seem to contradict, at least partially, Muslim respondents’ perception of radicalisation in Italy. Overall, most of

⁶⁹⁰ Domenico Messina, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017, Appendix 1.

⁶⁹¹ These were secretary general of the Italian Islamic Confederation (CII) Massimo Abdallah Cozzolino, head of the Union of the Italian Islamic Communities (UCOII) Ezzedin Elzir, and vice president of COREIS Yayha Pallavicini.

⁶⁹² Pallavicini, Yaha, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ Cozzolino, Massimo, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

⁶⁹⁵ Elzir, Ezzedin, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

them claimed there is no issue of radicalisation within the Italian Muslim community, and those who did, claimed such a problem to be minimal and exaggerated by the media. Inflated or not by media outlets, our numeric findings show Islamist radicalisation in Italy cannot be considered a marginal phenomenon. And even though the results may be inferior to other continental realities, they are certainly closer to Roy's belief that Islamist radicalisation is a matter worthy of attention –especially if one accounts for those restrictions and challenges expounded in the methodology section.


In the end, we can state that, in Italy, Islamist radicalisation is no myth, nor is it socially constructed as Croft maintains, for the analysis would have registered null or almost null rates of support for religiously justified violence. Though it can hardly be argued Islamist radicalisation is Italy's worst nightmare, the study showed the country cannot deem itself immune to Islamist processes either, as the latter should be examined as such.

CHAPTER VII: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ASSUMED CAUSAL MODELS OF ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

Drivers of Islamist Radicalisation in the Respondents' Eyes

If Roy's theories best fit the Italian case and the country cannot reckon itself impervious to prospects of Islamist radicalisation, exploring the drivers behind Islamist views becomes pivotal. But before delving into the statistical analysis, it is worth exploring what respondents themselves think the drivers of Islamist radicalisation are. Hence, we asked those Muslim and non-Muslim respondents who agreed that an issue of radicalisation exists to rank its first three causes. According to non-Muslim participants, "Economic social harshness" was the main driver of Islamist radicalisation, allocating it in the first three causes 16% of the times. Right behind was "Exploitation of Islam for political purposes", which was selected 15% of the times. "Identity crisis" and "Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam" were elected, respectively, 11% and 10% of the times, while every other cause ranged

Graph 15. Charts on Muslim respondents' take on drivers of Islamist radicalisation.



between 8% and 3% of the times.⁶⁹⁶

As for Muslim respondents, Graph 15 indicates they identified “Exploitation of Islam for political purposes” as the most influential factor in triggering Islamist radicalisation. On average, this voice was allocated 13% of the times in the first three causes. The second most nominated driver was “The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS” (chosen 12% of the times). The third most chosen

⁶⁹⁶ These were, in descending order: “Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world”, “Past and present Western foreign policy and the history of the Crusades”, “The call to arms for every true Muslim”, “The importance of personal bonds and the group”, “Denied rights/frustration”, “Western racism”, “The Israeli-Palestinian question”, “Search for adventure and sense of nobility”, “Traumatic personal experiences”, “The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS”.

factor was “Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam” (selected 11% of the times). “Traumatic personal experiences” was elected 9.4% of the times. Every other proposed cause ranged between 8% and 2% of the times.⁶⁹⁷

Muslims’ top-four selected drivers of Islamist radicalisation were also the most mentioned elements during the interviews and focus groups. Those who alluded to the “Exploitation of Islam for political purposes” based their claim on scriptural ignorance, misinterpretation, or deliberate hijacking of the complex, but yet peaceful nature of Islam for political goals. As an Italian convert from Rome phrased it, extremists “[...] use such tenets [of Islam] to obtain power or other political purposes,”⁶⁹⁸ for, “They misinterpret what is written in the Quran and use it for political reasons”, repeated Turkish citizens in Emilia-Romagna.⁶⁹⁹

Likewise, a Moroccan female graduate student from Padua confirmed that, “Yes, of course, there are people who use the name of God to hurt other people... but I think terrorism is nothing but military tactics that misuses or twists a certain ideology for political purposes, in the end.”⁷⁰⁰ The reason behind this is that, according to other two Italian-born Muslim university students from Modena and Naples, “People read just a few lines, know nothing of the complexity of the Quran, and use only parts of it for political purposes”, or, worse, “[...] take parts of the Quran out of context and use them to pursue their political, unholy interests.”⁷⁰¹ As fully summarised by an Algerian shopkeeper in southern Italy, those who justify violence in the name of Allah:

[...] Don’t understand anything about Islam, they only use it for political purposes. In the end, it’s all a game of politics, international politics, featuring global interests. All the players in the game have political purposes and, some of them, Muslims and non-Muslims too, use Islam and wrongfully self-proclaimed Islamic groups to obtain precise political goals in the Middle East and elsewhere.⁷⁰²

Conversely, respondents who indicated “The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS” as a major driver of radicalisation founded their beliefs on the individual’s desire to obtain goods granted for being extremist. Interviews and focus groups revealed three particular benefits to be believed to cause radicalisation. The most cited one was financial compensation. When a female student in Reggio

⁶⁹⁷ These were, in descending order: “Economic and social harshness”, “Identity crisis”, “Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world”, “Denied rights/frustration”, “Western racism”, “Past and present Western foreign policy and the history of the Crusades”, “The importance of personal bonds and the group”, “The Israeli-Palestinian question”, “Search for adventure and sense of nobility”, “The call to arms for every true Muslim”.

⁶⁹⁸ Interview no. 25, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁶⁹⁹ Interview no. 37, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁰ Interview no. 64, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰¹ Respectively, Interview no. 62, Q6; Interview no. 16, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰² Interview no. 12, Q6, Appendix 5.

Calabria was asked as to why people radicalise, she replied, “It’s very simple, for it is the oldest reason in the world: money.”⁷⁰³ Like her, respondents from all parts of Italy blatantly pointed to, “Money and lust for power”; “Definitely money and power”; “Money, business, and various opportunities”; “It’s just people who want money.”⁷⁰⁴ Such greedy attitudes are enabled by the fact that extremists and people who join terrorist groups are really “[...] mercenaries only driven by money,”⁷⁰⁵ for, “People who go fight for ISIS...have nothing going on in their own lives and are just lured by the money”, affirmed respondents in Rome and Modena.⁷⁰⁶ As an Egyptian/Italian grocer from the Capital exhaustively recapitulated, “I think it’s actually more about the money, those people don’t care about Islam or the state of the Islamic world, they have nothing to do, and what they truly care about is the money, that’s it.”⁷⁰⁷

The second most alluded benefit was the improvement of the individual’s social status. In addition to “Money”, respondents referred to fame and romantic/sexual triumph. As a group of Senegalese merchants in Naples explained, “[radicals] just want money and to become famous. They were poor, had nothing before and, when groups like ISIS offer them something to improve their everyday situation, they take it with no regard to God or any other religion for that matter.”⁷⁰⁸ Most Islamist extremists strive to “feel great and important people,”⁷⁰⁹ for they “[...] think they can have women because they feel cool”, continued the West African sellers.⁷¹⁰ Even more, if they become famous, extremists “[can] get women, steal, and do things that are utterly forbidden in Islam”, argued other Senegalese vendors.⁷¹¹ In sum, according to a southern Moroccan shopkeeper, drivers of radicalisation would be nothing but, “The only two things people like and that are motivated by: money and women.”⁷¹²

The third most cited advantage concerned the individual’s spiritual nature. Besides material goods such as “Money” and “Women”, respondents also included transcendent rewards to be collected in the afterlife. As such, an unemployed woman from Varese elucidated the fact that:

[Extremists] see some advantages in choosing this path. The first one is money...Also, if you don’t know anything about Islam and you meet with people who are bad [who] tell you that if

⁷⁰³ Interview no. 54, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁴ Respectively, Interview no. 32, Q6; Interview no. 21, Q6; Interview no. 7, Q6; Interview no. 57, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁵ Interview no. 22, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁶ Interview no. 37, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁷ Interview no. 4, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁸ Interview no. 7, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷⁰⁹ Interview no. 41, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁰ Interview no. 7, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹¹ Interview no. 7, Q9, Appendix 5.

⁷¹² Interview no. 19, Q6, Appendix 5.

you kill yourself you're going to Heaven, you can, at times, be brainwashed, and then you think God will reward you.⁷¹³

Another relevant element believed to cause Islamist radicalisation that emerged in the qualitative analysis was “Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam”. This stance was mainly based on the respondents’ sense of doctrinal ignorance within certain segments of the Muslim community, coupled with the paucity of inner debate peculiarly on the issue of religiously framed violence. From north to south, interviewees linked the acceptance of violent means in defence of Islam to lack of religious knowledge, because extremists “[...] just don’t know what the real Islam is all about. If they knew, they would never become radical”, maintained an Egyptian/Italian student in Milan.⁷¹⁴

Similarly, a Pakistani Shia and a Jordanian Sunni both affirmed violent Islamist ideas are the product of a “Complete lack of religious knowledge, along with bad leaders”, for “[extremists] got it all wrong because they go against the pure Islam.”⁷¹⁵ This scriptural unawareness or misinterpretation is then exacerbated by the absence of a much-needed discussion on violence in the name of God. As such, an Albanian engineer from Milan pictured the “Lack of heated debate on the interpretation of Islam and the role-violence plays in it” to be the major factor in triggering radicalisation.⁷¹⁶ Along the same lines, a group in Bergamo argued that, “The fact that [Islamist extremists] don’t know Islam is crucial, because a person who studies, goes to the mosque and such, cannot be brainwashed. The fact is that we don’t talk as much as we should about these things.”⁷¹⁷ Analogously, two Italian-born Muslim university students summarised the matter as follows: “[The cause of radicalisation is] Lack of religious knowledge, because people read, [but] know nothing of the complexity of the Quran”... “I don’t think it’s because of money, poverty, and denied rights as many Muslims are saying. It’s because people don’t know their own religion, hence, it’s an internal problem that we have to face and come to terms with.”⁷¹⁸

Lastly, those respondents that identified “Traumatic personal experiences” as major tools in triggering radicalisation pointed, obviously, to individual harmful episodes. As a student in Bergamo wondered, “I don’t know what goes off in that person’s head to push him to use violence. It must be something incredibly personal meant to be searched in that person’s past traumatic experiences.”⁷¹⁹ Yet,

⁷¹³ Interview no. 29, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁴ Interview no. 53, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁵ Respectively, Interview no. 56, Q6; Interview no. 64, Q8, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁶ Interview no. 52, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁷ Interview no. 23, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁸ Respectively, Interview no. 62, Q6; Interview no. 63, Q6, Appendix 5.

⁷¹⁹ Interview no. 23, Q6, Appendix 5.

unlike already mentioned studies, agonising experiences like death of relatives and time in prison were not as mentioned as drug abuse.

Remarks from around Italy included phrases such as, “[...] In order to kill innocent people whom you have never even met before, you must be twisted, a mentally ill person. In fact, many have used drugs or had personal problems that brought them to violence”; “They are just crazy, sad people, who had bad experiences in the past, maybe even used drugs and stuff”; “Many of them had already had terrible experiences, were drugged up, were stupid, and didn’t even read the Quran.”⁷²⁰ To these respondents, not only do poor choices bring misery, but they also pave the way, at times, for the acquisition of radical ideas. As articulated by two Italian converts, those who fall prey to radicalisation:

[...] Are crazy people whose lives are awful because they made bad choices or [because of] something not allowed in the Quran, which brought sadness upon them. They drink, smoke, have sex before marriage, and use drugs, then they get used by these criminals and do bad things.⁷²¹

In sum, respondents from the questionnaire and the interviews/focus groups principally blamed four main drivers for Islamist radicalisation. To both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, Islamist radicalisation would be the product of the exploitation of Islam for political purposes. But non-Muslim respondents majorly blamed economic hardship, then identity crisis, and lack of debate inside Islam. Muslim respondents focused more on the desire for money, women, fame, Heaven, and other material and spiritual benefits offered by Al Qaeda and ISIS. They too argued radicalisation is caused by the lack of internal, doctrinal debate within Muslim communities on the concept of religiously motivated violence. Finally, to Muslims, radicalisation happens due to traumatic past experiences that feature miseries such as drug abuse. All in all, were these assumptions by the study’s respondents accurate? Were these the reasons that ultimately enabled Roy’s argument over Croft’s? Were the respondents onto something? What really drove the rates of the “Islamist outlook”?

The Testing of the Variables

In an attempt to elucidate the previous queries, we tested a wide selection of models linking support for violence with predictors from the literature (please see Table 4 in the methodology). But as already specified in the methodological section, this was not to determine causal relations between variables, for statistics, as a matter of principle, are unable to establish causality. We could, however, determine quantitatively the degree of independence between the various variables. Secondly, we were

⁷²⁰ Respectively, Interview no. 37, Q6; Interview no. 32, Q6; Interview no. 57, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷²¹ Interview no. 15, Q6, Appendix 5.

able to conduct single parameter analyses that measured the odds that religiously framed violence could be justified based on the single predictor. Finally, we ran logistic regression models linking the responses indicative of “Islamist outlook” with the most statistically significant predictors.

Insignificant Predictive Variables

Our first main conclusion is that most predictors tested throughout the analysis are not supported by empirical, statistical evidence. Out of 28 assumed/proposed variables, 22 could not be statistically associated with the justification of violence in the name of God, the duty to punish offenders of Islam, and support for Al Qaeda and ISIS. Challenging Muslim respondents’ perception of what triggers Islamist radicalisation, the idea of benefiting from material and spiritual incentives (“rational choice theory”) was not a notable driver. Similarly, suffering from traumatic experiences could not be considered a key factor in shaping one’s take on the justification of violence either. Besides, except for one case, none of the standard sociological variables were statistically significant. Being younger or older, holding a particular citizenship, being born in Italy or not, having spent less or more than five years in the country, and being single or married were not important predictors, in the end. Being less or more educated, less or more well-off, leftist or more to the right, and more or less religious were irrelevant too. Even being male or female or having converted to Islam were not significant elements (Appendix 6).

Another remarkable finding was that most accredited predictors, which we abstractedly labelled “The usual suspects”, were not significant either. We found no empirical evidence for theories proposing discrimination/racism, religious and social inequality, economic disparity, and perceived ignorance and prejudice towards Islam. Likewise, outrage at Western foreign policy and perceived oppression of Muslims were also insignificant. In truth, predictors like discrimination, outrage at Western foreign policy, or perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide initially seemed relevant, as they were significantly associated to the justification of religiously motivated violence. For instance, not only was discrimination originally associated with violence in the name of God; the odds that individuals from the study who felt discriminated against also supported violence in defence of faith ranged from a 28% to 35% chance (Appendix 6). Nevertheless, these variables still turned out statistically insignificant in the regression models when grouped with the actual influential predictors (Appendix 6). In light of such results, we argue the data drawn from a sample of 440 Muslims residing in today’s Italy seem to challenge the majority of assumed models of Islamist radicalisation from the literature.

The study's Significant Variables

The Duty to Punish Offenders of Islam

The most significant variable was not initially envisioned or even considered as a potential predictor linked to Islamist framed violence. As a matter of fact, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was solely originally selected as one of the four response variables. But after excluding potential issues of multicollinearity,⁷²² both the tests of association and the regression models unequivocally showed this predictor to be the most meaningful one of the whole study. To begin with, duty to discipline mockers of Islam was the most associated predictor to violence in defence of faith. Considering we used the standard “0.05” significance threshold p-value, support for violence in defence of faith and duty to punish whoever insults Islam displayed a stunning p-value of 2.5E-59. In addition to being exponentially below the 0.05 threshold, this is by orders of magnitude the most significant association in the tests.

This striking connection was also confirmed in the single parameter analysis, when we measured odds between two taken variables. As shown in Appendix 6, within the statistical contours of the study’s sample, those who strongly agreed with the duty to punish offenders of Islam had also a 78% probability of supporting violence. Subjects who somewhat concurred with the previous assumption displayed a 49% chance of justifying violence in defence of faith. The odds that respondents from the survey sample who slightly disagreed with the duty to punish whoever insults Islam also justified violence amounted to 15%, which became 5% for those strongly disagreeing with the previous vision.

Unsurprisingly, the impact “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” had in the regression models was critical. By using Wald z-tests, our objective was to determine which predictor had the strongest impact on the response variable when interacting with other significant predictors at the same time – such variables were nothing but the most significant ones from the association tests. Hence, as for the justification of violence in the name of God, out of the 7 most significant predictors from the

⁷²² Predictors that are used in the regression models must be independent from each other. If two predictors turn out to be already correlated to each other, this connection will be reproduced in the models, altering the final results (issue of multicollinearity). In light of this, one could argue “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” to be already linked to the violence framed in Islamist terms. However, the first predictor does not imply any use of actual force, as punishment could be carried out through legal means. Hence, we would not normally assume that proponents of punishing whoever insults Islam also justify violence, as the two variables are not necessarily correlated. As shown in the qualitative part of the analysis, half of the interviewees who agreed with such a stance strongly believed a person should be sued but not attacked or physically harmed in any way. Still, for the sake of analysis, we have decided to control for “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” and carry out additional regression models void of the predictor in question to eliminate any potential issues of multicollinearity.

association tests, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was, by far, the most powerful. As Table 5 shows, it featured a p-value of 5.7E-11, which is tremendously significant.

Table 5. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the justification of violence in defence of Islam.

	Violence in defence of Islam can also be justified		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Duty to punish whoever offends Islam	5.067466e+01	3.000000e+00	5.738565E-11*
Ideology	11.996426725	3.000000000	0.007395411*
Identity Crisis	2.1186979	3.0000000	0.5481393
Social Difficulties	1.5209500	3.0000000	0.6774436
Religious inequality	4.156896	3.000000	0.245013
Geography (being from Rome or Lombardy)	2.98479060	1.00000000	0.084050016
Frustration	3.8139483	3.0000000	0.2822679

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

This result confirmed what transpired in the first part of the analysis. In relation to violence in defence of Islam, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was more important than anything else. That is, agreeing or disagreeing with the duty to punish mockers mattered more, comparatively, than one’s take on the Islamic government, potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at school, inability to find an appropriate worship place, one’s sense of frustration, and being from Rome or Lombardy. This outcome was possible because, when justifying or rejecting violence in the name of God, the personal impact that punishing or not punishing mockers had was considerably more meaningful than any other factor. In other words, one’s take on the duty to punish offenders was also the most important factor in shaping that person’s answer on violence in defence of faith.

This trend was even more evident when we looked at subgroups. As Table 6 shows, if only definite answers are taken into account, out of 102 subjects who agreed with the right to punish offenders of Islam, 82 (80%) also supported violence in defence of faith while 20 objected it.

Table 6. Contingency Table for Duty to Punish Whoever Insults Islam vs. Violence in Defence of Islam

	Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished			
Violence in defence of Islam can be justified		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	82	46	128
	Disagree	20	237	257
	Total	102	283	385

Out of 283 people who rejected the duty to punish offenders of Islam, 46 supported violence and 237 (92%) did not. Among those who supported the duty to punish offenders of the faith, supporters of violence outnumbered non-supporters by a factor of more than 4 (82/20). Instead, for those who opposed the duty to punish offenders the ratio was about 1/5 (46/237).

In light of this, we assessed the difference between subgroups to be significant. Furthermore, through Wald z-tests with weights, we were also able to determine whether shifting from one answer to the other had a significant impact in shaping the respondents' attitude towards violence. As illustrated in Table 7, as for violence in defence of Islam, the odds of supporting force diminished as respondents

Table 7. Contingency Table for Right to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and Violence in Defence of Islam featuring the four possible answers.

	Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished					
Violence in defence of Islam can be justified		Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
	Agree	52	30	10	10	102
	Disagree	15	31	56	181	283
	Total	67	61	66	191	385

increasingly disagreed with the assumption of punishing offenders of Islam. Counting only definite answers, out of 102 subjects who agreed with violence in the name of God, 52 also strongly agreed with right to punish offenders of Islam, 30 slightly agreed with such an assumption, 10 slightly disagreed, and 10 strongly disagreed. As shown in Appendix 6, the odds of supporting violence were reduced, in fact, by a factor of 2.36 (1/0.42304236) shifting from “strongly agree” to “slightly agree”, 15.07 (1/0.06637462) from “slightly agree” to “slightly disagree”, and 48.35 (1/0.02068083) from “slightly disagree” to “strongly disagree”. Featuring a p-value of 0.00093, the most significant shift was between the odds coefficients of “slightly agree” and “slightly disagree” (3/1 ratio). This confirmed that the odds of supporting violence for a person who saw no duty to punish whoever insults Islam are significantly lower. In this subgroup, what mattered more, though, was not increasingly disagreeing with the duty to punish offenders, but choosing to disagree with the previous assumption instead of agreeing with it.

In addition to violence in defence of Islam, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was strongly linked to support for ISIS. To start with, endorsement of ISIS and punishment of offenders of Islam were highly associated, for they scored a p-value of 7.2E-32 (Appendix 6). Exponentially below the 0.05 significance threshold, this value was the second greatest number in regard to support for ISIS in

all of the association tests. Such a strong connection was also visible in the single parameter analysis (Appendix 6). Indeed, subjects strongly agreeing with punishing those who insult Islam displayed a 51% probability of supporting the terrorist group, dropping to a 10% chance for individuals slightly agreeing with punishing mockers – with a 8% chance for subjects slightly disagreeing with the previous assumption, and 3% chance for those strongly disagreeing with it.

In the regression models testing each predictor's impact on support for ISIS, "Duty to punish offenders of Islam" was the second most powerful. Table 8 indicates that, of the 6 most significant predictors, "Duty to punish offenders of Islam was only second to "Ideology", scoring a p-value of

Table 8. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to support for ISIS.

	ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Duty to punish whoever offends Islam	2.079509e+01	3.000000e+00	1.161117E-04*
Ideology	21.780619748	3.000000000	0.000072459*
Identity Crisis	8.92923738	3.00000000	0.03024666*
Social Difficulties	1.9542320	3.0000000	0.5819602
Gender	0.3153972	1.0000000	0.5743870
Frustration	8.85197143	3.00000000	0.03132515*

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

1.2E-04. This result confirmed what emerged in the first part of the analysis. In relation to support for ISIS, aside from "Ideology", the right to punish mockers of Islam was more important than the other predictors. That is, agreeing or disagreeing with the duty to punish offenders mattered more, comparatively, than potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at school, one's sense of frustration, and being male or female. This outcome was possible because, when justifying or rejecting ISIS's struggle, the personal impact of punishing disrespectful individuals was a considerably meaningful factor.

This trend was even more perceptible when we examined subgroups. Table 9 shows that, out of 124 people who agreed with the duty to punish whoever insults Islam, 44 (35%) also supported ISIS, while 80 opposed it. Out of 250 individuals who did not agree with punishing offenders of Islam, only 10 sympathised with ISIS, while 240 (96%) rejected it. Among those who endorsed the duty to punish

Table 9. Contingency Table for Right to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and Support for ISIS

	Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished			
ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	44	10	54
	Disagree	80	240	320
	Total	124	250	374

offenders of Islam, supporters of ISIS were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of almost 2 (44/80), while the ratio for those who disagreed with punishing mockers of their faith was about 1/24 (10/242). That is, within the subgroup of those agreeing with punishing disrespectful individuals, pro-violence subjects were about half the people who rejected force.

Once again, the difference between the two subgroups was considerably significant. Further, as illustrated in Table 10, when we used Wald z-tests with weights, the odds of supporting ISIS

Table 10. Contingency Table for Right to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and support for ISIS featuring the four possible answers

	Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished					
ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate		Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
	Agree	36	8	5	5	54
	Disagree	27	53	59	181	320
	Total	63	61	64	186	374

diminished as respondents increasingly disagreed with the assumption of punishing offenders of Islam. Counting only definite answers, more than half (36/63) of those who felt strongly about the duty to punish offenders of Islam agree that ISIS are legitimate. Further, out of 54 proponents of ISIS, 8 slightly agreed with duty to punish mockers, 5 slightly disagreed with this stance, and 5 strongly disagreed. As shown in Appendix 6, the odds of supporting violence were reduced, in fact, by a factor of 4.72 (1/0.21179781) shifting from “strongly agree” to “slightly agree”, 11.93 (1/0.08383149) from “slightly agree” to “slightly disagree”, and 16.19 (1/0.06176335) from “slightly disagree” to “strongly disagree”. Unlike the case for the justification of violence in defence of Islam, this time the shifts from “slightly agree” to “slightly disagree” and from “slightly disagree” to “strongly disagree” were not significant.

Overall, the fact that “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” turned out to be significantly related to support for violence in the name of God and support for ISIS is emblematic. As already mentioned, we included the variable in question for its charged nature, cognizant of its unnecessary connection to violence. Nonetheless, its statistically significant impact suggests respondents may have approached questionnaires and interviews differently when they were asked about their thoughts on punishing mockers of their faith. Interviewees tended to be more prudent in voicing their support for violence against offenders of Islam. More than that, half of those who indeed endorsed some sort of punishment for whoever insults their religion meant through legal means. Similarly, support for ISIS was almost null, and rare instances of sympathy seemed to stem from the (debated) religious duty to fight oppression.

However, the quantitative analysis shows how a significant amount of the surveyed respondents who agreed with punishing offenders of Islam also justified violence in defence of faith. This means that those who agreed with some sort of punishment against disrespectful individuals most likely did not envision legal means but actual physical force. Along the same lines, statistics indicate that individuals who agreed with the right to punish offenders of their faith were substantially more prone to support ISIS than those who did not agree with the previous stance. Perhaps, this conveys how respondents in anonymous questionnaires, devoid of personal interaction, felt more at ease expressing their views. Regardless, such findings seem to confirm that religious tenets and icons are indeed sensitive topics and that certain individuals might take offense and even accept violence if Islam is insulted.

Ideology

The other enormously significant predictor was “Ideology”, here intended as the respondents’ take on a theocratic, Islamic government. Similarly to the previous case, we noticed that since the beginning of the statistical analysis our “Response variables” (i.e. support for violence in the name of God, punishment for offenders of Islam, Al Qaeda, and ISIS) were never independent from the respondents’ opinion on an Islamic, theocratic government. Considering the standard p-value significant threshold of 0.05, “Ideology” was always strongly associated to religiously framed violence. In particular, “Ideology” and violence in defence of Islam featured a p-value of 2E-18. “Ideology” and duty to punish whoever insults Islam displayed a p-value of 3.6E-17. “Ideology” and support for Al Qaeda scored a p-value of 1.6E-28, while “Ideology” and support for ISIS a p-value of 1.2E-34 (Appendix 6). Not only were such results greatly below 0.05, but they were also the second most

relevant ones in all of the tests of associations, except for the value on ISIS, which ranked the most significant.

This strong connection was also confirmed in the single parameter analysis, when we measured odds between two taken variables. Within the statistical contours of the study's sample, those who strongly agreed with the statement that an Islamic government in the Middle East is better than a democracy had a 57% probability of supporting violence in the name of God. Subjects who somewhat concurred with the previous assumption displayed a 39% chance of justifying violence to justify in defence of faith. Conversely, the odds that respondents from the questionnaire who slightly disagreed with a theocratic rule being better than a democracy also justified violence amounted to 27%, which became 9% for those strongly disagreeing with the previous vision (Appendix 6).

Such a trend was persistent in the other single parameter analyses too. Respondents who strongly endorsed theocratic rule had a 61% chance of agreeing with the duty to punish offenders of Islam, which became 57% for those slightly agreeing with the mentioned stance –with a 33% and 16% chance for those who slightly and strongly disagreed. Participants who strongly supported an Islamic government featured a 43% to support Al Qaeda, descending to 22% for those who slightly favoured theocratic rule –with a 6% and 1% chance for respondents who slightly and strongly disagreed with the previous assumption. Subjects who strongly preferred Islamic rule to democracy displayed a 44% probability of justifying ISIS's struggle, descending to 36% for those who slightly favoured theocratic rule, and dropping to 7% and 2% for individuals who slightly and strongly rejected an Islamic government.

With no surprise, the impact "Ideology" had in the regression models was crucial. Unlike "Duty to punish offenders of Islam", "Ideology" turned out to be a significant predictor for all the four response variables. In truth, in relation to the justification of violence in defence of Islam, "Ideology" was the second most significant predictor. More so, "Ideology" ranked the most significant predictor as for duty to punish whoever insults Islam, support Al Qaeda, and support for ISIS. And when we controlled for "Duty to punish offenders of Islam" and withdrew it from the models –in an attempt to diminish possible chances of multicollinearity⁷²³ - "Ideology" became the most significant predictor in all of regression tests.

That asserted, as shown in Table 5 on page 161, as for the justification of violence in the name of God, out of the 6 most significant predictors, "Ideology" ranked second with a p-value of 0.0074, which is still significant. Hence, agreeing or disagreeing with the Islamic government being better than

⁷²³ Please see footnote 722 on page 161.

a democracy mattered more, comparatively, than potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at school, inability to find an appropriate worship place, one's sense of frustration, and being from Rome or Lombardy.

As shown in Table 11, in relation to the duty to punish offenders of Islam, "Ideology" was, by far, the strongest predictor (p-value of 1.2E-05). Thus, a person's take on theocratic rule mattered more than anything else when deciding to agree or disagree with the idea of punishing whoever insults Islam and its prophet. In fact, in this case, "Ideology" was more important than experiencing social difficulties, identity crisis, religious inequality, frustration, or being from Rome or Lombardy.

Table 11. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the duty to punish whoever offends Islam.

Most significant predictors	Whoever insults Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished		
	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Ideology	2.552499e+01	3.000000e+00	1.199097E-05*
Social difficulties	13.949620323	3.0000000	0.002974536*
Identity crisis	1.5404591	3.000000000	0.6729644
Religious inequality	3.7791667	3.0000000	0.2863187
Geography (being from Rome or Lombardy)	2.82585062	1.00000000	0.09275774
Frustration	2.2303228	3.0000000	0.5260005

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

As for the justification of Al Qaeda's struggle, Table 12 shows that, out of 7 most significant predictors, "Ideology" ranked first (p-value of 0.0066). Thus, agreeing or not agreeing with a theocratic rule was more influential than any other predictor linked to support for Al Qaeda in this study.

Precisely, one's take on an Islamic state mattered more, comparatively, than the person's opinion on the duty to punish whoever insults Islam, having a good house (social inequality), having a good job (economic inequality), "networks", one's sense of frustration, and one's sense of perceived prejudice and ignorance towards Islam.

Table 12. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to support for Al Qaeda.

	Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight American and Zionist imperialism		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Duty to punish whoever offends Islam	6.1502896	3.0000000	0.1045229
Ideology	12.240579831	3.000000000	0.006602872*
Social inequality	2.5888980	3.0000000	0.4594392
Networks	8.34093554	3.000000000	0.03946684*
Frustration	5.4367490	3.0000000	0.1424711
Ignorance/prejudice	1.0724270	3.0000000	0.7837341
Economic disparity	0.3782795	1.0000000	0.53855255

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

Finally, in relation to support for ISIS, out of the 5 most significant predictors, “Ideology” was, once again, the strongest one with a p-value of 0.000072459, which is greatly significant. As illustrated in Table 8 on page 163, agreeing or disagreeing with an Islamic government counted more, comparatively, than potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at school, inability to find an appropriate worship place (religious inequality), one’s sense of frustration, and gender. This outcome was possible because, when respondents taking the questionnaire chose to endorse or reject ISIS’s struggle, agreeing or disagreeing on theocratic rule was, most likely, the most meaningful factor for their decision.

The importance of supporting or opposing theocratic rule when addressing violence framed in religious terms was even clearer when we scrutinised subgroups. Table 13 shows that, out of 109 subjects who preferred theocratic rule, 54 also supported violence and 55 opposed it, i.e., the subsample was split evenly with respect to justification of violence.

Table 13. Contingency Table for Ideology (Theocratic Government) and Violence in Defence of Islam

	In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better than a democratic one			
Violence in defence of Islam can be justified		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	54	37	91
	Disagree	55	211	266
	Total	109	248	357

In contrast, out of 248 subjects who opposed Islamic government, 37 justified violence, while 211 rejected it. That is, this subsample was split roughly 6 to 1 (211/37) against violence. Similarly, as

shown in Appendix 6, in comparison to respondents who did not support an Islamic government, those who did were also considerably more likely to endorse punishment of offenders of Islam (67/44 vs. 50/190 ratio), al-Qaeda (35/67 vs. 5/234), and ISIS (44/64 vs. 8/236). The contrast between all of the response variables' subgroups was highly significant.

Furthermore, through Wald z-tests with weights we assessed that the odds of supporting religiously framed violence decreased as respondents progressively disagreed with the idea of a theocratic rule being better than a democracy (Appendix 6). Aside from support for ISIS, where the most significant shift was registered between those who somewhat agreed and those who somewhat disagreed, for the other response variables what mattered the most was the change from "slightly disagree" to "strongly disagree".

Overall, our findings seem to suggest that, to a significant part of our respondents, the desire for an Islamic order based on a theocratic government is indeed an important subject. And within this context, to those placing Islam at the centre of the public, societal, and legal sphere, violence is considerably more accepted when compared to individuals who do not advocate for the same societal order. Such results might be twofold. On one hand, they might signal an alleged tension between Muslims centring Islam mostly within their private sphere and those wishing for their religion to increasingly pervade the public domain. On the other hand, our findings might also suggest the Italian Muslim community to be witnessing an inner confrontation on the role of violence in Islam and in the Islamic order.

Social difficulties

Here intended as the difficulty to mingle in at school or at the workplace being Muslim, "Social difficulties" ultimately resulted being quite significant, but only in regard to "Duty to punish offenders of Islam". In the beginning, "Social difficulties" was considerably associated with the right to punish mockers of Islam. Considering the standard p-value threshold of 0.05, "Social difficulties" and duty to punish whoever insults Islam scored a p-value of 6.4E-09, which is greatly significant (Appendix 6). Moreover, in the single parameter analysis, we calculated that subjects who strongly felt they experienced difficulties at blending in at school or at work also had a 60% probability of supporting the duty to punish offenders of their faith. As for respondents who admitted to somewhat struggling at mingling in at school or work because they are Muslim featured a 47% chance of supporting the right to punish offenders. Conversely, the odds that those who slightly and strongly disagreed with their

inability to socialise at school or at the workplace also justified the punishment of mockers of Islam were, respectively, 29% and 16% (Appendix 6).

Though not as powerful as expected, the regression models showed “Social difficulties” to still be quite a relatively significant predictor. As shown in Table 14, out of 6 significant predictors, “Social difficulties” ranked second, scoring a p-value of 0.003, which is moderately significant. Hence, the fact that a person experienced or did not experience any sort of arduousness socialising at school or at the workplace mattered more, comparatively, than potential issues of identity crisis, struggling at finding an appropriate place of worship (religious inequality), one’s sense of frustration, and being from Rome or Lombardy.

Table 14. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the duty to punish whoever offends Islam.

	Whoever insults Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Ideology	2.552499e+01	3.000000e+00	1.199097E-05*
Social difficulties	13.949620323	3.00000000	0.002974536*
Identity crisis	1.5404591	3.000000000	0.6729644
Religious inequality	3.7791667	3.00000000	0.2863187
Geography (being from Rome or Lombardy)	2.82585062	1.00000000	0.09275774
Frustration	2.2303228	3.00000000	0.5260005

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

In relation to support for punishing offenders of Islam, the impact of experiencing or not experiencing these social difficulties was also fairly patent when we analysed subgroups. Table 15 indicates that, counting only definite answers, out of 127 individuals who admitted to having a hard time blending in at school or at work being Muslim, 68 (54%) also agreed with the duty to punish whoever insults their faith, while 59 (46%) opposed the idea. Hence, among respondents who suffered from such social difficulties, supporters of the right to punish offenders of Islam slightly outnumbered non-supporters by a factor of roughly 1.6 (68/59). Out of 254 people who did not experience hardship at school or at work, 57 (22.4%) endorsed the right to punish offenders of Islam and 197 did not. That is, among those who did not struggle at blending in at school or work, supporters of the duty to punish mockers of Islam were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of 3.5 (197/57).

Table 15. Contingency Table for social difficulties (school and workplace) and duty to punish whoever insults Islam.

	As a Muslim, I have a difficult time blending in at school or at work			
Whoever insults Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	68	57	125
	Disagree	59	197	256
	Total	127	254	381

The difference between the two subsets was moderately significant. To such regard, when we used Wald z-tests with weights, we verified that odds of supporting the punishment of those who insult Islam diminished as respondents progressively denied having experienced social difficulties (Appendix 6). All in all, the results seem to partly confirm the intuitive expectation that instability and lack of belonging to a certain environment (in this case a person's school and workplace) may reinforce religious identity as a response to one's perceived sense of alienation. This could, at times, steer individuals towards a more purist interpretation of their faith, which, if not shared or respected, could entice resentment and radical views.

The study's Marginally Significant Variables

Geography

In addition to "Duty to punish offenders of Islam", "Ideology", and "Social difficulties", the statistical analysis indicates other predictors to be marginally significant in relation to religiously framed violence. "Geography", or the respondents' place of residence, was marginally significant, but only in relation to support for violence in defence of Islam. Initially, we created several predictors linked to geographical residence (city vs. city, region vs. region, larger areas vs. larger areas) to assess any potential association to the study's response variables. When we combined the answers of participants from Rome and Lombardy (including the cities of Milan, Brescia, Bergamo, and Varese) and compared them to answers from other geographical areas, we found the data to be slightly associated to violence in defence of faith. The two variables scored a p-value of 0.008, which is somewhat significant (Appendix 6). Likewise, in the single parameter analysis, we calculated that individuals from Rome or Lombardy had a 34% chance of supporting violence in defence of Islam, while people not from Rome or Lombardy a 20% probability (Appendix 6).

In the regression models, once we controlled for "Duty to punish offenders of Islam" and withdrew it from the test, we assessed "Geography" to be, ultimately, a marginally significant predictor

for violence in defence of Islam. Table 16 indicates that, aside from “Ideology”, being from Rome or from one of the four Lombard cities was slightly more important than issues of identity crisis, social difficulties, religious inequality, and one’s sense of frustration when a person decided to justify or condemn violence in the name of God.

Table 16. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the justification of violence in defence of Islam.

	Violence in defence of Islam can be justified		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Ideology	3.31209e+01	3.000000e+00	3.036898E-07*
Identity Crisis	2.0314478	3.0000000	0.5659053
Social Difficulties	6.25468488	3.00000000	0.09985574
Religious inequality	2.3567300	3.0000000	0.5017401
Geography (being from Rome or Lombardy)	4.56344733	1.00000000	0.03266127*
Frustration	7.04461371	3.00000000	0.07048929

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

Such a trend was also visible when we examined subgroups. As shown in Table 17, out of 169 subjects from Rome or Lombardy, 57 (34%) justified violence in defence of Islam, while 112 opposed it. Conversely, out of 239 individuals from the rest of the country, 48 (20%) endorsed violence in defence of faith, whereas 191 condemned it. In both groups those who agreed with violence in the name of God were largely outnumbered. Yet, in the Rome/Lombardy subset, supporters were outnumbered by a factor of roughly 2 (112/57), while the other group including answers from all over Italy, the ratio was 1/4 against violence (191/48). The contrast between the two groups was minimally significant.

Table 17. Contingency Table for geography (being from Rome or Lombardy) and the justification of violence in defence of Islam.

	Geography			
Violence in defence of Islam can be justified		Rome/Lombardy	Rest of Italy	Total
	Agree	57	48	105
	Disagree	112	191	303
	Total	169	239	408

Although the results provide weak support for “Geography” to be deemed a meaningful predictor, the fact that this variable turned out at least marginal is not surprising. Supporters of violent

Islamist views may be slightly more likely to be found in cities counting enormous Muslim communities, like Rome and Milan, or in the region, namely Lombardy, which is home to almost 30% of all Muslims residing in Italy. In other words, encountering supporters of violence in Rome and Lombardy may not be excessively astonishing, for it may be a matter of demographics. Second, especially in Lombardy, years of ideological and terrorist infiltrations by extremist preachers and Al Qaeda's operatives have allowed for the establishment of Islamist mosques and centres. Hence, having in Lombardy a rich record of Jihadist activity, these results, though marginal, may be nothing more than the residuum of Al Qaeda's presence in the area. Or these findings might be signs that the region is still a potential fertile ground for Islamist views.

Identity Crisis

"Identity crisis" turned out a marginally significant predictor in relation to support for religiously motivated violence. Here intended as the respondent's struggle in balancing feelings of welcoming or rejection of Italian culture, "Identity crisis" was minimally relevant, and only in regard to support for ISIS. In reality, we initially pictured the predictor in question to have a greater impact on the response variable, for the two were significantly associated (p-value of 3.1E-05, Appendix 6). Yet, our expectations were not met, since, already from the single parameter analysis, those who suffered considerably from instances of identity crisis had only a 23% chance of also supporting ISIS. This value became 10% for those who suffered relatively from identity crisis, rising back to 12% for subjects slightly disagreeing with the previous assumption, and descending to 8% for those totally denying issues related to identity crisis (Appendix 6).

Predictably, the regression models showed that "Identity crisis" was still a significant, but minimal predictor as for support for ISIS. As illustrated in Table 18, out of the 6 most significant predictors, "Identity crisis" ranked third. Its p-value amounted to 0.03, which is marginally significant. Nevertheless, that fact that participants to the questionnaire experienced some sort of identity crisis related to their role in Italian society and culture was more relevant than one's sense of frustration, gender, and social difficulties when expressing their support or rejection of ISIS.

Table 18. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to support for ISIS.

	ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Duty to punish whoever offends Islam	2.079509e+01	3.000000e+00	1.161117E-04*
Ideology	21.780619748	3.000000000	0.000072459*
Identity Crisis	8.92923738	3.00000000	0.03024666*
Social Difficulties	1.9542320	3.0000000	0.5819602
Gender	0.3153972	1.0000000	0.5743870
Frustration	8.85197143	3.00000000	0.03132515*

* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

Though minimal, the impact “Identity crisis” had in shaping respondents’ attitudes on ISIS was still visible when we looked at subgroups. As Table 19 indicates, out of 181 people who asked themselves whether or not they wanted to be part of Italy’s culture, 32 (21.5%) supported ISIS’s actions, while 149 condemned them. Considering only definite answers, in this subset, supporters of ISIS were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of almost 5 (149/32). By contrast, out of 179 participants who did not ask themselves if they wanted to be part of Italy’s culture or not, only 17 (9.5%) justified ISIS’s struggle, while 162 opposed it. Here, non-supporters were almost 10 times more numerous than ISIS’s supporters (162/17). Though supporters were largely outnumbered in both groups, the contrast was still marginally significant.

Table 19. Contingency Table for identity crisis and support for ISIS.

	In Italy I have often asked myself if I wanted to embrace Italian culture or if I wanted to be out of it			
ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	32	17	49
	Disagree	149	162	311
	Total	181	179	360

Furthermore, through Wald z-tests with weights, we were still able to assess that, though not in a persistent trend, the odds of supporting ISIS diminished as the respondents increasingly denied having issues related to identity crisis (Appendix 6). Although such results provide feeble support for theories linking identity crisis and radicalisation, the fact that ISIS is still appealing to a number of individuals stuck between cultures is worrisome. For these subjects, Islamist visions and ISIS’s rhetoric

might provide them with the meaning, sense of belonging, and social redemption they seek and lack in Italian society.

Networks

Another marginal predictor was what we called, with a degree of vagueness, “Networks”. As already discussed in the methodology, we were unable to assess if participants had actual contacts with radicals and terrorists. We were thus incapable of creating a predictor that could truly be used to test if real, physical and emotional connections could be linked to our response variables. Ergo, “Networks” is here intended as the respondents’ belief or disbelief that connections and personal bonds (members of a group and friends) are the elements that really make a cause worthy. That specified, “Networks” eventuated in a marginal predictor, and only in relation to support for Al Qaeda.

Originally, “Networks” and support for Al Qaeda were significantly associated. In the association tests, they scored a p-value of 1.6E-05, which is appreciably significant. However, this strong connection was not corroborated in the single parameter analysis (Appendix 6). Within the contours of this research, respondents who strongly agreed that friends and members of a group are the ones who really make a cause worthy had only a 25% chance of supporting Al Qaeda, dropping to 6% for those slightly agreeing with the previous stance. Conversely, subjects who slightly disagreed with contacts being most important for a cause still had a 6% probability of endorsing Al Qaeda, which increased to 9% for those strongly opposing the idea of “Networks” (Appendix 6).

In the regression models “Networks” had a marginal but still significant impact on respondents’

Table 20. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to support for Al Qaeda.

	Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight American and Zionist imperialism		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Duty to punish offenders of Islam	6.1502896	3.0000000	0.1045229
Ideology	12.240579831	3.000000000	0.006602872*
Social inequality	2.5888980	3.0000000	0.4594392
Networks	8.34093554	3.00000000	0.03946684*
Frustration	5.4367490	3.0000000	0.1424711
Ignorance/prejudice	1.0724270	3.0000000	0.7837341
Economic disparity	0.3782795	1.0000000	0.53855255

*Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

support for Al Qaeda (p-value of 0.04). Given Table 20, we claim one's belief or disbelief that friends or members of a group are the ones who really make a cause worthy was slightly more important than that person's sense of frustration, take on duty to punish offenders of Islam, perception of ignorance and prejudice towards Islam, and feelings of economic disparity and social inequality when choosing to endorse or condemn Al Qaeda's actions.

The partial impact "Networks" had on support for Al Qaeda was also noticeable in the subgroup analysis. As exemplified in Table 21, out of 285 respondents who agreed that friends are members of a group are the ones who really make a cause worthy, 37 (13%) also justified Al Qaeda's struggle, while 248 opposed it. Instead, out of 67 subjects who did not think friends and group members are the ones who really make a cause virtuous, only 5 (7.5%) supported Al Qaeda, while 62 rejected it.

Table 21. Contingency Table for Networks and support for Al Qaeda featuring the four possible answers

	Members of a group and friends are the ones who can really make a cause worthy			
		Agree	Disagree	Total
Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones who can fight American and Zionist imperialism	Agree	37	5	42
	Disagree	248	62	310
	Total	285	67	352

Although most respondents within both groups condemned Al Qaeda's actions, proponents of the group were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of 6.7 (248/37) among those who agreed with "Networks", and by a factor of 12.4 (62/5) among individuals who did not agree with the idea in question. The difference between these two subsets was marginally significant -even if the shift between answers calculated through Wald z-tests with weights was not when not ultimately significant (Appendix 6).

Although we were not able to actually analyse real personal connections to radicals or terrorists, these data offer frail evidence that "Networks" can be ultimately deemed relevant. Yet, the fact "Networks" was marginally significant in relation to support for Al Qaeda might partially confirm the impact the terrorist group had in Italy. Given Al Qaeda's extended range of action in Italy before and after 9/11, it may be possible some respondents might have witnessed (or even experienced) instances of radicalisation facilitated by members of Al Qaeda infiltrating their communities.

Frustration

The last predictor that was marginally connected to violence framed in Islamist terms was one's sense of frustration. In truth, we originally thought "Frustration" linked to one's personal situation in Italy to be a powerful predictor, especially in relation to support for Al Qaeda and ISIS. In the association tests "Frustration" and Al Qaeda scored a p-value of 3.1E-12, while "Frustration" and support for ISIS a p-value of 6.3E-09 (Appendix 6). Though greatly significant, such values were not fully reflected in the single parameter analysis. The odds that people who strongly felt frustrated also supported Al Qaeda equalled to 27.5%, descending to 14% for those feeling slightly frustrated. Conversely, the probability that subjects somewhat disagreeing with a sense of personal frustration also endorsed Al Qaeda equalled to 6% and 3% for those totally disagreeing with the previous stance. As for ISIS, strongly frustrated individuals had a 29% chance of supporting ISIS, while individuals who felt somewhat frustrated a 19% probability. By contrast, subjects slightly denying being frustrated had an 8% possibility of justifying ISIS's struggle, descending to 6% for those totally denying feeling frustration (Appendix 6).

Unsurprisingly, the regression models showed one's sense of frustration was a significant, but a marginal predictor in relation to support for Al Qaeda (p-value of 0.026). As shown in Table 22, once we withdrew "Duty to punish offenders of Islam" from the model, one's sense of frustration was slightly more relevant than perceived social inequality, economic disparity, ignorance/prejudice, and networks for that person's attitude to Al Qaeda. Similarly, Table 18 (page 175) illustrates how "Frustration" was marginally more important for respondents' attitudes on ISIS than social difficulties and gender.

Table 22. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to support for Al Qaeda.

	Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight American and Zionist imperialism		
Most significant predictors	Chi2	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Ideology	2.048220e+01	3.000000e+00	1.348362e-04*
Social inequality	2.2883063	3.0000000	0.5147648
Networks	2.7797250	3.0000000	0.4268484
Frustration	9.2214317	3.0000000	0.0264872*
Ignorance/prejudice	0.1829387	3.0000000	0.9802954
Economic disparity	4.0371747	1.0000000	0.53855255

*Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold.

This minimal impact was also perceptible when examining subgroups. Table 23 shows that out of 165 subjects who felt frustrated, 34 (20%) also supported Al Qaeda, while 131 oppose it. Instead, out of 203 individuals who did not feel frustrated, 8 (4%) justified Al Qaeda and 189 condemned it. Although supporters of Al Qaeda were few in both subsets, among those who did feel frustration the proponents of the group were outnumbered by a factor of roughly 4 (131/34). In the group who did not feel frustration, proponents of Al Qaeda were almost 24 times inferior in size compared to its critics (189/14).

Table 23. Contingency Table for frustration and support for Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones who can fight American and Zionist imperialism	In Italy I often feel frustrated due to my personal situation			
		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	34	8	42
	Disagree	132	194	326
	Total	166	202	368

Analogously, as illustrated in Table 24, out of 172 subjects who felt frustrated, 41 (24%) also justified ISIS's struggle and 131 condemned it. Contrarily, out of the 203 individuals not feeling frustration, 14 (7%) supported ISIS, while 189 opposed it. In the first subset, ISIS's proponents were outnumbered by a factor of approximately 3 (131/41), while in the second subgroup by a factor of almost 14 (189/14).

Table 24. Contingency Table for frustration and support for ISIS.

ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate	In Italy I often feel frustrated due to my personal situation			
		Agree	Disagree	Total
	Agree	41	14	55
	Disagree	131	189	320
	Total	172	203	375

In both instances, the difference between the two subgroups is not enormous but remains marginally significant. Besides, when we used Wald z-tests with weights, we noticed the odds of supporting Al Qaeda and ISIS decreased (though not always in a continuous way) as respondents progressively disagreed with the claim they are frustrated. Yet, there were no significant shifts in the answers in any of the two cases (Appendix 6).

Although the reasons behind the respondents' sense of frustration remain unclear –are they driven by discrimination, economic disparity, identity crisis, or by other totally unrelated events such as family issues or widespread occupational instability?- these results provide weak evidence for theories linking frustration and radicalisation. Nevertheless, the implications of the fact that “Frustration” turned out to be marginally significant in relation to support for Al Qaeda and ISIS may be twofold. First, it shows that a few frustrated individuals may have recurred indeed to Islamist views as a response to their sense of anger and resentment. Second, though minimal, these findings might be a sign that, even in Italy, Al Qaeda and ISIS are increasingly attempting to appeal to and capitalise off the sense of frustration many Muslims unfortunately experience.

Assessment

All in all, out of 28 tested predictors, only 6 from the literature were eventually statistically significant. Among these, as illustrated in Table 25 summarising the results of the regression models, the most significant predictor was “Duty to punish offenders of Islam”. It registered the highest p-value

Table 25. Summary of the regression tests featuring significant predictors for each response variable.

Response variables	Significant predictors	Significant p-values
1) Justification of violence in defence of Islam	1. Duty to punish offenders of Islam	5.738565E-11
	2. Ideology	0.007395411 (3.036898E-07)*
	3. Geography (Rome/Lombardy)	0.03266127*
2) Duty to punish offenders of Islam	1. Ideology	1.199097E-05
	2. Social difficulties	0.002974536
3) Support for Al Qaeda	1. Ideology	0.006602872 (1.348362e-04)*
	2. Frustration	0.0264872
	3. Networks	0.03946684*
4) Support for ISIS	1. Ideology	0.000072459 (2.65949490E-07)*
	2. Duty to punish offenders of Islam	1.161117E-04
	3. Identity crisis	0.03024666
	4. Frustration	0.03132515 (0.0208782)*

*Significance levels when “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was withdrawn from the regression models.

of all the models (5.7E-11), and ranked the first and the second most significant predictor as for the justification of violence in defence of Islam and support for ISIS. “Ideology” was the other enormously relevant predictor. It was significant for all four response variables, ranking first in relation to the duty to punish offenders of Islam and support for Al Qaeda and ISIS, and second as for the justification of violence in defence of faith. Perhaps, this is the variable that reflects Muslim respondents’ perception of drivers of Islamist radicalisation the most, for it was their third most mentioned factor. That said, “Social difficulties” was relatively significant in relation to the duty to punish offenders of Islam. Every other predictor had a marginal, minimal impact on the response variables. “Geography” was marginally significant in shaping the respondents’ take on the justification of violence in defence of faith. “Networks” was partially relevant regarding support for Al Qaeda. Finally, “Frustration” was marginally significant for endorsement of Al Qaeda and ISIS.

In light of this, we contend the following. Solely within the contours of this study, we hold that for those who supported violence in defence of Islam and ISIS, being a person who agreed with the right to punish those who insult their creed mattered immensely. For respondents who supported religious violence, punishment for Islam’s offenders, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, being someone who championed an Islamic theocratic government counted considerably. For participants accepting the punishment of offenders of their faith, being a person experiencing social difficulties at school or at work somewhat mattered. Moreover, participants who felt frustrated or believed that personal connections are the ones that can really make a cause worthy were barely more likely to support Al Qaeda than those who did not share the same ideas. Lastly, respondents suffering from frustration and identity crisis were also slightly more likely to support ISIS than those who were not.

Yet again, two major clarifications are due. First, although “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” and “Ideology” dominated the regression tests, we mean no generalisations. As James Forest observes, an individual’s behaviour is subject to his/her interpretation of a specific ideology.⁷²⁴ Thus, these results are not to argue all Islamist purists who support an Islamic government or the punishment of Islam’s offenders ultimately endorse violence.⁷²⁵ Nor it is maintained that Islam is connected to violence or that Islamist views necessarily cause support for violence. Likewise, the results do not demonstrate that, in Italy, social difficulties, identity crisis, frustration, belief in personal connection,

⁷²⁴ Forest, James. (2009). “Terrorism as a Product of Choices and Perceptions”. In Howard, Russell, Hoffman, Bruce (Eds.). *Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (4th edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 110-139.

⁷²⁵ Moreover, it is theoretically possible that inherently violent people tend to embrace purist Islamic opinions/ideology, i.e., the causality works in the opposite direction. There would still be a question why the ideology is so attractive to individuals who are prone to violence.

and being from Rome or Milan automatically trigger support for religiously framed violence. As a matter of fact, most respondents from the questionnaire who did share the same views or status did not support force framed in religious terms. More generally, every claim made pertains exclusively to the study's sample, which, though fairly representative of the Italian Muslim community, has been scrutinised in spite of multiple methodological and logistical restrictions and challenges.

Second, in addition to the kinds of restrictions illustrated in the methodology, it is important to recognise that our initial choices could have impacted the results and their interpretations. For instance, when we crafted and identified our predictive variables, we made a sharp distinction between "Discrimination", (i.e. question # 15, "In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against"), and "Duty to punish offenders". As we know, the latter turned out to be the strongest driver in all of the study, whereas "Discrimination" was ultimately insignificant. Still, one could argue that mockery is by definition an act of discrimination and thus, had we counted "Duty to punish offenders" within the "Discrimination umbrella", our findings might have been rather different.

Such a consideration deserves further explanation. In order to evaluate the possibility that "Discrimination" and "Duty to punish offenders" could be related to one another, we have calculated the correlation between the two variables. The latter amounted to 0.15, which is really low considering that the maximum correlation between two given variables is 1. This low number makes sense, however. In truth, there is a marked conceptual difference between "Discrimination" and "Duty to punish offenders". The first one is factual, for it does measure the respondents' perception about discrimination –that is, if they feel that they are experiencing discrimination on account on being Muslim. The second, instead, is merely a hypothetical stance, for it does not measure how many times respondents say Islam is insulted, but explores their reaction should their religion be offended.

Unsurprisingly, within our sample, most of the subjects who felt discriminated against did not accept the punishment of offenders, while a few cases showed that there were participants who did not feel discriminated against who did want to punish offenders. Hence, within the contours of this study, we can state that there was a clear statistical difference between "Discrimination" and "Duty to punish offenders". Nonetheless, future investigations could solve such a potential issue by introducing an additional question that actually tests the real entity/degree of iconic disrespect and only then should studies assess if this variable is significantly associated to "Duty to punish offenders" – a possible example could be something like "In Italy, people often offend Islam and Islamic tenets" or "Italians make fun and insult Islam and its tenets".

CHAPTER VIII: DISCUSSION

Although it cannot be deemed as the country's worst nightmare, this study has proven Islamist radicalisation affects Italy. We can affirm this because we did not encounter mere "spurs" of radicalisation. Rather, we quantitatively determined the presence of what we called an "Islamist outlook". We observed that a significant minority of the country's Muslim community did express support for Islamist framed violence. Duty to punish offenders of Islam and support for an Islamic, theocratic government were the two factors that drove the study's results, outshining every other assumed theory of radicalisation.

In light of such findings, how do Italian non-Muslims see their Muslim counterparts? Aside from violence, how do these two groups see matters of integration, security, and coexistence? What were the Muslim leaders' opinions and recommendations? In an effort to answer these queries, the following section compares Muslim and non-Muslim respondents' views and features comments by the three prominent Muslim leaders.

Muslims' and Non-Muslims' Attitudes: Differing Perceptions


As already illustrated, Muslim and non-Muslim respondents expressed diverging views on the matter of religiously framed violence. Non-Muslims were more likely to consider Islamist radicalisation an issue both within Islam and the Italian Muslim communities than their Muslim counterparts. The latter, though, registered higher rates of support for religiously motivated violence. Also different were the two samples' selection of the drivers of Islamist radicalisation. While both groups mentioned "Exploitation of Islam for political purposes" as one of the main causes of radicalisation, non-Muslims emphasised the impact of "Economic hardship" and "Identity Crisis". Conversely, Muslim participants pointed more to "The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS" and "Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam" as the main drivers.

Non-Muslims' Views on Muslims' Situation in Italy

In addition to the mentioned issues, Muslim and non-Muslim respondents had the chance to compare thoughts and attitudes about other topics intrinsic to their mutual relation. For instance, in regard to the perception of Muslims' status in their country, 39% of Italian non-Muslims (172/440) agreed Muslims are discriminated against. 32.7% (144/440) stated Muslims have no voice. 33.6% (148/440) claimed Muslims have a hard time blending in at school. 43% (189/440) agreed that there is a media war to discredit Islam. 35.8% (157/440) maintained Muslims are often oppressed.

But once again, such results significantly differed from answers by Muslim respondents. As shown in Graph 16, in comparison to non-Muslims, 222 Muslims said they felt discriminated against

Graph 16. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent's views on Muslims' situation in Italy.




(1.3 times as many). 299 stated that they have no voice (more than twice as many). 150 claimed to have a hard time blending in at school (sample almost split equally). 358 felt there is a media war to discredit Islam (almost twice as many). 285 argued Muslims are often oppressed (circa twice as many). Therefore, except for the belief Muslims have a hard time blending in at school that virtually matched answers by Muslims participants, in all of the other cases non-Muslim respondents were markedly less likely to perceive the kind of unease felt by their Muslim counterparts.

Non-Muslims' Views on Muslims' Attitudes Towards Violence

As for non-Muslims' perception of Muslims' take on religiously motivated violence, 39% of non-Muslim participants (172/440) claimed that, in the end, many Muslims justify violence in defence of faith. 42.7% (188/440) held that, in the end, many Muslims would punish whoever offends their religion. 27.3% (120/440) believed that, in the end, many Muslims actually support terrorism. These beliefs did not match the actual attitudes by Muslim respondents, whose rates of support for violence were inferior to those envisioned by non-Muslim participants.

In reality, Graph 17 shows that 105 Muslims accepted violence in defence of faith (1.6 ratio). 131 would punish offenders of their religion (1.4 ratio). 44 supported Al Qaeda (2.7 ratio) and 57 ISIS (2.1 ratio). In contrast with the actual Muslims' rates of support for violence, non-Muslim respondents were still considerably more likely to assume most Muslims would accept religiously motivated force. This attitude by non-Muslim respondents may be consistent with the fact 57% of them (252/440) claimed that fear over Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is not exaggerated and that almost 80% of them (349/440) worry over ISIS.

Graph 17. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent's views on Muslims' attitude towards violence.



Non-Muslims' Views on Muslims in Italy

As to how Italian non-Muslims perceive their fellow Muslim citizens, 47.7% of non-Muslim respondents (211/440) declared Islam and Italian values are definitely incompatible. 41% (181/440) would never live in a predominantly Islamic neighbourhood. 50.7% (223/440) did not believe that Muslims love Italy and its culture and want to be part of it. 47% (208/440) contended Muslims want to impose their beliefs and Islamise Italy. 40.4% (178/440) agreed Islam is a threat for Italy and its culture.

By contrast, 81% of the surveyed Muslims (357/440) stated they love Italy and its culture in spite of every issue. 69% (305/440) strongly opposed the abolition of Christmas plays in schools and the removal of the cross from classrooms as a sign of respect towards Muslims. 53% (233/440) assured they would sign a law featuring the training of Imams and the imposition of sermons held in Italian in a


keen effort to balance integration and security. Nevertheless, non-Muslims' displayed mostly negative views of their fellow Muslim citizens.

Non-Muslims' and Muslims' Views on Future Issues of Security and Coexistence

In relation to future projections, non-Muslims and Muslims seem to differ in their perception on security but move closer in regard to future prospects of coexistence. For instance, 73% of non-Muslim respondents (320/440) said Italy could suffer from terrorist attacks similar to those that took place in Paris and Brussels. 55% (241/440) agreed tension between Italian Muslims and non-Muslims will increase. But the same amount (241/440) also disagreed with the statement that interreligious dialogue will be futile. In truth, 48% of non-Muslim respondents (212/440) were convinced Italy and its Muslim community will eventually live in peace and harmony. 61% (268/440) agreed the key to a better future is a greater integration of Islamic communities. And 73% (320/440) also claimed the key to a better future is education and teaching of multiculturalism and pluralism.

Unlike their non-Muslim counterparts, when asked about the likelihood of Jihadist terrorist attacks occurring in Italy, only 28% of Muslim respondents (119/440) agreed with the previous stance. As illustrated in Graph 18, only 32% (143/440) believed tension between Italian Muslims and non-Muslims is destined to increase. When it came to future issues of coexistence, 66% (289/440) disagreed with the idea interreligious dialogue will be useless. 77% (336/440) were convinced Italy and its Muslim community will live in peace and harmony. 80% (350/440) believed the key for a better future is a greater integration of Islamic communities and 77% (339/440) shared similar thoughts about education and teaching of multiculturalism and pluralism.

Graph 18. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent's views on future issues of security and coexistence.



Assessment

What has patently emerged is that non-Muslim and Muslim respondents' perceptions differ nearly in every case. Overall, non-Muslims showed to be appreciably more likely to reject violence in defence of faith, the duty to punish offenders of sacred tenets, and groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. Yet, they were more significantly inclined to perceive radicalisation in Islam and Italy as an issue, believe many Muslims in the end actually support violence, display unfavourable views of Muslims, and worry over future issues of security. On their side, Islamic respondents were more likely to minimise or reject allegations of radicalisation in Islam and within their communities, but featured higher rates of support for religiously motivated violence. They mostly displayed favourable views regarding Italy and integration and were considerably less preoccupied with prospects of security.

Mismatched perceptions and differing attitudes may be linked to the lack of mutual knowledge. As for non-Muslims, 53.6% of the respondents (236/440) affirmed they rarely interact with Muslims. 13% (57/440) said they never socialise with them and 61% (269/440) stated they do not have any good Muslim friends. On their part, as emerged in interviews and focus groups, Muslim subjects have often showed an ignorance about Italian beliefs, culture, and religious traditions. In other instances, Muslims have even shown little respect for Italian society, for 44% of them (192/440) have claimed Islamic morality is Italy's solution to its loss of values. "Islam is the true religion for all people and Italy will all

convert one day. In fact, in 50 years you will be working for us, and all women in the street will wear the veil or the burka”, predicted an Egyptian employer in Milan.⁷²⁶

Hopes rest on the assumptions regarding future issues of coexistence, though. Even if non-Muslims were more pessimistic about the future, both groups overwhelmingly approved of more constructive and conciliatory measures as key to a better tomorrow. Muslim and non-Muslim respondents indeed agreed that crucial steps towards a stronger future included increased integration of the Muslim community and education and teaching of multiculturalism and pluralism. As it will be shortly discussed, these are the essential premises needed to construct cultural bridges that could progressively diminish the gap between Italy and its Muslim citizens.

Muslim Leaders' Reception of the Study

As already specified at the end of Chapter V, the three Muslim leaders who granted the project assistance and credibility were all unanimous in their disappointment and worry over the quantity of Muslim subjects endorsing violence framed in Islamist terms. In addition to their reaction to the “Islamist outlook”, the three public figures also worried over Italian non-Muslims’ perception of their fellow Islamic citizens. To them, misconceived views on Muslims and Islam would be the product of Islamophobia spread by the media and certain politicians. Elzir explained that, “Italians are not bad people, they are our brothers, for many of us are Italian citizens. But it’s natural when you read or hear about Muslims only after terrorist attacks that you become afraid of them.”⁷²⁷ Returning from a short-term period in the United States to study de-radicalisation programmes, Cozzolino elucidated that:

Both radicals and people who don’t want Muslims exploit the Islamophobic media propaganda for their needs. In more serious societies, such as America, Denmark, England, the Netherlands [...], governmental and non-governmental actors try to limit the usage of technical, poorly understood terms linked to Islamism and shift focus to more sociological aspects devoid of charged terminology. The idea is to promote a more conciliating tone, for we must not provide ground for bitterness.⁷²⁸

As Pallavicini put it, “I understand and feel many Europeans’ timorousness in relation to Islam and its establishment in mainstream society. That can be a challenging process. But demonising all Muslims through the media only because a few of them misbehave enlarges the gap between them and their society.”⁷²⁹

⁷²⁶ Interview no. 43, Q5, Appendix 5.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ Cozzolino, Massimo, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

⁷²⁹ Pallavicini, Yaha, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

All in all, when asked about the most important measures against Islamist radicalisation, the three leaders made one last unanimous call for dialogue as a tool for security and coexistence. Reiterating the contents of a former interview, Imam Pallavicini stressed the importance of multifaceted dialogue both within the contours of the Muslim community and between Italian Muslims and their government. In particular, the Imam urged the various segments of civil society to “work all together” to counter prospects of Islamist radicalisation:

Politicians, experts of the matter in question, academics, clerics –and not just Muslim ones, but also other ones from Europe’s main religious creeds- must create a task force in coordination with each other. Only through this rhetoric based on secularism and religious pluralism will we be able to achieve concrete results.⁷³⁰

Similarly, to Elzir, “dialogue and reciprocal knowledge is the ultimate key against terrorism, Islamophobia, and extremism.”⁷³¹ As a matter of fact, “without dialogue with the Italian State and the Italian people we are not going anywhere”, categorically admonished Cozzolino.⁷³²

⁷³⁰ Pallavicini, Yaha. In Ciavardini, Tiziana. (2016). “Terrorists attacks in Brussels, Imam Pallavicini: ‘Let’s condemn Isis. Let’s forget about the Middle Ages. But Italy shall acknowledge Islam’ [Italian]. *Il Fatto Quotidiano*. <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/03/24/attentati-bruxelles-imam-pallavicini-condanniamo-isis-dimentichiamo-il-medioevo-ma-litalia-riconosca-lislam/2578141/> accessed on 30 June 2017.

⁷³¹ Elzir, Ezzedin, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

⁷³² Cozzolino, Massimo, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1.

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION

Islamist radicalisation is an indubitably controversial matter in today's Europe. In the course of this project, we have attempted to explore the phenomenon in question by proposing a new case study, that is, Italy. Unlike other European nations, Italy has yet to experience one single major Jihadist attack and Islamist views seem to gain little traction within the Italian Muslim community. Yet, the country's arguably significant role in the 2016 Berlin attack and the London Bridge attacks perhaps suggest that "something" might be changing in Italy. Ergo, no matter how one looks at it, Italy is actually a case worth examining. If one considers the country as an exceptional case in comparison to other European realities truly affected by ISIS-related terrorism and Islamist radicalisation, one should ponder over the reasons why Rome is still a relatively safe environment. On the contrary, if one considers Italy not to differ substantially from other European countries -or if one agrees with the idea that its alleged "exceptionalism" is changing- then it is worth analysing if and how Islamist views espousing violence have penetrated the Italian Muslim community. In other words, is Islamist radicalisation Italy's worst nightmare or is the latter just a myth?

In order to answer the above question, we decided to explore the diverging positions on Islamist radicalisation featured by Olivier Roy and Stuart Croft. Based on his sociological observations, Roy contends Islamist radicalisation is a worrisome issue and should be treated accordingly. Conversely, Croft argues that fear over Islamist radicalisation is socially and culturally constructed to securitise Muslims and advance specific agendas. Hence, after presenting the academic discussion on definitions and theories of radicalisation, we completed one of the largest quantitative and qualitative analyses in the field exploring Italian Muslims' views on religiously framed violence. Our aim was to search for what we labelled an "Islamist outlook", that is, the respondents' attitudes that justified violence framed in Islamist terms. In doing so, we surveyed 440 Italian Muslims from 15 cities, comparing their views with those from 440 Italian non-Muslims; in the course of the analysis, we also examined the opinions of 200 Muslim subjects from interviews and focus groups.

Considering the arguments against and in favour of chances of Islamist radicalisation in Italy, our initial hypothesis was that neither Roy nor Croft was ultimately right. In truth, although we hypothesised Islamist radicalisation not to be a pressing issue in Italy, we still predicted to encounter "spurs" of radicalisation. That is, we expected our "Islamist outlook" to be marginal and, thus disproving both Roy and Croft - for the latter would not be neither relevant nor null/almost null. In simpler terms, we thought that our data would locate Italy somewhere in the middle Roy's and Croft's positions.

However, after providing our definition of “Islamist radicalisation”, our initial hypothesis was challenged, for we did not encounter mere “spurs” of radicalisation. In detail, within the Muslim sample, 24% of respondents (105/440) agreed with violence in defence of faith, 30% (131/440) accepted the punishment of offenders of Islam, 10% (44/440) supported Al Qaeda’s struggle, and 13% (57/440) viewed ISIS’s struggle as legitimate. Not only were such results significantly higher compared to the ones from the Italian non-Muslim counterparts; they also confirmed the presence of a minor but yet significant “Islamist outlook”. In line with data from the Italian Postal Police, the study’s results were considered matter of concern even by the three Muslim leaders who assisted the project, for they too expected the observed “Islamist outlook” to be marginal. In the end, although Islamist radicalisation in Italy still cannot be considered as the country’s worst nightmare, our findings confirm that Roy’s position fits the Italian scenario better than Croft’s.

Subsequently, we tested a large number of models linking support for violence with various predictor parameters stemming from the most accredited theories on the drivers of radicalisation. No statistically significant support was found for theories proposing discrimination, economic disparity, outrage at Western foreign policy, oppression of Muslim, or any standard sociological variable, including gender and being a convert to Islam, as predictors. Similarly, neither “traumatic experiences” nor rational choice theory was supported by the data. By contrast, the most significant predictor variables relating to support for violence were taking offense against offenders of Islam and the endorsement of an Islamic, theocratic form of government (ideology). Social difficulties were fairly significant. Geography, “networks”, frustration, and uncertainty as for the wish to belong to Italian culture (identity crisis) were marginally significant.

All in all, we believe that this study has proven that Italy does not differ substantially from the broader Western European experience of radicalisation. Italy’s lack of major Jihadist attacks does not mean that the country is impervious to Islamist views that endorse violence within its borders. On the contrary, our data shows that a minor but significant amount of Italian Muslims did support such visions. Perhaps, what is keeping Italy relatively safe from ISIS-related attacks is a combination of operational, strategic, and temporal circumstances intrinsic to the relation between Italy and Jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.⁷³³ What we are sure of, though, is that Italy needs to address prospects of Islamist radicalisation and, without any type of alarmism and unfair generalisation against Islam and Muslims, we feel a number of policies at the social and institutional level are necessary to foster dialogue, communal feelings, and social justice for all citizens of Italy. And most importantly, as

⁷³³ Please see comments by experts on page 15 and 16.

shown below, we stress the need for further research meant to contribute to the existing discussion on radicalisation.

Future research: Is Italy the Next France?

In spite of the study's provided evidence, Italy still cannot be compared to realities such as Belgium or France. The Italian government's counter-terrorist efforts have, so far, successfully thwarted plots and disrupted networks. Italian Muslims have considerably denounced acts of violence perpetrated in the name of Islam. ISIS seems to have exerted a minor lure inside the nation's Muslim community. Perhaps along with Italy's limited presence and action in the Middle East, a series of logistical/operational conditions might have protected the country from acts of terrorism.

But there is reasonable doubt that this apparent absence of violence between Muslims and non-Muslims in Italy may not last. Although racism and perceived inequality have not been significant factors in relation to support for Islamist violence, 51% of surveyed Muslims still did feel discriminated against. Likewise, 64% stated they have no voice and 82% believed there is a media war to discredit Islam. From its part, Italy, whose economy has still not recovered from the 2008 economic crisis, finds itself overwhelmed with managing the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding as a result of war and instability in Syria and Libya – which in 2016 brought to its shores more than 200,000 migrants.⁷³⁴ Coupled with fear of Jihadist terrorism, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments are on the sharp rise. Cities hosting large Muslim communities have been experiencing a sort of ghettoization of certain neighborhoods mostly inhabited by Muslim immigrants. Regrettably, Via Padova in Milan, Torpignattara in Rome, and Falchera in Turin are inevitably progressively becoming synonymous with degradation.

A more unstable future is not inconceivable, thus.⁷³⁵ Incapable or unwilling to successfully integrate and assimilate migration flows, Italy might turn into the object of resentment for hordes of disenchanted individuals. Demoralized and unoccupied, Muslim immigrants might flood suburban neighborhoods around Milan, Rome, and Turin, creating predominantly Islamic enclaves. Torn by unemployment, crime, and poverty, the formation of something comparable to the French *banlieues* might not be exceedingly farfetched.

Besides, were Italy unable to meet expectations of social inclusion and recognition, second-

⁷³⁴ (2017). "Migrants, record arrivals in 2016". *Il Sole 24 Ore*. <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-01-05/migranti-2016-record-sbarchi-e-accoglienza-162035.shtml?uuid=ADdVMwQC> accessed on 30 June 2017.

⁷³⁵ Groppi, Michele. (2016). "No Molenbeeks here, but the future is not guaranteed" [Italian]. In *Limes: Indagine sulle periferie*. pp. 37-45.

generation Italian Muslims might fall prey to issues of identity crisis and reject their country. In an increasingly polarized society, Islamist visions might offer that sense of meaning and nobility so desperately sought by a myriad of victimized, frustrated individuals. Though chances that Italy might eventually become the next France remain blurry, present signs blatantly indicate Rome to be slowly trending in that direction. Only through interdisciplinary efforts by all segments of the government and the civil society could the country impede these odds.

Unwilling to turn into the next France, Italy cannot afford to disregard the study of Islamist radicalisation. As such, a fairly similar analysis should be repeated at a wider level devoid of the various logistical and practical restrictions faced by this investigation. It would be interesting to examine at least 100 Muslim and non-Muslim subjects per city, including other peripheral, but major centres such as Aosta, Bari, Belluno, Bolzano, Cagliari, Catania, Pordenone, Reggio Calabria, Trento, Treviso, and Trieste. Inmates arrested on charges of terrorism should too be examined in order to compare public perception of radicalisation and actual paths towards religiously framed violence.

Searching for the “Islamist outlook” among immigrants and refugees would also make a significant contribution to the discussion surrounding matters of integration and security. Having conducted this type of investigations, the formulation of a rigorous, exhaustive counter-radicalisation policy should be the fulcrum of future Italian research.

More generally, larger quantitative and qualitative analyses studying prospects of Islamist radicalisation should be carried out in other European countries as well. In addition to comparing findings, trends, and narratives, results could be, perhaps, utilised to form more exhaustive EU policies against radicalisation, discrimination, and Islamophobia. Last but not least, empirical studies on Islamophobia should be continued in every European nation, examining statistical trends and developing causal models of what could be labelled “Western radicalisation”.

All in all, future research is of vital importance to understand the extremely complex phenomenon that is radicalisation. And further study is warranted to make sure Roy’s assertion of urgency does not turn into our worst nightmare. But Italy must not do so at the expense of its Muslim community, validating claims of securitisation of European Muslims. And as we embark on the quest for balancing security and democracy, this will be our challenge.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Interviews with Professional/Public Figures

1) 18/06/2015, Olivier Roy

Groppi: Thank you for receiving me professor Roy. We talked on the phone and I explained to you my research. What do you think about my project?

Roy: I would say it's really interesting, but you have to be very careful about how you frame the concept of radicalisation and political violence. You said that you want to find out how much Italian Muslims are radicalised, right? But I don't think this is the right way to go. Radicalisation is often associated to violence. Hence, if you were doing something like Farhad did in the French prisons, interviewing former Al Qaeda members arrested on charges of terrorism, then that would be really good. Because that would really be a research analysing causes and mechanisms of radicalisation. If you do something like this, if you do surveys, I would suggest that you look for "Visions of Radicalisation", meaning what people think of radicalisation and how much radicalised they might be. Then, once the project is done, we can compare the results with the ones from Farhad.

Groppi: How do you think I should frame the concept of radicalisation?

Roy: Make a clear distinction between radicalisation leading to violence and what you are searching, meaning views completely detached from violence.

Groppi: For the rest, do you think there is a need of more quantitative studies in our field?

Roy: For sure, it would be nice to see what your results are, but to be quite frank with you, it really depends on the findings.

Groppi: Stuart Croft says Islamist radicalisation is socially constructed to securitise Muslims. What are your thoughts on that?

Roy: There is certainly a point in his theory, but at the same time I still think we have to keep an eye on this phenomenon.

Groppi: Is Islamist Radicalisation an urgent matter?

Roy: Certainly and without being alarmist or anything, we have to admit it is an urgent matter. And it should be treated as such. Again, we don't have to be alarmist. Yes, there is an issue with radicalisation, but there is no need for panic. If we do, then we do what the terrorists want. We have to keep an eye on the banlieues, we have to watch all of the people who are leaving France, Britain, Germany, and Belgium to join the Islamic State. We have to be very careful about converts as well, who are becoming more and more involved in every type of Jihadist activity.

Groppi: Why do people leave and become radicalised?

Roy: Well, Islamism works as a function of globalisation and the de-territorialisation of Islam and Muslims in the Diaspora. They are stuck between two worlds, suffer from identity crisis, and cannot

deal with the fact that globalisation has left them out. And in a country like France, they mostly live in the banlieues torn by poverty and crime. So, Islamist views are their salvation. They allow them to escape their harsh reality and form a virtual, but global community, which can resist to the West, counter the West in its own yard. With these views, they feel powerful again.

Groppi: As I am embarking on this project, what is your main advice?

Roy: Make sure to define the theoretical contours of your research. That's the most important aspect for me.

Groppi: Merci beacoup.

2) March 2017, Domenico Messina, Italian Postal Police

Groppi: Dr. Messina, thank you for your time. What do you think of the study results?

Messina: They are certainly interesting and similar to the ones we find monitoring online the people we deemed as potentially dangerous. In fact, I would dare to say that your results are consistent with our findings. As we monitor the Web on a daily basis, we can say that about 30% of the online community supports violent interpretations of Islam. And those who argue for such Islamist views use religious reasons to try to convince others they are right. In other words, their ideology is a tremendously important factor.

Groppi: Who are these people and why do you think they support violent interpretations of Islam?

Messina: Generally speaking they are consistent with the Muslim population's demographic composition, so, Muslim males from North Africa who came here searching for better living conditions. Still, especially in these last years, we are noticing converts really pushing for more hard-core visions of Islam and women too whom we consider border line subjects.

Groppi: What do you do with these subjects?

Messina: We monitor them online on a daily base. In certain cases we execute environmental interceptions, including wiretapping.

Groppi: How dangerous are these subjects?

Messina: Potentially dangerous

Groppi: Are we prepared to counter them? What should Italy do?

Messina: It's not so easy. We at the Postal Police engage in wiretapping and online surveillance. We keep under tight control dozens of subjects we have reasons to believe are being radicalised online. Among these are a number of female converts who are really active on disseminating propagandistic material. Yet, identities are not always clear and we are not able to decipher many messages on Facebook and Google, because these companies won't provide us with the codes we need to decrypt confidential conversations. We believe that Italy will have to deal more and more with lone-wolves radicalised online who are really hard to identify and stop. If our country, the political domain, and the

international institutions do not come together and give us a hand, it's always going to be harder and harder for use to counter such an increasing level of threat. In truth, if an international step is not taken in this direction, we are destined to witness the emergence of more lone-wolves.

Groppi: Thank you Dr. Messina.

3) *March 2017, Pallavicini, Yaha, Vice President of COREIS*

Groppi: Dear Imam, thank you for coming here. So, what do you think of the results?

Pallavicini: It's just bone-chilling. When I completed the questionnaire myself, when it came to the statements about violence in Islam, the answer was quite simple and unquestionable. But, apparently, I was wrong. I didn't think you could find what you've found.

Groppi: Why do you think is that?

Pallavicini: Ignorance and misinterpretation of Islamic tenets. But the thing that worries me the most is that there are going to be people who will not accept these results. Instead of looking at them critically, they will contest them and not recognise the problem and the need of reform. We're fighting an battle first and foremost inside Islam, inside the European Muslim community, and inside the Italian community. But we have to be ready to stare at the evidence and take action.

Groppi: What do you think of the Italian non-Muslim results?

Pallavicini: They are hard to look at too. But I think they have to be analysed deeper. There is much potential for improvement. But we all have to do our part. In reality, I understand and feel many Europeans' timorousness in relation to Islam and its establishment in mainstream society. That can be a challenging process. But demonising all Muslims through the media only because a few of them misbehave enlarges the gap between them and their society. It's like saying that all Italians are Mafiosi. The community must take action, but the Italian institutions, the political world, and the civil society must all cooperate for the construction of more conciliatory tones that bring unity instead of division.

Groppi: What should be the steps towards this?

Pallavicini: On our part we must do anything we can to contrast these so-called Muslims. We must expose their ignorance, their unholy goals, and their way of being criminals. Because that's what they are, criminals and nothing more. On its end, the Italian government should make an epochal move and recognise Islam as a religion. By granting us the status of official religion can we built a more progressive version of European Islam, where people feel proud to be Muslim and European at the same time. Who says that the two identities have to conflict? If the State does its part, we can succeed in creating a form of Islam, which remains Islam, but is also inserted into the European context because, being Muslims in Europe is not the same that being Muslim in Saudi Arabia. This is what we have to do, to allow second and third generations to feel pride in their double identity.

Groppi: What are the main challenges?

Pallavicini: What aren't the main challenges, you mean. We stand before really hard times, filled with extreme visions that feed on ignorance and rage. We must come all together and fight it together. It's the only way, and if we embark on this journey together, we can succeed in creating a society in which everyone feels proud to belong to.

Groppi: Thank you dear Imam.

4) *March 2017, Cozzolino Massimo, Secretary general of CII*

Groppi: Dr. Cozzolino, thank you for making time for me. What do you think about the study's results?

Cozzolino: Dear Michele, these results are really, really worrying, for they should not be diminished. It's incredible how much ignorance and exploitation of the good nature of Islam there is around. More than we expected, to be honest. But again, if I think again, perhaps it's not too surprising.

Groppi: How so?

Cozzolino: You see, both radicals and people who don't want Muslims exploit the Islamophobic media propaganda for their needs. In more serious societies, such as America, Denmark, England, the Netherlands and so on, governmental and non-governmental actors try to limit the usage of technical, poorly understood terms linked to Islamism and shift focus to more sociological aspects devoid of charged terminology. The idea is to promote a more conciliating tone, for we must not provide ground for bitterness

Groppi: Do you think the government is doing a better job lately?

Cozzolino: Not at all! I mean, okay, there has been some partial improvement now and then, but that's only because we had to do something about it. I don't know if you know, but the government is currently discussing this legal proposition which is referred to as "Anti-Jihad Law". How can you call a law "Anti-Jihad Law"? Even inadvertently, the State is promoting stereotypes against Muslims and this is really grave. You see how this name can be really problematic right? Because then there are people from certain political parties that can exploit this for the electoral campaigns and gain votes.

Groppi: What should we do then?

Cozzolino: We should educate the media and the political word about terms and difficult concepts that need clarification. But without dialogue with the Italian State and the Italian people, we are not going anywhere

Groppi: What should the government do?

Cozzolino: If the government can give Islam its rightful place in society, we will be able to train Imams, register and regulate the funding of mosques.

Groppi: What should the Muslim community do? Especially given that the main drive in my study was "Ideology"?

Cozzolino: We cannot pretend everything is alright. And it's now that we must take action, by getting the second and third generations involved. As a matter of fact, that's where we have to start, from women, active second-generations, and converts who love Italy and are our winning key against all sorts of extremisms

Groppi: Hence, moderation when using certain terms and getting young and female Muslims involved, right?

Cozzolino: Right, the quest for excessive, sensational news filled with inflammatory remarks enlarge the gap between Muslims and the Italian society. We might counter this, because this type of behaviour provides ground for feelings of Islamophobia and victimisation which extremists can exploit to radicalise, recruit, and turn people to violence.

Groppi: Thank you Dr. Cozzolino.

5) *March 2017, Ezzedin Elzir, President of UCOII*

Groppi: Dear Imam, thank you for your help. What do you think of the results?

Elzir: This research is very important to us to see how we are doing inside our communities. And when you say that almost 30% of the people would punish whoever offends Islam or would justify violence in the name of Allah, while between 10% and 15% support Al Qaeda and ISIS, it's way too many people. I thought we would find like a 5% rate or so, but even 5% would still be too much. The fact there are these people who espouse violence in the name of Islam is unacceptable. It goes against everything we teach everyday.

Groppi: What do you think drives the result?

Elzir: Misguided religious interpretations and all the malaise that people who do not know nothing of Islam and want to use it for their political needs exploit to brainwash.

Groppi: What should we do? Especially given that the non-Muslim results don't look so good...

Elzir: Italians are not bad people, they are our brothers, for many of us are Italian citizens. But it's natural when you read or hear about Muslims only after terrorist attacks that you become afraid of them. But what it takes is courage, courage to come together, put our differences aside and grow together, because in the end, if you look closer, we share many things. And if you look at what we as UCOII did in Florence, well, this is a story of success. We signed that pact with the mayor, granting us certain rights, but, most importantly certain responsibilities. And with certain responsibilities comes the sense of integration and belonging to the city and the country. I myself consider myself a proud Italian, a proud Muslim, and a proud citizen of Florence.

Groppi: Hence what would you tell people who don't want anything to do with Muslims?

Elzir: Come and meet us. You'll see we're good people and, in fact, people, just like you, with the same dreams, aspirations, and fears. But we really need dialogue. Dialogue and reciprocal knowledge is the ultimate key against terrorism, Islamophobia, and extremism.

Groppi: Thank you dear Imam.

6) March 2017, Claudio Galzerano, Director of the International Anti-Terrorism Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Groppi: Director, thank you for this brief interview. What do you think of the study's results? Do you think they are fairly reflective of the situation?

Galzerano: I think so, even though prisons and the virtual space are the real main battlefields.

Groppi: How would you describe the Italian situation?

Galzerano: We are witnessing the re-emergence of the Balkan route. We are monitoring converts, among whom are a number of women who are really active in the promotion of such Islamist visions. We think lone-wolves are really what we have to worry about.

Groppi: Why hasn't our country been hit yet?

Galzerano: It's a combination of operational considerations. They have a hierarchy of who they want to strike. They need us for several reasons, but this does not mean that they won't do it one day or sooner than we think.

Groppi: How do you see the role that Islamist ideology played in the study?

Galzerano: Certainly Islamist ideology is the core of the question. Yet, this proves once again that as a society, we must foster dialogue with those who want it for real, for dialogue is truly the only way.

Groppi: Thank you director.

Appendix 2: Theoretical Models of Radicalisation

General models of terrorism and radicalisation

Although the proposed models shortly described are mostly borrowed from terrorism studies, they still are, nonetheless, useful in understanding how, in general terms, individual radicalise and, at times, embrace terrorism. Aside from three “classical” psychological progressions to violence presented by Ehud Sprinzak, Roy Baumeister, and Albert Bandura respectively dealing with how individuals engage in de-legitimisation processes,⁷³⁶ conceive and process hatred,⁷³⁷ and gradually morally disengage to justify violence,⁷³⁸ six models of pathways to terrorism are hereby explored, three linear and three non-linear.

Linear Models

In a FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Randy Borum proposes a conceptual model to explain an individual’s pathway to terrorism.⁷³⁹ Through the analysis of multiple violent extremist groups featuring diverse ideologies with the intent to verify the existence of common factors in the process of radicalisation, Borum points to four main phases. At the initial stage, named “it’s not right”, the individuals judge their condition as undesirable and unbearable. At the second stage, called “it’s not fair”, people realise not only is their situation undesirable, but also unjust. At the third stage, baptised “it’s your fault”, such injustice is blamed on the juxtaposing out-group, such as a target policy, person, or nation. Finally, the fourth stage termed “you’re evil”, the believed responsible party is vilified and demonised, justifying impetus for aggression.

Fathali Moghaddam’s famous model is the so-called “staircase to terrorism”, in which he uses the metaphor to describe the process of violent radicalisation.⁷⁴⁰ The staircase narrows as it ascends from the ground floor and through five successive levels. Like most theories, feelings of discontent and perceived suffering and deprivation are a platform for stepping initially onto the path to terrorism – even though fewer people ascend to each successive level and, eventually, very few become terrorists. In the beginning, at the ground level individuals’ attempts to alleviate adversity and improve their status have been unsuccessful, leading to frustration. At the second level, frustrated individuals mature feelings of aggression that are then displaced onto some perceived causal agent, who becomes an enemy. As anger toward this enemy increases ascending to the third level, some become increasingly sympathetic towards justifications for violence and toward those terrorist groups taking action against the enemy. Some of those sympathizers eventually ascend to the fourth level, where they join an extremist group, organization or movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist violence. At the top, final level are those who have joined, overcome barriers to violent action, and actually commit a terrorist act.

Another way of conceiving the radicalisation process is illustrated in the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) pyramidal-type model.⁷⁴¹ The pyramid is divided into four tiers. At tier 1 are all the members of the community. At tier 2 are those members considered as vulnerable to radical messages, such as young people within the criminal justice system, for instance. At tier 3, called “moving towards extremism”, are those individuals who, while not committing any violent acts

⁷³⁶ Sprinzak, Ehud. (1991). “The process of delegitimation”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 3, no.1. pp. 50-68.

⁷³⁷ Baumeister, Roy. (1997). *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty*. New York: Freeman.

⁷³⁸ Bandura, Albert. (1998). “Mechanisms of moral disengagement”. In Reich, Walter. (Ed.). *Origins of Terrorism*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

⁷³⁹ Borum, Randy. (2004). *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of Florida. pp. 28-9.

⁷⁴⁰ Moghaddam, Fathali. (2005). “The Staircase to Terrorism”. *American Psychologist*. Vo. 60, no. 2. pp. 161-169.

⁷⁴¹ Audit Commission. (2008). *Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise*. Report to the Home Office and Communities and Local Government. p. 12.

themselves, may provide tacit support to terrorists and act to inspire others from below. Finally, at tier 4 are the terrorists, who are the most radicalised but remain relatively few in number when considered in relation to all those who may sympathise with their beliefs and feelings.

Non-linear Models

Max Taylor and John Horgan propose a conceptual framework for addressing the psychological process in the development of the terrorist.⁷⁴² Such framework is composed of three main categories: setting factors, personal factors, social/political/organisational contexts. Setting factors are those elements such as one's family, peers, economic conditions, and past experiences that facilitate the decision for opt for involvement. Personal factors are linked to one's psychological status, immediate negative experiences with the surrounding environment (arrests or clashes with police) or peer pressure with lead or reinforce disaffection. Finally, social/political/organisational contexts refer to the impact of group politics, identity, and ideology on the individual. In their observation of such factors, Taylor and Horgan note that terrorism works both at an individual and political level and the significant element in reinforcing involvement is the increased role of the social/political/organisational contexts in exerting control over behaviour.

In a keen attempt to conceptualise some form of risk assessment for prediction of involvement in terrorism, John Horgan proposes six main risk factors he encountered in studying British terrorists.⁷⁴³ These six elements include any emotional vulnerability linked to anger or alienation that leads to search for guidance and clarity; dissatisfaction with one's current activity, which leads to the conclusion that conventional politics does not work and that terrorism is the only necessary alternative; identification with oppressed Muslims around the world; acquisition of the belief violence directed against the state is not immoral; gaining of a sense of reward in terms of status, respect, and authority for participation in terrorist organisation; finally, kinship and social ties of those already involve as means of encouragement. Horgan's factors provide a valuable framework for an individual's predisposition to radicalise and, eventually, join terrorist organisations. Yet, as Horgan warns, the factors in question are not to be taken in isolation, but as a combination of factors that can ignite the radicalisation process towards terrorism.

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko identify twelve mechanisms of political radicalisation that operate across three main levels: the individual, the group, and the mass level.⁷⁴⁴ The individual level includes personal victimisation (personal grievances at the base for action); political grievance (oppression of Muslims); joining a radical group –the slippery slope (gradual involvement in the group with final greater tasks); joining a radical group –the power of love (personal ties increasing commitment to the group); extremity shift in like-minded groups (increase in polarised ideas of the group). The group level, instead, includes extreme cohesion under isolation and threat (as threat increases cohesion augments too); competition for the same base of support (competition with other groups to gain support causing increase in radicalisation); competition with state power (struggle and increase in violent response to state counter actions); within group competition –fissioning (increase of radicalisation due to in-group competition). Finally, the mass level includes Jujitsu politics (threats increasing respect for leaders and punishment for dissenters); hate (dehumanisation for the enemy); martyrdom (glorification of martyrdom of group members).

⁷⁴² Taylor, Max. Horgan, John. (2012). "A conceptual framework addressing psychological process in the development of the terrorist". In Horgan, John. *Terrorism Studies*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 130-144.

⁷⁴³ Horgan, John. (2008). "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes". *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vo. 618, no. 1. pp. 82-83.

⁷⁴⁴ McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. (2008). "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Towards Terrorism". *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vo. 20, no. 3. pp. 415-433.

Models of Islamist Radicalisation

In addition to general linear and non-linear models of terrorism and radicalisation, the literature also offers models dealing specifically with Islamic radicalisation processes.

Linear Models

One of the most famous phase models is the so-called top-down model by the Danish intelligence services (PET).⁷⁴⁵ PET phase model distinguishes different degrees or stages of the radicalisation process, where the person becomes more and more radicalised the more phases he or she goes through. The process starts by being “susceptible” to radical ideas and meeting a “radicaliser”, and advances on to new religious practices and changed behaviour. Subsequently, the process involves a narrowing of the person’s circle of friends and family and results in the so-called “hardening phase”, which includes “reviewing of and interest in very violent videos” displaying terrorists in battle and the killing of hostages.

Another widely used linear model is the one developed by the NYPD, which distinguishes four distinct phases forming the radicalisation process of radical Muslims in the West.⁷⁴⁶ According to the model, radicalisation is a bottom-up, linear process that functions as follows. Phase 1, the “Pre-Radicalisation” phase, describes the individual’s world in terms of lifestyle, socio-economic status, and religion at the starting point towards radicalisation. Generally speaking, Muslims tend to be male, second or third-generation immigrants, stemming from middle-class backgrounds, having ‘ordinary’ lives and jobs, and with little, if any, criminal history. Phase 2, the “Self-Identification” phase, describes how the individual gradually opens up to a new interpretation of the world and starts to explore radical Islam. From this moment onward, the individual begins to gravitate away from his or her former identity and to associate with like-minded individuals. Phase 3, the “Indoctrination” phase, relates to the full adoption of the “Jihadi-Salafi ideology”, leading the individual to conclude militant Jihad is the only possible tool to achieve the “grater good.” Phase 4, lastly, the “Jihadization” phase, entails self-designation as holy warriors and actual engagement in violence, in which individuals plan and execute terrorist attacks.

Similarly to the NYPD model, Tomas Precht model of a “Typical” radicalisation pattern also features four main phases.⁷⁴⁷ The first one, “Pre-Radicalisation”, relates to individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society, or foreign policy of their governments. The second phase, “Conversion and Identification with Radical Islam” entails identification with extremist ideologies. The third phase, “Indoctrination and increased group bonding” is where adoption of extreme beliefs takes place, among which justification for violence. Finally, “Actual acts of terrorism or planned plots”, relates to the last phase only a few individual who become terrorists embark on.

Wiktorowicz puts greater stress on the role that social influence plays in leading a person to join a radicalised Islamic group.⁷⁴⁸ The author conducted extensive fieldwork observing al-Muhajiroun and identifies four key processes that enhance the likelihood of an individual being drawn to a radical Islamic group and being persuaded to become actively involved. According to Wiktorowicz, these four factors include a cognitive opening, where a person becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas and world views; a phase of religious seeking, where a person seeks meaning through a religious framework; frame alignment, when the public representation of reality offered by the radical group “makes sense” and is internalised by each member; socialisation, where a person experiences religious

⁷⁴⁵ Danish Intelligence Services. PET. (2009). *Radicalisation and Terrorism*. [Danish]. Center for Terrorism Analysis.

⁷⁴⁶ Silber, Mitchell. Bhatt, Arvin. (2007). “Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat”. New York City Police Department

⁷⁴⁷ Precht, Tomas. (2007). *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe*. The Danish Ministry of Justice. pp. 32-37.

⁷⁴⁸ Wiktorowicz, Quintain. *Radical Islam Rising*. Ch. 3, 4, 5, pp. 206-208.

instruction that facilitates indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes

Non-Linear Models

One of the most famous models of the process of radicalisation is indubitably the one by Marc Sageman.⁷⁴⁹ His bottom-up, non-linear process entails four main factors. First, a sense of “moral outrage”, like reaction to perceived “major moral violations” such as the killings of Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya, or the perceived humiliation of Muslims as in the abuse at Abu Grade prison in Iraq – which bridge the local and global in the world view of the recipient; second, a specific interpretation of the world, for instance, where moral violations are seen as representing a war against Islam; third, resonance with personal experiences, given by interpretations of a Western war against Islam that meshes with one’s history of discrimination; finally, mobilisation through networks that work as “echo chambers”, where group dynamics and peer pressure encourage and reinforce one’s acquisition of radical views.

Similarly, Paul Gill offers a pathway model that charts the trajectory of individuals who become suicide bombers. The model proposes four key stages on their path to a suicide bombing.⁷⁵⁰ First, a broad socialisation process and exposure to propaganda which tends to predispose individuals towards violence; second, the experience of a “catalyst event”, which can motivate the decision to join a terrorist organisation; a number of pre-existing familial or friendship ties, which facilitate the recruitment process; finally, in-group radicalisation through processes of internalisation and polarisation of the group’s sets of norms and values. Although Gil concedes these stages can vary from bomber to bomber, they nonetheless mutually reinforce one another.

Analogously, drawing on his analysis of the Hamburg Cell before 9/11, Michael Taarnby proposes eight factors that characterise Islamic radicalisation process.⁷⁵¹ These factors feature individual alienation and marginalisation; a spiritual quest; a process of radicalisation, intended as the acquisition of radical interpretations of Islam; meeting and association with like-minded people; gradual seclusion, polarisation, and cell formation; acceptance of violence as a legitimate political means; connection with gatekeepers and operational experts; going operational by plotting terrorist attacks.

The last two empirical studies by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman and Goli and Rezaei also find interesting characteristics of Islamic radicalisation processes.⁷⁵² As for the previous ones, a study of radicalisation processes in the US and the UK displays six common manifestations: adopting a legalist interpretation of Islam; trusting only select religious authorities; perceived schism between Islam and the West; low tolerance for perceived theological deviance; attempts to impose religious beliefs on others; political radicalisation often featuring Western-based conspiracies to subjugate Islam. As for Goli’s and Rezaei’s works, instead, common elements of Islamic radicalisation processes are advocating for Islam as a religious ideology; acquisition of a holistic interpretation of Islam, distinguishing between true and false visions of Islam; submission to the idea that Islam final goal is the conquest of the world; agreement on the justification of violence.

⁷⁴⁹ Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad*. Ch. 4, 5.

⁷⁵⁰ Gill, P. (2008). “Suicide Bombers Pathways Among Islamic Militants”. *Policing*. Vo. 4, no. 2. pp. 412-422.

⁷⁵¹ Taarnby, Michael. (2005). *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe*. Danish Ministry of Justice. p. 22.

⁷⁵² Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. Grossman, Laura. (2009). *Homegrown terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.* Foundation for Defense and Democracy. Washington DC: Foundation for Defense and Democracy Press. pp. 12-13; Goli, Mardo. Shahamak Rezaei. (2010). *House of War: Islamic Radicalisation in Denmark*. Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR) Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. p. 48.

Summary of Proposed Models

All of the models examined have little specific information on how long the radicalisation process takes from inception to action. The NYPD study indicates radicalisation takes place gradually over two to three years, similar to Andrew Silke's contention that for most, radicalisation takes months or years.⁷⁵³ However, Fernando Reinares' sociological profile of arrested Jihadist terrorists in Spain estimated a longer process of radicalisation, starting up to ten years before their arrest.⁷⁵⁴ Yet, the case of Roshanara Choudhry shows radicalisation (in this case, self-radicalisation) leading to acts of violence can take place in less than 6 months.⁷⁵⁵ Similarly, the final "Jihadisation" stage identified in the NYPD study, that is, when attacks are planned, can occur very quickly, namely a couple of weeks, provided the members accept the group decision to undertake an attack.⁷⁵⁶

Despite many differences, all studies agree on the fact radicalisation leading to acts of terrorism is a gradual process. In addition, many studies also agree there are common stages in most radicalisation processes.⁷⁵⁷ That is, there is always a stage of individual change, like an increase in religiosity or a search for identity, which is enhanced through external aspects linked to or discrimination or perceived sense of war against Muslims. Then, there is a move to violent radicalisation, usually taking place when the individual socialises with like-minded people who come to morally justify violence. These stages are not necessarily sequential and they can also overlap, meaning that a person may skip a stage in reaching militant action or alternatively may become disillusioned and, at any given point, abandon the process altogether. In fact, although this section has presented models of radicalisation that lead to violence, this is not to argue that whoever embarks on such journeys eventually embrace violence. Once again, radicalisation and terrorism or political violence, most times, have nothing to do with each other.

⁷⁵³ Silke, Andrew. (2008). "Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization". *European Journal of Criminology*. Vo. 5, no. 1. pp. 99-123.

⁷⁵⁴ Reinares, Fernando. (2006). *Towards a Social Characterisation of Jihadist Terrorism in Spain*. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid.

⁷⁵⁵ Azeem, Ibrahim. (2010). "The Lesson of Roshonara Choudhry's Radicalization". *The Huffington Post*.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/the-lesson-of-roshonara-c_b_779800.html accessed on 30 June 2017.

⁷⁵⁶ Silber, M. Bhatt, A. "Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat". p. 45.

⁷⁵⁷ Christmann, Kris. (2012). *Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales p. 21.

Appendix 3: Written Questionnaires Aimed at Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents

Written Questionnaires for Muslim Participants

Part I.

1) Age

- 16-30
- 30-60
- >60
- Decline to state

2) Gender

- Male
- Female
- Decline to state

3) Nationality

- Italian
- Other= _____ Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal, Syria, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, other.
- Decline to state

4) Were you born in Italy?

- Yes
- No
- Decline to state

5) If you were not born in Italy, for how many years have you been living in this country?

- _____
- Decline to state

6) In which city/province do you live?

- _____ Bologna, Bergamo, Brescia, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Modena, Naples, Padua, Palermo, Reggio Emilia, Rome, Turin, Varese, Venice
- Decline to state

7) Social status

- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Decline to state

8) Do you have any children?

- Yes
- No
- Decline to state

9) Economic status

- I earn less than 1,000 euros on a monthly basis
- I earn between 1,000 and 2,000 euros on a monthly basis
- I earn more than 2,000 euros on a monthly basis
- Decline to state

10) Educational attainment

- Elementary school
- Middle school
- High school
- University (including BA, MA, PhD)
- Decline to state

11) Occupation

- Employee
- Employer/business owner
- Student
- Unemployed
- Other
- Decline to state

12) If you have ever voted in Italy, you have voted for parties considered to be more from the:

- Left (Partito Democratico, Sinistra Ecologia Libertà)
- Right (Nuovo Centro Destra, Fratelli Italia, Lega, Forza Italia)
- Centre (Scelta civica per l'Italia, Democrazia solidale)
- Other (Movimento 5 Stelle, altre liste civiche)
- I have never voted
- Decline to state

13) Religious participation

- I always/often go to mosque and take part to all the Islamic holidays
- I only take part to the Islamic holidays
- I am not very observant
- Decline to state

14) Religion

- Sunni Muslim since birth
- Shia Muslim since birth
- Sunni convert
- Shia convert
- Decline to state

Part II.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
15) In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against						
16) In Italy I feel we Muslims have no voice and would like we could be listened to more						
17) As a Muslim, I have a difficult time in blending in at school						
18) As a Muslim, I struggle at finding a good occupation						
19) As a Muslim, I struggle at finding good housing						
20) As a Muslim, I struggle at finding an appropriate place for worship						
21) As a Muslim, I feel people look at me with greater diffidence						
22) In Italy I feel there is much ignorance and prejudice towards Islam and Muslims						
23) Particularly in recent times, I feel there is a sort of media war to discredit Islam						
24) I feel Italian institutions do little to facilitate my integration						
25) Italy should enforce laws that respect Muslim identity						
26) I feel fear of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is exaggerated						
27) In countering Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, I feel the involvement of Islamic communities is of crucial importance						
28) Western foreign policy towards Muslim countries is and has been unjust and frustrating						
29) Muslims in the world are often oppressed						
30) In Italy I often feel frustrated due to my personal situation						

31) In Italy I have often asked myself if I wanted to embrace Italian culture or if I wanted to be out of it						
32) In the past, there have been hard experiences that brought me closer to God						
33) In spite of everything, I love Italy and its culture and I want to be part of it						

34) Please rank the following ones from most important (1) to least important (5) according to your life. If you wish not to answer, please select the last voice “decline to state”.

- ____ Work
- ____ Faith
- ____ Family
- ____ Health
- ____ Security
- Decline to state

35) Please, rank the first three most important problems Italy faces from most important (1) to least important (3). If you wish not to answer, please select the last voice “decline to state”.

- ____ Economy
- ____ Corruption
- ____ Health system
- ____ Immigration
- ____ National security
- ____ Education system
- ____ Crime
- ____ Social inequality
- Decline to state

Part III.

36) In your opinion, is there an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- Yes
- Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions
- No
- I do not know
- Decline to state

If your previous answer has been “No”, please go to question number 39.

37) In your opinion, is there an issue of radicalisation inside the Italian Muslim communities?

- Yes
- Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions
- No
- I do not know
- Decline to state

38) Please rank the first three causes of Islamist radicalisation leading to terrorism (from 1 to 3). If you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”.

- ____ Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam
- ____ Traumatic personal experiences
- ____ Exploitation of Islam for political purposes
- ____ The Israeli-Palestinian question
- ____ The material and mental/spiritual benefits offered by Al Qaeda, Isis, etc.
- ____ The importance of personal bonds with radicals and the role of the group
- ____ The call to armed struggle for every true Muslim against those who attack Islam
- ____ Search for adventure and sense of nobility
- ____ Personal identity crisis
- ____ Denied rights and frustration
- ____ Western racism
- ____ Economic and social harshness
- ____ Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world
- ____ Past and present Western foreign policy and the history of the crusades
- Decline to state

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
39) Members of a group and friends are the ones who really make a cause worthy						
40) A person decides to get physically involved in a cause due to personal interests, which can be both material and mental/spiritual						

41) It is a duty of every true Muslim to defend Islam						
42) Violence in defence of Islam can be justified						
43) Whoever offends Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished						
44) Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight American and Zionist imperialism						
45) Isis' struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate						
46) In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better than a democratic one						
47) Jews control the world and are responsible for much evil						
48) 9/11 is an American and Jewish conspiracy						
49) In America and the West not only are many at war with certain Muslim countries, but also with Islam						
50) The State of Israel has no right to exist						
51) Hamas and Hezbollah are not terrorist organisations						
52) The solution to the loss of values in the Western world is the Islamic morale						
53) I feel that, as a sign of respect to us Muslims, it is fair to abolish Christmas plays at school and remove the cross from classrooms						
54) I think my son/daughter's adopting of Western ways of life is fair						
55) I am opposed to my son/daughter marrying an Italian non-Muslim person						
56) Lying for the sake of faith, if faith is in danger, is acceptable						
57) The Quran is the unquestionable, absolute truth						
58) I would sign a law that is similar to the Austrian one,						

featuring the training of Imams and the imposition of sermons in the local language (not in Arabic)						
59) In the future, I would like Muslims' needs to be dealt by a Mufti or an Islamic court						

Part IV.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
60) In Italy, tension between non-Muslim Italians and Muslims will increase						
61) Italy will experience acts of Jihadist terrorism						
62) In case of a Jihadist attack, life for Italian Muslims will become much harder						
63) Interreligious dialogue will be useless						
64) I am confident Islam and Italian culture will live in peace and harmony						
65) The key to a better future for the country is a greater integration of our Muslim communities						
66) The key to a better future for the country is education and pluralism						
67) The key to a better future for the country is a greater economic and social conditions for foreigners, including us Muslim						
68) Islam in Italy is destined to remain a foreign reality, in the sense there will never be an Italian version of Islam						

Written Questionnaire for Non-Muslim Participants

Written Questionnaire for Non-Muslim Participants and Summary of its Sample's Composition

Part I.

1) Age

- 16-30
- 30-60
- >60
- Decline to state

2) Gender

- Male
- Female
- Decline to state

3) Where do you live?

- _____
- Decline to state

4) Economic status

- I earn less than 1,000 euros on a monthly basis
- I earn between 1,000 and 2,000 euros on a monthly basis
- I earn more than 2,000 euros on a monthly basis
- Decline to state

5) Educational attainment

- Elementary school
- Middle school
- High school
- University (including BA, MA, PhD)
- Decline to state

6) Occupation

- Employee
- Employer/business owner
- Student
- Unemployed
- Other
- Decline to state

7) I consider myself to be more from the:

- Left
- Right
- Centre
- Other (Movimento 5 Stelle, altre liste civiche)

- Decline to state

8) Religion

- Christian
- Other (Jewish, Buddhist...)
- Not applicable (atheist, agnostic)
- Decline to state

9) Religious participation

- I always/often go to church/place of worship
- I only take part in holidays
- I am not very observant
- Decline to state

10) Do you interact with any Muslims?

- Always
- Often
- Rarely
- Never
- Decline to state

11) Do you have any Muslim good friends?

- Yes
- No
- Decline to state

Part II.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
12) In Italy, I feel Muslims are discriminated against						
13) In Italy, I feel Muslims have no voice and should be listened to more						
14) In Italy, I feel Muslims have a difficult time in blending in at school						
15) In Italy, I feel Muslims struggle at finding a good occupation						
16) In Italy, I feel Muslims struggle at finding good housing						
17) In Italy, I feel Muslims struggle at finding an						

appropriate place for worship						
18) In Italy, I feel people look at Muslims with greater diffidence						
19) In general, I feel Islam and Italian values are utterly incompatible						
20) Particularly in recent times, I feel there is a sort of media war to discredit Islam						
21) I feel fear of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is exaggerated						
22) In countering Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, I feel the involvement of Islamic communities is of crucial importance						
23) Western foreign policy towards Muslim countries is and has been unjust and frustrating						
24) In the world, Muslims are often oppressed						
25) In Italy, I feel there is much ignorance and prejudice towards Islam and Muslims						
26) I feel Italian institutions do little to facilitate Muslims' integration						
27) Italy should enforce laws that respect Muslim identity						
28) In the end, I feel Muslims do not feel much different from Italian non-Muslims						
29) In general, I feel most Muslims do not love Italy and its culture and do not want to be part of it						
30) I would never live in a mostly Muslim neighbourhood						

31) Please rank the following ones from most important (1) to least important (5) according to your life. If you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice "decline to state".

- ____ Work
- ____ Faith
- ____ Family
- ____ Health
- ____ Security

- Decline to state

32) Please, rank the first three problems Italy faces from most important (1) to least important (3). If you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”.

- _____ Economy
- _____ Corruption
- _____ Health system
- _____ Immigration
- _____ National security
- _____ Education system
- _____ Crime
- _____ Social inequality
- Decline to state

Part III.

33) In your opinion, is radicalisation happening inside Islam and is it a problem?

- Yes
- Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions
- No
- I do not know
- Decline to state

If your previous answer has been “No”, please go to question number 36.

34) In your opinion, is radicalisation inside the Italian Muslim communities happening and is it a problem?

- Yes
- Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions
- No
- I do not know
- Decline to state

35) Please rank the first three causes of Islamist radicalisation (at times) leading to terrorism (from 1 to 3). If you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”.

- _____ Personal identity crisis
- _____ Traumatic negative experiences
- _____ Search for adventure and sense of nobility
- _____ Economic and social harshness
- _____ Denied rights and frustration
- _____ Western racism
- _____ The importance of personal bonds with radicals and the role of the group
- _____ Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world
- _____ Past and present Western foreign policy and the history of the crusades
- _____ The Israeli-Palestinian question
- _____ Exploitation of Islam for political purposes

- ____ Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam
- ____ Economic possibilities offered by Al Qaeda, Isis, etc.
- ____ The call to armed struggle for every true Muslim against those who attack Islam
- Decline to state

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
36) Members of a group and friends are the ones who really make a cause worthy						
37) A person decides to get physically involved in a cause due to personal interests, which can be both material and mental/spiritual						
38) It is a duty of every true Muslim to defend Islam						
39) Violence in defence of Islam can be justified						
40) Whoever offends Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished						
41) Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight American and Zionist imperialism						
42) Isis' struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate						
43) In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better than a democratic one						
44) Jews control the world and are responsible for much evil						
45) 9/11 is an American and Jewish conspiracy						
46) In America and the West not only are many at war with certain Muslim countries, but also with Islam						
47) The State of Israel has no right to exist						
48) Hamas and Hezbollah are not terrorist organisations						
49) Many Muslims want to impose their beliefs and Islamise Italy						

50) I feel that, as a sign of respect to Muslims, it is fair to abolish Christmas plays at school and remove the cross from classrooms						
51) In the end, many Muslims would lie for the sake of faith, if faith is in danger						
52) In the end, for many Muslims, questioning certain tenets is unacceptable						
53) In the end, many Muslims justify violence in the name of their faith						
54) In the end, many Muslims believe that whoever offends Islam and its Prophet deserves to be punished						
55) In the end, many Muslims support terrorism						
56) I believe many Muslims would sign a law that is similar to the Austrian one, featuring the training of Imams and the imposition of sermons in the local language (not in Arabic)						
57) In the future, I believe more Muslims would like their needs to be dealt by a Mufti or an Islamic court						

Part IV.

Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6).

	1	2	3	4	5	6
58) ISIS and the Jihadist threat worry me						
59) Italy will experience acts of Jihadist terrorism like in Paris and Brussels						
60) In Italy, tension between non-Muslim Italians and Muslims will increase						
61) In case of a Jihadist attack, life for Muslims will become harder						
62) In case of a Jihadist attack, I would be in favour of measures limiting my personal freedom for the sake of national security						

63) In case of a Jihadist attack, I would support the government's harsh terrorist countermeasures, even military retaliation, against terrorists						
64) Interreligious dialogue will be useless						
65) Islam is a threat to Italy and its culture						
66) I am confident Islam and Italian culture will live in peace and harmony						
67) The key to a better future for the country is greater integration of Italian Muslim communities						
68) The key to a better future for the country is education and pluralism						
69) The key to a better future for the country is greater economic and social conditions for foreigners, including Muslims						
70) The key to a better future for the country is patrolled immigration and preservation of regional and national identities						
71) Islam in Italy is destined to remain a foreign reality, in the sense there will never be an Italian version of Islam						

The non-Muslim sample featured the same amount of respondents of the Muslim sample (440). It also featured the same gender and occupational composition, and number of cities (290 males, 147 females, and 3 “decline to state”; 187 employees, 59 employers, 119 students, 22 unemployed, 49 “other”, and 4 “decline to state”; 15 cities). The sampling also displayed roughly the same residence and age cross sections –with non-Muslims counting 10 extra people over age 60. That stated, the majority of non-Muslim respondents (42%) stated to earn between 1.000 and 2.000 euros per month; almost 50% had a high school degree (and 47% a university degree); 41% voted left (24.5% were from the right); 70% defined themselves as Christian, but only 24.1% affirmed to often/always go to church. Lastly, more than $\frac{3}{4}$ of the questionnaires were completed online, while the rest were executed in person.

Appendix 4: Statistical Methods

This Appendix provides an informal introduction to the statistical methods used in this work.

1. Categorical Variables.

Most of this study's data subject to statistical analysis are categorical, i.e., the instances are divided into discrete categories or "bins". The categories may correspond to expressed opinions on various issues or reactions to offered statements, such as "agree"/"disagree" or "strongly agree", "somewhat agree", "somewhat disagree", "strongly disagree", etc. In other cases, they may correspond to basic demographic or social variables, such as gender, age, nationality, political affiliation, place of birth or residence, education, marital or family status, etc. In some cases the underlying variable may be numerical, such as age or monthly income, but rather than dealing with a wide range of continuous or discrete numerical values the parameters are categorised, e.g., with monthly incomes of less than Euros 1000, between Euros 1,000 and Euros 2000, and above Euros 2,000 considered separate categories.

The technical notions in the rest of the Appendix will be mostly stated in application to such categorical variables. It should be noted that in some cases there might be a natural "order" between the categories, even though the relative scaling may or may not exist. Such order exists, for instance, between the "strongly agree", "somewhat agree", "somewhat disagree", and "strongly disagree" reactions to various statements: clearly "somewhat agree" lies between "strongly agree" and "somewhat disagree", while "strongly disagree" lies further away from any agreement. This intuitively means that a categorical analysis that distinguishes between all the 4 responses may be more detailed, and yield more insight, than a similar analysis of the same data that only distinguishes between "agree" and "disagree". At the same time, there is no definition of a quantitative scale, so the additional insight is limited and may be uncertain. One may wonder, for instance, how various respondents whose reaction to a particular statement is uncertain decide between "somewhat agree" and "somewhat disagree", or whether a thoughtful or cautious person may choose "somewhat agree" over "strongly agree" if there is the tiniest doubt or hesitation in his or her mind.

The above considerations are an important part of the decision to eliminate the "I do not know" and "Decline to state" responses from the analysis. Clearly, these are not subjects to the same qualitative order as the "definite" reactions. In cases where the real underlying variables are numeric (age, income, etc.) the scale may not be intuitively clear, either. There is no a priori information that would guide one to the "correct" – or "interesting" – categorisation. Should "low income" be defined as Euros 1,000/month? Does "young" correspond to "under 30 years of age"? Without extensive additional research such categorisation is necessarily arbitrary, at least to some extent. In some cases, of course, no natural order exists even in a qualitative sense. Consider gender, nationality, place of residence, etc.

A final note is that any statistical analysis assumes that the experimental sample is very large and very random (the analytic results are "asymptotic" in this respect). This assumption may or may not be correct. The sample in this study may be regarded as moderately sized at best, there may be selection or self-selection biases (for instance, this study necessarily covers only individuals who agreed to respond to a survey or be interviewed), distortions (there is no proof that the answers were truthful), etc. This assumption will be explicitly referred in the rest of the appendix only if it is essential, but it is always implicitly present.

2. Contingency Tables

We used contingency tables because it is usual way to present the (multivariate) frequency distribution of sampled variables. For 2 variables, such as perceived discrimination (statement #15 in the Questionnaire: “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against”) and support for ISIS (statement #45 in the Questionnaire, “ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western Influence is legitimate”), where the responses to the “Discrimination” question are divided into 4 categories (“strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, and “strongly disagree”), while “support for ISIS” has 2 categories (“agree” and “disagree”) may look as follows (NB: this contingency table represents the actual data from this study):

	Discrimination					
Support for ISIS		Strongly agree	Slightly agree	Slightly disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
	Agree	19	13	7	8	47
	Disagree	51	92	81	73	297
	Total	70	105	88	81	344

Note that only the “definite” responses (cf. Section 1 above) are included.

3. Chi-Squared Test of Association/Independence.

As discussed in Section 1, we assume categorical variables. In particular, the categories are not necessarily ordered. Suppose that Variable A has m categories, and Variable B has k categories. The null hypothesis states that knowing the category of Variable A does not help you predict the category of Variable B. That is, the variables are independent.

The alternative hypothesis is that knowing the category of Variable A can help you predict the category of Variable B, that is the variables are related and not independent. To summarise, the null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis (Ha) are:

H0: Variable A and Variable B are independent.

Ha: Variable A and Variable B are not independent.

As an example, suppose A corresponds to perceived discrimination (statement #15 in the Questionnaire: “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against”) and B corresponds to expressed support for ISIS (statement #45 in the Questionnaire, “ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western Influence is legitimate”). Is there a relationship between these variables? Support for the alternative hypothesis suggests that the variables are related, but the relationship is not necessarily causal, in the sense that one variable “causes” the other. As an example, if we find that the perceived level of discrimination against Muslims is related to stated support for ISIS, this does not mean that respondents who feel discriminated against tend to support ISIS. It may mean, for instance, that ISIS supporters tend to feel (or at least report to feel) discriminated against in Italy. This is a crucial point when one interprets the data.

The null hypothesis H0 in this example is that perceived discrimination and expressed support for ISIS are independent. The experimental data can be presented in the form of a “contingency table”, cf. Section 2 above (only the “definite” responses are included). The table shows that 47 out of 344 respondents expressed support for ISIS activities (in the form of agreeing that those activities were

“legitimate”). Consider the 70 respondents out of 344 that strongly agree that Muslims in Italy are discriminated against. One would expect that the number of respondents who feel discrimination among ISIS supporters will be:

$$47 \cdot (70/344) = 9.56$$

Instead, the actual observed number is 19. The residual difference between the observed and the expected results for this particular cell of the table is

$$(\text{observed} - \text{expected}) / \sqrt{\text{expected}} = (19 - 9.56) / 3.09 = 3.05$$

The expected values corresponding to the observed values in Table 1 are shown in Table 2, and Table 3 shows the residuals. The sum of squares of the residuals over all the cells in the table is the so-called “test statistics” usually dubbed “chi-squared”, and in our example it is 14.345.

Under the null hypothesis the test statistics are distributed as the sum of squares of k independent normal variables (this incorporates the assumption that our sampling is completely random, cf. Section 1 above, and also assumes that the deviations are normally distributed). Such a distribution is usually called “chi-squared” (hence the name of the statistics and of the test itself, called “Pearson’s chi-squared test”), and the number of variables is referred to as the number of “degrees of freedom”, equal to:

$$k = (\text{\#rows} - 1) \cdot (\text{\#columns} - 1) = (4 - 1) \cdot (2 - 1) = 3.$$

Larger deviations are not likely under the null hypothesis. Therefore, if the test statistics value is improbably large, then one is compelled to reject the null hypothesis. The quantitative measure of the likelihood that the null hypothesis (H_0) is correct is the so-called “p-value”, the probability that the chi-squared statistics will be as large as it is under the null hypothesis. The smaller the p-value the more likely it is that the alternative hypothesis (H_a) is correct.

The p-value corresponding to the observed chi-squared of 14.345 with 3 degrees of freedom is approximately 0.0025. Is this “small”? On the face of it, 0.25% is small indeed. In fact, for a normal distribution it roughly corresponds to 3 standard deviations, or “3 Sigmas”. However, one should remember the various assumptions that went into the analysis. The “large random sample” assumption is certainly not completely true and the sample size and biases lead to underestimation of the p-value. The assumption regarding the normal distribution of residuals is probably not true, either. Note that the latter leads to an underestimation of the p-value, since the normal distribution implies very low (exponentially low) probabilities of high residuals. This may be a good approximation for natural phenomena in thermal equilibrium. Social variables related to human behaviour tend to have much “fatter tails” and therefore the normal distribution assumption leads to unrealistically small p-values.

These and other reasons mean that the “2 sigma” level of significance (corresponding to p-value of approximately 0.05) often adopted as a rule of thumb is probably inappropriate. The p-value of 0.0025 in this example may be regarded as “moderately significant” at best, and to be reasonably certain that the null hypothesis can be rejected one would set the cut-off level quite a bit lower. It is well known that events whose probability according to normal models are at the level of dozens of standard deviations are observed with surprising frequency. A daily event will deviated by 3 standard deviations from the expected value (as in this illustrative example) approximately once a year, and by 2 standard deviations every 3 weeks, which should look surprising enough to anyone who is used to considering 2 standard deviations significant.

All of the above considerations should lead a conscientious scholar to adopting a much smaller p-value as a significant result. The 5 sigma level (p-value of $5.7e-7$) seems reasonable enough and is often a criterion of significance in natural sciences, and 4 sigma level (p-value of $6.3e-5$) may be adopted if one is inclined to a compromise. The latter corresponds to observing a daily event with 4 Sigma deviation twice in a lifetime. And all those, as mentioned, are significantly underestimated values in the context.

4. Probabilities, Odds, and Logs

Consider an event or an experiment with a binary categorical outcome. It may be a result of a coin or dice toss, Chelsea winning the Premier League, Tories winning the next general election, or an individual randomly chosen from some well defined population supporting ISIS. Let's call the two possible outcomes "success" and "failure".

Let us say that the probability of "success" is P , assume $P=0.8$ for a specific numerical example. The probability of "failure" is then $1-P=1-0.8=0.2$. The odds of success -the number normally quoted by bookies- is the probability of success divided by the probability of failure (or sometimes the reverse – "odds against").

In our example the odds of success are $P/(1-P)=0.8/0.2=4/1$, normally quoted as "4 to 1". For a fair coin toss, of course, the probabilities of heads and tails are equal, $P=1-P=0.5$, and the odds of heads (or tails) are 1 to 1. To summarise the relationship between probability P and odds O of success may be expressed as:

$$O = P/(1-P),$$

$$P = O/(1+O).$$

Odds are a monotonically increasing function of the probability of success, i.e., when the probability of success increases, the odds of success rise also. While the probability ranges between 0 and 1 odds range from 0 to positive infinity.

Often one prefers to deal with logarithms of odds. Note that $\log()$ is also a monotonically increasing function that ranges from negative infinity to positive infinity. Dealing with logarithms of odds circumvents many difficulties intrinsic in modelling variable that vary within a restricted range, such as probability. The transformation from probability to logarithm of odds (the so-called "logit" transformation) allows one to deal with a variable defined as a real number without restrictions. We will adopt the notation:

$$\text{logit}(P) = \log(O) = \log(P/(1-P))$$

in what follows.

5. Logistic Regression

A logistic regression model considers a relationship between a binary categorical variable and a group of predictor variables. It models the logit-transformed probability (cf Section 4 above) as a linear combination of the predictor variables. We will note in passing that the model does not have to be linear in predictor variables. It may also include "interaction" terms (products of predictors) of the second, third, and higher orders. One should note that when categorical predictors (cf. Section 1) are considered the model will include a coefficient for each category of each predictor.

Application of a logistic regression model means determination of the coefficients for each term. Each coefficient is the expected change in the logarithm of odds as the corresponding predictor's value is switched from one category to the next (here is where the “ordering” between non-binary categories becomes meaningful, cf. Section 1), with the rest of the predictors in the model kept constant. The exponent of each coefficient is the ratio of two odds corresponding to the two values of the corresponding predictor.

One can also consider the goodness of fit by computing the model's residuals (differences between the predicted and observed values) and the chi-squared statistics (cf. Section 3). The p-value – the probability of having the chi-squared statistics, i.e., the sum of squares of the residuals, at least as large as observed - will

indicate the goodness of the fit: the smaller the p-value the better. Obviously, this provides a quantitative means to compare competing models. One can add the model's terms one by one to analyse how the residuals diminish and determine which of the parameters are the most significant in the model.

6. Wald z-test

One can estimate the probability that a coefficient in the logistic regression model is 0, i.e., that the corresponding predictor is not significant in the model. More specifically, the difference between the maximum likelihood estimate of the coefficient (cf. Section 5 above) and the proposed value (0), normalised on the estimate of the variance, is compared to the chi-squared distribution (cf. Section 3 above). The lower the corresponding p-value is the more readily the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 0 and the corresponding category of the predictor is not significant in the model can be rejected. The Wald z-test may be performed on a group of coefficients. The most obviously useful case is to estimate the collective significance of the coefficients corresponding to all the categories of a particular predictor. This gives an overall estimate of how significant that predictor variable is in the model.

Another potentially interesting analysis consists of looking at the difference between the model coefficients of different categories of the same categorical predictor. Essentially, it is a test whether the coefficients, say, of the “somewhat agree” and “somewhat disagree” responses to a statement in a questionnaire are the same. If they are then there is no significant differences between the subsamples that gave the two responses. Such an analysis can be performed by running a Wald test with opposite weights (+1 and -1) assigned to the two terms in question, and zero weights assigned to all the other terms (this is called “weighted Wald test” in the main body of this study). The difference is compared to the chi-squared distribution and the resulting p-value indicates whether the difference between the two categories is significant (it is if the p-value is small, cf. Section 3 above).

Appendix 5: Excerpts from the Transcripts of Interviews and Focus Groups

The full transcript of the interviews and focus groups is attached to the thesis. Every voice reports, in this order, the city, the date (month and year), the number of people taking part to the interview/focus group, their nationality, gender, religion (Sunni or Shia), employment status (employed, employer, student, unemployed), age range (16-30, 30-60, >60), and the time they have spent in Italy (<1, <5, >5 years).

#1) Rome, 03/16, #3 Bangladeshi, male, Sunni, employed, 16-30, 1 year in Italy

6. What about if someone insults Islam and its prophet?

- a. Not even in this case is violence justified, because the teaching of Mohammad and even his very own life prohibit us from responding violently to any kind of provocation.
- b. You cannot kill innocent people, even if they wronged you.
- c. The only case in which violence is justifiable is in face of oppression, in self defence. Let's say someone kills or attacks your family or your Muslim brethren, you then can kill or attack your enemy's family, for the Quran allows you to do so.

#2) Rome, 03/16, #2, Bangladeshi, male, Sunni, 1 employed, 1 employer, 16-30 & 30-60, > 5

7. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. Radicalisation exists and is a big problem because people who don't know Islam read the Quran, take some parts out of context, and use them for their own needs
- b. Yes and it's huge

#3) Rome, 03/16, #2, Moroccan, male, Sunni, 30-60, 1 unemployed, 1 employed, >5

7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- a. If there is oppression or if you offend our prophet, it's somewhat justifiable.
- b. It's definitely right to punish someone who offends the prophet, maybe even physically especially if this person keeps doing that, but he/she should not be killed.

#4) Rome, 03/16, #3, Egyptian/Italian, male, Sunni, 20-30, all born in Italy, employed, >5

6. What causes that [Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. Definitely identity crisis
- b. I think it's the people you know because you must know someone who can point you and guide you if you want to do those types of things.
- c. I think it's actually more about the money, those people don't care about Islam or the state of the Islamic world, they have nothing to do and what they truly care about is the money, that's it.

#5) Rome, 03/16, #2, Somali, Palestinian, male, Sunni, 20-30, employed, >5

7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- a. Look what happen is Paris was tragic, but if you touch our prophet, you know, there are some crazy people out there and it can be dangerous.
- b. Killing is bad, but you should not do it, if you do, you should be sued immediately.

#7) Naples, 05/16, #8, Senegalese, male, 16-30, Sunni, employed, 2 <1 & 6 <5 years

6. What causes that [Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. (8) Money, business, and various opportunities

- i. They just want money and to become famous, they were poor, had nothing before and when groups like Isis offers them something to improve their everyday situation, they take it with no regard to God or any other religion for that matter.
- ii. They think they can have women because they feel cool
- iii. If they say they are the bad guys the get women...lucky them!
- iv. They are poor people who can have some money and food, so they go
- v. Also, they are thieves who rob people and can get rich that way
- vi. Money I tell you!
- vii. I think they are all Jews wanting money and control over the world
- viii. Or maybe because these people think they can cleanse past sins by joining this cause.

9. What are your views regarding Isis and al-Qaeda?

- b. (8) They got it all wrong. How can a person say he's Muslim and do such a thing. Shame on them, they are godless people, that's what they are.
 - i. We hate them because they are the worst thing happened to Islam
 - ii. They are not Muslim and they will go to Hell.
 - iii. They don't know what Islam, they only do what they do for the money, to get women, steal, and do things that are utterly forbidden in Islam.
 - iv. We despise them, they are a disgrace, are made of infidels!

#8) *Naples, 05/16, #1 Senegal, male, Sunni, 30-16, employed, >5*

8. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda

- a. They are the only defenders of oppressed people in Syria and the Middle East

#10) *Naples, 05/16, #3 Pakistani, male, Sunni, 30-16, 2 employed, 1 employer <5*

6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- a. It's only possible if one brother is attacked and cries for help, then I have to help him, because I have to be a good Muslim
- b. (2) It's natural when a person is oppressed to rebel and do whatever he can to end the suffering, even by fighting.
 - i. What would you do?

7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- c. (3) If you decide to insult Mohammad it's your risk, you should not do that.
 - i. There are a lot of crazy people out there

#12) *Naples, 05/16, #2 Algeria, male, Sunni, 30-60, employers, >5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. No, Islam has no issues, extremists do not exist in Islam, and those who say they are, they are not real Muslims.
- b. I don't agree. Radicalisation has become a problem because people who know nothing of Islam, who have not studied it, take some figurative notions and take them too far, but these people are not real Muslims, for they do not represent us

6. What do you think are the causes for such radicalisation?
- c. They don't understand anything about Islam, they only use it for political purposes. In the end, it's all a game of politics, international politics, featuring global interests. All the players in the game have political purposes and, some of them, Muslims and non-Muslims too, use Islam and wrongfully self-proclaimed Islamic groups to obtain precise political goals in the Middle East and elsewhere.
 - d. Wow, what an answer, yes I agree with him all along!

#15) *Naples, 05/16, #2 Italian, male, Sunni converts, 30-16, unemployed.*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?
- a. Money and lack of knowledge of Islam
 - b. They are crazy people whose lives are awful because they made bad choices or something not allowed in the Quran, which brought sadness upon them. They drink, smoke, have sex before marriage, and use drugs, then they get used by these criminals and do bad things.

16) *Naples, 05/16, #1 Italian, male, Sunni since birth, 30-16, student*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?
- a. Yes. There are people who definitely take parts of the Quran out of context and use them to pursue their political, unholy interests. But I also must say that they are really a minority and fear towards them is exaggerated, even created by the media to securitise our community and keep us under control.

#19) *Naples, 05/16, #2 Morocco, male, Sunni, 30-16, employed, >5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?
- a. (2) The only two things people like that are motivated by: money and women.

#20) *Genoa, 05/16, #10 (4 Tunisian, 2 Palestinian, 2 Italian, 1 Albanian, 1 Algerian), male, Sunni, 5 30-16, 5 30-60, 3 students, 7 employed, >5*

7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?
- a. (7) You can never kill innocent people, people deserve to live, even if they are bad people
 - i. Islam is all about mercy and making it up to your neighbour.
 - ii. If you kill without a good reason Allah will never forgive you
 - iii. Since we are little they teach us to forgive, to never raise our voice, you have to show everyone the right path, which is Allah's. But if you kill or punch someone, that is not what Allah has taught you
 - iv. Killing people, even if they have wronged you, goes against the real peaceful essence of Islam
 - b. (3) The only case in which violence can be justified is if there is oppression. If a brother is in danger or under the yoke of the oppressor, it is a religious duty to go and help him
 - i. Yet, you can never kill civilians
 - ii. Jihad can only be waged in defensive terms and never in offensive terms

#21) Reggio Emilia, 04/16, #30 (8 Tunisian, 3 Turkish, 6 Morocco, 5 Egyptian, 1 Lebanese, 3 Albanian, 1 Saudi, 1 Libya, 2 Algerian), male, Sunni, 18= 30-16, 12= 30-60, all employed, all >5

6. Then, in addition to this, for those who say radicalisation exists, what do you think can be other causes? (Only for the 15 who agreed radicalisation exists)

- a. (4) Definitely money and power
- b. I say Western racism and oppression
- c. You know, the West has always done some really bad things, especially towards the Arab. And if you look at the last ten years, I think it's pretty clear some people in the West are at war with us and with Islam. I don't justify terrorism, but you also have to understand that it may be caused by injustice perpetrated by the West
- d. Especially if you look at the Syrian case, or other dictatorship that were put there by the West. First you put there people who massacre their own people, but then, when it's time to intervene to save lives, if there is no direct interest for the West, you look the other way. This is why people then go fight for Isis.
- e. I also think people here in Europe are so frustrated by their inability to find their spot in society that just become radicalised
- f. Finally, in addition to all of this, I think sometimes we don't really know who we are, we're not sure if Italy or the West are good for us, I mean, we love it here, but when you take a look at the values this society is fostering, like nudity, same-sex marriage and such, where do we stand? Do we want to be part of it? And where there is confusion as to who we are and where we'd like to live, that's when vulnerable people can fall prey to such nonsense
- g. (2) Money and prostitutes
- h. These people are just so bored. Come work with me, then you'll see you don't want to believe that crap
- i. They are screwed in the head, they are mentally ill
- j. (2) Again, it's because people don't know Islam
 - i. That is the core question here, trust me

7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- k. (2) I think these topics are way too complicated for people like us, and even you, to understand. The only way we can answer this, is that if we go to the real source, which is the Quran, and to the people who have dedicated their whole lives to understand what's written in it, that is, the teachers.
- l. (23) Well, in spite of all of this, of all of the things we have just said, I think I can speak for all of us when I say it's super wrong
 - i. It's against the message and even the life of the prophet
 - ii. A true Muslim can never harm a person, because, if he does, the first person he kills is himself, his soul, and then not just the other person, but all of humanity
 - iii. A true Muslim cannot even hurt a tree
 - iv. There was a time in which, if you were a Muslim, you had to brace arms to guarantee your survival and the survival of Islam, but that time has been over for many centuries. Now there can never be a justification for that, because Islam is here, even in Italy, we can pray and be Muslim.
 - v. A true Muslim cannot yell "Allah Akbar" and kill someone. This person is not a Muslim and when he will be before Allah, he will be sent straight to Hell for killing innocent people and harming Islam

- vi. I think by now you know the answer, that every true Muslim condemns violence in the name of Islam, because Islam is simply not about violence, but it tells you how to live in peace in every circumstance
- vii. You are free not to follow the tenets and still Allah can forgive you, but if you kill someone, it is going to be really difficult, unless you truly repent, for Allah to forgive you
- viii. For these people, the terrorists, there is just no place in our society. We hate them as much as you and everybody else do. And do you know why? Because their actions reflect on us and affect us first than everybody else. Remember, we are the first victims.
- m. (5) Yes, but, although this type of violence cannot be justified, you still can understand it
 - i. Think you are a Syrian citizen. Who is going to protect you? Assad? Putin? The West? No, only other true Muslims who are obliged to come protect you if you are in danger
 - ii. If there is violence, if people are dying and the West does nothing, what is left for the Syrians? If other people do not take action, there's only death
 - iii. And at this point, it's really a religious duty for every true Muslim to defend oppressed and persecuted brothers. Besides, as a man, you must defend your own home and your own brothers. If you cannot, other men will come protect you. That's what they do, it's their job as good Muslim men.

9. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda?

- n. (3) What type of question is that? It's even offensive for us to talk about it
- o. (2) We don't know anything about them, and don't want to know anything about them
- p. (25) They are not real Muslims, they do not represent us
 - i. They do not represent any kind of Islam or Muslims by any means
 - ii. They were created by the CIA and Israel
 - iii. Have you ever wondered how a group of young guys with no real military experience has managed to hold a city like Paris hostage for hours, almost killing the French Prime Minister at the stadium? Isn't it clear that it's an inside job or, worse, Israel did that?
 - iv. And, I'm sorry, how come Isis has yet to attack Israel? It's all part of a big plan against us and Islam
 - v. Have you ever asked yourself, if Isis were actually real, how come it's still there? I mean, after all, you have the US, Russia, and a huge coalition against, what, some thousands fighters and former soldiers from Saddam Hussein's army. How is it possible they are still there, killing, burning, and pillaging? Perhaps someone needs them?
 - vi. Who sells them weapons, who runs them? It's the Jews and Israel.
 - vii. Same thing as for 9/11. Israel knew about it. That day 3000 people perished, but, among them, not even one Israeli in the largest financial district in the world. Israel called every person who was there warning them not to go to work. But that's no surprise, because they run everything, the Zionists, the media, information, and the economy.
 - viii. I am sorry Michele, my brothers at the beginning did not mean to be rude with you. It's just Isis is so bad and hurts us so much to see other people who call themselves Muslims do the opposite of what a true Muslim would do, this is why

we get frustrated and even offended at times, but we are here to tell you we are not all like them, in fact, they are a very small part of the big family Islam really is.

#22) Rome, 04/16, #4 (3 Egypt, 1 Morocco) male, Sunni, 30-16, employed, >5

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. (4) Absolutely not.
 - i. Islam is the true, perfect path towards salvation, whoever kills innocent people, other Muslims, and women and children is not Muslims, even if they say they are
 - ii. They are mercenaries only driven by money who are controlled by the Americans and the Jews. Think about 9/11, is it possible that people from all over the world, including Christians and Muslims, died that day, but not even one Israeli died? They are behind them

6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- b. (2) A true Muslim cannot hurt anyone. Even if a Muslim is forced into war, there are many rule one has to follow, because life and its sanctity come first
- c. (2) Violence cannot be justified unless there is a good cause, like defending oppressed brothers

#23) Bergamo, 05/16, #12, 5 Italian, 7 Morocco, male, Sunni, 8 students, 4 employed, all 16-30, >5

3. What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media?

- a. (11) For us, the media is our enemy number 1, the worst thing for us Muslims living here
 - i. The media is writing false things about Islam because the political world does not want Italy to get to know us and Islam
 - ii. There is a clear media war meant to discredit Islam. If a white, Christian, Italian or European citizen commits a heinous crime, as it happened in Norway, we always find out the person had some personal issues or that he mentally ill, while if a Muslim does the same thing he's automatically labelled as a terrorist.
 - iii. This type of double standard helps some politicians get votes, it's all calculated
 - iv. I think you remember a major headline following the Paris attack entitled "Islamic bastards". I think that explains itself as a mixture of ignorance, fear, and political goals hidden in the media war against Islam. If someone bad happens, all of us become affected, an entire religion is judged, and our credibility ends up on the line.
- b. (1) Though I totally agree with everything said, I think the responsibility lies on our end too because we complain but rarely take action in a constructive way, because we in the first place don't know much about Islam in order to explain what it really is and that's where it gets really hard to fight ignorance and prejudice.

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- c. (1) I honestly would not know man
- d. (2) There is not because Islam is perfect and people are just bad people regardless of their religion
- e. (9) There is, although it's not as bad as they tell us

- i. You probably know that Muslims are killed by these terrorists for the most part and, on top of it, if you look at who commits the most acts of terrorism, Muslim perpetrators are the great minority. This problem exists but it's minimal.
- ii. In fact, if you think that we are more than a billion and a half in world and there are only a few thousands who are now in Syria, you do the math, but it's a very small percentage of the whole Muslim population in the world.
- iii. It's just a bunch of guys who say they are Muslims, but they are wrong and do wrong
- iv. You don't have to believe anything. Those people, in my opinion, are not even Muslims in the real sense of the term, they are from some place else in the world, I feel that.

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- f. (2) Honestly, I don't know because, if you are a real Muslim, anything can happen to you, but you are called to accept it because it's Allah that allows it.
 - i. I don't know what goes off in that person's head to push him to use violence. It must be something incredibly personal meant to be searched in that person's past traumatic experiences
- g. (10) It's a combination of many factors, like money and ignorance in the first place
 - i. The fact they don't know Islam is crucial, because a person who studies, goes to the mosque and such cannot be brainwashed. The fact is that we don't talk as much as we should about these things.
 - ii. But this tells us that knowing the wrong people is also instrumental because without those individuals there would be less people diverting from the real path of Islam
 - iii. I think poverty and ignorance are key elements
 - iv. I think Western racism and discrimination also play a role because if you are happy here and have your place in society, why on Earth should you lose it all to go die for something that we all know is fake?
 - v. I think those people must be crazy, drugged up too, because otherwise they would not be able to kill innocent people just like that, with no remorse

#25) Rome, 04/16, #1 Italian convert, male, Sunni convert, 30-60, employed

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. Yes, and I think it's because of people who take tenets of Islam too far, or just don't understand them. In other cases, these people just use such tenets to obtain power or other political purposes

#26) Florence 04/16, #1 Algerian, male, Sunni, >60, employed, >5

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. Yes, radicalisation is huge and our communities have to do something.

#28) Milan 04/16, #2, 1 Italian convert, 1 Pakistani, male, Sunni, employed, 30-60, >5

3. What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media?

- a. (1) The media are engaging in a real crusade against Islam. You must not believe anything you read or watch on TV because it's false. A true Muslim is peaceful, violence has no place in God's kingdom. A true Muslim is calm, honest, and tries to resolve problems with words, not swords. A true Muslim would never kill innocent

people, would never burn, rape, pillage, and do things like that. Even if you insult the prophet, I cannot kill you, I will sue you, but God forbid I use violence in his name, and whoever does so, he's not a Muslim

- b. (1) Al-Qaeda and Isis are not made of Muslims. They are made of CIA men and are orchestrated by the secret services from Israel. They exist just to serve their political purposes and create fear towards Islam and justify war, confiscation, and robbery against Muslims around the world. In spite of what you've read and seen, what happened in Paris didn't really happen at all. The people at the Bataclan theatre didn't really die, because if you look at blood traces on the wall, they are all in the wrong position, they cannot coincide with bullet wounds. The people you see laying on the ground are actually actors who were put there and if you look closely at the image of those "dead" bodies, you can see the symbol of the Jews Freemasons. But this makes sense, how could a bunch of guys with criminal background engineer something like this? How could they even get close to Hollande? That's preposterous, but, again, it makes sense because the Jews and the Freemasons control the world and, with Israel, use everything they create ad hoc to enslave Muslims, just like in Palestine. But no worries, they are destined to fall, Allah will bring upon them great punishment and Israel will not exist anymore

#29) *Varese, 03/16, #1 Morocco, female, Sunni, 30-60, unemployed, <5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. They see some advantages in choosing this path. The first one is money, in the first place. Also, if you don't know anything about Islam and you meet with people who are bad, tell you if you kill yourself you're going to Heaven, you can, at times, be brainwashed, and then you think God will reward you

8. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- a. This person has to be punished harshly.

#32) *Brescia, 03/16, #10 Tunisian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employed, >5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. (2) Money and lust for power
 b. (2) They are just crazy, sad people, who had bad experiences in the past, maybe even used drugs and stuff
 c. (1) Their lives are bad, I mean, look at where those people live in France, something like this gives them purpose and a sense of nobility
 d. (5) In our case, we have to mention the role dictatorships play in this. A dictatorship is the worst thing that can happen to you. If you dare to have a different opinion, they put you in jail, they torture you, they bring your wife and rape her in front of you, and then they even hurt your kids. Which kind of person can you turn into then? Plus, a person who can be easily influenced can be persuaded to go fight for Isis through false promises of greatness
 i. Can you imagine growing up in that? What kind of person do you become?
 ii. They don't care and they will hurt everyone you love just because they feel like it
 iii. It's the worst, and I can tell you because my father was jailed and tortured

8. What about if someone offends Islam and its Prophet?

- e. (3) Nothing happens
 - i. We just have to tell you it's wrong, but the prophet never reacted violently when someone insulted him, so who are we to do otherwise?
- f. (4) We can take legal action because Mohammed cannot be touch, as he's sacred for us.
 - i. We are for freedom of speech, but your freedom ends when someone's starts. We respect all of the prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and even the Virgin Mary, because, if you do not, you cannot be a real Muslim. So, given that we respect this, why shouldn't people respect our prophet and our sacred truth?
 - ii. In fact, you can insult me, my wife, my children, and all of the people who are here. It would hurt, but it wouldn't hurt as much as if you offended our prophet, because all of our lives, compared to him, are worth nothing, and so, when someone insults Mohammed it hurts us real bad inside of our souls, because he's more sacred than our lives.
- g. (3) It's wrong to kill people, but I understand that if you insult Mohammed and there are some crazy people out there, it's your risk
 - i. If there are some hotheads and you insult the prophet, it's your fault

37) *Modena, 06/16, #6, Turkish, male, Sunni, 1 16-30, 5 30-60, 5 employed, 1 other, >5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. (2) Yes, but it's because people don't know Islam and take some rules too far
 - i. They misinterpret what is written in the Quran and use it for political purposes
- b. (4) No, in the sense that Islam is perfect, while men are imperfect

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- c. (1) In the first place, ignorance and misinterpretation about Islam, which, by definition, teaches to be respectful of everything and everyone on Earth, since a young age.
- d. (1) I say people who go fight for Isis are mere mercenaries who have nothing going on in their own lives and are just lured by the money
- e. (3) Well, we also have to take into account the horrible situation the French and the English created in our region after WWI. They divided the land that the Ottomans had ruled for centuries without caring of cultural and societal differences. Now everything is falling apart and I think much of the mess that came out of it can be attributed to Western intervention and imperialism
 - i. Look at Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Palestine...all lands where the Europeans had conquered and look at them today
- f. (1) I also think that, In order to kill innocent people whom you have never even met before, you must be twisted, a mentally ill person. In fact, many have used drugs or had personal problems that brought them to violence.

8. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- g. (1) Killing someone is out of the question. But at the same time, just like in your family you have to discipline your children and punish them if they persevere in their mistakes, you have to do the same here. If you decide to write offensive caricatures and I tell you that insults me once, twice, three times, four times, etc., then maybe, if I slap you, you stop.
- h. (5) Nobody should afford to insult the prophet, but nobody should be killed if that happens.

- i. If you do it, I am compelled, as a Muslim, to tell you that you are making a big mistake, but that's it.
- ii. I would invite you to our mosque so that you can learn what Mohammad means to us and why it's really hurtful to us when someone insults him
- iii. But at the same time, given that we have laws here in Italy to protect religious minorities, those who insult Islam should be prosecuted
- iv. No one should be punished physically, but legally

#39) *Verona, 06/16, #2, Gambian, male, Sunni, 16-30, unemployed, <1*

6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- a. (1) Only if there is a good reason God can allow it, like say if you have to defend yourself
- b. (1) I don't want to answer

#41) *Milan, 06/16, #1, Kurdish, male, Sunni, 30-60, employed, > 5*

6. What do you think its causes are [Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. They want money and want to feel great and important people

#42) *Milan, 06/16, #1, Egyptian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employer, > 5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. No, at least not here. Here in Italy, Imams teach us to love the country and its inhabitants. We have to earn our spot in society, and maybe one day Milan could have too, like London, a Muslim mayor who serves all citizens. So, you see, there is just no room for radicalism and extremism here; we would be the first victims

#43) *Milan, 06/16, #1, Egyptian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employer, > 5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. No, Islam is the true religion for all people and Italy will all convert one day. In fact, in 50 years you will be working for us and all women in the street will wear the veil or the burka.

6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- b. Islam and violence cannot go in the same sentence unless you are talking about non-Muslims oppressing Muslims

#47) *Milan, 06/16, #4, 3 Egyptian, 1 Algerian, 3 male, 1 female, Sunni, 2 16-30, 2 30-60, 3 employed, 1 unemployed, > 5*

7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- a. (1) If there is oppression you are compelled to take action to defend your Muslim brothers
- b. (3) I don't agree, violence in the name of God is not right
 - i. I don't agree either because you cannot kill in the name of God
 - ii. I see your point, which is about self-defence. Yet, although self-defence can be justified, you cannot justify it as 'God told me to do so', because if God allows you to go fight, then it's his will, but if you sense it's not the right thing, like Isis is doing, and you go, then it's your will, not God's.

#48) *Milan, 06/16, #2, Bangladesh, male, Sunni, 30-60, employer, > 5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. Yes
- b. I don't think there is. Islam is perfect, it teaches you how to love, how to behave, how to be peaceful at all times, then, if you hurt someone in the name of God, I am not sure if He will ever forgive you.

#52) *Milan, 06/16, #1, Albanian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employed, > 5*

6. What do you think its causes are [Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. Lack of heated debate on the interpretation of Islam and the role of violence plays in it

#53) *Milan, 06/16, #1, Italian-Egyptian, female, Sunni, 16-30, student, > 5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. They just don't know what the real Islam is all about. If they knew, they would never become radical

#54) *Reggio Calabria, 06/16, #1, Moroccan, female, Sunni, 16-30, student, > 5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. It's very simple, for it is the oldest reason in the world: money

#55) *Carpi, 06/16, #1, Pakistani, male, Shia, 16-30, student, > 5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. There are people who use their credo as a means of destruction. Islam means peace and has nothing to do with being radical.

#56) *Reggio Emilia, 06/16, #1, Pakistani, male, Shia, 16-30, student, > 5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. Lack of religious knowledge, along with bad leaders

#57) *Reggio Emilia, 06/16, #6, 2 Moroccan, 1 Egyptian, 1 Tunisian, 1 Syrian, 1 Italian convert, male, employed, Sunni, 2 16-30, 4 30-60, >5*

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- a. (1) Look, you are Italian just like me. If you want to ask me why I converted, why Allah is the true and only God, I am here for you, but otherwise, this doesn't concern me, because Islam is perfect, there is no violence, no radicalisation
- b. (4) All of those who are radical are not real Muslims, they don't know what Islam actually is
 - i. It's just people who want money
 - ii. Many of them had already had terrible experiences, were drugged up, were stupid, and didn't even read the Quran. But they are not Muslims.
 - iii. What does "Allah Akhbar mean"? Everyone can say it, even you could and are you a Muslim? It's not enough to cry that aloud in a public place, you don't become Muslim, you're not a Muslim just for that. You have to live Islam, follow the teachings of the prophet, which are all about peace. So, ask yourself: can those people be Muslims? No, they cannot.
 - 1. They are Jews from the Mossad
 - 2. They are mercenaries that someone, you know who, has paid to obscure and discredit Islam

- c. (1) Brothers, please, enough. They are our brothers, we have to stop going around the problem. There is a problem not with Islam but in Islam, we have a problem of radicalisation and those, even if they follow or don't, are Muslims, they are our brothers who are wrong and need to be corrected, but it's not gonna do us any good if we just refrain from addressing the problem, a problem which is given by ignorance, misinterpretation, and exploitation of unsettled youths by some radical preachers

7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- d. (5) The very prophet has suffered insults and many pieces of injustice in his life, but never reacted with violence
 - i. I can talk to you, tell you that what you are doing is wrong, but that's it
 - ii. The only thing I can do is to take legal action and demonstrate, but I certainly cannot kill you
 - iii. I would just ignore you, because you have no idea what you could be facing once you're in front of God in the day of judgement
- e. (1) Yes, but there are lots of crazy people out there, if you decide to provoke them, it's your own risk, because you know by now how bad insulting the Prophet is

#58) *Bologna, 06/16, #1, Tunisian, male, student, Sunni, 16-30, >5*

7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- a. It is a huge provocation, which should not be done and you should be sued. Yet, even if I think killing or hurting someone is wrong, I think we are doomed to wars of religion, because people don't understand how hurtful insulting Mohammed is

#60) *Bologna 07/16, #3, 2 Egyptian, 1 Tunisian, male, student, Sunni, 16-30, >5*

7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- a. (3) The only thing that Islam allows is self-defence, that is if you are attacked, then you can react, but that's it. Violence, offensive violence can never be justified

#61) *Padua, 07/16, #1, Jordanian, male, Sunni, employed, 16-30, >5*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. Complete lack of religious knowledge, because if you are a radical, you are not a Muslim because the Quran and the Prophet teach us to respect everyone

#62) *Modena, 06/16, #1, Italian, female, student, Sunni since birth, 16-30*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. Lack of religious knowledge, because people read just a few lines, know nothing of the complexity of the Quran, and use only parts of it for political purposes. Yet, I think that, especially in the case of Europe, including Italy too, it's because of failed processes of integration and identity crises. These people don't know who they are, don't feel accepted, and can be easily manipulated by other people who tell them to go fight for Allah

#63) *Reggio Emilia, 06/16, #1, Italian, female, student, Sunni since birth, 16-30*

6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?

- a. I don't think it's because of money, poverty, and denied rights as many Muslims are saying. It's because people don't know their own religion, hence, it's an internal problem that we have to face and come to terms with.

#64) *Padua, 07/16, #1, Moroccan, female, student, Sunni, 16-30, >5, living in Venice also*

3. What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media?

- a. Things are improving, but there is a long way to go. Now you see Muslims on TV when there is terrorism. But that's the point, only when terrorism happens. They never call an expert on any issue, let's say medicine, to discuss something related to his/her field. They want Muslims, instead, only when it's about terrorism, but this, you see, creates an immediate correlation between Islam and terrorism, between Italy and its Muslim citizens who have to defend themselves, and the tones are never that constructive. I guess it's a start because, some time ago, many TV shows didn't even invite Muslims; yet, Muslims now are always on the other side, they always have to defend themselves for something 99% of them already condemns...in short, Muslims are like defendants.

5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?

- b. Yes of course, there are people who use the name of God to hurt other people, but I think the causes of this phenomenon are not to be researched in who knows what field. I think terrorism is nothing but military tactics that misuses or twists a certain ideology for political purposes, in the end.

8. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda

- c. They got it all wrong because they go against the pure Islam. Of course there are some dirty games underneath it, but those organisations are made by Muslims for Muslims. Let's not forget that they are waging war on Muslims and Islam in the first place, not on the West. They break families, make false promises, twist the religion, and kill exponentially more Muslims than non-Muslims. First and foremost, they are at war with Islam

#65) *Modena, 06/16, #1, Moroccan, male, employer, Sunni, 16-30 >5*

7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- a. I cannot kill you, but I do understand if someone punches you because you cannot touch the Prophet

#67) *Catania, 06/16, #1, Algerian, male, employed, Sunni, 30-60*

8. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

- a. The peaceful nature of Islam leaves no room for violence, at any time, especially in the name of God

#68) *Palermo, 06/16, #1, Tunisian, male, other, Sunni, 30-60*

6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?

- a. Allah is merciful and teaches us to love. But self-defence is allowed in Islam. If they attack your family and you do nothing, what kind of man are you?

#71) *Florence, 05/16, #1, Somali, male, employed, Sunni, 30-60*

7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet?

a. That person should be definitely punished, even physically if he doesn't stop and repent

8. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda

b. They are the ones who defend the people that the Syrian and the Western regimes butcher daily. If it weren't for them, there would be much more blood in the area

Appendix 6: Association Tests, Single Parameter Analyses, Regressions, and Wald Z-Tests with Weights

1) Association Tests

The following Table summarises the scores of the p-value resulting from the association tests of the 25 models that were tested (+ “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” that was inserted throughout the course of the analysis). Most of the assumed variables were not significant from the start, for they scored p-values greater than 0.05, which is the threshold we used. For those variables that were indeed significant in the first part of the analysis, that is, displaying significant p-values in the association tests, we then present their single parameter analysis results and then regression models to show their final insignificance.

A. Table of all the association tests of the 25 tested models (+ “Duty to punish offenders of Islam”) in relation to the study’s response variables

PREDICTIVE VARIABLES	RESPONSE VARIABLES p-values of the Chi-square tests, threshold 0.05			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for Al Qaeda	Support for ISIS
1) Age	0.78	0.49	0.62	0.47
2) Gender	0.005*	0.04*	0.32	0.04*
3) Nationality (all)	0.24	0.006*	0.28	0.06
3.1) Nationality (Italian/North African/Rest)	0.25	0.85	0.051	0.047*
3.2) Nationality (African/Rest)	0.22	0.79	0.02*	0.08
3.3) Nationality (Italian/Rest)	0.17	0.56	0.08	0.02
4) Born in Italy	0.31	0.32	0.007*	0.06
5) Years lived in Italy (<1, <5, >5)	0.10	0.54	0.34	0.65
6) Geography** (Rome+Lombardy/Rest)	0.008*	9.E-5*	0.02*	0.29
7) Social status	0.68	0.42	0.15	0.09
8) # of children	0.86	0.41	0.99	0.80
9) Monthly pay	0.31	0.60	0.11	0.01*
10) Educational attainment	0.57	0.40	0.0004*	0.0008*
11) Occupation	0.14	0.32	0.03*	0.26
12) Political party	0.59	0.17	8.E-7*	0.009*
13) Religious participation	0.77	0.72	0.22	0.006*
14) Religion	0.56	0.01*	0.35	0.69
15) Discrimination	0.0003*	5.E-6*	3.E-5*	0.0003*

16) Social difficulties	1.E-5*	6.E-9*	3.E-10*	1.E-5*
17) Finding good job	0.03*	0.001*	0.009*	0.03*
18) Western FP	0.004*	1.E-6*	1.E-5*	0.0006*
19) Oppression of Muslims	1.E-8*	1.E-11*	1.E-6*	0.0002*
20) Frustration	3.E-5*	2.E-7*	3.E-12*	6.E-9*
21) Traumatic experiences	0.29	0.09	0.0003*	0.03*
22) Identity crisis	3.E-5*	3.E-6*	1.E-5*	3.E-5*
23) Rational factors	0.0004*	0.15	3.E-5*	0.005*
24) Networks	0.005*	0.02*	1.E-5*	0.006*
25) Ideology	2.E-18*	3.E-17*	1.E-28*	1.E-34*
26) Duty to punish offenders of Islam	2.E-59*	-	1.E-34*	7.E-32*

* Significant values being inferior to the “0.05” significance level.

** We ran many tests for this variable. We tested every single city (15 in total), and we combined regions and areas of Italy. For the sake of analysis, though, we are only presenting the variable, which is the combination of “Rome” and the “Lombardy” region juxtaposed to the rest of the country, which eventually resulted partially significant in the regression models.

2) Single Parameters of Significant Variables After the Association Tests

The following section presents the single parameter analyses of the most significant predictive variables from the association tests. For each variable, we have included the odds that, within the contours of this study, respondents in that variable supported religiously framed violence.

A. Table for the odds of “Gender”

Gender	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence		
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for ISIS
Male	27%	35%	18%
Female	22%	28%	7%

B. Table for the odds of “Nationality” (Italian/African/Rest)

Nationality	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence	
	Support for ISIS	
Italian/African	11%	
Rest	15%	

B1. Table for the odds of “Nationality” (African/Rest)

Nationality	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence	
	Support for AQ	
African	8%	
Rest	15%	

C. Table for the odds of “Born in Italy”

Born in Italy	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence
	Support for AQ
Born	13%
Not born	6%

D. Table for the odds of “Geography”

Geography	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence		
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ
Rome + Lombardy	27%	35%	18%
Rest	22%	28%	7%

E. Table for the odds of “Educational Attainment”

Education	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence	
	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Elementary school	16%	29%
Middle school	13%	14%
High school	11%	14%
University	11%	13%

F. Table for the odds of “Occupation”

Occupation	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence
	Support for AQ
Employed	12%
Employer	11%
Student	4%
Other	17%

G. Table for the odds of “Political Party”

Political party	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence	
	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Left	10%	10%
Right	13%	13%
Centre	29%	29%
Other lists	8%	8%
Never voted	10%	15%

H. Table for the odds of “Religious Participation”

Religious participation	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence
	Support for ISIS
Always go to mosque	14%
Only holydays	14%
Not observant	9%

I. Table for the odds of “Religion”

Religion	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence
	Duty to punish offenders of Islam
Sunni	34%
Shia	35%
Sunni convert	25%

L. Table for the odds of “Discrimination”

Discrimination	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	36%	56%	24%	26%
Slightly agree	28%	31%	9%	13%
Slightly disagree	21%	23%	5%	7%
Strongly disagree	15%	21%	4%	10%

M. Table for the odds of “Social difficulties”

Social difficulties	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	44%	60%	29%	29%
Slightly agree	31%	47%	19%	19%
Slightly disagree	25%	29%	8%	12%
Strongly disagree	13%	16%	3%	7%

N. Table for the odds of “Economic Disparity”

Economic disparity	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	35%	52%	24%	23%
Slightly agree	27%	38%	9%	14%
Slightly disagree	24%	27%	9%	12%
Strongly disagree	20%	22%	7%	11%

O. Table for the odds of “Western FP”

Western FP unjust	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	33%	44%	17%	21%
Slightly agree	22%	22%	2%	4%
Slightly disagree	21%	20%	6%	7%
Strongly disagree	5%	10%	5%	5%

P. Table for the odds of “Oppression of Muslims”

Oppression of Muslims	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	38%	47%	19%	23%
Slightly agree	22%	30%	5%	7%
Slightly disagree	12%	19%	5%	7%
Strongly disagree	5%	2%	5%	10%

Q. Table for the odds of “Frustration”

Frustration	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	44%	51%	28%	29%
Slightly agree	33%	44%	14%	19%
Slightly disagree	22%	27%	6%	8%
Strongly disagree	12%	15%	3%	6%

R. Table for the odds of “Traumatic experiences”

Traumatic experiences	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence	
	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	15%	18%
Slightly agree	15%	16%
Slightly disagree	11%	12%
Strongly disagree	4%	10%

S. Table for the odds of “Identity crisis”

Identity crisis	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	33%	40%	19%	23%
Slightly agree	38%	45%	10%	10%
Slightly disagree	18%	29%	10%	12%
Strongly disagree	13%	16%	4%	8%

T. Table for the odds of “Rational Factors”

Rational factors	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence		
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	32%	36%	18%
Slightly agree	22%	31%	11%
Slightly disagree	33%	33%	10%
Strongly disagree	5%	14%	20%

U. Table for the odds of “Networks”

Networks	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	38%	45%	25%	25%
Slightly agree	22%	30%	6%	11%
Slightly disagree	21%	33%	6%	10%
Strongly disagree	15%	18%	9%	12%

V. Table for the odds of “Ideology”

Ideology	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	57%	62%	43%	44%
Slightly agree	39%	59%	22%	36%
Slightly disagree	27%	33%	6%	7%
Strongly disagree	9%	16%	1%	2%

Z. Table for the odds of “Duty to punish offenders of Islam”

Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence		
	Violence in defence of faith	Support for AQ	Support for ISIS
Strongly agree	78%	51%	57%
Slightly agree	49%	10%	13%
Slightly disagree	15%	6%	8%
Strongly disagree	5%	1%	3%

X. Table for the odds of “Monthly pay”

Monthly pay	Probability (in percentage) of support for violence
	Support for ISIS
Less than Euros 1,000	12%
Between Euros 1,000 and Euros 2,000	15%
More than Euros 2,000	14%

3) Logistic Regressions and the Final Significance of the Study's Variables

PREDICTIVE VARIABLES	RESPONSE VARIABLES p-values of the Wald-Z tests in the regression models**, threshold 0.05			
	Violence in defence of faith	Duty to punish offenders of Islam	Support for Al Qaeda	Support for ISIS
2) Gender	0.23	0.1		0.4
3) Nationality (all)		0.3		
3.1) Nationality (Italian/North African/Rest)				0.1
3.2) Nationality (African/Rest)			0.7	
4) Born in Italy			0.2	
6) Geography (Rome+Lombardy/Rest)	0.03***	0.09	0.6	
10) Educational attainment			0.9	0.3
11) Occupation			0.09	
12) Political party			0.3	0.2
13) Religious participation				0.7
14) Religion		0.8		
15) Discrimination	0.7	0.4	0.1	0.2
16) Social difficulties	0.6	0.002*	0.2	0.6
17) Finding good job	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.1
18) Western FP	0.5	0.5	0.16	0.2
19) Oppression of Muslims	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4
20) Frustration	0.28	0.5	0.03*	0.03* & 0.02**
21) Traumatic experiences			0.6	0.5
22) Identity crisis	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.03*
23) Rational factors	0.8		0.6	0.3
24) Networks	0.8	0.1	0.04*	0.1
25) Ideology	0.007* & 3.E-7***	1.E-5*	0.006* & 1.E-04*	0.00007*& 2.E-07**
26) Duty to punish offenders of Islam	5.E-11*	-	0.10	1.161117E-04*

* Significant values being inferior to the “0.05” significance level.

** The p-values come from multiple Wald Z-tests in various regression models. And not all of them are part of the last regression model that ultimately determined which variable, among the strongest predictors, was ultimately significant –for they scored low p-values in the pre-tests to assess which predictors should form the last regression model.

*** Only when we controlled for “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” and took it out of the model.

4) Regression Models of the Significant Variables Featuring Wald z-tests and Wald z-tests With Weights

A. X42.Violence in defence of Islam (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X43.OffendereIslam (duty to punish offenders)
 X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology)
 X31.CulturaItaliana (Identity crisis)
 X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties)
 X20.LuogoCulto, (Worship place)
 X6.RomaLombardia, (Geography)
 X30.Frustraz (Frustration)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	11.36851287	3.65252949	41.68889468
X43.OffendereIslam2	0.42304236	0.14296063	1.21052642
X43.OffendereIslam3	0.06637462	0.01993415	0.19665357
X43.OffendereIslam4	0.02068083	0.00588270	0.06247186
X46.GovIslamico2	0.45959016	0.13462361	1.54126384
X46.GovIslamico3	0.37103392	0.11547517	1.14870010
X46.GovIslamico4	0.14316060	0.04535940	0.42926210
X31.CulturaItaliana2	1.53162307	0.53919669	4.42817604
X31.CulturaItaliana3	0.69989741	0.21567650	2.24314014
X31.CulturaItaliana4	1.40178766	0.43567852	4.61084304
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2	0.50617065	0.14172372	1.74252794
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3	0.86395245	0.26571761	2.82815504
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4	0.60373189	0.13576554	2.68437139
X20.LuogoCulto2	0.73118275	0.23076337	2.25798616
X20.LuogoCulto3	2.15770780	0.72844810	6.61391016
X20.LuogoCulto4	0.62011352	0.14169287	2.57456559
X6.RomaLombardia1	2.04692988	0.91557460	4.69819753
X30.Frustraz2	0.39759690	0.13543302	1.13469225
X30.Frustraz3	0.51319326	0.15174045	1.67117989
X30.Frustraz4	0.34687210	0.09016683	1.25102930

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X43.Offend Islam:

chi2	df	P
5.067466e+01	3.000000e+00	5.738565e-11

Wald z-test for X46.IslamicGov:

chi2	df	P
11.996426725	3.000000000	0.007395411

Wald z-test for X31.Identitycrisis:

chi2	df	P
2.1186979	3.0000000	0.5481393

Wald z-test for X17.SocialDiff:

chi2	df	P
1.5209500	3.0000000	0.6774436

Wald z-test for X20.Worshipplace:

chi2	df	P
4.156896	3.000000	0.245013

Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia:

chi2	df	P
2.98479060	1.00000000	0.08405016

Wald z-test for X30.Frustration:

chi2	df	P
3.8139483	3.0000000	0.2822679

Weighted Wald tests

For X43.OffendereIslam:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 11.0, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.00093 (significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 3.8, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.052 (marginal at best)

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 0.13, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.71 (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 3.3, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.068 (not significant)

X42.Violence in defence of Islam (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology)
 X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity crisis)
 X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties)
 X20.LuogoCulto, (Worship place)
 X6.RomaLombardia, (Geography)
 X30.Frustraz (Frustration)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	3.32703959	1.41051732	8.3773834
X46.GovIslamico2	0.67895197	0.25301523	1.8072842
X46.GovIslamico3	0.36165284	0.14534932	0.8760035
X46.GovIslamico4	0.08488132	0.03387033	0.2009565
X31.CulturaItaliana2	1.18852552	0.50955444	2.7948664
X31.CulturaItaliana3	0.58960303	0.21831509	1.5496369
X31.CulturaItaliana4	0.96907850	0.36851195	2.5433411
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2	0.53775163	0.19526118	1.4507841
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3	0.53551676	0.20579935	1.3818902
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4	0.23385275	0.07223001	0.7283094
X20.LuogoCulto2	1.08851423	0.42721051	2.7239976
X20.LuogoCulto3	1.61329201	0.65430360	4.0329975
X20.LuogoCulto4	0.69297583	0.21739785	2.0646259
X6.RomaLombardia1	2.02185218	1.06556659	3.8971823
X30.Frustraz2	0.40231872	0.17194763	0.9191628
X30.Frustraz3	0.40018718	0.14723029	1.0493058

X30.Frustraz4 0.31040069 0.10669903 0.8604069

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico:

chi2	df	P
3.312096e+01	3.000000e+00	3.036898e-07

Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana:

chi2	df	P
2.0314478	3.0000000	0.5659053

Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro:

chi2	df	P
6.25468488	3.00000000	0.09985574

Wald z-test for X20.LuogoCulto:

chi2	df	P
2.3567300	3.0000000	0.5017401

Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia:

chi2	df	P
4.56344733	1.00000000	0.03266127

Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz:

chi2	df	P
7.04461371	3.00000000	0.07048929

Weighted Wald tests

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 1.7, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.2 (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 11.2, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.00083 (significant)

Roma-Lombardia

Chi-squared test:

X2 = 0.66, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.42

B. X43.Duty to punish offenders (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X46.GovIslamico (Ideology)
 X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity Crisis)
 X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties)
 X20.LuogoCulto, (Worship place)
 X6.RomaLombardia, (Geography)
 X30.Frustraz (Frustration)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	3.1246520	1.37184620	7.5244809
X46.GovIslamico2	1.5486411	0.58731811	4.1701231
X46.GovIslamico3	0.5192094	0.21309798	1.2471215
X46.GovIslamico4	0.2001622	0.08934701	0.4373848
X31.CulturaItaliana2	0.8519254	0.37901897	1.9088805
X31.CulturaItaliana3	0.9855822	0.42244943	2.3119307
X31.CulturaItaliana4	0.5955441	0.24080513	1.4455770
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2	0.7955563	0.30256801	2.0718971
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3	0.3507480	0.13725023	0.8704324
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4	0.1610160	0.05205609	0.4722150
X20.LuogoCulto2	1.8390299	0.80163920	4.2799606
X20.LuogoCulto3	0.7634586	0.31328372	1.8413061
X20.LuogoCulto4	0.9597614	0.35838382	2.5490288
X6.RomaLombardia1	1.6795257	0.91868246	3.0895186
X30.Frustraz2	0.6575902	0.28939406	1.4834819
X30.Frustraz3	0.5758888	0.23234483	1.4087797
X30.Frustraz4	0.5236007	0.19931299	1.3528449

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico:

chi2	df	P
2.552499e+01	3.000000e+00	1.199097e-05

Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana:

chi2	df	P
1.5404591	3.0000000	0.6729644

Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro:

chi2	df	P
13.949620323	3.000000000	0.002974536

Wald z-test for X20.LuogoCulto:

chi2	df	P
3.7791667	3.0000000	0.2863187

Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia:

chi2	df	P
2.82585062	1.00000000	0.09275774

Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz:

chi2	df	P
2.2303228	3.0000000	0.5260005

Weighted Wald tests

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 5.1$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.024$ (marginal to somewhat significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 5.9$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.015$ (rather significant)

For scuola lavoro

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 3.3$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.068$ (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 0.2$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.66$ (not significant)

C.X44.AlQaeda (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X43.OffendereIslam (Duty to punish offenders)
 X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology)
 X19.BuonaCasa, (Finding a good house)
 X39.Contatti, (Networks)
 X30.Frustraz, (Frustration)
 X22.IgnoranzaPreg, (Ignorance and prejudice)
 X18.BuonLavoro, (Economic disparity)
 X6.RomaLombardia (Geography)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	8.555109e+00	1.849821e+00	6.531640e+01
X43.OffendereIslam2	1.850340e-01	2.799883e-02	9.968500e-01
X43.OffendereIslam3	1.284143e-01	1.699501e-02	6.726612e-01
X43.OffendereIslam4	4.135029e-10	1.635385e-215	1.385156e+31
X46.GovIslamico2	2.322670e-01	4.122272e-02	1.120732e+00
X46.GovIslamico3	2.046602e-01	2.893558e-02	1.143135e+00
X46.GovIslamico4	1.242936e-02	4.945570e-04	1.116328e-01
X19.BuonaCasa2	2.887125e+00	4.964415e-01	2.146503e+01
X19.BuonaCasa3	9.392138e-01	1.031606e-01	8.406191e+00
X19.BuonaCasa4	4.601987e-01	2.445511e-02	5.643919e+00
X39.Contatti2	1.016530e-01	1.628767e-02	4.963481e-01
X39.Contatti3	1.107974e-01	8.640228e-03	1.021675e+00
X39.Contatti4	9.281520e-01	9.353578e-02	8.506972e+00
X30.Frustraz2	2.006826e-01	3.345993e-02	9.576375e-01
X30.Frustraz3	1.544205e-01	5.754089e-03	1.548943e+00
X30.Frustraz4	8.285111e-02	4.950913e-03	8.787066e-01
X22.IgnoranzaPreg2	4.400670e-01	8.166636e-02	2.143356e+00
X22.IgnoranzaPreg3	4.557348e-01	4.056189e-02	4.228453e+00
X22.IgnoranzaPreg4	4.152113e-08	NA	2.740015e+111
X18.BuonLavoro2	5.243761e-01	5.793911e-02	3.819335e+00
X18.BuonLavoro3	3.403053e+00	5.020383e-01	2.479059e+01
X18.BuonLavoro4	4.672583e+00	4.083925e-01	7.310323e+01
X6.RomaLombardia1	5.847061e+00	1.257852e+00	3.660021e+01

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X43.OffendereIslam:

chi2	df	P
6.1502896	3.0000000	0.1045229

Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico:

chi2	df	P
12.240579831	3.000000000	0.006602872

Wald z-test for X19.BuonaCasa:

chi2	df	P
2.5888980	3.0000000	0.4594392

Wald z-test for X39.Contatti:

chi2	df	P
8.34093554	3.00000000	0.03946684

Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz:

chi2	df	P
5.4367490	3.0000000	0.1424711

Wald z-test for X22.IgnoranzaPreg:

chi2	df	P
1.0724270	3.0000000	0.7837341

Wald z-test for X18.BuonLavoro:

chi2	df	P
0.3782795	1.0000000	0.5385255

Weighted Wald tests

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 0.017, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.9 (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 4.4, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.037 (marginal)

For X39.Contatti:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 1.0, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.31 (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 0.37, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.54 (not significant)

X44.AlQaeda (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X46.GovIslamico (Ideology)
 X19.BuonaCasa, (Finding a good house)
 X39.Contatti, (Networks)
 X30.Frustraz, (Frustration)
 X22.IgnoranzaPreg, (Ignorance and prejudice)
 X18.BuonLavoro, (Economic disparity)
 X6.RomaLombardia (Geography)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	2.656021e+00	8.798580e-01	8.946803e+00
X46.GovIslamico2	2.640945e-01	6.683745e-02	9.221160e-01
X46.GovIslamico3	1.406594e-01	2.835250e-02	5.603626e-01
X46.GovIslamico4	1.003481e-02	5.103011e-04	5.996886e-02
X19.BuonaCasa2	1.024624e+00	2.457611e-01	4.534599e+00
X19.BuonaCasa3	4.516833e-01	6.350310e-02	2.891592e+00
X19.BuonaCasa4	1.731739e-01	1.123145e-02	1.799339e+00
X39.Contatti2	3.548811e-01	9.729511e-02	1.266115e+00
X39.Contatti3	4.634595e-01	5.265688e-02	2.891990e+00
X39.Contatti4	7.718010e-01	1.061390e-01	5.156222e+00
X30.Frustraz2	2.701950e-01	7.360420e-02	9.166534e-01
X30.Frustraz3	5.755205e-02	2.341848e-03	4.604385e-01
X30.Frustraz4	8.723572e-02	8.512973e-03	5.328003e-01
X22.IgnoranzaPreg2	7.827006e-01	1.947220e-01	2.980689e+00
X22.IgnoranzaPreg3	7.172705e-01	9.654279e-02	4.696710e+00
X22.IgnoranzaPreg4	2.021463e-06	2.133281e-190	2.615707e+25
X18.BuonLavoro2	5.204428e-01	7.874645e-02	2.902252e+00
X18.BuonLavoro3	1.582626e+00	3.112651e-01	8.548956e+00
X18.BuonLavoro4	6.113664e+00	6.347655e-01	7.582651e+01
X6.RomaLombardia1	3.084023e+00	9.678756e-01	1.113942e+01

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico:

chi2	df	P
2.048220e+01	3.000000e+00	1.348362e-04

Wald z-test for X19.BuonaCasa:

chi2	df	P
2.2883063	3.0000000	0.5147648

Wald z-test for X39.Contatti:

chi2	df	P
2.7797250	3.0000000	0.4268484

Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz:

chi2	df	P
9.2214317	3.0000000	0.0264872

Wald z-test for X22.IgnoranzaPreg:

chi2	df	P
0.1829387	3.0000000	0.9802954

Wald z-test for X18.BuonLavoro:

chi2	df	P
4.0371747	3.0000000	0.2574778

Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia:

chi2	df	P
3.35352982	1.00000000	0.06706107

Weighted Wald Tests

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 0.6$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.44$ (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 5.0$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.026$ (marginal at best)

For X30.Frustraz:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 1.6$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.21$ (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 0.09$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.76$ (not significant)

D. x45.ISIS (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X43.OffendereIslam, (Duty to punish offenders)
 X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology)
 X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity crisis)
 X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties)
 X2.Sesso, (Gender)
 X30.Frustraz (Frustration)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	4.92292438	1.633141718	16.9701643
X43.OffendereIslam2	0.21179781	0.052117813	0.7620656
X43.OffendereIslam3	0.08383149	0.017430626	0.3255673
X43.OffendereIslam4	0.06176335	0.014293902	0.2217906
X46.GovIslamico2	1.17663427	0.359544736	3.9855788
X46.GovIslamico3	0.20400371	0.048045042	0.7521102
X46.GovIslamico4	0.05201329	0.009961005	0.2068575
X31.CulturaItaliana2	0.13644954	0.028836418	0.5366416
X31.CulturaItaliana3	1.28645613	0.316704603	5.1798712
X31.CulturaItaliana4	0.89212650	0.203657423	3.8292386
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2	2.74233136	0.648224901	12.3679438
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3	2.01261592	0.489262870	8.6997461
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4	1.69029318	0.332191274	8.7900065
X2.Sesso2	0.71362358	0.206578869	2.2457306
X30.Frustraz2	0.32684591	0.098478805	1.0209224
X30.Frustraz3	0.03975475	0.001872772	0.2862332
X30.Frustraz4	0.37024221	0.077932009	1.5991803

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X43.OffendereIslam:

chi2	df	P
2.079509e+01	3.000000e+00	1.161117e-04

Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico:

chi2	df	P
21.780619748	3.000000000	0.000072459

Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana:

chi2	df	P
8.92923738	3.00000000	0.03024666

Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro:

chi2	df	P
1.9542320	3.00000000	0.5819602

Wald z-test for X2.Sesso:

chi2	df	P
0.3153972	1.00000000	0.5743870

Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz:

chi2	df	P
8.85197143	3.00000000	0.03132515

Weighted Wald tests

For X43.OffendereIslam:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 1.2, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.27 (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 0.14, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.7 (not significant)

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 6.4, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.012 (somewhat significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 2.6, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.11 (not significant)

For X31.CulturaItaliana:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 6.8, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.0089 (significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 0.2, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.65 (not significant)

For X30.Frustraz:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 3.3, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.069 (marginal at best)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 3.3, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.068 (marginal at best)

X45.ISIS (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs.

X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology)
 X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity crisis)
 X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties)
 X2.Sesso, (Gender)
 X30.Frustraz (Frustration)

Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals:

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	2.16813444	0.864193621	5.6932281
X46.GovIslamico2	1.18467724	0.425705346	3.3420890
X46.GovIslamico3	0.17616975	0.049626229	0.5411438
X46.GovIslamico4	0.03292801	0.007085331	0.1108375
X31.CulturaItaliana2	0.22500147	0.065285175	0.6859077
X31.CulturaItaliana3	0.65829485	0.190459656	2.1483344
X31.CulturaItaliana4	0.73579816	0.210585689	2.4895041
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2	1.81254669	0.527538981	6.4664483
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3	1.13800320	0.343235814	3.8484990
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4	0.84415780	0.218221546	3.2351674
X2.Sesso2	0.61137670	0.196286417	1.7049168
X30.Frustraz2	0.37258889	0.128162622	1.0273117
X30.Frustraz3	0.08144493	0.011023686	0.3763936
X30.Frustraz4	0.28270401	0.072175544	1.0152461

Wald tests

Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico:

chi2	df	P
3.339413e+01	3.000000e+00	2.659490e-07

Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana:

chi2	df	P
6.43000166	3.00000000	0.09246432

Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro:

chi2	df	P
1.5686096	3.0000000	0.6665281

Wald z-test for X2.Sesso:

chi2	df	P
0.8137632	1.0000000	0.3670100

Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz:

chi2	df	P
9.7433919	3.0000000	0.0208782

Weighted Wald Tests

For X46.GovIslamico:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 9.0, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.0027 (significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:

X2 = 4.7, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.03 (marginal at best)

For X30.Frustraz:

"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 3.2$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.073$ (not significant)

"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test:
 $X^2 = 2.0$, $df = 1$, $P(> X^2) = 0.16$ (not significant)

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